This is the second of two posts (Part 1 is
here) on a new report by Austria's has an official center founded by the current People's Party/Green (ÖVP/Grüne) government under Chancellor Sabastian (Basti) Kurz (ÖVP) called the Dokumentationsstelle Politischer Islam (DPI: Documentation Office on Political Islam).
The study is called,
Der Politische Islam als Gegenstand wissenschaftlicher Auseinandersetzungen und am Beispiel der Muslimbruderschaft (
Political Islam as the subject of academic debates ising the example of the Muslim Brotherhood), with authors Mouhanad Khorchide of the DPI and Lorenzo Vidino as attributed authors. Vidino is the Director of the Program on Extremism at George Washington University. (
Dokumentationsstelle legte Studie zu Muslimbruderschaft vor Standard 23.12.2020)
My own first look at the 54-page report was not encouraging. Early in the report, they cite the following source on the general concept of "political Islam": "Vgl. John L. Esposito, Emad El-Din Shahin. (2013), „Introduction”, in J. Esposito, S. Emad El-Din (Hrsg.),
The Oxford Handbook of Islam and Politics, Oxford, Oxford University Press."
I thought, okay, this is interesting, because Esposito is one of the leading Western scholars on Islam. Between the holidays and the COVID lockdown, I don't have access at the moment to a dead-tree version of that book. But I do have access to the online version, which is edited by Esposito and Shahin. But it, uh, doesn't have an "Introduction." The DCI reports cites it specifically again, so I'll assume for now it is in the print edition.
But Esposito did do a book with John Voll on
Islam and Democracy (1996) in which they note when the notion of "political Islam" in its current general meaning took hold in the political vocabulary of the West:
In the minds of many, Iran's Islamic revolution of 1978-79 represents the quintessential example of political Islam, "Islamic fundamentalism." The revolution encompassed many of the issues associated with contemporary Islamic revivalism - issues of faith, culture, power, and politics. Emphasis on identity, cultural authenticity, political participation, and social justice was accompanied by a rejection of Westernization, government authoritarianism, corruption, and maldistribution of wealth. Khomeini's Iran became the paradigm and source of fears of revolutionary or radical Islam, its export and threat to governments in the Muslim world and in the West. [my emphasis]
The Oxford
Handbook also includes an essay by Voll on "Political Islam and the State," which also recognizes the Iranian Revolution of 1979 as the "first major victory" of what he calls "the rise of political opposition articulated in Islamic terms." Voll identifies four different phases in the discussion in the Islamic world about religion and state. The most recent one he sees as beginning around 2000: "The fourth phase began by the end of the century as many began to speak about the 'failure of Political Islam.' New types of movements and organizations reflecting the processes of globalization and electronic communication became increasingly important."
In other words, he stresses a dynamic process involving nationalism and postcolonial governance and development which continues to evolve over the decades. It's a useful caution about attempts to define Political Islam as a definite and static phenomenon. Of his most recent fourth phase:
Turkey provides possibly the major example of how contemporary political developments have changed the debates about religion and state by setting limits on established secularism, as in the political battle over whether or not women could wear headscarves in government buildings. In addition, although many still identify secularism with atheism, an Islamic secularism is emerging with people such as Abdullahi an-Na‘im, who states, “In order to be a Muslim by conviction and free choice...I need a secular state.” [my emphasis]
In other words, understanding actual "political Islam" is a matter of understanding what it is and how it functions in particular national and international contexts and how it changes over time. There is no timeless, immutable version of it. Even on the issue of headscarves, which in Austria is used in particular to stigmatize Muslim women and girls.
By page 9 of its report, the DCI gives its definition of political Islam, which is pretty obviously tailored to Chancellor Kurz' very vague definitions that could basically be applied to any political idea articulated by a Muslim:
Gerade in Europa werden wir heute mit einem weiteren Phänomen konfrontiert, das zwar nicht die Übernahme des Staates zur Errichtung eines islamischen Staates als (primäres) Ziel hat, aber anstrebt, die Gesellschaft bzw. Teile der Gesellschaft nach bestimmten religiösen Vorstellungen, die im Widerspruch zu den Grundsätzen des demokratischen Rechtsstaates, den Menschenrechten sowie den Grundlagen einer freien Gesellschaft stehen, umzustrukturieren, aber auch staatliche Einrichtungen entsprechend diesen Vorstellungen zu beeinflussen bzw. umzugestalten, weshalb man auch hierbei vom Politischen Islam spricht. Die Schwäche einer Definition des Politischen Islams, die sich nur auf die Errichtung eines islamischen Staates bzw. einer islamischen Gesellschaft konzentriert, besteht darin, dass sie solche aktuellen Phänomene nicht erfasst.
[In Europe in particular, we are confronted today with another phenomenon which, although not aimed at taking over the state in order to establish an Islamic state as a (primary) goal, seeks to restructure society or parts of society according to certain religious ideas, which are contrary to the principles of the democratic rule of law, human rights and the foundations of a free society, but also to influence or reshape state institutions of the state in accordance with these ideas, which is why we are speaking of political Islam here, too. The weakness of a definition of political Islam that focuses only on the establishment of an Islamic state or Islamic society is that it does not capture such current phenomena.} (my translation and emphasis)
After establishing a definition that can be applied to any Muslim voicing an opinion on Austrian politics, the report begins on the following page to present four bullet-points to use as alibis against just thst criticism. Which I would summarize this way:
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We're not against Muslims participating in politics. really not, seriously, trust us.
- Not every kind of political engagement that is "religiously motivated" is bad. As long as it can be considered as similar to the "Christian social ethic," which of course is not defined. It's just that all these Muslims and Jews or Hindus or whatever understand that the Christian social ethic as determined by Basti's Christian-Democratic ÖVP is the standard that matters! The report is pretty transparent that this point is meant as a talking point when people call out what Basti and his party obvious mean here: "Diese Präzisierung ist sehr wichtig, um dem Vorwurf entgegenzuwirken, mit dem Vorgehen gegen den Politischen Islam wolle man jede Form der politischen Partizipation von MuslimInnen unterbinden." ("This clarification is very important in order to counteract the accusation that the action against political Islam is intended to prevent any form of political participation by Muslims.")
-
So it's not about the individual Muslim's motivation, you see, it's about "the concept of values and norms" ("die Werte- und Normenvorstellungen") that are involved which - don't forget! - are established by the Political Christianity of Basti and his Christian-Democratic Party and his favorite rightwing Catholic advisers within it. As long as the exotic and scary Muslim Others stick to that, we won't criticize them. At least not too much, as measured by our Political Christian standards.
- And these scary, strange, Muslims have to also remember that they can't exert any "social or institutional pressure" of any kind on anyone because that would violate the "individual right of self-determination". So if one of these here mosques try to define what a legitimate marriage in their religion is ... oh, wait, the Christian churches can do that, too, but mosques, synagogues - those are pretty suspect. But if some Muslim religious community decides to ostracize a woman who gets an abortion or someone who facilitates it, that's DEFINITELY verboten - Wait, what's that you say? The Catholic Church can excommunicate someone for those things, which also means they're going to Hail? Well, that's different because, you know, "European values." And stuff.
And, well, it goes downhill from there. We cain't have no Sharia PO-lice in Austria, nuh-uh! (I've never heard of Sharia PO-lice in Austria. The Catholic Church has canon law. And they can legally compel you to pay your church tax. Yes, Austrian has one. But at least since the 1930s, I haven't heard about any prowling Catholic goons squads busting down people's doors, either.)
We cain't have no compulsion to religious practice, which in any case is already illegal in Austria and for which there is legal and practical recourse for anyone subjected to it in an abusive family relationship. Although Basti's and his
Christian-Democratic Party aren't so hot on funding actual social programs designed to help anyone in such a situation.
My favorite part of the report is where a kind of political Islam that cannot be allowed is defined as one that instrumentalizes Islam "to actively polarize society". Jesus Christ! - Basti's Politi8cal Christinaity allows me to use that as an exclamation, right? - has been using Islam to polarize society is a central part of Basti's personal program of Political Christianity since 2015. This is so screaming dumb, I'm surprised that Basti's obsession with Message Control let this get out.
The rest of the report is largely painting a vague and scary picture of the Muslim Brotherhood in Europe. It follows the familiar patterns of low-grade Cold War propaganda descriptions of the World Communist Conspiracy: small, internatonally-networked secret groups that are exceptionally good at concealing their identifies and goals, are intensely trained and practice rigid discipline, and are inevitably fixed on an unchanging, nefarious goal, which must be relentlessly combated in all its forms or they will EAT.US.ALL!!!
The introduction to this section (pp. 18-20) is written by Lorenzo Vidino, a scholar who has done serious work on the Muslim Brotherhood. This does necessarily means that he is endorsing the full text on the Muslim Brotherhood in the report. He does argue that the Muslim Brotherhood in general holds "numerous positions on women's rights, homosexuality, religious freedom and anti-Semitism [that] are incompatible with the fundamental values of European societies." I wouldn't argue with that broad conclusion. But I'm cautious about the contexts in in which concepts like European values or "fundamental values of European societies" are invoked. Because among ethnonationalists, xenophobia and Islamophobia
are fundamental European values. (I would argue that the DCI report even stigmatizes the concept of "Islamophobia.")
I'm reacting here to this December text with an eye to how it's likely to be perceived by journalists, political actors, and interested members of the public in Austria and elsewhere in the EU. And the report does fit fairly obviously into a particular kind of political narrative.
It's a required part of this genre to pepper the narrative with Arab words and names that will sound exotic to conservative Europeans and Americans: (
al-maslaha al-ʿamma,
bayʿa,
muršid !āmm, Rashid al-Ghanushi,
shumūliyya,
šūrā, Yusuf al-Qaradawi. And - of course! -
šarīʿa (Sharia-aaaa!!)
And as usual in such rightwing narratives, a lot of projection is involved. The report warns that in the vaguely defined positions of the Muslim Brotherhood - or is it "political Islam" generally? - "in the end, there is no place for pluralism; Islam is misinterpreted as clearly superior and in the end victorious in this clash of civilizations." Since he's going for a highbrow vibe, he tosses in the alibi qualification that "in the European Muslim Brotherhood [this] narrative [is] very widespread but not universal."
As noted in Part 1, no party in Austria of any political significance advocates even implicitly positions that fit this description.
Despite its superficial scholarly pretensions, This report is a political polemic seemingly tailored to fit the most primitive Islamophobic narratives promoted by the far right, although framed in the somewhat more respectable-rounding terms preferred by Basti and his
Christian-Democratic ÖVP and the brand of Political Christianity he favors.
The conservatives and far-right in Austria use "integration" as a benign-sounding word for normal integration of immigrants into the society in which they live. They typically accuse Muslims of having a "parallel societies," which is somehow ominously different that the parallel society of, say, the Catholic Church or the ÖVP and its Political Christianity. Americans will recognize that xenophobic tropes involved that Those people (Jews, Latino immigrants, African-Americans) "prefer to stick to themselves," as people commonly say. Livino claims, "The Brotherhood [and implicitly all Austrian "political Islam"] must perform a balancing act between the necessary degree of political and social integration to achieve its goals and that of protecting its own cultural identity."
You have to watch these tricky Muslims, you see, because even when they come from several generations of native Austrians and appear to be "integrated," you can't really count on them being one of Us. He warns darkly, "Integration, to the extent that the Brotherhood pushes it, is therefore not the product of an emotional attachment to the European homeland, but an instrument for enforcing its own ideas."
Propaganda narratives like this one, even when phrased in highbrow, pseudo-academic language as the DCI report is, provide a clean-shaven version of narratives that are used for xenophobic, Islamophobic, and various unsavory related themes. But they also are a real problem for a serious approach to dealing with Muslim terrorism, which does exist and was very much on display in Paris and Vienna this year. But polarizing non-Muslims against Islam and against Muslims generally not only discourages the kind of specific cooperation with authorities that might prevent specific terrorist incidents. It also ignores the role that well-informed Muslims themselves can and do play in de-radicalization of young people attracted to jihadist groups. And crudely stereotypical presentations of what "political Islam" involves get in the way of people developing reality-based understanding of Muslim radicalization involving jihadist groups like the Islamic State. Plus it promotes religious illiteracy and stigmatizes Muslims generally.
Readers of the report will also get very little actual understanding of what the Muslim Brotherhood is. The section on the Brotherhood in Austria is mostly a list of people with non-stereotypical names for Austria who are mentioned in connection with the group, in what appears to be mainly a thinly-documented guilt-by-association style. Organizational and personal connections can be important in understanding a person's politics, of course. But the DCI report doesn't draw those connections very clearly.
One indicator of who this report serves comes from an online article from the
ZurZeit website, closely associated with the hard-right FPÖ. In a December 23 article called "'Muslimbruderschaft in Österreich als 'wichtiger Akteur des politischen Islams'“ (that I'm not going to link here because the site is obnoxious), the DCI report is quoted and praised in a solely positive light. Includeing tossing in the old-fashioned term "Mohammedaner" (Mohammedans) to describe Muslims. It also quotes a polemical comment from DCI director Lisa Fellhofer about the report in the first sentence.
The key point for the DCI's narrative is stated in the report's first paragraph, written by Mouhanad Khorchide, in which "political Islam" is
defined as being "in contradiction to the principles of the democratic rule of law and human rights". DCI Director Fellhofer - who unlike Khorchide and Vidino has no real scholarly credentials as a specialist in the field of Islamist movements - stresses the point in an interview, "We are looking at a segment [of Islam], that of political Islam, whose actors work against democracy and human rights." (
"Wir wollen niemanden diskriminieren!" Die Zeit 02.11.2020)
In practice, it's a circular definition. Since political Islam is defined as against democracy and human rights, any manifestation of political action by Muslim groups can be stigmatized as being "political Islam" and therefore opposed to the democratic order in Austria. Even a group of women identifying as Muslim who are taking a stand
for women's rights, for instance.
Related:
Zweifel an Objektivität der Dokumentationstelle Politiische Islam Vienna.at/APA 25.12.2020
Nina Goldmann,
„Politischer Islam“ und andere Begriffe ORF 24.11.2020 (Rüdiger Lohlker interviewed),
DPI press release on publication of the study
[04/04/2021: Minor corrections have been made to this post.]
