Reality-check on immigration/refugee issues in the EU from Judith Kohlenberger

Judith Kohlenberger is an immigration expert at the Institute for Social Policy at the Wirtschaftsuniversität of Vienna. I’m providing a translation here of something she recently posted on X/[Twitter] which addresses some common themes used by EU xenophobes: (1)

How much the reality of migration is now practically irrelevant to (almost) all sides is shown, among other things, by the fact that I have *not ever* advocated open borders in a *single interview* and yet I am held out and defamed as an "open-borders activist"

In my new book, I even present arguments against open borders. LOL.

The assessment that Europe's people have enough of "uncontrolled mass migration" and want to teach the politicians responsible for it a lesson may describe the motives of some voters, but it does not stand up to empirical examination.

That encourages a longing for order and security, for demarcation of what is ours and defensiveness against the Others. The “strong men” (and women) of the rightwing parties answer this longing in the form of fortress fantasies, thereby enflaming the feeling of the outside threat.

P.S. Whoever claims that “uncontrolled mass migration” is taking place in Austria thereby also negates the daily work of the armed forces and border police in registering and identifying the arrivals and denies the functioning of the rule of law.

Oh, yeah, that “rule of law” thing. That’s kind of important in the “democracy vs. autocracy” struggle in which the West is supposedly representing the democracy side.

The X/Twitter display of her thread seems to be a bit quirky. But as it appear on my feed, In response to a question about the thoroughly misguided response for center-left and (especially) center-right parties to try to take votes from the far right by pandering to xenophobic attitudes and claims, she writes:

For years, centrist parties, including those that are in government in their countries, have been pursuing a restrictive course on [im]migration and asylum. For a long time now, there has been a discussion across the political spectrum about isolation, deterrence, and outsourcing [to other countries] as a patent remedy.

Just a few years ago, no centrist party would have seriously considered the outsourcing of refugees to Rwanda [as Britain is now trying to do]. Such plans seemed too bizarre at the time.

"Uncontrolled immigration" to Europe does not take place, on the contrary:

For years, there have been complete controls at numerous Schengen [treaty country] borders, including between Austria and Germany. In 2018, there were six times as many border walls worldwide as during the Cold War. Securitization and fortification of the EU's external and internal borders have increased sharply. [The Schengen treaty is one that defines outer borders for immigration to Europe; the first country of entry is responsible for verifying the entrant’s immigration status. In theory, countries like Germany and Austria that are completely surrounded by other Schengen countries shouldn’t have to check most entrants, though as she notes, some countries like Germany and Austria have done it on a temporary basis.]

Border “pushbacks” that violate international law have become an accepted form of border security. Kidnapping, slavery and sexual exploitation are part of everyday life on the periphery of Europe, as are hunts [for humans] with paramilitary troops and attack dogs.

People on the run [refugees], NGOs and sea rescuers are systematically criminalized. All this has accustomed the European population to human rights violations that remain without consequences, to the brutalization and dehumanization of those who are "foreign".

The more militantly borders are defended in order to protect the supposed order within them from the "foreign", the more it is threatened: chaos, violence and open breaches of the law, the feeling of powerlessness and resignation radiate into the interior.

FRANCE 24 English recently produced this four-minute report on the EU’s recently-adopted restrictions of receiving refugees: (2)

It's not a great report. It airs the common anti-immigrant slogans: coming from supposedly ordinary voters, of course, sort of a German version of the New York Times visits to small-town diners to talk to elderly white Republicans.

Unfortunately, it does not explain why those complaints are mostly bogus. To get that, you have to go to people like Judith Kohlenberger.

Notes:

(1) 06/10/2024. https://x.com/J_Kohlenberger/status/1800077629607031135 (Accessed: 2024-12-06).

(2) Germany introduces new measures to make country less attractive to migrants. FRANCE 24 English 06/14/2024. <https://youtu.be/LAHAy3Bg6Pw?si=OjO1-lgP2rcTvs19> (Accessed: 2024-17-06).

German mainstream parties imitating the far right on refugee issues

A large part of the German political class seems to have come down with the chronic affliction of the US Democratic Party, trying fecklessly to imitate Republican positions instead of fighting for their own side when it comes to refugee and other immigration issues

They all need to snap out of it.

Full post: https://brucemillerca.substack.com/p/german-mainstream-parties-imitating

The rightwingers are ready to demagogue about a new refugee "crisis" in Europe

Anti-refugee rhetoric is becoming more obvious in EU politics now. I suppose we could say the issue is always on a slow boil, at least for the past decade or so. But now the winter is coming, there are four million or more Ukrainian refugees in EU countries, with many more likely to come in the following months. Russian attacks on civilian facilities seem to have the generation of many more refugees as its goal.

The current Austrian weekly Profil headlines, "A wave of refugees like 2015? What is different now":

Dark, mysterious refugees, it seems, who would prefer that we not see their faces as they stand in the shadows. The cover does identify them as (l.to r.) Ukrainian, Indian, and Russian. A Russian named Vlad.

It's worth noting that it's stock rhetoric for xenophobes to use natural metaphors to describe refugees fleeing war and repression and torture. Like "wave" and "flood." Profil is generally more of a center-left publication.

The two great weaknesses of the EU are the flawed construction of the euro currency and their (on the whole) dysfunctional approach to refugee issues. The European Central Bank (ECB) was able to ease the euro crisis of 2015 with a muddling-through solution in which the European governments decided not no make a big stink about the fact that its bond-buying program wasn't exactly part of the official function of the ECB.

The 2015-16 influx of refugees, which is now universally remembered as a "crisis," involved less than half the number of refugees into the EU as the Russia-Ukraine War has already produced in 2022. The EU also came up with a muddling-through solution to the 2015-6 crisis by a treaty with Turkey, in which Turkey agreed to house 3-4 million refugees in exchange for EU payments to pay for their support. The treaty was the brainchild of immigration expert Gerald Knaus, who worked close with Angela Merkel's government in negotiating it.

Both crises coincided in time. And the financial crisis, particularly the hostile, nationalistic (even ethono-nationalist) rhetoric against the so-caled PIGS countries (Portugal, Ireland, Greece, Spain) - which had very real and very ugly consequences in the brutal economic measures taken against Greece in particular - set the stage for nationalistic reactions to the refugee "crisis" of 2015-16. The political poison has yet to be cleaned out of that well.

Both solutions also have stayed provisional. The structural problems of the euro, such as the need for a common budget for the eurozone and collective debt instrucments for the eurozone - are still there. But so far, the muddling-through of the ECB has been good enough. Which could change very quickly in a new financial crisis.

The EU-Turkey treaty was renewed in 2021. The fact that it continued to function generally well makes it a success story, on the whole. So far. (Daniele Albanese, The Renewal of the EU-Turkey Migration Deal ISPI 05/27/2021) But it still remains a kind of interim agreement. And it means that Turkey can use the threat of sending hundreds of thousands, even millions, of refugees to the EU to pressure European countries. The number of Syrian and other refugees coming from Turkey in 2022 via the "Balkan route" has notably increased, thanks in part to the pro-Russian regime in Serbia generously providing tourist visas to such refugees. (Suzanne Lynch and Jacopo Barigazzi, EU fumes that Serbia is fanning new migrant route Politico EU 10/14/2022)

However, Knaus himself pointed out on Sunday:

Today, Turkey is not safe for returnees from 🇬🇷.

🇪🇺🇬🇷 & anyone who cares about refugee rights have a massive interest to see this change.

1. because there are millions of refugees in 🇹🇷.

2. because otherwise 🇬🇷 pushbacks are almost certain to continue, with tacit 🇪🇺 support. https://t.co/iyYOYlLJj4

— Gerald Knaus (@rumeliobserver) October 16, 2022

The international laws on refugees and asylum currently in effect are to a large extent the product of the experience of Europe after the Second World War, when massive displacements of populations took place. "Displacement" is almost a euphemism to describe what actually happened. There were also later  examples of genuine refugee crises, not least of them in the aftermath of the partition of Britain's Indian colony into India and Pakistan. William Dalrymple describes it this way, "By 1948, as the great migration drew to a close, more than fifteen million people had been uprooted, and between one and two million were dead." (The Great Divide: The violent legacy of Indian Partition New Yorker 06/22/2015)

The EU's handling of refugee issues is also a danger to the rule of law in the EU itself. Poland and Hungary in particular have presented various problems in that regard in the last decade. But handling of refugees and asylum claims is definitely one of them. It's also clear that Vladimir Putin's government is very aware that EU political leaders have found xenophobic agitation a tough political challenge. And they clearly want to exacerbate those problems with the Ukrainian refugees.

Here it's worth recalling Belarus' cynical use of refugees against Poland and the EU in 2021. The immediate occasion was limited EU sanctions against Belarus because of an air piracy incident by Alexander Lukashenko's government. But in retrospect, it seems obvious that this was also a test of how the EU might react in the face of a far more massive inflow of Ukrainian refugees. It may be possible to make a non-xenophobic argument that the EU handled this well. But I can't imagine what that would be.

I blogged about it last year, e.g.: EU trembles before "hybrid operations" (i.e., a few thousand refugees) from Belarus' Lukashenko 08/04/2021; How to make the EU look pitifully weak and irresponsible: send a few thousand refugees across the border and watch the EU panic 11/15/2021.

Poland's refusal to allow asylum-seekers to enter the country and their pushbacks of refugees were criminal behavior. And Poland's fellow EU members backed them in that behavior. Even after accepting two million or so Ukrainian refugees this year, Poland is reportedly continuing its illegal conduct toward refugees from Belarus. (The wrong refugee: How Poland's Belarus border differs from the Ukrainian welcome The Times and The Sunday Times 08/23/2022: Maria Skóra, The paradox of Polish migration policy Social Europe 07/12/2022)

Concerns about criminal conduct of EU officials in the Frontex border patrol agency are continuing. (EU border agency Frontex covered up illegal migrant pushbacks, says report Euronews/AP 10/14/2022.

Other EU countries have been trying to get into the criminal-handling-of-asylum-seekers game, e.g., Dutch gov't hitting pause on Turkey agreement is 'disgraceful': Architect of deal NL Times 08/27/2022.

In Austria, the leader of the far-right "Freedom" Party (FPO), Herbert Kickl (formerly national Interior Minister), called this week for Austria to make an "immediate suspensions of the right to asylum" (sofortiges Aussetzen des Asylrechts). Standard commentator Martin Tschiderer comments drily that this would be "not consistent with international treaty obligations," aka, blatantly illegal. (Debatte um Flüchtlingsquartiere: Kein Platz für Kleingeld 17.10.2022)

This trend will get uglier. How ugly will depend on how energetically the left and center parties actively counter the hate-and-fear rhetoric. Conservative parties could and should do this, too. But some of them are very tempted to go along with xenophobic agitation. Like Profil with its "flood" metaphor on the cover.

Two silos of attitudes toward immigrants, with Austrian and American examples

Immigration expert Gerald Knaus of the European Stability Initiative on ZiB2, the nightly news program of the Austrian network ORF, explains that despite the distinctly anti-refugee and anti-immigrant rhetorical posture of the governments of Chancellor Sebastian Kurz from 2017-2021 (with a seven-month interruption in 2019-2020) that Austria a very solid record in sticking to the rule of law in processing asylum applications. (Gerald Knaus on Migration 21.08.2022). While most EU countries had a more mediocre-to-poor record, with some states like Greece blatantly defying international and EU law in that regard.

Not that Austria's record is spotless. Neglect and petty chicanery in immigration and asylum matters are certainly not unknown. In January 2021, Kurz' government on the orders of then-Interior Minister (now Chancellor) Karl Nehammer deported a 12-year-old girl who was born in and had lived most of her life in Austria to the country of Georgia. Nehammer staged an ugly nighttime raid, a Nacht und Nabel staging that showed the kind of performative cruelty that was a trademark of Trump's anti-immigrant policies in the US.

Known as the Tina case from the girl's first name, Austria's high court, the Administrative Court (VfGH), recently ruled that the deportation had been flat-out illegal. Griss on the decision in the Tina case: “Child welfare always comes first” 24 World Hours 08/17/2022. But on August 23, current Interior Minister Gerhart Karner, an admirer of the "Austrofascist" dictator Engelbert Dollfuss, rather bizarrely defended the appropriateness of that illegal action! (Minister Karner zur Anti-Migrations-Kampagne ORF.at 23.08.2022)

It's helpful to think of political reactions to immigration and especially refugee issues as falling into two distinct silos, which I call here Real-World Experience and Political Narrative silos.

"Stammtisch" in this context refers to discussions among friendship groups. It's typically used in a similar way as the American "good ole boys." The elderly white people in small-town diners the New York Times so loves to interview to gain insight into what the common people are thinking would count as "Stammtisch" in the political context.

On the one hand, it's unrealistic to see the two as radically separated. Even the most demagogic political narratives usually have some discernable contact with reality. There are exceptions of course. Alex Jones' talk about lizard people from outer space comes to mind.

On the other hand, racists and narrow nationalists are better able to ignore crass contradictions in their claims than most people are.

Even in the segregated Jim Crow South, even the most racist whites had examples of a "Good Negro." This tradition still persists in the US Republican Party. Their current African-America candidate for the Senate in Georgia, strikes a public pose that matches crude Republican stereotypes of a Good Negro. As Elie Mystal put it in the spring, "The Walker campaign exists as a political minstrel show: a splashy rendition of what white Republicans think Black people look and sound like." (The Herschel Walker Senate Campaign Is an Insult to Black People The Nation 04/14/2022)

Adolf Hitler, the most infamous Austrian of all time, used to complain that too many Germans had acquaintances they considered "good Jews." Amazingly, he even had at least one himself, his parents' doctor in LInz, Eduard Bloch (1872-1945). Austrian historian Brigitte Hamann did a biography of him, Hitlers Edeljude: Das Leben des Armenarztes Eduard Bloch (2008). Hilter put him under special protection after the annexation (Anschlusss) of Austria in 1938, and he was allowed to emigrate to America, where he lived in the Bronx until his death.

But such an exception obviously didn't carry over into Hitler's more general treatment of Jews, to put it mildly.

But this is part of the larger phenomenon that individuals who have realistic evaluations of their personal experiences with members of the target group can simultaneously adopt political narratives hostile to that group. And, more to the practical point, support and accept anti-immigrant and anti-refugee policies of parties who hold such positions.

White racists in the US try to deal with this phenomenon by trying to redefine racism as a question of personal manners. So politicians who active support voter-suppression measures against Black and Latino voters insist that they don't judge anyone by the color of their at all in the slightest way. They will assure you that some of their best friends are Blacks, Latinos, or whatever group is the topic at the moment.

The two silos in the chart above could also be labeled Personal Attitudes and Political Narratives. It's important to distinguish between the two. Because claimed personal attitudes can be drastically in contrast with the political attitudes of the same individual.

Meanwhile, there's an Italian election coming up in which rightwing parties like Matteo Salvini and his Lega party, which is a Putinist party in both it political orientation and its attitude toward Russia, will use xenophobic rhetoric to promote themselves.

In Austria, the far-right FPÖ (Freedom Party) has relied heavily on anti-foreigner rhetoric since the 1990s and continues to do so. The Christian Democratic People's Party (ÖVP) partnered with the FPÖ as their junior partner in Chancellor Sebastian Kurz' first government of 2017-2019. And not only did Kurz stress anti-foreigner and anti-refugee themes, his party unfortunately continues to do so.

Austrian journalist Barbara Tóth recently tweeted:

Man kann echt jedes Jahr die Uhr danach stellen. Immer nach ferragosto startet die #ÖVP eine sicherheits/migrationskampagne. Intern ist das vermutlich der Auftakt für den politischen Herbst. Durchschaubar und nicht schlau. Spielt doch nur der FPÖ in die Hände.

— Barbara Tóth (@barbaratoth) August 17, 2022

[You can really set the clock by it every year. Always after Ferragosto [August 15], the ÖVP launches a security/migration campaign. Internally, this is probably the prelude to the political autumn. Transparent and not smart. Just plays into the hands of the FPÖ.]

The ÖVP party general secretary Laura Sachslehner has been tweeting anti-immigrant themes. Interior Minister Karner (ÖVP) has begun chiming in. So, we can expect a steady stream of those "political narratives" from them along the lines of: refugees are a burden for Austria; refugees are criminals threatening Austrians; refugees aren't real refugees, they are "migrants" looking to lie in Austria's social hammock, and on and on.

How effective they will be for the ÖVP's and FPÖ's political prospects, and how much damage they will do, depends very heavily on how well and how forcefully the social-democratic (SPÖ), Green, and liberal (Neos) parties directly counter the toxic political narrative. Civil society organizations also play a role, of course. But to counter the xenophobic narrative coming from politicians, other politicians need to provide an opposing one.

I'm focusing on the Austrian situation here. But the same thing is true for other EU countries and the parties in the European Parliament.

How the EU's refugee policy hogties its relations with the Taliban (and others!)

Eldar Mamedov about considerations in European Union relations to the new Taliban regime in Afghanistan. (How the EU should — and should not —deal with the Taliban Responsible Statecraft 08/23/2021)

He points to a fact that is discouraging to anyone hoping the EU could develop a more constructive immigration and refugee policy than just paying Turkey for years on end to hold 3.5 million or more refugees. That was a constructive and sensible agreement when Angela Merkel first negotiated it in 2016. But instead of using the ensuring half-decade to come up with a broader and practical policy, the EU has just punted.

(I often use somewhat dismissive language in talking about EU immigration and refugee policy. I don't mean to imply that it's an easy problem, particularly in cases where wars or their aftermaths suddenly generate a surge of refugees. My main criticism is that the approach of mainstream parties is often a head-in-the-sand posture while the xenophobic demagogues too often drive the public conversation and official policy.)

Rightwing xenophobic populists still drive the EU politics of immigration and refugees. If the center-left and center-right parties just ape the xenophobes in their immigration politics as they have tended to do, it will be hard to develop better alternatives. Unless mainstream politicians can do a much better political vocabulary for talking about the real issues involved, the far right nationalists will continue to drive the narrative. And, while waiting for the next actual refugee crisis, diplomatically kiss Turkish President Tayyip Erdoğan's behind. Because he can unleash a 2015-style refugee inflow to the EU in a matter of days under the current arrangements.

Meanwhile, paranoia and panic over possible refugees dominate EU foreign policy to a ridiculous extent, as in dealing with Belarus. (See my post EU trembles before "hybrid operations" (i.e., a few thousand refugees) from Belarus' Lukashenko 08/03/2021)

And Mamedov explains that it makes a pragmatic approach to the new Taliban government particularly difficult for the EU:

Human rights activists suspect that such an about-face on the Taliban is mainly due to concerns about “migratory flows” that the crisis in Afghanistan would unleash and ultimately impact the EU, much the way the Syrian refugee crisis did in 2015. Indeed, one day after the foreign ministers met, their colleagues responsible for home and justice affairs followed suit.

The statement produced by the European Commission as a result of that meeting is a painstakingly negotiated compromise. On the one hand, it sets out to protect the borders from the “migratory pressures;” on the other, it acknowledges that the EU cannot completely close itself off to Afghans seeking refuge and should use resettlement and other legal pathways to help them out.

The implementation of these provisions, however, depends on the good will of the bloc’s member states. This is where the problem lies — the refugees/migration debate in the EU, while valid, is poisoned by the xenophobic, particularly Islamophobic, tropes pushed by nativist politicians. [my emphasis]

Gerald Knaus, an Austrian refugee expert who serves as the Chair of the European Stability Initiative think tank and was a key player in negotiating the 2016 agreement with Turkey, calls attention to how problematic the framing of refugee and even normal immigration issue in "hydraulic" terms is, i.e., "migratory pressures" (above), gigantic "flows" of refugees, a "flood" of refugees, etc. This frames the entire issue in terms of menace, threat, and danger. "The faster we put behind us hydraulic metaphors about borders and migration, the quicker we will find our way to a solutions-oriented debate." ("An den Grenzen Europas" in [Österreichische] Sicherheitspolitische Jahresvorschau 2021, p. 95)
Mamedov:

This context dangerously narrows the European conversation on Afghanistan to migration and its alleged threat to the European way of life. Seen from this angle, seeking transactional deals with the Taliban in order to “keep the migrants out” might look superficially attractive. In the longer run, however, they would not only make a further mockery of European ideals, such as women’s rights, but would also be short-sighted as they won’t contribute to creating conditions in Afghanistan less conducive to migration in the first place.

Instead, the EU should engage with the Taliban on a much broader agenda, including development, regional stability, human rights, and security. [my emphasis]

One of several ways the EU limits itself in ways that are not only morally shabby but unnecessary risky in straight-up realist terms.

Mamedov mentions several ways in which an understanding of what happened in the Afghanistan War could improve EU policies. This kind of advice is the standard tone of professional foreign policy articles, even in situations where the willingness of the parties being addressed may be small to nonexistent.

But even EU foreign ministers might be able to grasp this part:

But any European engagement must begin with a recognition that, as a U.S. junior partner for the past twenty years, the EU holds a weak hand in the new Afghanistan. That means that the EU should shed the notion of Afghanistan as another arena of global competition with Russia and China. To the contrary, it should leave Moscow and Beijing in the driving seat when it comes to relations with Kabul. [my emphasis]

Maybe China or Russia will take another shot at installing a regime in Kabul more suitable to them. For the last 180 years or so, i.e., since the start of the First Anglo-Afghan War in 1839, that has not tended to produce happy results for those foreign powers making the attempt. My favorite stodgy-but-reliable source, Britannica Online, summarizes how that British effort worked out, "On January 6, 1842, some 4,500 British and Indian troops, with 12,000 camp followers, marched out of Kabul. Bands of Afghans swarmed around them, and the retreat ended in a bloodbath." Although I find the term "political Islam" problematic, this observation of Mamedov's is also important:

The swift Taliban victory should prompt a broader rethink in the EU on how it deals with political Islam. Islamic militants everywhere interpret the Taliban’s success and the failure of the Muslim Brotherhood-style parliamentary Islamism in Egypt, Palestine or Tunisia, as proof that violent resistance, not compromise and accommodation, works best.

Although this particular "swift" Taliban victory took the better part of 20 years. The final collapse calls to mind the comment economist Rudi Dornbusch about the Mexican financial crisis of 1994: "It took forever and then it took a night." (Frontline Murder Money & Mexico WGBH 1995)

"Sofagate", refugees and EU-Turkish relations

I recently commented on EU-Turkey relations, in which current points negotiation include The range of issues includes the long-standing dispute between Turkey and Greece over Cyprus and maritime rights, Turkey's interventions in Libya and Syria, travel between Turkey and the EU, expanding the EU-Turkey customs union arrangement (which goes back to 1963), and human rights issues. (Europa geht auf die Türkei zu und lockt mit Zollunion und Visa-Freiheit Oberösterreichische Nachrichten 27.03.2021.)

Turkish President Tayyip Erdoğan made a diplomatic snub of The EU Commission President Ursula von der Leyen that gave headline writers something to label "Sofagate," in which European Concil President Charles Michel was given distintly privelged seating for an official photo-op and Von der Leyen was visibly snubbed.

It was diplomatic mischief on Erdoğan's part. But there is also reason to think that Michel was happüy to go along with it, because it was the EU Council that handled the diplomatic protocol in the meeting preparations. The Commission and the Council are both executive bodies of the EU. But the Commission is generally seen as representing more the EU institutions, while the Council is set up more as a body representing the member states as such. The protocol explanation for the Sofagate setup was that Michel was treated as a head of state and Von der Leyen as head of government, the implication being that the Commission President was higher representative of the EU than the Council President, which scored a point for Michel and the Commission in internal EU politics. (Sylvia Wörgetter, Welche Rolle spielte EU-Ratspräsident Michel?Oberösterreichische Nachrichten 10.04.2021)

Former Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker kinda-sorta agreed with the protocol point about the Council President being the senior official while adding: "'I think it would have been better to have her sitting at the same level' as Michel, 'but from a protocol point of view the president of the Council is No. 1.”" (Lily Bayer, Juncker tries to take the sting out of Sofagate Politico EU 04/07/2021)

But Erdoğan was no doubt happy to be seen snubbing a senior woman official of the EU.

In the previous post, I talked about the centrality of the 2016 refugee agreement in EU-Turkey relations. Gerald Knaus, head of the think tank European Stability Initiative (ESI) and an immigration activist, was one of the main players in putting together the 2016 deal. Broadkly speaking, the deal involved Turkey holding refugees, largely coming from Syria, in Turkey. The agreement assumed that Turkey would allow a certain number of refugees to come to the EU after having their asylum requests processed in Turkey. For asylum-seekers that fled to Greece, Turkey would be accept them back. In turn, Turkey would then be able to send an equal number of additional approved ssylum applicants to the EU. The idea was that the EU would regularly absorb a certain number of refugees from Turkey. And the facilities for the refugees in Turkey would be financed by the EU. The arrangement was designed to reduce the need for desperate refugees to undertake highly risky sea crossings to be able to seek asylum in the EU.

The basic assumptions of the deal were resonable. As Knaus wrote in Welche Grenzen brauchen wir? (2020):

Andere Kritiker erklärten, es sei absurd zu erwarten, dass Flüchtlinge und Asylsuchende in der Türkei sicher seien. Dabei leben in der Türkei nun bereits seit vielen Jahren Millionen Flüchtlinge, gehen Hunderttausende syrische Kinder in türkische Schulen. Die Türkei hat zudem eine lange Tradition, Asylsuchenden - darunter auch Afghanen - Aufenthalt zu gewahren, während der UNHCR Asylverfahren durchführte und Neuansiedlungen organisierte. Es sollte darum gehen, das türkische System durch Anreize und Unterstützung zu verbessern, zum Wohl von Schutzbedürftigen.

[{Some} critics said it was absurd to expect refugees and asylum seekers to be safe in Turkey. {But} millions of refugees have been living in Turkey for many years now, and hundreds of thousands of Syrian children are going to Turkish schools. Turkey has a long tradition of keeping asylum seekers - including Afghans - resident, while the UNHCR asylum procedures are carried out and resettlement organized. It should be about improving the Turkish system through incentives and support, for the benefit of those needing protection.]

But, as he also explains in that book and elsewhere, the processing of asylum seekers has not gone as planned. In Knaus' view, Greek officials with the approval of EU officials have failed to process asylum-seekers at a reasonable pace. Knaus believes it's a deliberate strategy of scaring refugees away from trying to head toward Europe. (See p. 196 in his book)

As the Oberösterreichische Nachrichten (Fünf Jahre Flüchtlingsdeal: Brüssel versucht einen Neustart mit Erdogan 20.03.2021) puts it:

Kernpunkt des Deals ist, dass die Türkei jeden Migranten, der irregulär auf die griechischen Inseln gelangt und keinen Anspruch auf Asyl hat, zurücknimmt. Im Gegenzug nimmt die EU für jeden rückgeführten Syrer einen anderen Syrer aus der Türkei auf. Für die Flüchtlingsbetreuung soll die Türkei wiederum mit bis zu sechs Milliarden Euro von der EU unterstützt werden.

Die Rückführung irregulär eingereister Migranten in die Türkei funktioniert jedoch kaum. Seit 2016 schickte die EU insgesamt nur rund 2740 Menschen zurück in die Türkei, wie die EU-Kommission mitteilte. Das liegt jedoch nicht an der Türkei, sondern daran, dass Griechenland teils massiv überfordert mit der Bearbeitung der Asylanträge war und ist.

Asylsuchende auf griechischen Inseln müssen monatelang, teilweise über ein Jahr, auf einen Ersttermin bei den Behörden warten. Viele von ihnen sitzen mehrere Jahre in den oft als menschenunwürdig kritisierten Camps, bis ihr Verfahren abgeschlossen wird. Immer wieder wurde der griechischen Regierung vorgeworfen, dieses Szenario bewusst zu provozieren, um damit möglichst viele Flüchtlinge abzuschrecken.

Umgekehrt nahmen EU-Staaten bisher 28.621 Migranten aus der Türkei auf – deutlich weniger als im Abkommen 2016 in Aussicht gestellt. Mit Beginn der Corona-Pandemie wurde der Mechanismus überhaupt ausgesetzt.

[The key point of the deal is that Turkey will take back any migrant who reaches the Greek islands irregularly and is not entitled to asylum. In return, the EU accepts another Syrian from Turkey for every Syrian repatriated. Turkey is to receive up to €6 billion in EU support for care of the refugees.

However, the repatriation of irregular migrants to Turkey hardly works. Since 2016, the EU has sent a total of only around 2,740 people back to Turkey, according to the EU Commission. However, this is not due to Turkey, but to the fact that Greece has been, and still is, massively overwhelmed with the processing of asylum applications.

Asylum seekers on Greek islands have to wait months, sometimes more than a year, for a first appointment with the authorities. Many of them sit in the camps, which are often criticized as inhumane, for several years until their trial is completed. Time and again, the Greek government has been accused of deliberately provoking this scenario in order to deter as many refugees as possible.

EU states have so far taken in 28,621 migrants from Turkey – significantly fewer than the 2016 agreement promised. With the onset of the corona pandemic, the mechanism was suspended completely.

As of last September, the UN refugee agency put the number of refugees in Syria at 3.6 million.

Turkey, the EU, and the US early in Biden's Presidential term

The EU is making moves to try to ease relations with Turkey and its authoritarian President Tayyip Erdoğan. EU Commission President Ursula von der Leyen of Germany and and European Council President Charles Michel of Belgium just held a meeting with Erdoğan in Ankara to discuss some major current issues. (EU-Spitzen beraten mit Erdogan über Beziehungen Oberösterreichische Nachrichten 06.04.2021) The EU Commission and the European Council are the two executive bodies of the European Union.

The range of issues includes the long-standing dispute between Turkey and Greece over Cyprus, Turkey's role in the conflicts in Libya and Syria, travel between Turkey and the EU, and human rights issues, including Turkey's recent decision to leave the Council of Europe treaty on combatting violence against women known as the Istanbul Convention. (Turkey quits Istanbul Convention on violence against women Deutsche Welle 20.03.2021)

Turkey's human and diplomatic club: refugees

One connection between Turkey and the EU that I don't think receives sufficient prominence in news reports is the 2016 deal Angela Merkel negotiated with Erdoğan to hold millions of refugees from conflicts in the Greater Middle East. Robin Alexander gave a good account of the negotiating of that deal in Die Getriebenen: Merkel und die Flüchtlingspolitik (2018).The Oberösterrichische Nachrichten describes it this way (Die EU-Spitzen reisten mit Zuckerbrot und Peitsche zu Erdogan nach Ankara 07.04.2021):

Beide brauchen einander – auch in der Flüchtlingsfrage. Diese nannte die Kommissionspräsidentin als eines von vier Themenfeldern, um die es in einem ersten Gespräch mit Erdogan gegangen sei. Themenfelder, "in denen beide von einer verstärkten Zusammenarbeit profitieren können".

2016 hatte die EU mit der Türkei einen Deal geschlossen, wonach das Land keine Flüchtlinge in die EU durchwinkt und dafür sechs Milliarden Euro für deren Versorgung erhält. Geflossen sind davon bisher mehr als vier Milliarden Euro. Erdogan fordert mehr Geld, die EU will ihre Außengrenze dicht halten. Also wird es auf eine Verlängerung des Deals hinauslaufen.

[Both {Turkey and the EU} need each other, including on the refugee issue. The President of the Commission mentioned this as one of the four topics discussed in an initial discussion with Erdogan. topics "in which both can benefit from enhanced cooperation".

In 2016, the EU struck a deal with Turkey under which the country will not to wave refugees through into the EU and receives six billion euros for its trouble. More than four billion euros have been spent so far. Erdogan is demanding more money, the EU wants to keep its external border close. So it will result in an extension of the deal.] {my translation}

That mention comes at the very end of the news article. But it's not only an intense issue between Turkey and the EU. It's also dramatic evidence of a current weakness in the EU, which is to rely far too heavily on a kick-the-can-down-the-road approach to significant problems. The EU faced a big and very unusual surge of refugees in 2015-16, which was met with a great deal of disarray among EU member nations. And not only far-right parties responded in many countries with a xenophobic political reactions to which the center-right and left parties generally did a poor job of responding in a constructive way.

The agreement with Turkey was established in early 2016, and it gives Turkey the ability to pressure European governments by threatening to send more refugees north. As of last September, there were some 3.6 million refugees in Turkey. (UNHCR Turkey - Fact Sheet September 2020 22.09.2020) As Robin Alexander reported in his 2018 book, "Erdoğan nutzt seinen Machtzuwachs und sein Erpressungspotenzial gegenüber der EU dazu, die Demonrage der jahrzehntelang gewachsenen Demokratie in der Türkei zu beschleunigen." ("Erdoğan is using his increased power and his blackmail potential against the EU to accelerate the dismantling of Turkey's democracy, which has been growing for decades.") He threatened the EU just over a year ago with sending a large number of refugees north toward Europe. (Turkey says millions of migrants may head to EU BBC News 03/02/2020)

The EU has had five years now to work on reducing this threat, which is basically only seen as a threat because of xenophobic and Islamophobic sentiments in various EU countries that way too many EU leaders would rather duck that deal with them straightforwardly. An EU burden-sharing agreement to absorb a significant number of those refugees could have steadily reduced that particular blackmail potential. And would have been a decent thing to do. A concerted effort during that time to reduce European arms sales to warring parties in Libya and the Middle East would have also been very helpful.

All this compromises the EU's human rights position considerably. Turkey has used some of the Syrian refugees to carry out an ethnic cleansing operation in formerly Kurdish areas it gained military control over in northern Syria, moving out Kurds and repopulating those areas with non-Kurdish Syrian refugees. The 2016 deal makes the EU at least passively complicit in that kind of operation.

And whether the issues are human rights or democratic governance or Turkish foreign policy mischief, the current refugee situation gives Turkey a big addition of diplomatic clout. Erdoğan knows it, and EU leaders know it. In Germany and Austria, rightwing politicians like to bitch and moan about Turkish funding of mosques that my promote jihadism and worries that Turkey tries to inappropriately manipulate the considerable Turkish minorities in those countries in service of Turkish foreign policy. Whatever real concerns there may be on that score - and my impression is that those are relatively limited - those are legitimate concerns. But, for better or worse, Germany and Austria are significantly constrained in taking action on such perceived threats because of Turkey's refugee club.

So it's not surprising to see Wolfgang Münchau's Eurointelligence blog expressing low expectations and a bit of disgust at the EU's current situation with Turkey (Beware of photo-ops with Erdogan 04/07/2021):

They had to have the photo op with Recep Tayyip Erdogan, and it turned out to be bad idea, as we predicted. ...

A video clip from the meeting went viral. It showed Charles Michel taking the seat next to Erdogan, forcing Ursula von der Leyen to sit on the sofa opposite the Turkish foreign minister. Symbols speak more than words, especially in countries like Turkey. The same is true for the official photo in which the two EU leaders smiled, while Erdogan looked like he just wanted to get it over and done with. If the EU does not know how speak in images, they are better off keeping meetings behind closed doors.

Erdogan may not be Sergey Lavrov, but his seating arrangements were enough to display the rift between European Council and the Commission, and male dominance over a female leader. The EU's concern over Turkey's exit from the Istanbul Convention on Discrimination and Violence against Women suddenly lost its bite.

He's referring there to this obnoxious symbolic move by Erdoğan, Ursula Von der Leyen snubbed in chair gaffe at EU-Erdoğan talks Guardian News 04/07/2021:

Erdoğan pulled a similar stunt when Angela Merkel came to Ankara in 2016 to negotiate the refugee deal.

In the press briefing afterwards, von der Leyen said human rights are non-negotiable and that Turkey should respect the recent rulings of the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) for the release Turkish businessman Osman Kavala and Kurdish politician Selahattin Demirtain. She said the Commission will come up with a proposal for how to support Syrian refugees in Turkey in a show of good will. So goodwill first, non-negotiables after?

Hiding under the covers from the refugee challenge has a significant price for the EU, diplomatic as well as financial.

Joe Biden's early positioning with Turkey

US President Joe Biden sent an important diplomatic signal at the time of the recent EU (video) summit by singling out Greek Prime Minister Kyriakos Misotakis as the only one of the Greek heads of government to whom he made a personal call, a significant diplomatic signal early in his administration that he's leaning toward Greece in its current disputes with their fellow NATO member Turkey.

Ekathimerini reports (Biden offers full support to Mitsotakis 03/28/2021):

Washington’s intention to support Athens was reportedly made loud and clear in the telephone call between US President Joe Biden and Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis last Thursday on the occasion of the 200th anniversary of the start of the Greek War of Independence.

“If you need anything, call me. I’m here to help,” Biden reportedly told Mitsotakis – an offer which carries added significance given that no one can discount Ankara’s stance in the coming months. At the same time the foundations were laid for Mitsotakis to visit to the White House within the year.

If anything, the phone call reflected the open line of communication between the two capitals, and the US involvement in the region after its resounding absence during the era of Biden’s predecessor Donald Trump, during which time Ankara challenged Greece’s sovereign rights, not least with its Oruc Reis research vessel conducting surveys over several months last year.

Biden doesn't have hotel branding deals to worry about for his personal business, so he can take a more Presidential posture in dealings with other countries including Turkey than Trump did. (John Haltiwanger and Sonam Sheth, Trump’s disastrous retreat from Syria raises new questions about his financial interests in Turkey Business Insider 10/18/2019) You can check out photos of Trump Tower Istanbul here.

Biden also doesn't seem to share Trump's particular fondness for leaders like who strike authoritarian tough-guy postures.

Turkey, Syria, Russia and refugees being released to head to Europe

Developments in the armed conflict between NATO ally Turkey and Russian ally Syria. Turkey is fighting on Syrian territory to create a zone in which to settle Syrian refugees and replace, i.e., ethnically cleanse an area long populated by Kurds.

Linah Alsaafin and Virginia Pietromarchi report in Turkey-Syria tensions escalate after troops killed: Live updates Aljazeera 02/28/2020:

Dozens of Turkish troops have been killed in Syrian government air raids, marking a dramatic escalation in the conflict between Ankara and Moscow-backed forces in northwestern Syria.

The 33 deaths followed an attack in Idlib late on Thursday and come as Syrian government forces, backed by Russian air power, are attempting to seize the last remaining territory held by Turkey-backed Syrian opposition forces.

Der Standard characterizes the situation a little more bluntly (André Ballin und Jürgen Gottschlich, Die Türkei steht in Syrien immer knapper vor dem offenen Krieg 28.02.2020):

Der seit langem befürchtete Ernstfall ist eingetreten. Die militärischen Auseinandersetzungen in der syrischen Rebellenprovinz Idlib sind in einen regelrechten Krieg zwischen der Türkei und den Truppen des Assad-Regimes ausgeartet. In der Nacht von Donnerstag auf Freitag sind bei einem Luftangriff syrischer Kampfflugzeuge auf Stellungen türkischer Soldaten mindestens 33 Soldaten getötet und 40 weitere schwer verletzt worden.

Präsident Recep Tayyip Erdoğan will mit dem Einsatz seiner Armee erreichen, dass Assad zumindest einen Teil von Idlib nicht mehr angreift, damit dort für fast drei Millionen Menschen, von denen nach UN-Angaben bereits eine Million in Zelten entlang der türkischen Grenze kampieren, eine Schutzzone entsteht. Die Türkei fürchtet, dass sonst erneut hunderttausende syrische Flüchtlinge über die Grenze kommen könnten, die das Land nicht mehr aufnehmen könne. ...

So nah an einem Krieg waren Russland und die Türkei jedenfalls seit 2015 nicht mehr. [meine Hervorhebungen]

{The long-feared emergency has arrived. The military clashes in the Syrian rebel-held province of Idlib have degenerated into a veritable war between Turkey and the Assad regime's forces. During the night from Thursday to Friday, an airstrike by Syrian warplanes on positions of Turkish soldiers killed at least 33 soldiers and seriously injured 40 others.}

With the deployment of his army, President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan wants Assad to stop attacking at least part of Idlib, so a protection zone can be created for nearly three million people, of whom, according to the UN, one million have already camped in tents along the Turkish border. Turkey fears that otherwise hundreds of thousands of Syrian refugees could cross the border, which the country can no longer accept.

Russia and Turkey have not been so close to war since at least 2015. [my emphasis]}

The UN Security Council is scheduled to meet on the Turkey-Syria conflict this evening at 21:00 GMT.

Semih Idiz reports on how Turkish President Tayyip Erdoğan plans in the situation has gone serious awry (Idlib and the collapse of Erdogan’s foreign policy Al-Monitor 02/27/2020):

Turkey is an isolated country today that has confrontational ties with the United States and Russia, as well as the Arab world and Europe. It is trying to ensure its vital security interests against this difficult backdrop.

But the few friends Ankara has left, such as Qatar, Pakistan or Azerbaijan, provide Turkey with no strategic value that could strengthen its hand against its adversaries.

The only option Erdogan has is to try and play the United States and Russia against each other, as he has been doing for some time now, but this approach seems to also have run its course.

Erdogan’s ambitious intervention in Libya, also on the other side of Russia, is also not going well. At the same time, it has complicated relations with its NATO allies by Russian arms purchases:

Erdogan’s decision to purchase Russian made S-400 air defense systems — over the objections of Turkey’s NATO allies — was also considered to be more of an act of defiance of the West than a coherent move based on a sound military rationale.

Erdogan’s biggest miscalculation is proving to be the reliance he placed on Russia.

And, contrary to his 2016 agreement with Angela Merkel, he's now sending an increased flow of refugees into Europe (Turkey says it will let refugees into Europe after troops killed in Syria Reuters 02/28/2020). And the EU is not prepared for a new refugee surge like that of 2015-16. "Greece and Bulgaria reinforced their borders in response to Turkey’s threat to reopen the frontier, shut under an agreement that halted the migration crisis of 2015-2016, when more than a million people crossed into Europe by foot."

Syria and Turkey and the Idlib crisis and the US and Russian involvements

European policymakers and the public as well need to be preparing for the refugee fallout from Syria's current brutal military operations in Idlib province.

Aljazeera reports on the situation in 'Nowhere is safe': UN warns of urgent danger of Syria escalation 02/19/2020, noting that Syria's action in Idlib has produced "the biggest wave of displacement since the start of the war nearly nine years ago."

Syria recently killed some Turkish troops. And Turkey is threatening expanded military action against Syria, which backed by Russia:

"An operation in Idlib is imminent," Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan told his party's legislators in Parliament on Wednesday. "We are counting down, we are making our final warnings".

Ankara, which supports several rebel groups in northwest Syria, has been outraged since recent Syrian government attacks in Idlib province killed 13 Turkish military personnel in two weeks. It is also eager to prevent another flood of refugees into its territory adding to the 3.6 million Syrians it already hosts.

Responding to Erdogan's comments, Russia - the main ally of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad - said any operation against Syrian forces in Idlib would be the "worst scenario".

Mark Katz discusses the Turkey-Russia angle in How long can Russia and Turkey cooperate amid a myriad of conflictual hazards? Responsible Statecraft 02/17/2020. Here's one of the immediate risks:

And those differences are serious, especially in Syria where the Russian-backed Assad regime’s determination to retake Idlib from the Turkish-backed Syrian opposition there is now coming to the fore. What Ankara fears is that if the Assad regime retakes Idlib, a flood of refugees will stream north into Turkey where Ankara is already struggling to support previous waves of refugees from the Syrian civil war that has been going on since 2011. Further, if the Assad regime retakes Idlib, it may then seek to retake areas further north that Turkey now has influence over, such as Afrin. Conflict between Turkish and Assad regime forces involving Russian personnel has already occurred and could grow worse. [my emphasis]

Turkey and Russia are also on opposing sides in Libya. "A similar dynamic may be developing in the conflict between Libya’s U.N.-recognized government and General Khalifa Haftar in which Turkey is aiding the former and Russia (via private military contractors) is helping the latter."

Turkey is a NATO ally of the US and European NATO members. NATO is a mutual defense treaty obligating members to defend each other against outside aggression, although the commitment to supportive military action isn't automatic. Libya is in no shape to invade Turkey and Syria is highly unlikely to do so. But NATO ally Turkey is currently in a shooting conflict with Syria and is occupying part of Syria territory.

Bakr Sidqi reports for the Middle East Monitor (As Tensions Flare between Russia and Turkey in Syria, will Trump be Drawn in on side of Ankara? 02/21/2020) on the complicated diplomatic triangle of Ankara, Washington, and Moscow:

Yesterday, there was a telephone conversation between Erdogan and US President Donald Trump, the latter stated they had discussed matters regarding Idlib, adding that they are working together.

This American statement, at the highest level, indicates American support for Turkey regarding the conflict in and around Idlib, but it is nothing more than a statement. American Special Envoy to Syria, James Jeffrey, had already announced this support in Ankara. However, the National Security Advisor, Robert O’Brien, said on the same day that the US would not send troops into the Idlib conflict zone. While O’Brien’s words are not surprising, as no one expected otherwise, it seemed to be a response to the statement made by Jeffrey and a warning to Ankara not to cling to illusions about the extent of Washington’s involvement in Syria in support of Turkey, after having withdrawn most of its forces from Upper Mesopotamia. ...

Regardless of the extent to which Washington can go in support of the Turkish war effort in the Idlib and Aleppo regions, it is clear that the Turkish president is playing, in this conflict, the game of blackmailing Russia with the Americans and the Americans with Russia. [my emphasis]

EU long-term challenges on immigration and refugees (Part 2 of 3)

There are wars, rumors of wars, and major instability in the Greater Middle East. This has produced millions of refugees headed toward Europe.

Austria’s then Foreign Minister and current Chancellor Sebastian “Basti” Kurz claimed to have solved the 2015-16 acute phase of the refugee flow that xenophobic politicians (including him) successfully exploited by “closing the Balkan route”. At best, Basti’s “Balkan route” negotiations played a small supplementary role next to Angela Merkel’s negotiations with Turkey: Deutsche Welle provides description and analysis of that deal, which is still in effect: The EU-Turkey refugee agreement: A review 18.03.2018; Barbara Wesel, The EU's grubby and dangerous deal with Turkey 18.03.2016.

As Barbara Wesel rightly describes it, Merkel’s Turkey deal “It effectively outsources the protection and care of the majority of refugees from the Middle East to Turkey.”

The UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR) notes currently on its website (accessed 01/24/2020):

Turkey continues to host the largest number of refugees worldwide, with close to 4.1 million refugees, including 3.7 million Syrians and nearly 400,000 asylum-seekers and refugees of other nationalities. Turkish legislation provides people in need of international protection with a broad range of rights upon registration with the authorities. Some protection gaps are nonetheless observed in the implementation of the legal framework, largely due to the scale of the refugee response.

The main challenges remain the pressure on national resources and the availability of services for refugees and host communities. While state institutions are addressing these challenges, the protracted nature of the refugee situation has drawn public attention to the social impact of the refugees’ presence.

Of course, Middle Eastern countries are already absorbing refugees from conflicts in the region. And Libya in North Africa plays a particular role. Also from UNHCR (accessed 01/24/2020):

In Libya, an estimated 823,000 people need humanitarian assistance, according to the 2018 Humanitarian Needs Overview (HNO). Internally displaced people (IDPs), refugees and asylum-seekers are amongst the most vulnerable, with limited or no access to basic commodities and essential services. Political instability and violent clashes have generated ongoing displacement and created a very challenging operational environment for UNHCR. It is expected that the protection environment in Libya will remain restricted and will likely deteriorate even further.

UNHCR estimates that 4,500 people are detained in Libya, out of whom 2,500 are of concern to UNHCR. The condition of refugees and migrants in detention remains of grave concern and identifying solutions for the most vulnerable is a key priority in 2020. In addition, there are over 300,000 IDPs, of whom 128,000 have been newly displaced since clashes restarted in Tripoli in April 2019, and there are more than 447,000 IDP returnees. While high-level negotiations are underway to end conflict and encourage a resumption of the peace process, UNHCR is prepared to respond to humanitarian needs in 2020.

During Muammar Gaddafi’s rule, Libya was certainly no model of enlightened governance or a country where human rights were scrupulously protected. But it had absorbed and employed large numbers of African refugees fleeing military conflicts or disastrous economic conditions in their own countries.

But when civil war broke out and the US, Britain, and France intervened militarily to overthrow Gaddafi’s government, that function was radically reduced. And so more of the refugees that Libya could previously absorb head toward Europe, often in dangerous sea journeys in rickety vessels. There are refugee camps in Libya, set up partially in collaboration with EU countries, and they have been poorly managed, i.e., serious neglect and crimes including rape and some people being literally sold into slavery.

The Libya and Turkey aspects of the issue have converged even more lately with Turkey’s military intervention in the ongoing civil war and the international negotiations seeking a ceasefire in which Turkey is now necessarily a key participant. (Daniel Brössler, Erdoğan ist eine zentrale Figur im Libyen-Drama geworden Süddeutsche Zeitung 24.01.2020)

Turkey justified its recent invasion of northern Syria as necessary to repatriate some of the Syrian refugees they were hosting. But Turkey used that as an excuse for “ethnic cleansing” of Kurds out of that region. But the 2016 Merkel-Erdoğan refugee agreement limits the EU’s ability to challenge military misadventures by Turkey in Syria or Libya because Turkey can credibly threaten to release large refugee flows into the EU. (Turkey lashes out at EU over refugee deal ahead of Merkel visit Deutsche Welle 23.01.2020)

Also: Erdogan fordert von EU mehr Unterstützung für Flüchtlinge Oberösterreichische Nachrichten 24.01.2020:

In 2016, Merkel negotiated a refugee deal with Turkey to prevent migrants from continuing their journey to the EU. Erdogan had repeatedly threatened in the past to cancel the agreement.

Im Zentrum des Flüchtlingsdeals der EU mit der Türkei steht ein Tauschhandel: Die EU darf alle Migranten, die illegal auf die griechischen Inseln übergesetzt haben und kein Asyl erhalten, in die Türkei zurückschicken. Im Gegenzug kann für jeden zurückgeschickten Syrer ein anderer Syrer aus der Türkei legal in die EU einreisen. Es wurde zudem vereinbart, dass die EU sechs Milliarden Euro für die Verbesserung der Lebensbedingungen syrischer Flüchtlinge in der Türkei zahlt.

At the heart of the EU's refugee deal with Turkey is a barter deal: the EU is allowed to send back to Turkey all migrants who have illegally transferred to the Greek islands and are not granted asylum. In return, for every Syrian returned, another Syrian from Turkey can legally enter the EU. It was also agreed that the EU would pay €6 billion to improve the living conditions of Syrian refugees in Turkey. [my translation from the German]

And those wars and rumors of wars – and US sanctions paving the way for one with Iran – are generating new refugees headed toward Europe. (Erin Cunningham and Mohammad Mahdi Sultani, Trump’s sanctions on Iran are helping fuel a new refugee crisis - in Turkey Washington Post 01/24/2020).

In other words, a massive increase in refugees coming into the EU comparable to that of 2015-16 can still happen. And likely will. And it’s very difficult to predict that. Erdoğan’s international ambitions, an escalation of the US-Iran conflict, serious economic problems are all things that could make that happen.

It does not appear to me that the EU is any better prepared today to deal effectively with such a recurrence than it was in 2015. They should be. But if anything, the nasty political battles related to immigration and refugees has made an effective collective EU response more difficult. The dominant EU narrative that each member country should promote its own national “competitiveness” also creates an every-country-for-themselves response to disruptions which works against EU cooperation and solidarity.

As mentioned at the start of Part 1, the EU needs an immigration policy based on (1) a positive rather than defensive immigration policy based on the understanding that EU countries all need significant numbers of immigrants for the foreseeable future, larger than the current supply; and, (2) a refugee policy that is based on an allocation of refugees among all EU countries, i.e., giving up the “Dublin system”.

The Dublin system works as follows (EU Commission Factsheet on the The Dublin System n/d; accessed 01/24/2020):

When applying the Dublin rules, the country of arrival is, in most cases, identified as the one responsible for the asylum application.

The vast majority of arrivals are currently registered in just a few Member States (e.g. Greece and Italy), putting the asylum systems of these countries of first entry under immense pressure. This is not a fair distribution of responsibility.

The current system, in other words, puts by far the greatest burden for dealing with the refugee flow out of the Greater Middle East and Libya falls on Greece, Italy, and non-EU member Turkey.

Part 1: https://brucemillerca.blogspot.com/2020/01/eu-long-term-challenges-on-immigration.html
Part 2: https://brucemillerca.blogspot.com/2020/02/eu-long-term-challenges-on-immigration.htmlbr />
Part 3: https://brucemillerca.blogspot.com/2020/02/eu-long-term-challenges-on-immigration_5.html

EU long-term challenges on immigration and refugees (Part 1 of 3)

The European Union’s immigration situation faces two major problems, both now and for the foreseeable future.

One is that the EU needs more people. And that applies to most if not all member countries, not just to less wealthy ones like Hungary and Rumania, whose populations have been shrinking due to emigration of younger native-born people.

The other is that Europe’s near neighbors to the south have experienced nearly two decades of war and instability, with no near end in sight: the Middle East and North Africa, and Afghanistan as well, from which refugees make their way towards the EU countries.

In light of the 2015-6 refugee crisis (or acute phase of a much longer crisis), two major policies are needed: systematic recruitment and admission of immigrants for jobs currently going unfilled, whether the shortage is due to lack of skilled workers or because the jobs are so unpleasant they can’t get enough workers for them: and, a plan for fair sharing of refugees among all EU countries at an early stage, not only after asylum has been granted.

Immigration policies can be very complex. But the EU needs both those sets of policies and doesn’t have them now.

It’s a worldwide phenomenon that as countries become wealthier and more urbanized and decent health care becomes more available, the birth rate goes down. The replacement rate, the fertility rate at which the population will remain stable in numbers from one generation to the next, is generally taken to be 2.1 children per woman.

According to Wikipedia (List of sovereign states and dependencies by total fertility rate 01/23/2020), the EU member states have the following fertility rates, rounded to one decimal point:

Austria 1.5
Belgium 1.8
Bulgaria 1.6
Croatia 1.4
Cyprus 1.3
Czechia 1.6 (Visegrad Group)
Denmark 1.8
Estonia 1.6
Finland 1.8
France 1.9
Germany 1.5
Greece 1.4
Hungary 1.5 (Visegrad Group)
Ireland 2.0
Italy 1.3
Latvia 1.5
Lithuania 1.6
Luxembourg 1.6
Malta 1.5
Netherlands 1.8
Poland 1.3 (Visegrad Group)
Portugal 1.4
Romania 1.4
Slovakia 1.6 (Visegrad Group)
Slovenia 1.6
Spain 1.5
Sweden 1.8
UK 1.7

All of them are below the replacement fertility rate of 2.1.

I’ve flagged the Visegrad states, which have been particularly insistent on keeping refugees out of the EU. Visegrad Group member Poland is tied with tiny Cyprus as having the lowest. We should note here that the fertility rate won’t match one-to-one with national wealth measures. But all EU countries are already past the point where the fertility rate has dropped below 2.1.

Fertility rates below the replacement rate mean that over the coming decades, their populations will shrink. This is often discussed in the news in terms of how an aging population presents new challenges for country’s health care and government social insurance.

But it’s also generally assumed that a shrinking population is a danger to economic growth.

Scott Lanman writes (A World With Fewer Babies Spells Economic Trouble Bloomberg Businessweek 09/14/2018:

Forget the prophecies saying overpopulation will starve the planet. The human race is approaching the point where it’s no longer reproducing enough to expand the global headcount. In the world’s biggest economies -- the U.S., China, Japan and Germany -- it’s already happening or will soon. Economists say these countries could see slower economic growth unless they increase their working-age populations by accepting immigrants, possibly from regions with higher fertility rates, like parts of Asia and Africa. Lower fertility rates -- the number of live births per woman -- could also threaten safety-net programs like pensions and health care. [my emphasis]

In the US and Europe, the only reason it would threaten “safety-net programs” is if governments are unwilling to tax the wealth at a reasonable rate. But until those countries transition to a green economy in which economic prosperity is not linked to a growing population fueling growing consumption, a growing population is needed.

It was interesting to hear what Austrian Chancellor Sebastian “Basti” Kurz (ÖVP) himself recently said at the Davos World Economic Forum (A Conversation with Sebastian Kurz, Federal Chancellor of Austria 24.01.2020):

I recently had a discussion in which it was philosophized about how the post-growth society, and, can it [it] actually be good for a country when there is no more economic growth and if, yes, we still are satisfied, and would it not be even better in any case to measure the satisfaction of the population and not economic growth.

So, that all always sounds so beautiful and so romantic. I can only say that in Europe we have some of the oldest societies in the world. I think Germany has the second oldest society after Japan.

So, satisfaction doesn’t pay any pensions, okay? If we do not have growth, if we do not succeed in remaining economically competitive, that is, the European Union, because then its also Good Night welfare state and Good Night European achievements. (after 25:20 in the video)

The relation of birth and fertility rates has been studied in the context of Malthusian claims that low growth in poor countries is caused to a large if not near-exclusive extent by high population growth. This notion has been effectively refuted for, oh, the last two centuries. But it is still remarkably persistence because it is an effective distraction from maldistribution of world income and massive exploitation of poor countries by wealthier ones.

The European far right recognizes the decline of the population but try to use it as a justification for their racist, anti-Semitic “great replacement” theory. Europe’s current model authoritarian Viktor Orban is trying to promote a higher birth rate, framing in racist-nationalistic terms (Hungary to provide free fertility treatment to boost population BBC News 01/10/2020):

Hungary will provide free in-vitro fertilisation (IVF) treatment to couples at state-run clinics, Prime Minister Viktor Orbán has announced.

He said fertility was of "strategic importance". Last month his government took over Hungary's fertility clinics.

Mr Orban, a right-wing nationalist, has long advocated a "procreation over immigration" approach to deal with demographic decline.

The country's population has been falling steadily for four decades.

See also: Nora Shenouda, Ungarn setzt auf staatliche "Babyfabriken" Euronews 15.01.2020.

The idea that Hungary will get from a fertility rate of 1,5 to 2,1 or higher in any foreseeable future is nonsense. It would take forcing women out of the workforce and into a real Handmaid’s Tale kind of society in which women were basically only allowed to breed and raise children. And even that probably wouldn’t get it to the replacement rate. (If there is a side benefit of some improvement’s in women’s reproductive health care, that will be a desirable if unintended consequence.)

It’s also important to remember that the relationship between economic growth and declining population isn’t instantaneous. It doesn’t mean that if in 2020, Hungary’s population declines from 2019 that Hungary’s GDP or per capital income will decline from 2019 to 2020. Obviously, business cycles still exist.

And the fact that population decline does not manifest its effects instantly means that it’s difficult to make it a focus of short-term politics. We are seeing dramatically and worldwide now how the difficulty of prioritizing long-term policies against climate change is working out. That is, not well.

In Part 2, I will look specifically at how the new coalition government in Austria is approaching the long-term challenges of the fertility rates and refugees. (Or not doing so.)

Part 1: https://brucemillerca.blogspot.com/2020/01/eu-long-term-challenges-on-immigration.html
Part 2: https://brucemillerca.blogspot.com/2020/02/eu-long-term-challenges-on-immigration.html
Part 3: https://brucemillerca.blogspot.com/2020/02/eu-long-term-challenges-on-immigration_5.html