Deutsche Welle reports on Hungary making diplomatic mischief within the EU

Report from earlier this week from Deutsche Welle News, Why is Hungary taking sides with China rather than with the EU and NATO? 06/08/2021:

The notes to the video include:

In the latest move toward China, Hungary’s foreign minister announced the country would begin to produce China’s Sinopharm in 2022. Hungary is also the only country in the EU to inoculate its citizens with the Chinese COVID-19 vaccine.

The implications of Hungary turning to China are concerning for the EU, especially for NATO security. A detailed report by Hungarian investigative outlet “Direkt36” documented how the country’s “Eastern Opening” policy creates a friendly environment for Chinese intelligence. In short: making Budapest a spy hub.

Orbánism and authoritarianism in Hungary

Shalini Randeria analyzes examples of how rightwing populists can turn a democratic government into an authoritarian one without staging a coup, or a sudden revolution overturning the old governmental system, or blatantly going outside the letter of the law. Her article gives particular attention to Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán and his Fidesz party, who she describes as practicing "soft authoritarian rule" via "electoral authoritarianism."

She focuses on the use of ethnonationalist demagoguery and extreme gerrymandering in Hungary.

Randeria writes that one of the characteristics of ethnonationalist´politics to encourage "pro-natalist" policies. This means some form of promoting a higher rate of reproduction by those who are part of the favored type of people, or ethnic group, or Volk. This also tends to enable traditional masculine attitudes, some of them more toxic than others. She cites the new anti-abortion laws in Poland, and Hungary's withdrawal of rights based on non-binary, non-traditional gender identities, as well as the Orbán government' hostility to women's rights in general. "A politics that defines an ethnically, "racially" or religiously homogeneous nation as a political ideal and goal mobilizes against alleged internal enemies, for example, against cosmopolitan elites, minorities or against migrants."

(All the translations from German in this post are mine.)

Even the word "migrants" has an ideoligical twist in its use by European xenophobes. They assume that "refugee" and "immigrant" are more sympathetic and neutral terms. So they prefer to talk about "migration" and "migrants," because that invokes more of an image of people voluntarily wandering from one country to another.

"Pro-natalist" creates there is an implication and sometimes a more explicit demand to promote people from the pure natural ethnic groups to have more children. 

This is a big joke in the real world. Not one of the 27 countries in the European Union has a birth rate as high as the "replacement rate" that would keep the country's population stable over the long term. That rate is generally taken to be 2,1 children per woman. New immigrants, i.e., people who immigrate as adults, tend to have more children. But children of immigrants tend to have birth rates reflecting that of the country in which they grew up.

Which isn't surprising. Because children of immigrants to Hungary or Poland or Austria who grow up in those countries are Hungarians and Poles and Austrians. So that is one of many ways they are like their fellow Hungarians, Poles and Austrians.

Randeria gives a good description of voter suppression measures in Hungary, which she rightly compares to those the Republican Party in America is actively pursuing. She also compares gerrymandering by Venezuela's President Hugo Chávez to that of Orbán. I'm not familiar with drawing of electoral districts in Venezuela during his Presidency, and that charge is new to me. I do know about the American Republican Party's redistricting habits. And they are very compatable with Orbánism.

But the political body is deformed not only by population politics, but also by a strategic transformation of the electoral law. The fact that Viktor Orbán, as well as Hugo Chávez, used this tactic shows that such attacks on democracy do not only come from the far right. [Until recently, Fidesz had been a conservative party in the European Christian Democratic tradition.] The American political scientist Kim Lane Scheppele of Princeton University uses the term "autocratic legalism" to describe how legal and constitutional measures shift the democratic rules of the game toward illiberalism. In this respect, a variety of soft authoritarian tactics and practices can be observed. One measure favored by American Republicans is gerrymandering. The strategic manipulation of constituency boundaries is intended to distort election results in the long term in order to secure a political advantage for one's own party in the long term. [my emphasis]

There can also be other kinds of gerrymandering. In the US, we're all to familiar with racial gerrymandering. But since we're talking about electoral districts, partisan political considerations are always present.

Viktor Orbán's government in Hungary has taken this tactic to the extreme: it first halved the number of constituencies and then completely redefined the boundaries of these constituencies throughout the country. Constituencies that traditionally voted for Orbán's Fidesz party by a majority came out much smaller than those in which opposition parties could count on greater electoral success. [Opposition voting strength was diluted, in other words.] As a result of these demarcations, Orbán's Fidesz party won two-thirds of the seats in parliament in 2014 with only 45 percent of the vote. With this majority in his back, it was easy for Fidesz to make further constitutional changes. As early as 2012, there had been a constitutional amendment under Orbán, in which ethnic Hungarians living in neighboring states and without residency in Hungary were given the right to vote. A full 95 percent of these new voters outside Hungary's borders voted for the Fidesz party in 2014. In doing so, Orbán‘s government has succeeded in changing the electorate to serve its [Fidesz’] own long-term advantage. [my emphasis]

The gerrymandering is indeed extreme. But the addition of ethnic Hungarians living in other countries is also a disturbing piece of enthonationalist chauvinism, connected with resentments over the Treaty of Trianon (1920). Although Orbán isn't about to start a war with any of Hungary's neighbors over it, countries like Romania have reason to be concerned about Orbán's posturing.

Shaun Walker reported last year (Hungary marks treaty centenary as Orbán harnesses 'Trianon trauma' Guardian 06/04/2020):

While never speaking directly about reclaiming lost territory, Orbán’s government has made Hungarian minority populations in neighbouring countries a cornerstone of its foreign policy, pumping money into cultural centres, media outlets, churches and football clubs in the region and handing out Hungarian passports to those who want them. Hundreds of thousands of ethnic Hungarians have taken up the offer, and the vast majority have cast votes for Orbán’s Fidesz party, cementing its control over Hungarian politics.

Last month, Orbán caused consternation in a number of regional capitals by posting a map of historical Hungary on his Facebook page as part of a post wishing students good luck with their history exams. Slovenia’s president, Borut Pahor, expressed “rejection and concern” over the map. The rights of Hungarian minorities have caused tension in relations with both Romania and Ukraine in recent years. [my emphasis]

Viktor Orbán's Hungarian ethno-nationalist posturing, including provocations over the Treaty of Trianon

Hungary's authoritarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán likes to be provocative. He recently posted on Facebook a photo of a plaque with what he calls the "seven laws of the Hungarian national policy," i.e., slogans for the nationalist politics of Orbán and his ruling Fidesz party. (Orbán sorgt mit seinen "sieben Geboten" für neue Aufregung Kurier 25.03.2021.

The seven include (my translation from German):

• The homeland exists only so long as there is someone who loves it!
• Every Hungarian child is a new guard post!
• Without strength, justice is worth little!
• Only what we can defend belongs to us!
• Every match lasts until we win it!
• Only the country has borders, the nation has none!
• No Hungarian is alone!

Part of Orbán's political schtick is to fan nationalist resentments about the territorial losses Hungary incurred at the Treaty of Trianon (1920) after the end of the First World War. (Shaun Walker, Hungary marks treaty centenary as Orbán harnesses 'Trianon trauma' Guardian 06/04/2020; Nick Thorpe, The 100-year wound that Hungary cannot forget BBC News 06/04/2020)

After the Hungarian Communist regime headed by Bela Kun that held power from March to August 1919 was ousted, the Allies proceeded to divvy up around two-thirds of what had formerly been considered territory of the Kingdom of Hungary, which had been part of the now-destroyed Austro-Hungarian Empire of the Habsburgs. From the 2020 Britannica Online article on the treaty:

By the terms of the treaty, Hungary was shorn of at least two-thirds of its former territory and two-thirds of its inhabitants. Czechoslovakia was given Slovakia, sub-Carpathian Ruthenia, the region of Pressburg (Bratislava), and other minor sites. Austria received western Hungary (most of Burgenland). The Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes (Yugoslavia) took Croatia-Slavonia and part of the Banat. Romania received most of Banat and all of Transylvania. Italy received Fiume. Except for plebiscites in two small regions, all the transfers were effected without any plebiscites. [my emphasis]

Hungary's neighbors and fellow EU members understandably take a dim view of revanchist Hungarian treatments of the lost territories, to which Hungary has no claim in international law.

Fidesz' revanchist politicking has gone beyond sentimental historical retrospectives to actually extending Hungarian citizenship to some of those considered to be members of the Hungarian community in other countries. Lili Bayer and Matei Rosca report in Hungary’s century of anger Politico EU 06/04/2020

While some of Hungary’s neighbors are now fellow EU and NATO members, the Treaty of Trianon remains among the most controversial and sensitive issues in the region’s politics, made all the more complex by Hungary’s alliance with Nazi Germany and attempts to reclaim the lost lands during World War II.

Over the past few years, tensions have simmered as Budapest raised concerns over the rights of Hungarian-speaking communities in Romania and Ukraine, while officials in surrounding countries looked on with discomfort as Orbán’s government poured large sums of money into Hungarian-speaking areas in neighboring states. Last year, the Hungarian government withdrew financial backing for a festival in Slovakia organized by a far-right group after its support for the event came under scrutiny.

Unlike some of his political rivals, Orbán grasped early on the power of Trianon in the popular imagination, even for people who were born decades after the treaty was signed. A survey conducted in 1991 across Europe found that Hungary, which had just become a democracy, had the largest majority of respondents claiming that pieces of neighboring countries belong to them — 68 percent.

Each year, the Hungarian leader’s most important political speech takes place not in Hungary, but in Romania. He often refers to the treaty — telling his supporters about a glorious past that was unfairly taken away.

A decade ago, Orbán’s ruling Fidesz party extended citizenship and voting rights to Hungarian-speakers in surrounding countries — who have become among the party’s most loyal voters. The Fidesz party’s delegation to the European Parliament currently includes one member from the Hungarian-speaking community in western Ukraine. [my emphasis]

Hungary as a model for American authoritarians

Paul Krugman points to Hungary as a credible model for how the US can become an authoritarian country with democracy effectively suppressed (American Democracy May Be Dying New York Times 04/09/2020):

To see how a modern democracy can die, look at events in Europe, especially Hungary, over the past decade.

What happened in Hungary, beginning in 2011, was that Fidesz, the nation's white nationalist ruling party, took advantage of its position to rig the electoral system, effectively making its rule permanent. Then it further consolidated its control, using political power to reward friendly businesses while punishing critics, and moved to suppress independent news media.

Until recently, it seemed as if Viktor Orban, Hungary's de facto dictator, might stop with soft authoritarianism, presiding over a regime that preserved some of the outward forms of democracy, neutralizing and punishing opposition without actually making criticism illegal. But now his government has used the coronavirus as an excuse to abandon even the pretense of constitutional government, giving Orban the power to rule by decree. [my emphasis]

The Austrian Social Democratic politician Muna Duzdar (the first Muslim to serve as a member of an Austrian national government), posted this criticism of a new anti-LGBTQ position of Hungary's government on Facebook:

My translation from the German]:

This is happening in the middle of our neighboring country, Hungary, an EU Member State. I do not recognize this country. I often wonder how this development into an authoritarian state could be so rapid. Unfortunately, we also see clearly that minorities are the first to be oppressed and stigmatized.

But what I have been observing with incomprehension for years in Austrian politics [is]: before our borders, our neighbor is step-by-step saying goodbye to democracy and the rule of law, but I have never heard a word of criticism, but only appeasement, from the current Chancellor [Sebastian Kurz] and the turquoise ÖVP [Kurz’ Christian Democratic conservative party]. Can you understand why this is so? What does Kurz have in common with Orbán?

The linked article, Ungarn will trans* Personen nicht mehr anerkennen NOIZZ.de 07.04.2020, comments:

Orbán ist seit 2010 Ministerpräsident Ungarns und verfolgt einen politischen Ansatz, mit dem er die Demokratie des Landes nach und nach zerstört. In der vergangenen Woche hat das ungarische Parlament den rechtsnationalen Orbán per Dekret die volle Regierungsgewalt zugesprochen, solange das Coronavirus als Bedrohung für die Nation angesehen wird – und damit die letzten demokratischen Kontrollsysteme des Parlaments ausgehebelt. Denn mit seinen aktuellen umfassenden Sondervollmachten kann Orbán ohne zeitliche Befristung und gegebenenfalls ohne parlamentarische Kontrolle regieren – eine Demokratie ist das nicht mehr.

[Orbán has been Prime Minister of Hungary since 2010 and has been pursuing a political approach that is gradually destroying the country's democracy. Last week, the Hungarian parliament granted full government power to the right-wing nationalist Orbán to rule by decree, as long as the coronavirus is seen as a threat to the nation – thereby undermining parliament's last democratic control systems. With its current comprehensive special powers, Orbán can govern without a time limit and, if necessary, without parliamentary control – that is no longer a democracy.]

Boris Johnson and the road to "illiberal democracy"

There's a difference between revolution and revolutionary methods. Sociologists and political scientists can come up with more-or-less well-delineated definitions to clearly distinguish them. For most people, the distinction is about as vague as it is irrelevant.

Britannica Online provides a useful general definition of the concept as it evolved since antiquity (Revolution, 2019), including references to these modern theories of revolution:

The 16th-century Italian writer Niccolò Machiavelli recognized the importance of creating a state that could endure the threat of revolution; but, at the same time, his detailed analysis of power led to a new belief in the necessity of changes in the structure of government on certain occasions. This new acceptance of change placed Machiavelli at the forefront of modern revolutionary thought, even though he never used the word revolution in his texts, and he was primarily concerned with the creation of a truly stable state.

The 17th-century English writer John Milton was an early believer in revolution’s inherent ability to help a society realize its potential. He also saw revolution as the right of society to defend itself against abusive tyrants, creating a new order that reflected the needs of the people. To Milton, revolution was the means of accomplishing freedom. Later, in the 18th century, the French, Haitian, and American revolutions were attempts to secure freedom from oppressive leadership. Modern revolutions have frequently incorporated utopian ideals as a basis for change. [my emphasis]

The Britannica editors also give credit to Immanuel Kant, who "believed that revolution was a 'natural' step in the realization of a higher ethical foundation for society," noting that the Kantian "idea helped serve as a basis for the American and French revolutions." Although in the former, more people got it directly from Thomas Paine rather than from Kant.

They even give credit to Hegel as "a crucial catalyst in the formation of 20th-century revolutionary thought" who "saw revolutions as the fulfillment of human destiny, and he saw revolutionary leaders as those necessary to instigate and implement reforms." A new biography of Hegel by Klaus Vieweg that emphasizes Hegel's republican thought rooted in the French Revolution, as suggested by its subtitle, Hegel: Der Philosoph der Freiheit [Hegel: The Philosopher of Freedom] (2919). Hegel, like Thomas Jefferson, was deeply engaged with the political ideals of the French Revolution and supportive of them, while of course keeping a critical view of its actual outcomes. Paine himself was an elected deputy to the French Revolutionary National Convention, though his service was interrupted for a year when he was imprisoned for his criticism of the Terror.

In the United States for the last 40 years, Republicans have tended to be more comfortable than Democrats with using "revolution" to describe their goals, e.g., the Reagan Revolution, the Gingrich Revolution. Although Bernie Sanders' use of "political revolution" currently has Republicans, corporate Democrats, and poor babbling Chris Matthews reverting to a more classical conservative view of at least feigning horror over the very notion.

But in our current, much-discussed trend in the world of rising authoritarianism, including in the US, Europe, Latin America, and India, some governments and parties are using and advocating methods that the Founding Father of modern reactionary thought, Edmund Burke, might have regarded as French Jacobin approaches.

The authoritarian, "illiberal democracy" that Viktor Orbán established after winning the Hungarian Presidency in 2010, he moved rapidly to build the current version of government in Hungary, using extreme gerrymandering, wide-ranging control of the press with help from allied oligarchs, politicized institutions of justice, without resorting to tactics like jailing or murdering journalists. Elections are still nominally free and competitive and people aren't arrested for political reasons. But the system is sufficiently rigged that Orbán's party can retain control without winning a majority in elections.

Peter Oborne has a thought-provoking take on Britain's Trumpish Prime Minister which is a reminder that there are various potential models for those seeking to get rid of democracy (Boris Johnson as a revolutionary figure, Boris Johnson is leading a revolution, and this time it's coming from the right Middle East Eye 02/08/2020:

Most of us were taught in college to think that revolutionary movements come from the left. It seemed to make sense: Robespierre, Marx, Lenin, Che Guevara, Mao. It may be time to reconsider. Johnson is leading a revolution, and this time it's coming from the right.

He's either forgotten, does not know, or most likely does not care that the Conservative Party came into existence in the wake of the French Revolution as a defender of great institutions - monarchy, parliament, rule of law, the church - against abstraction, ideology and political violence.

This means that Johnson repudiates the doctrines of every Conservative leader from the Duke of Wellington onwards. Johnson's hostility to institutions is so striking that I don't believe he can be viewed as a Conservative in the way the term has been understood over the last two centuries.

The party he leads has detached from its moorings, while Johnson himself should be understood as part of a group of populist leaders that includes Donald Trump, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, and most relevantly Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban. [my emphasis]

He cites various examples of Johnson's authoritarian bent, including trying to politicize the courts, attacked and restricted journalists Trump-style, and a five-week shutdown of Parliament last fall that the British Supreme Court ruled illegal.

Oborne also calls attention to the often-mentioned charismatic leader in building an authoritarian political order. He cites an article by New Statesman international editor Jeremy Cliffe (Central Europe’s authoritarians show where an unleashed Boris Johnson could lead Britain 12/18/2019) on authoritarianism in the Visegrad nations - Czechia, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia. Cliff sees Boris Johnson as having just followed an "electoral narrative of 'people versus politicians' requiring rescue by a muscular father-of-the-nation type" that "is straight out of the Visegrad playbook."

But I try to be cautious about the notion a single charismatic leader as a ncessary element of authoritarian rule. All movements, including democratic ones, need leadership. Conventional wisdom often equates populism with authoritarianism and rightwing politics. I take a more restrictive view of populism as a way of doing politics that pose an antagonism between "the elite" and "the people." There are left and democratic versions of populism. And charismatic leadership does not equate to authoritarian or antidemocratic political goals.

But the institutional moves toward dismantling democracy and the rule of law need to be taken very seriously. And in the United States, the Democrats need to take "revolutionary" actions by the Republicans as the sign of asymmetric polarization that need to be countered within the rule of law. But they need to give up the fantasy that they can be countered with covering and "bipartisan" platitudes.

EU long-term challenges on immigration and refugees (Part 1 of 3)

The European Union’s immigration situation faces two major problems, both now and for the foreseeable future.

One is that the EU needs more people. And that applies to most if not all member countries, not just to less wealthy ones like Hungary and Rumania, whose populations have been shrinking due to emigration of younger native-born people.

The other is that Europe’s near neighbors to the south have experienced nearly two decades of war and instability, with no near end in sight: the Middle East and North Africa, and Afghanistan as well, from which refugees make their way towards the EU countries.

In light of the 2015-6 refugee crisis (or acute phase of a much longer crisis), two major policies are needed: systematic recruitment and admission of immigrants for jobs currently going unfilled, whether the shortage is due to lack of skilled workers or because the jobs are so unpleasant they can’t get enough workers for them: and, a plan for fair sharing of refugees among all EU countries at an early stage, not only after asylum has been granted.

Immigration policies can be very complex. But the EU needs both those sets of policies and doesn’t have them now.

It’s a worldwide phenomenon that as countries become wealthier and more urbanized and decent health care becomes more available, the birth rate goes down. The replacement rate, the fertility rate at which the population will remain stable in numbers from one generation to the next, is generally taken to be 2.1 children per woman.

According to Wikipedia (List of sovereign states and dependencies by total fertility rate 01/23/2020), the EU member states have the following fertility rates, rounded to one decimal point:

Austria 1.5
Belgium 1.8
Bulgaria 1.6
Croatia 1.4
Cyprus 1.3
Czechia 1.6 (Visegrad Group)
Denmark 1.8
Estonia 1.6
Finland 1.8
France 1.9
Germany 1.5
Greece 1.4
Hungary 1.5 (Visegrad Group)
Ireland 2.0
Italy 1.3
Latvia 1.5
Lithuania 1.6
Luxembourg 1.6
Malta 1.5
Netherlands 1.8
Poland 1.3 (Visegrad Group)
Portugal 1.4
Romania 1.4
Slovakia 1.6 (Visegrad Group)
Slovenia 1.6
Spain 1.5
Sweden 1.8
UK 1.7

All of them are below the replacement fertility rate of 2.1.

I’ve flagged the Visegrad states, which have been particularly insistent on keeping refugees out of the EU. Visegrad Group member Poland is tied with tiny Cyprus as having the lowest. We should note here that the fertility rate won’t match one-to-one with national wealth measures. But all EU countries are already past the point where the fertility rate has dropped below 2.1.

Fertility rates below the replacement rate mean that over the coming decades, their populations will shrink. This is often discussed in the news in terms of how an aging population presents new challenges for country’s health care and government social insurance.

But it’s also generally assumed that a shrinking population is a danger to economic growth.

Scott Lanman writes (A World With Fewer Babies Spells Economic Trouble Bloomberg Businessweek 09/14/2018:

Forget the prophecies saying overpopulation will starve the planet. The human race is approaching the point where it’s no longer reproducing enough to expand the global headcount. In the world’s biggest economies -- the U.S., China, Japan and Germany -- it’s already happening or will soon. Economists say these countries could see slower economic growth unless they increase their working-age populations by accepting immigrants, possibly from regions with higher fertility rates, like parts of Asia and Africa. Lower fertility rates -- the number of live births per woman -- could also threaten safety-net programs like pensions and health care. [my emphasis]

In the US and Europe, the only reason it would threaten “safety-net programs” is if governments are unwilling to tax the wealth at a reasonable rate. But until those countries transition to a green economy in which economic prosperity is not linked to a growing population fueling growing consumption, a growing population is needed.

It was interesting to hear what Austrian Chancellor Sebastian “Basti” Kurz (ÖVP) himself recently said at the Davos World Economic Forum (A Conversation with Sebastian Kurz, Federal Chancellor of Austria 24.01.2020):

I recently had a discussion in which it was philosophized about how the post-growth society, and, can it [it] actually be good for a country when there is no more economic growth and if, yes, we still are satisfied, and would it not be even better in any case to measure the satisfaction of the population and not economic growth.

So, that all always sounds so beautiful and so romantic. I can only say that in Europe we have some of the oldest societies in the world. I think Germany has the second oldest society after Japan.

So, satisfaction doesn’t pay any pensions, okay? If we do not have growth, if we do not succeed in remaining economically competitive, that is, the European Union, because then its also Good Night welfare state and Good Night European achievements. (after 25:20 in the video)

The relation of birth and fertility rates has been studied in the context of Malthusian claims that low growth in poor countries is caused to a large if not near-exclusive extent by high population growth. This notion has been effectively refuted for, oh, the last two centuries. But it is still remarkably persistence because it is an effective distraction from maldistribution of world income and massive exploitation of poor countries by wealthier ones.

The European far right recognizes the decline of the population but try to use it as a justification for their racist, anti-Semitic “great replacement” theory. Europe’s current model authoritarian Viktor Orban is trying to promote a higher birth rate, framing in racist-nationalistic terms (Hungary to provide free fertility treatment to boost population BBC News 01/10/2020):

Hungary will provide free in-vitro fertilisation (IVF) treatment to couples at state-run clinics, Prime Minister Viktor Orbán has announced.

He said fertility was of "strategic importance". Last month his government took over Hungary's fertility clinics.

Mr Orban, a right-wing nationalist, has long advocated a "procreation over immigration" approach to deal with demographic decline.

The country's population has been falling steadily for four decades.

See also: Nora Shenouda, Ungarn setzt auf staatliche "Babyfabriken" Euronews 15.01.2020.

The idea that Hungary will get from a fertility rate of 1,5 to 2,1 or higher in any foreseeable future is nonsense. It would take forcing women out of the workforce and into a real Handmaid’s Tale kind of society in which women were basically only allowed to breed and raise children. And even that probably wouldn’t get it to the replacement rate. (If there is a side benefit of some improvement’s in women’s reproductive health care, that will be a desirable if unintended consequence.)

It’s also important to remember that the relationship between economic growth and declining population isn’t instantaneous. It doesn’t mean that if in 2020, Hungary’s population declines from 2019 that Hungary’s GDP or per capital income will decline from 2019 to 2020. Obviously, business cycles still exist.

And the fact that population decline does not manifest its effects instantly means that it’s difficult to make it a focus of short-term politics. We are seeing dramatically and worldwide now how the difficulty of prioritizing long-term policies against climate change is working out. That is, not well.

In Part 2, I will look specifically at how the new coalition government in Austria is approaching the long-term challenges of the fertility rates and refugees. (Or not doing so.)

Part 1: https://brucemillerca.blogspot.com/2020/01/eu-long-term-challenges-on-immigration.html
Part 2: https://brucemillerca.blogspot.com/2020/02/eu-long-term-challenges-on-immigration.html
Part 3: https://brucemillerca.blogspot.com/2020/02/eu-long-term-challenges-on-immigration_5.html

What does a democracy under internal threat look like?

This week's Profil (15.10.2018) has a story, "Abrisshirne" by Martin Staudinger and Robert Treichler, that I found really irritating. Which in this case, turned out to be a good thing, because it made me concentrate on the points they are making.

The topic is whether there is a world trend toward similar populist-authoritarian movements and governments. The title pages feature phots of Rodrigo Dutere (Phillipines), Jair Bolsonaro (Brazil), Nicolás Maduro (Venezuela), Matteo Salvini (Interior Minister and de facto head of government in Italy), Viktor Orbán (Hungary), Hein-Christian Strache (Vice Chancellor of Austria and head of the far-right FPÖ), Donald Trump (of course!), Tayyip Erdoğan (Turkey), and Andrés Manuel López Obrador, aka, AMLO (President-elect of Mexcio).

Putting AMLO in that list is pretty silly. he won the Presidential election in July and takes office December 1. Why he was included in that particular group as part of the "Populist International," as the caption called them is a mystery. I didn't follow the campaign closely, but my impression is that it was more a conventional center-left campaign rather than distinctly populist. More importantly, he served for five years as Governor of Mexico City (Federal District of Mexico) and built a reputation as an good executive who fought corruption. How that makes him a Duterte or an Erdoğan, I have no idea. The only thing the article itself says about AMLO is that he's an "erratic populist." Erratic? Why? It's sloppy at best to lump him into this group.

Nicolás Maduro can legitimately be called a populist. But, to put it generously, the constant American polemics against Maduro and Hugo Chávez before him as dictators was always overblown. Prior to 2016, international observers of Venezuelan elections under both Chávez and Maduro, including the Carter Center, regarded their national elections as legitimate with strong safeguards against fraud. The US is openly engaged in a regime change effort against the current Venezuelan government and Trump has threaned to militarily invade the country. And the US government always become intensely concerned about human rights and democracy in countries that it is preparing to bomb and kill lots of their people. Also, not at all incidentally, Venezuela has the largest known oil reserves of any country in the world. Anyone who think that hasn't been the overriding concern of American policy toward Venezuela is disregarding the entire history of US dealings with Venezuela and the rest of Latin America. Venezuela is a petrostate heavily hit for years by falling oil prices and facing a protracted period of civil disorder that makes it particularly difficult to compare Venezuela's situation in 2018 with any of the other country's whose leaders feature in the Profil rouges' gallery.

But Staudinger and Treichler do ask their readers to think more closely about just what features of a government make it democratic versus not-so-democratic. For instance, they point to previous worries about apathy among voters in liberal democracies, and note that voter participation has been rising. Because of the interest generated by the far-right Alternative für Deutschland (AfD). Without diving into the voting numbers here, it's a valid point that needs to be considered when we look at the antidemocratic trends their article highlights.

Don't be superficial about it, in other words.

Unfortunately, the reader doesn't come out from reading the article with any real guidelines on how to go about making that judgment.

The EU has started a formal review of the status of democracy in the member states Poland and Hungary. The EU does have a variety of standards for a country to qualify for EU membership, including things like democratic elections, a stable rule of law including politically independent police and courts, recognition of basic civil liberties and human rights, equal voting rights for all citizens. The EU also has standards for business law and regulatory practices. Unfortunately, after the 2008 financial crisis, the EU was far more focused on enforcing bad neoliberal economic policies than they have so far shown about enforcing democratic standards on member states.

The very legitimate concerns that have been raised about Poland and Hungary have particularly to do with the independence of the judicial system and whether the election system has been rigged so that the ruling party in practice cannot be voted out of office. Freedom of the press is also a major concern in both countries.

Some of these considerations are region- and country-specific. For instance, in the United States, public television receives relatively little public money. And the major news outlets are also not publicly funded and are generally businesses and some nonprofits. Governmental actions clearly aimed at punishing or restricting the functioning of independent, i.e., non-govwernmental, news operations raise real concerns about inerference with press freedom. But the federal government deciding not to financially support public TV, while that may be a bad decision, would likely not significantly reduce news coverage of public affairs.

The situation in Europe is different. Publicly-funded news media, organizationally structured to be independent of day-to-day political interference, are a major source of public news. The BBC in Britain is generally seen as the model of this approach. Other such public news operations include ARD and ZDF in Germany and ORF in Austria. Drastically reducing their public funding or trying to turn them into partisan outlets would negatively affect the availability of professional, independent news available to citizens.

A different situation is presented by Latin American countries like Argentina in which news media is broadly in the hands of oligarchs and often present news with a strong partisan-political slant. In that situation, a center-left government that uses public media outlets for news and documentaries with a viewpoint friendly to, or at least not hostile to, the elected government couldn't be said in itself to suppress press freedom. Independent public news organizations on the BBC model would improve news coverage and expand freedom of the press in those situations.

A final observation on comparing far-right political movements is that looking at international connections and interactions between those groups and parties. Far-right parties in EU countries interact on an individual basis with one another. And there is an umbrella European party represented in the European Parliament that connects some of those parties in a more formal way. And Putin's Russia is actively encouraging the far-right populist parties in an effort to undermine the EU.

[01/24/2018: Updated for clarity.]