A reminder that war analogies can be very tricky

Robert Pape has an update on Pakistani and French forces being deployed to Saudi Arabia, which is currently at war with the Houthis of Yemen and with Iran. (1)

The US-Israel War on Iran that began in February a major military attack on Iran is now a big mess. And it’s spreading.

Pape’s analysis of this situation is always worth hearing because he’s an actual expert on war with Iran. I do have big reservations about the analogy with which he opens this segment and continues later, which is the analogy he makes to the beginning of the First World War. One of the biggest problems the US brought upon itself during the Cold War was the heavy but often careless application of historical analogies. To this day, the US can’t have any foreign policy confrontation without pundits and policymakers invoking the Munich Analogy. It is understandably said of the US neoconservatives in particular that for them, it’s always 1938 and Hitler is always on the verge of seizing the Sudetenland. Jeffrey Record is one of the military scholars who has warned that careless analogical approaches can lead to serious threat inflation and bad policy responses – and has done so repeatedly. (2)

Beware the World War I analogies

Obviously, it’s important to learn lessons from actual wars! And the miscalculations the various sides made in the lead-up to the First World War were serious. But even today, the origins of the First World War are still very much disputed to this day. There’s the “sleepwalker” thesis that the European powers stumbled into a war without really meaning to. And there was certainly stumbling in the leaders’ decision-making!

John Kenneth Galbraith once put the stumbling of those prewar days into a particular framework:

People of privilege will always risk their complete destruction rather than surrender any material part of their advantage. intellectual myopia, often called stupidity, is no doubt a reason. But the privileged feel also that their privileges, however egregious they may seem to others, are a solemn, basic, God-given right. …

There was a final consideration [on the beginning of the First World War], one that it is always thought a trifle pretentious to stress. Rulers in Germany and Eastern Europe, generals in all countries, held their jobs by right of family and tradition. If inheritance qualifies one for office, intelligence cannot be a requirement. Nor is its absence likely to be a disqualification. On the contrary, intelligence is a threat to those who do not possess it, and there is a strong case, therefore, for excluding those who do possess it. This was the tendency in 1914. In consequence, both the rulers and the generals in World War I were singularly brainless men.

None was capable of thought on what war would mean for his class - for the social order that was so greatly in his favor. There bad always been wars. Rulers had been obliterated. The ruling classes had always survived. To the extent that there was thought on the social consequences of war, this was what was believed. [emphasis added] (3)

Galbraith narrated his view of the beginning of the war in a television series of the same name: (4)

Something like the stupidity problem Galbraith discussed is also part of the current Iran War. The great European powers in 1914 were at least capable of conducting sophisticated diplomacy, even if they ultimately failed miserably in their aims. But Donald Trump has shown very little ability as President to manage complicated diplomatic challenges like those with the Iran War and the Russia-Ukraine War. Settling either of those with something like a stable peace would require very difficult and elaborate diplomacy, for which Trump has show little ability in either his first or second terms.

But neither carelessness nor stupidity adequately explain the beginning of that war. German historian Fritz Fischer in his 1961 book Griff nach der Weltmacht: Die Kriegzielpolitik des kaiserlichen Deutschland 1914–1918 (English title: Germany’s Aims in the First World War) argued what became known as the “Fischer Thesis,” which stressed the responsibility of the German leadership for the beginning of the war. It’s clear that after the assassination of Crown Prince Franz Ferdinand in Sarajevo, Kaiser Bill’s government in Germany pushed the Austro-Hungarian Emperor Franz Joseph to declare war on Serbia, which triggered the network of alliances that the European powers had set up in the previous decades to undertake a mass disaster of the war. As Galbraith put it:

In 1914, all the continental powers had immensely detailed mobilization plans - plans for getting troops into uniform and to the frontier. Once started, this mobilization had a further momentum of its own; the act of mobilization signified an intention to fight. And, given the importance of territory, it naturally signaled a preference (and thus an intention) for fighting on someone else's land. Better, if you were the other party, to mobilize, strike first and fight beyond your frontiers. Mobilization in 1914 did not, as is sometimes suggested, make war inevitable. It did provoke the atmosphere of fear and crisis in which rational decision was even less probable. [emphasis added]

But 1914 was a long time ago. There is no Austro-Hungarian Empire anymore, no Austrian Crown Prince to be assassinated. Although the current Iran War began with a “decapitation strike” which killed the Iranian Supreme leader and several other senior members of the government. But using easy analogies is a risky approach to foreign policy. Galbraith also noted that the European rulers in 1914 still were heavily influenced by the longtime fixation on war for territory as being critical, as opposed to warfare aimed at destroying the enemy country’s ability to continue a war.

Jeffrey Record had a straightforward caution for policymakers on dealing with historical analogies in dealing with current military threats, here using the Mother Of All Historical Analogies for American foreign policy wonks, the Munich Analogy. Here, Record uses the word “appeasement” in the 1930s sense of making concessions in a compromised. After the results of Munich, “appeasement” became in practice a synonym for cowardice and fecklessness in foreign policy:

The democracies' choices in the 1930s were severely constrained by war weariness, domestic politics, fiscal and economic considerations, perceptions of military inadequacy, and Hitler's effective strategic deception regarding Nazi Germany's intentions and capabilities.

Appeasement of attempted German revision of the Versailles Treaty made both moral and strategic sense because the treaty was unjust, strategically short-sighted, and unenforceable. And it was not politically possible for the democracies to forcibly oppose the reunification of the German nation within a single state. The victors of 1918 had violated Woodrow Wilson's sacred principle of self-determination by prohibiting union of Germany and Austria and by creating the polyglot state of Czechoslovakia with unhappy German majorities in that state's border areas with Germany. Appeasement became untenable the moment Hitler demanded, under the threat of force, the dismemberment of Czechoslovakia - which was not only a democratic state prepared to grant the Sudeten Germans considerable political autonomy but also a significant military counterweight to German territorial ambitions in eastern and southeastern Europe. Yet neither Britain nor France was in a political or military position to defend Czechoslovakia, although Chamberlain's threat of a general war deterred Hitler from seizing all of Czechoslovakia.

Security policy decisions are not made in a political and strategic vacuum; all are contextual and made by fallible human beings who can and do make mistaken judgments based on bad information, poor reasoning, ideological bias, disbelief, fear, overconfidence, stubbornness, and pride. Chamberlain clearly misjudged Hitler, but so did a lot of others, including conservative German nationalists who supported Hitler until his war-ensuring revolutionary intentions became apparent. [emphasis added]

Notes:

(1) Prof Robert Pape: LAST WEEK TODAY - CHAOS IS COMING. Prof Robert Pape YouTube 10/17/2026. <https://youtu.be/n6DOoYayQNA?si=Mm7RHlZPf8lzaZHj> (Accessed: 2026-17-10).

(2) Record, Jeffrey (2005): Appeasement Reconsidered: Investigating the Mythology of the 1930s. US Army War College Press. <https://press.armywarcollege.edu/monographs/736> (Accessed: 2026-17-10).

(3) Galbraith, John Kenneth (1977): The Age of Uncertainty: A History of Economic ideas and Their Consequences, 22, 137-138. Boston: Houghton Mifflin.

(4) The Age of Uncertainty Episode 5 Lenin and The Great Ungluing. sveinbjornt YouTube channel 10/17/2011. <https://youtu.be/sxAoymq_SEA?si=5NXcezHvEnQULTsR> (Accessed: 2026-17-10).

(5) Record, Jeffrey (2007): The Specter of Munich: Reconsidering the Lessons of Appeasing Hitler, 116. Dulles VA: Potomac Books.

European challenges: Russia, rearmament, rightwingers and euro problems

There is a lot of disturbing news coming out of Europe, which is undergoing a big change in its strategic concerns.

The Trump Administration is becoming more and more a chaos agent. European allies can no longer count on Trump to side with them in a possible conflict with Russia. Trump’s new arrangement to exempt Russian diesel from the economic sanctions is a further signal that the US is pursuing a different and more accommodating policy toward Putin’s Russia – to the extent there is a coherent policy on that conflict from the Trump regime at all.

Russia-Ukraine War

It’s obvious that Trump himself is increasingly incapable of operating anything resembling a normal foreign policy. His primary focus in office is maximizing his own wealth. It’s very hard to see how he could achieve a stable peace agreement with Iran or facilitate one in the Russia-Ukraine War.

It certainly appears that what John Mearsheimer has been saying about the latter conflict for a while is essentially correct. The Russia-Ukraine War is a brutal mess. Despite the hype around this strike or that by Ukraine into Russia, it’s not at all clear to me that Ukraine is doing more damage with their attacks on strategic infrastructure targets than Russia is doing to it. The leap in drone capabilities that Ukraine has achieved has been impressive. But since Ukraine’s offensive in 2023 that temporarily won back some territory, it’s basically been a long war of attrition, alternating between gains and reverses for both sides. The drones on both sides have made gaining ground nearly impossible on the front lines, with huge casualties for any offensive.

The best case in the current situation would most likely be some kind of semi-permanent ceasefire along the current lines without Ukraine formally conceding any territory. But as long as they are stuck in the current war of attrition, Russia’s advantages in population and economic strength - even without of the latest boost from Trump agreeing to exempt some diesel fuel from the US economic embargo) are big.

Even as unsatisfactory as a deal like that would be, I just don’t see how the Trump-Kushner-Wikoff malicious clown show could accomplish even that. Russia would demand US assurances and specific commitments before they agreed to any substantive solution. And unfortunately I just don’t see how this crew is able to pull off anything as complicated as a Russia-Ukraine armistice would be.

So Europe is looking at very likely having two more years of war between Russia and Ukraine, at least. And the war means that Russia has a much bigger and battle-experienced army than it had when they started this in 2022. Of course, war always takes a toll on a country. And many Russian officials and citizens will surely look very unfavorably on aggressive moves against Europe which could lead to another war like the current one, or worse.

Additional threats from Russia

But that does not mean that Russia will refrain from threats and actions short of actual war against the EU/NATO countries. Politico recently reported:

The talks about a nightmare attack scenario have taken place in recent weeks among EU ambassadors from all 27 countries gathering in “restricted format,” meaning without phones or assistants. Discussions have ramped up since the discovery of an explosives-laden drone at Leipzig airport in August, said the diplomats and officials, who were granted anonymity to discuss the confidential exchanges.

While the EU has discussed such scenarios for years — unveiling a “hybrid toolbox” geared at coordinating responses to cyberattacks, election interference, and sabotage — the latest talks zeroed in on the risk of more serious attacks that cause large-scale casualties. Two diplomats said a meeting among EU ambassadors last Wednesday focused specifically on such examples.

Since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the EU says Moscow has intensified a campaign of cyberattacks, sabotage and other covert operations across the bloc. (1)

But, as always, there are a lot of angles being promoted by people representing various different interests and perspectives. For example, the former Ukrainian foreign minister, Dmytro Kuleba, gives his spin on reported events:

"Anti-European hysteria is being fueled in Russia, which I interpret as the preparation for a broader conflict with the rest of Europe," said Kuleba, before adding: "We [Ukrainians] don't have to drag you — Putin will drag you into the war."

European officials say Moscow has upped its hybrid campaign across the continent in recent months, using cyberattacks, sabotage and disinformation to disrupt critical infrastructure and weaken support for Ukraine.

Kuleba said the failed drone attack on the Leipzig airport in Germany in August was a sign of "growing preparation" for an offensive on the continent. "They see how your intelligence operates. They see how your security forces operate. They see how you react and they draw conclusions," he added.

In the aftermath of the incident, the German government concluded that Moscow was responsible for the attack, and ordered a review of security around sensitive locations. (2)

As always, it’s worth being caution about phrases like “hybrid war.” A violations of a country’s air space or some kind of cyber-hacking attack may or may not be war or a cause for war, depending on the severity and the particular situation. The use of “hybrid war” to describe immigration or refugee movements, even when it’s being consciously used as a provocative act by another country (which rarely happens), describing that a “war,” hybrid or not, is particularly problematic.

Intermingled political narratives

One constant feature in discussions over military spending is that war is profitable, especially for war industries and their financiers. That’s true regardless of the legal or moral aspects of the war. And, of course, if one side suffers enough damage, that can cut into profits, as well. Although the damage to corporate profits is not the same as the damage done to the human beings affected.

But this also means that there are vested interests who have a financial stake in hyping foreign threats. Anne Applebaum (who is married to Poland’s Foreign Minister) recently wrote:

All Vladimir Putin has to do is tell his soldiers to stop fighting, and then the war is over. The Ukrainians cannot stop fighting because, if they do, their country will be conquered and they will suffer the fate of their occupied territories: leaders murdered, children kidnapped, repression and concentration camps for everyone else. (3)

This is understandable as a polemical formulation. Russia did illegally invade Ukraine, first by seizing Crimea in 2014 and more in the current war that began in 2022. But it appears very unlikely that Russia has as its aim to take all of Ukraine. John Mearsheimer has argued repeatedly that Russia’s goal has been to hold Crimea and significant portions of eastern Ukraine, and to have a Russia-friendly government in Kiev. Or, failing that, having a weak government in Kiev that functions as the head of a dysfunctional rump state. As Mearsheimer notes, Russia occupying all of a hostile Ukraine would be a nightmare for Russia because it would be a significant military drain because of hostility from the local population. It would also give Europe that chance if they chose to do so of backing the irregular military resistance inside Ukraine.

We always have to be careful to remember that the calculations that countries make in such situations includes making assumptions about uncertainties. And national leaderships may not always make an accurate evaluation of their options. And even smart and experienced leaders can make dumb decisions.

The other huge uncertainty hanging over all this is the debility of the Trump 2.0 regime in diplomacy.

As low an opinion as I have for Trump diplomacy, I’m still surprised at all the instances we’re seeing of their inability to conduct anything like what we could call even half-competent foreign policy. It’s painfully obvious that Trump, Jared, and Steve Witkoff are laser-focused on deals that enrich themselves and their cronies. It’s been about as disastrous as it could be on the Iran War. And on Gaza. And they are hardly making a pretense these days that they could arrange a peace between Russia and Ukraine.

Former US Ambassador to Ukraine Steven Pifer wrote this week:

“You don’t have the cards,” President Donald Trump angrily told Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy during their infamous February 2025 Oval Office meeting. Trump issued this assessment just days after he had launched his effort to mediate an end to the Russia-Ukraine War. Some 19 months later, the cards have been shuffled and redealt.

But does Trump know how to play cards? Apparently not. (4)

The following is a discussion at the Warsaw Security Forum of the European situation with Russia. It includes the foreign ministers of Britain, German, Norway, and Poland. Which of course includes Mr. Applebaum, Polish Foreign Minister Radosław Sikorski. Of course, they are speaking here as the foreign ministers of their countries, not as independent experts. (5)



A particular feature of the debate is that far-right European parties that favor a pro-Russia foreign policy are opposed to boosting European military budgets. And they will take the opportunity to make “guns and butter” arguments that government programs that benefit the public will need to be further cut back if the military buildup goes forever. Part of the scam of far-right parties like the Alternative for Germany (AfD) and Austria’s Freedom Party (FPÖ) is that they pretend that the support social services and public institutions for ordinary people. But generally they are happy to follow the policies advocated by TechBro oligarchs like Elon Musk and Peter Thiel – and those kinds of supporters aren’t going to be shelling out campaign money for parties that demand that they pay higher taxes! (6)

The dead weight of bad economic ideas

Europe suffers from two really bad policy problems: austerity economics and a serious fault in the construction of the euro currency.

Germany is well known for its chronic tendency toward conservative economic policies, despite its substantial social-welfare state. There are a couple of basic ways to remedy a shortage of funds: cut programs or increase government revenue. And since a big expansion of defense spending will require a substantial dose of one or both.

Germany’s current Chancellor Friedrich Merz of the conservative Christian Democratic Union (CDU) is heavily inclined toward the former and against the latter. Because raising more revenue will require wealthier Germany including the sacred billionaires paying more to support their country. Merz and the CDU would rather not hear about any need to do that.

Politico reports under this title image: (7)

Germany and its allies rebuffed Ireland’s plan to downsize the [EU] bloc’s next seven-year budget, arguing that the proposed cuts are not enough.

On Saturday, the Irish presidency of the Council of the EU, which is steering the talks, proposed cutting around 8% from the bloc’s total budget from 2028 to 2034 in a bid to assuage a German-led camp demanding reductions of several hundred billions euros.

But Dublin’s hopes of facilitating a deal were immediately dashed by German Chancellor Friedrich Merz, one the key players in the negotiations as his country contributes to approximately one-quarter of the bloc’s common budget. [emphasis added]

Paul Krugman, an actual authority on international finance who closely followed the euro crisis following the 2008 economic slump warns that the structure of the euro currency remains highly risky.

What is France’s problem? France is on a fiscally unsustainable path. Debt is already very high as a percentage of GDP, and the French government is adding to that debt by running large budget deficits even though there is no emergency like a war, a severe recession, or a pandemic to justify such deficits. Furthermore, France has an aging population, which means that pension costs will, other things equal, grow much faster than revenue.

Now, everything I just said about France’s fiscal situation is true for other major advanced economies too, the United States very much included. But France does stand out, even among fiscally troubled nations, in one main way: its persistent inability to get realistic about retirement. …

And France’s reliance on the euro means that it’s all too easy to see how [a] loss of [market] confidence [in French debt] could turn into an ugly crisis. (8)

Krugman spent years arguing that the EU needed to fix the euro currency zone to meet the requirements of what economists call an “optimal currency area” (OCA). I won’t try to elaborate what that is here, though there are plenty of accessible descriptions available online. (9)

Notes:

(1) Vincour, Nicholas (2026): EU quietly braces for nightmare scenario of multiple-casualty hybrid attack. Politico EU 10/07/2026. <https://www.politico.eu/article/eu-nightmare-scenario-multiple-casualty-hybrid-attack/> (Accessed 2026-11-10).

(2) Ronzheimer, Paul and Caulcutt, Clea (2026): ‘Putin will drag you into the war,’ former Ukrainian foreign minister tells Europeans. Politico EU 10/11/2026. <https://www.politico.eu/article/ukraine-former-fm-europe-vladimir-putin-will-drag-you-into-war/> (Accessed 2026-11-10).

(3) Applebaum, Anne (2026): Trump’s Message to Ukraine Is Now Crystal Clear. Atlantic 10/12/2026. <https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/2026/10/trump-ukraine-putin-fuel/688974/?gift=hVZeG3M9DnxL4CekrWGK372rbdCi0mU0IdJSunXI0Sk> (Accessed 2026-13-10).

(4) Pifer, Steven (2026): In the Russia-Ukraine War, Does Trump Know How to Play Cards? Just Security 10/12/2026. <https://www.justsecurity.org/160357/russia-ukraine-trump-cards/> (Accessed 2026-13-10).

(5) UK, Germany, Poland and Norway Foreign Ministers Discuss Russia and Ukraine. DRM News YouTube channel 10/13/2026. <https://youtu.be/MPx9XH8h6sg?si=hjez_RM2hbePT6Q-> (Accessed: 2026-13-10).

(6) Jack, Victor & Barigazzi & Chris Lunday (2026): Far-right surge threatens Europe’s drive to rearm. Politico 10/08/2026. <https://www.politico.eu/article/europe-far-right-nato-defense-spending-ukraine-aid/> (Accessed: 2026-13-10).

(7) Sorgi, Gregorio (2026): Germany warns EU that €159B budget cuts are not enough. Politico EU 10/10/2026. <https://www.politico.eu/article/friedrich-merz-germany-warns-eu-e159b-budget-cuts-not-enough/> (Accessed: 2026-12-10).

(8) Krugman, Paul (2026): What’s the Matter With France? Paul Krugman Substack 10/08/2026. <https://paulkrugman.substack.com/p/whats-the-matter-with-france> (Accessed: 2026-13-10).

(9) Schelkle, Waltraud & Editors (2026): "optimum currency area." Encyclopedia Britannica, 06/06/2023. <https://www.britannica.com/money/optimum-currency-area> (Accessed: 2026-13-10).

Albert Alesina & Robert Barro & Silvana Tenreyro (2002): Optimal Currency Areas. National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper 9072 (July 2002). <https://www.nber.org/system/files/working_papers/w9072/w9072.pdf>

Beck, Krzysztof & Okhrimenko (2024): Optimum Currency Area in the Eurozone: The Regional Origins of the European Business Cycle. Springer Nature Link 03/06/2024. <https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11079-024-09750-z>

Heartland Democrats

Jess Piper is a Democratic activist in rural Missouri who shares important insights on grassroots politics, especially in rural areas. She recently wrote:

It’s frustrating to hear folks say that rural Missourians vote against their self-interest when 66 of Missouri’s 163 House Districts had no Democratic nominee on the ballot in 2022 and in cycles previous to that. Nearly 2.5 million Missourians live in those uncontested districts and didn’t have the option to vote for a Democrat for the State House and many other races because there wasn’t one on the ballot.

More candidates ran in 2024, but we still had way too many uncontested seats.

The good news is that we have changed that metric…by a massive amount. When I ran in 2022, over 40% of seats were uncontested. In this cycle, only 2% are uncontested.

That’s the first step in clawing back democracy. (1)

She cites Howard Dean’s main theme during his time as Chair of the Democratic Party (2005-2009), the 50-state strategy to actively contest election in “red” Republican-dominated states. As one might expect, Democrats who successfully contested election in red states during that period tended to be more on the centrist part of the political spectrum than on the left. But at the very minimum, forcing the Republicans to spend more of their campaign funds on what they had been able to consider safe Republican districts was an advantageous effect.

The essential idea of the 50-state strategy was to build active Democratic Party organizations everywhere. As the title of Jess’ article states, “The Only Race We Can’t Win ... Is the one we don’t run.” During his first Presidential campaign, Barack Obama relied heavily on a community-organizing model with his Obama For America group that was doing essentially that kind of organizing.

But the party let that approach drop after Obama was elected. As Michele Hornish observes, “after the 2008 election we scrapped a national 50 state strategy that put funding and support into the hands of Red State Democrats and Democratic parties and helped deliver huge victories.” (2)

Despite the Republican approach that relies even more than the Democrats on big-money donations to drive campaigns with advertising, they have at least a robust grassroot get-out-the-vote (GOTV) operation based on conservative Christian churches.

This has left the Democrats in places like Nebraska, for instance, not even bothering to put up a Democratic candidate in the current Nebraska Senate race. Instead, they are backing an independent named Dan Osborn. As Michelle Cottle writes in the New York Times:

“I don’t like either party,” he told me over pizza and beer in the town of Albion recently, after a morning of campaigning. “I think they both kind of suck.” His goal, as Mr. Osborn tells it, is to infiltrate the Senate and start breaking the unhealthy two-party death grip on the system.

Given this pox-on-both-their-houses posture, it might seem strange that the Nebraska Democratic Party is backing Mr. Osborn’s candidacy, that national Democrats have given him their tacit blessing and that his campaign events tend to be packed with more die-hard Democrats than fence-sitting unaffiliateds. (3)

As Cottle notes, “by not running its own candidate, the party might give some voters the impression that it has given up on rural America.” But to Cottle, it apparently seems obvious that this is merely a “second-tier concern” when “compared with the fierce urgency of rural America’s antipathy toward Democrats - an antipathy unlikely to be improved by the ongoing crusade of the party’s left flank to drive out moderates.”

Who those among “the party’s left flank” it is who have as their goal “to drive out moderates,” she doesn’t specify. In the real world of 2026, it’s one of the notable features of this year’s politics that after party primaries, both progressives and more traditional Democrats have closed ranks around Democratic nominees.

But somehow, she finds it obvious that it’s better for the Democrats to back candidates who aren’t Democrats at all than to build up their own party brand by nominating, you know, actual Democratic candidates! The mysterious insights of inside-the-Beltway political commentary are sometimes difficult to comprehend …

She even rolls out one of the hoariest Beltway political clichés that what voters really want in a political representative is “a guy [sic] you’d like to have a beer with.”

As opposed to, say, a “guy” who thinks billionaires should be required to pay taxes to support their country. Or one who thinks that everyone having affordable health insurance would be a desirable thing. Or one who thinks completely unnecessary Forever Wars are a bad thing.

But Cottle assures us that not only would you want to drink a beer with Osborn, he’s also “loose, chatty, goofy and prone to saying stuff that would give the average campaign consultant a heart attack.” Of course, standard-issue Beltway political commentators feel heart attacks coming on when they hear the phrase “Medicare for All.” Which Harry Truman was promoting in his 1948 Presidential campaign (though by another name).

As Cottle notes, the Democrats in Montana, Idaho, and South Dakota have been leaning in the same direction. She closes by saying that such a trend “could make for a more dynamic, maybe even less polarized, Congress.” Presumably because a Congress in which a united Democratic Party would be consistently “polarized” against unnecessary and illegal wars, massive corruption, and masked ICE goons shooting people in the streets for no good reasons, would not be conducive to Democratic and Republican Senators and Congresspeople getting drunk with each other.

Notes:

(1) Piper, Jess (2026): The Only Race We Can’t Win ... Is the one we don’t run. The View from Rural Missouri 10/01/2026. <https://jesspiper.substack.com/p/the-only-race-we-cant-win> (Accessed: 2026-09-10).

(2) Hornish, Michele (2026): Not Far Enough. Everywhere Means Everywhere. Small Deeds Done 09/29/2026. <https://michelehornish.substack.com/p/not-far-enough-everywhere-means-everywhere> (Accessed: 2026-09-10).

(3) Cottle, Michelle (2026): He’s Not a Democrat. Democrats Love Him Anyway. New York Times 08/11/2026. Gift link: <https://www.nytimes.com/2026/08/11/opinion/dan-osborn-nebraska-independent-democrats.html?unlocked_article_code=1.HVE.C5cR.rOnf3z-f_HOF&smid=url-share> (Accessed: 2026-09-10).

This post originally appeared in the ProDA-Progressive Caucus of Democrats Abroad Substack.

Another DHS action that stinks to high heaven

I’ll try to be fair about this. So I’ll say there is some chance there’s something to this beyond sleazebag New York Mafia-style politics.

I would put the odds of that being true at appoximately 100,000-to-1 against it. (1)

From the New York Times story: (2)

Federal agents executed a search warrant at the home of Representative Ilhan Omar of Minnesota on Monday, according to three people briefed on the matter, the kind of investigative step the Justice Department has long shied away from so close to an election.

The court-approved search of her Washington-area home comes after Department of Homeland Security officials said in recent months that they were investigating Ms. Omar, a Democrat, over her family’s immigration paperwork. [emphasis added]

They are trying to revoke an elected Congresswoman’s American citizenship.

Steven Levitsky and Lucan Way recently provided this round-up of similar political prosecutions in the Trump 2.0 regime:

The Justice Department launched politically targeted investigations into dozens of opposition politicians, prominent public critics, and other perceived rivals of the president. Many of them were indicted on flimsy charges or for minor offenses: New York attorney general Letitia James was indicted for alleged mortgage fraud; FBI director James Comey was indicted twice on dubious charges; and Congresswoman LaMonica McIver was indicted (and faced the prospect of seventeen years in prison) for allegedly impeding federal officers during an authorized visit to a U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE; a division of DHS) detention center. The administration sought indictments against Senators Mark Kelly and Elissa Slotkin as well as four House members for “seditious behavior” after they publicly discouraged members of the U.S. armed forces from obeying illegal orders. The administration also initiated politically motivated investigations into then–Federal Reserve Chair Jerome Powell, Federal Reserve Governor Lisa Cook, Senator Adam Schiff, Minneapolis mayor Jacob Frey, Minnesota governor Tim Walz, former special counsel Jack Smith, and ex-government officials John Brennan, Christopher Krebs, and Miles Taylor—among others.

The Justice Department launched investigations into Democratic Party donors Reid Hoffman, George Soros, and Alexander Soros, as well as the Democratic Party’s main fundraising platform, ActBlue; indicted the Southern Poverty Law Center, a civil rights organization, on dubious grounds; and instructed U.S. attorneys to investigate the Open Society Foundations, a major funder of civil society organizations. By late 2025, Reuters had documented 470 individuals, organizations, and institutions that had been “targets of retribution” under Trump. (3)

Notes:

(1) Federal agents search Rep. Ilhan Omar’s house as part of criminal investigation. MS NOW YouTube channel 10/12/2026. https://youtu.be/wj1R0w5h2rM?si=DroxsJPUKB9Ok7uq (Accessed: 2026-12-10).

(2) Barrett, Develin et. al. (2026): Homeland Security Agents Search Home of Rep. Ilhan Omar. New York Times 10/12/2026. <https://www.nytimes.com/2026/10/12/us/politics/ilhan-omar-home-searched.html?unlocked_article_code=1.IFE.xdZp.o34iHMTWLRli&smid=bs-share> (Accessed: 2026-12-10).

(3) Levitsky, Steven & Way, Lucan A. (2026): Competitive Authoritarianism in America. Journal of Democracy 37:4 10/04/2026, 5-25. <https://doi.org/10.1353/jod.2026.a1001893> Publicly available at this writing.

North Carolina Republicans using an old-school “Willie Horton” theme against Democratic Senate candidate Roy Cooper

The Republicans in North Carolina’s Senate race have been running almost a carbon copy of the notorious “Willie Horton” theme from the 1988 Presidential campaign.

Democratic nominee Roy Cooper – currently leading in the polls - was Governor when a guy got out of prison and that guy later killed someone, so Cooper is responsible for the murder. USA Today: “This is not the first time that Republicans have stretched the truth to make Cooper appear weak on crime.”

What?!? Republicans making up sleazy claims against Democrats? Say it ain’t so!!!

That was the scam the Republicans used back then. And the Democrats at the national level and their campaign consultants still weren’t willing to take seriously enough how nasty the Republicans were willing to go to keep the White House.

This is a flashback report on that political episode from Retro Report (1):

That report plausibly suggests, though, that what hurt Dukakis even more was his seemingly passionless answer to a question asked by reporter Bernard Shaw during his Presidential debate against then-Vice President George H.W. Bush about what he would do if his wife were raped and murdered by someone. Dukakis’ bland-sounding response was disastrous.

Although legacy media loves to identify dramatic moments like that as decisive turning points, in that case it was at least a big negative for Dukakis.

He could have responded with something along the lines of: “If someone had said something to me like you just said in a bar, I would probably have just punched you in the face and then had your arrested for threating my wife in such a sleazy way. Try to have some dignity, dude.”

1988 was years before FOX News went on air and became the unofficial channel for the Republican Party. Conspiracy-mongers along the lines of Alex Jones and Glenn Beck in those days were more likely to be ranting on talk radio shows about UFOs or lizard-people from outer space than about Presidential politics. By 1992, Rush Limbaugh had become a Republican star with his own sneering “political humor” directed against Democrats.

According to Dukakis campaign manager Susan Estrich in the Retro Report account, Dukakis’ debate-prep team had encouraged him to counter such a question with a response about how he would always be on the side of crime victims. It’s notable that the Willy Horton ads were promoted by an “independent” group not officially connected with the Bush campaign, which was a relatively new thing in those days.

We can see in retrospect that the Republicans were already barreling toward the endless “Whitewater” scandals, the “Gingrich Revolution,” and the era of Forever Wars. But the belligerent tone of sneering contempt was there in Bush Sr.’s politics already. And with Trump 2.0, it has taken a quantum leap into the hostile madness that the current Republican President displays – at least in those moments where his statements and “Truth Social” posts are coherent at all.

Cooper was North Carolina’s attorney general for 16 years, so he has no trouble coming up with examples to show that he has a record as a “crime-fighter.”

Although in that ad, he does indulge in some needless “hippie-punching” by saying “no way do we defund the police.” “Defund the police” has long since become a stock Republican talking point against the Democrats, even though apparently no Democratic candidate nominee in 2026 is running on that slogan. There’s no reason to repeat a Republican talking point, although given Cooper’s credentials it doesn’t distract much from his message in this case.

Moral of this story: The Democrats have to show they will fight for their own side.

This post was originally published at the ProDA-Progressive Caucus of Democrats Abroad Substack.

Notes:

(1) Pequeño, Sara (2026): North Carolina loves Roy Cooper. All GOP has is misinformation. USA Today 09/03/2026. <https://eu.usatoday.com/story/opinion/columnist/2026/09/03/roy-cooper-senate-north-carolina-republicans/91546715007/> (Accessed: 2026-10-09).

(2) Willie Horton: Political Ads That Shaped the Battle for the White House. Retro Report YouTube channel 07/14/2016. <https://youtu.be/sdJ97qWHOxo?si=msMdqdy-wLZ4PnQW> (Accessed: 2026-10-09).

(3) Roy Cooper Tackles Safety in Latest Campaign Ad. Roy Cooper YouTube channel 01/24/2026. <https://youtu.be/3STxcgRAskQ?si=Z1hXnsuVeEhgYXQK> (Accessed: 2026-10-09).

Calling Europe – it’s not as hard as Trumpistas might think

There’s an old cliche about American foreign policy toward Europe, often cited as a quote from Henry Kissinger, “Who do I call when I want to call Europe?”

It’s probably apocryphal. But the idea is that Europe in general and the EU in particular are a confused mess of squabbling countries is common as dirt with the American press.

But the Dutch foreign affairs reporter Caroline de Gruyter has a different take: “The more that Washington seems to have just one phone number - namely that of the Trump family - the more Europeans should cherish their multiple numbers. They are a sign of moderation - and therefore, of civilization.” (1)

Given the last few centuries of European history, the fact that the EU countries manage to muddle through complicated problems without starting wars with each other every few years looks more like a miracle than a mess.

De Gruyter explains why the old saying is actually pretty silly:

A good number of Americans in high political positions … who keep asking for that one telephone number are, moreover, fairly hypocritical: On the one hand, they say they want a single point of contact in Europe, but on the other hand, they work for or with a regime that does everything it can to undermine a more centralized, top-down Europe that could perhaps one day have one phone number. They actively seek to dismantle European rules that happen to be the result of (many) years of debate and negotiation between all those institutions, following a careful balancing of the interests of the 27 member states (the council), representatives of 451 million citizens (the parliament) and the European interest (the commission). Moreover, by forking out subsidies to far-right nationalist groups in Europe, they hope to wreck the few areas where matters are actually regulated centrally in Europe - trade and agriculture, for example. [my emphasis]

On those far-right parties who are focused on undermining EU Unity and cooperation, the Netanyahu government in Israel, the government that calls any mild criticism of Israel’s often reckless and criminal foreign policy anti-Semitic, is also kissing up to them.

"I had the privilege of being part of this process and of helping advance it over the past two years," Chikli said of what he called "a historic turning point in the relationship between Austria's Freedom Party, the State of Israel and the Jewish people." In reality, Kickl's speech – in which he affirmed the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance's working definition of antisemitism, pledged to move Austria's embassy to Jerusalem and committed to "take seriously the Jewish people's historical connection to Judea and Samaria" [i.e., the occupied West Bank] – was one more step in a much longer and larger journey for the far right in Austria and across Europe. [emphasis added] (2)

When is an apology not an apology? On September 17, Diaspora Affairs Minister Amichai Chikli posted on X what he presented as a quote from Herbert Kickl, leader of Austria's far-right Freedom Party (FPÖ), taken from Kickl's address to a meeting at the European Parliament: "I express my deep regret before this international audience and sincerely apologize to the Jewish citizens of Austria, to the victims and survivors of National Socialism, to their descendants and to the Jewish people."

Herbert Kickl is a snake. During the short-lived Austrian government of 2017-2019 headed by conservative (ÖVP/Austrian Christian Democrat) Sebastian Kurz, who has since joined J.D. Vance democracy-hating oligarch Peter Thiel’s stable – Kickl was the Interior Minister in charge of the Austrian policy and internal-security services. He staged a bizarre police raid on one of Austria’s own intelligence services. Other European countries to this day are reportedly leery of sharing sensitive intelligence with Austria because of the damage done by Kickl back then. The President of Austria, Alexander Van Der Bellen, who must approve the ministers in a Chancellor’s government, has stated publicly and repeatedly that he would never approve Kickl for such a senior position. Van Der Bellen actually has to formally approve the Chancellor, as well. If putting Netanyahu’s new friend Herbert Kickl in as Austrian Chancellor is a goal that Thiel and his boy Kurz are working on, they at least can’t do it in the next couple of years or so as long as Van Der Bellen is still President.

Kickl’s Freedom Party (FPÖ) is a notoriously rightwing party that is staunchly pro-Russian in its foreign policy and reliably reactionary, always pushing the boundaries that might disqualify them as antisemitic or anti-democratic. The also-notorious Alternative for Germany (AfD) party has been sending people to work with its sister party FPÖ and learning from their long experience as a relatively successful far right party that constantly pushes the limits of democratic respectability. (To put it mildly.)

The AfD and the FPÖ aren’t officially sister parties, at least in terms of their formal EU Parliamentary party affiliation. The FPÖ is part of the Patriots of Europe group while the AfD affiliates with the Europe of Sovereign Nations Group (ESN). But they are cut from the same cloth. And they are both operating with “brown” ideologies, even though both (usually) manage to stay on the legal side of the anti-Nazi laws.

It’s striking that the Israeli Ministry Diaspora Affairs chose to edit Kickl’s words to make them sound more in line such diplomatic statements from other countries. The fact that Kickl verbally affirmed his agreement with International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance (IHRA) definition of antisemitism, which has been commonly used especially since 2023 to charge that any criticism of Zionism, the Jewish-nationalist ideology that the State of Israel promotes, and basically any criticism of all of Israel’s policies toward Palestinians and neighboring states, are antisemitic. I’m sure the FPÖ will be glad to apply those standards - to Muslims.

Since Israel has gone a long way toward doing away with democracy and the rule of law inside its own country, there is discernable political logic in promoting far-right Islamophobic parties in Europe, even though neither their supporters nor or their opponents in their home countries don’t regard parties like the FPÖ as friends of democracy and the rule of law. At the moment, Netanyahu and other Israeli rightwingers can hope to gain politically by cheering on and lending political legitimacy to parties that make Muslims the primary targets of their xenophobic politics.

It’s a strange alliance between Israel and rightwing parties like the FPÖ. It brings the old saying to mind, “Politics makes strange bedfellow.” But it does make sense in the context of Nationalist International thinking, in which nationalist/xenophobic/racist parties reinforce each others’ rhetoric. In this case, the State of Israel could obviously hope to take some advantage from xenophobic and racist attitudes that parties like the FPÖ and the AfD actively promote and encourage.

This report from January 2025 after the previous year’s Austrian elections in which the FPÖ won the most votes of any party give some sense of what the FPÖ is about. (3)



Not surprisingly, some Israelis are not thrilled with Netanyahu’s kissing up to parties like the FPÖ.

Notes:

(1) De Gruyter, Caroline (2026): Thank Goodness Europe Doesn’t Have a Phone Number. Foreign Policy 09/24/2026. <https://foreignpolicy.com/2026/09/24/europe-phone-number-eu/> (Accessed: 2026-09-10).

(2) Hoare, Liam (2026): Israel's Embrace Is a Gift to Austria's Far Right, but It Comes With Hidden Risks. Haaretz 09/27/2026. Gift link: <https://www.haaretz.com/world-news/europe/2026-09-27/ty-article-magazine/.premium/israels-embrace-is-a-gift-to-austrias-far-right-but-comes-with-hidden-risks/000001a0-e24f-dfbb-afa4-f35f05800000?gift=b011dcf2a2444b55b44b2fd1d1352c8e>

(3) Austria's far-right Freedom Party leader Herbert Kickl is asked to form a government. DW News 01/06/2025. <https://youtu.be/Fjld7GgZyUs?si=jSVJq3A32lfh5_WZ> (Accessed: 2026-29-09). (Accessed: 2026-09-10).

Germany’s conservatives: ready to rerun 1933?

The recent election in the small eastern German state (Bundesland in German) of Saxony-Anhalt made world news when the far-right AfD (Alternative for Germany) party won the largest percentage of the votes and nearly won a majority. This is the party supported by such luminaries as J.D. Vance (part of tech oligarch Peter Thiel’s stable of politicians) and Elon Musk.

Deutsche Welle has this English-language report (1):

The SPD, which is a junior coalition partner in the current national government headed by the CDU, is actively protesting against political cooperation with the AfD (2):

The AfD is distinctly pro-Russia in their foreign policy orientation, and their national Parliamentary caucus is solidly in support of Netanyahu’s government in Israel and endorses the current US-Israel war against Iran. Netanyahu has actively cultivated the AfD and other far-right parties like the Freedom Party (FPÖ) in Austria on Islamophobic grounds. The Parliamentary caucus’ current statement says, “The conflict between Israel and Iran must not be imported into Germany. Foreigners who use this conflict to stir up religious or ethnic conflicts must be consistently expelled from Germany.” (3)

There is definitely a parallel to the German politics of the 1930s, when Hitler’s Nazi Party came into power with the support of German conservatives. It was the old reactionary President Paul von Hindenburg (1847-1934) who appointed Hitler as Chancellor in 1933. The Catholic Center Party provided the votes necessary in the German Parliament for Hitler’s Enabling Act, which effectively ended parliamentary democracy there. (The final season of the Babylon Berlin that was recently released deals with that final period of German democracy.)

Germany’s main conservative party today is the Christian Democratic Party (CDU), and since Angela Merkel left office, they have copied the route taken by conservatives in Britain, France, Italy and some other European democracies of trying to co-opt issues stressed by the far-right parties, including the key one of anti-immigrant xenophobia. The result has been remarkably consistent: that approach by the conservatives strengthens the far-right parties.

The CDU has for years endorsed the concept of a “firewall” against far-right parties including the AfD because of their de facto hostility to democracy and the rule of law, though the AfD has been careful to stay within Germany’s legal limits for parties participating in elections. (Saxony-Anhalt’s internal security ministry has labeled the group “rightwing extremist,” a designation indicates that it’s at least bordering on illegal conduct.) J.D. Vance infamously criticized the concept of the “firewall” at the 2025 Munich Security Conference, indicating the Trump Administration encouragement for the AfD and similar parties.

J.D. must be happy at the latest turn by the CDU in Saxony-Anhalt. The state parliament (Landtag) just elected AfD representative Tobias Rausch to be the Landtag president, making him the first AfD official to achieve such a position in Germany. Even more notably, the CDU was careful to show their approval:

Confident of victory, the flowers for Tobias Rausch are ready on the table of the AfD parliamentary group. Then the result: 48 members of the state parliament in Saxony-Anhalt voted for him. Enough for Rausch. He is the first state parliament president of the AfD nationwide since this Tuesday. The 48 votes are more than expected in advance. Rausch receives standing applause from his parliamentary group. The BSW [Bundnis Sarah Wagenknecht, another small far-right party] also applauds. Otherwise, there is silence.

In the front row of the CDU parliamentary group, Sven Schulze reaches next to himself a little later, picks up a bouquet of flowers and stands up. The acting [state] prime minister is in the plenary hall that day as chairman of the CDU parliamentary group. As such, he takes steps to Rausch, hands him the bouquet and quickly pushes past the photographers. The SPD [Social Democrats], on the other hand, presented Rausch with a Basic Law and a white rose for election. [White Rose was the name of a now-famous World War II era student resistance group at the University of Munich.)]

Before the secret ballot, only the BSW had announced that it would vote for the AfD candidate. Together, the two parties have 44 votes. After four more MPs voted for the AfD, Schulze's CDU parliamentary group is now coming into focus. It had announced in advance that it would abstain from the election. According to information from the taz, two MPs in the parliamentary group stated that they would vote against Rausch. Accordingly, there should have been 12 abstentions. In the end, there were only five. (4)

taz used this photo of the new Landtag president, in which he looks like a Marvel Universe movie villain:

The news reports I’ve seen don’t say explicitly from which party the four decisive votes besides the AfD and the BSD came. Lars Klingbeil, one of the two national chairs of the Social Democratic Party (SPD), has suggested the other four votes came from the CDU. The vote was a secret vote, though the votes were otherwise consistent with the AfD and the BSW voting for Rausch.

Notes:

(1) Far-right AfD wins first state parliament speaker post in Germany. DW News YouTube channel 10/06/2026. (Accessed: 2026-10-07).

(2) Germany's conservatives face scrutiny after far-right AfD candidate wins top post. DW News YouTube channel 10/08/2026. (Accessed: 2026-11-08).

(3) Positionierung der AfD Fraktion zum Israelisch-Iranischen Krieg. (Accessed: 2026-10-07). My translation to English.

(4) Joswig, Gareth & Muschenich, David (2026): Rechtsextremer Durchmarsch. taz 10/06/2026. (Accessed: 2026-10-07). My translation to English.

Jamelle Bouie and Sam Seder on how Democrats need to fight Trumpism

Jamelle Bouie this past Friday did an hour-long interview with Sam Seder on The Majority Report, in which they discuss current Democratic messaging and potential post-election strategies for the Democrats if they succeed in getting majorities in the House and/or the Senate.

Quick history of the Democrats’ so-called “Big Tent” (which was big enough for oligarchs and anti-abortionists)

Mainstream US commentators became addicted decades ago to “horse-race” coverage of political campaigns, i.e., who’s up, who’s down in the polls? How did the candidate handle the gotcha moment in their TV interview yesterday? This was sometimes mixed with the notorious “Tip ‘n Ronnie” anecdotes, in which pundits lamented the decline of “bipartisanship” (which usually meant Democrats surrendering to Republicans!) by talking about how Ronald Reagan and House Democratic leader Tip O’Neill would fight in public during the day and get together in the evening to have a friendly beer together. Good sportsmanship was what really mattered, not whether Reagan and the Republicans were cutting funds for health care and cutting Social Security by raising the full Social Security retirement age - which they did!

This sloppy approach to political reporting was partly a mirror of how the Democrats adapted to the ideological realignment in the party system that was substantially completed in the early years of the Reagan Administration, after many decades in which the liberal/conservative divide on most issues crossed party lines. But by the time Reagan officially began his Presidential campaign by giving a speech at a state fair in Mississippi defending the concept of “states rights” – the typical euphemism for defending racial segregation – that process was largely completed within the Republican Party. A process Republicans proudly called the Reagan Revolution.

But the electoral map was such that California, Texas, and Florida were still competitive states in Presidential elections, which meant that the Democrats decided that ideological ambiguity as represented by Michael Dukakis’ technocratic rhetoric and Bill Clinton’s embrace of what came to be known as “Third Way” politics of the kind espoused by the Democratic Leadership Council (DLC). Joe Biden was a founding member of the DLC.

Even when Obama astounded the world by winning the 2008 election on what many of his voters took to be progressive positions, even before he took office he began advocating a Grand Bargain in which Republicans would agree to tax rate increases on billionaires (which could be easily reversed by a future Republican Congress and President) and the Democrats would agree to another Reagan-style cut to Social Security by further raising the full-retirement age (when the Reagan-era version unfortunately turned out to be permanent). This came to be known as the “Simpson-Bowles” approach, after the leaders of a Commission Obama appointed in 2010 to promote the Grand Bargain, which fortunately for the vast majority of people who definitely need Social Security, failed to convince a Congressional majority. Paul Krugman started using Alan Simpson and Erskine Bowles as embodiments of what he mockingly called the Very Serious People, i.e., conservative establishment types who promoted bad ideas that would only benefit the wealthiest.

Campaign narratives and post-election Democratic strategy

Jamelle’s and Sam’s conversation largely focuses on the larger framing the Democrats need to aggressively apply to counter Republican pitches. It’s particularly interesting in that it criticizes the weaknesses of the Democrats and their campaign consultants often use of trying to target various slices of voter opinion while neglecting the need to build a majority for the general Democratic program.

They talk about how and why Democrats in Congress are too often reluctant to use Congressional investigations and in proposing aspirational legislation like Medicare for All, which is in no small part a hangover of years of listening to advice from the Very Serious People – which also includes many campaign consultants, of course.

They also discuss how public opinion on political issues is not like the weather. With the weather, it’s either raining or it’s not. And measuring whether it’s raining isn’t a problem, because everyone can see if it’s raining or it isn’t. Public opinion on political issues is much more vague and diffuse. The two agree that Democrats too often seem to be chasing public opinion on particular issues rather than shaping the campaign discussions. Jamelle uses the example of immigration, noting that many people have a general concept along the line of “criminals bad, neighbors good.”

So when voters think about getting rid of what they think of as undesirable foreigners, they are often fine with the idea of deporting serious criminals. But they like their undocumented Latino next-door-neighbors and gardeners and house cleaners and waiters and lettuce-pickers. And they really don’t want their next-door neighbors and their school children snatched by ICE Gestapo thugs in the middle of the night and sent to some private-prison company’s concentration camp in Texas or so some alligator-infested Florida swamp. And, of course, the idea of masked ICE goons just deciding to shoot people because they feel like it isn’t really a very popular one.

Jamelle uses the metaphor of people “cutting the line,” i.e., getting some unfair advantage, as an understandable conservative resentment, because he sees that as a values-based attitude, and argues that the Democrats need to appeal to that value perspective on a wide variety of issues, from immigration to free buses. The cutting-the-line metaphor is one that was popularized among Democrats and the establishment punditocracy with her 2018 book Strangers in Their Own Land: Anger and Mourning on the American Right (2018), which arguably took too uncritical a view of the attitudes expressed to her by the white Louisianians she studied. The point about the emphasis on fairness is very legitimate. But it’s very questionable whether that particular metaphor sheds much light on the roots of white racism or of xenophobia.

They also discuss issues on which Democrats have been successful in leading public opinion on issues like marriage equality. But their discussion also highlights on both political issues and hearings on particular criminal or incompetent or irresponsible government behavior, the Democrats have to use both appealing value frameworks and particular instances to which those apply. Everybody likes to grump about annoying regulations and “gubmint waste.” But to make those issues effective for Democratic candidates, they have to combine values (e.g., stealing public funds, illegally using insider information on stock trades, and carrying out crassly political prosecutions are bad) with very specific examples of that happening. And there is no shortage of such examples with the Trump 2.0 regime!

Even if both Houses wind up with Democratic majorities, any substantive legislation would be blocked by Republicans. So they will need to rely heavily on hearings to keep in the public consciousness what an astonishingly bad and corrupt President Trump has been. They could start, for instance, by proposing a Constitutional Amendment explicitly requiring the President to obey the law and use the hearings to remind everyone of how lawless Trump’s governance has been - with endless specific examples. They could hold hearings about the multiple failures and bad results the current Iran War has produced. If the Republicans could hold ten hearings on “Benghazi! Benghazi! Benghazi!” surely the Democrats can do actual constructive and substantive hearings on the Iran War. And the Venezuela intervention. And Pete Hegseth’s war on fishing boats in the Caribbean.

However, former Missouri moderate Democratic Sen. Claire McCaskill and current Democratic Senate candidate Adam Hamilton agreed on McCaskill’s MS NOW podcast that the Democrats should not seek “vengeance” on Trump. But look-forward-not-backward when it comes to serious crimes by public officials won’t fix the damage the Trump crew has done and continues to do.

How times change! In 2023, McCaskill was saying that Trump was “even more dangerous” than Mussolini and Hitler!

Rahm Emanuel on Meet the Press this past weekend seems to think that the Democrats have a big opportunity in appealing to what he calls “Mitt Romney/John McCain Republicans” who he thinks have “broken with the Republican Party” but haven’t “moved to the Democrats.” He talked vaguely about holding investigations. He straightforwardly opposes the idea of holding impeachment proceedings against Trump because that would be a “return to the politics of fighting.” And his repeats his hostility to anything that sounds like “democratic socialism.”

But Emanuel didn‘t make it clear how this would differ from the “triangulation” course the Clinton Administration pursued on the advice of political consultant Dick Morris, who has been a Republican since 1996 and who co-authored a 2012 book titled, Here Come the Black Helicopters! UN Global Governance and the Loss of Freedom warning about a supposed Obama plot to impose “UN global governance” on the world.

Jamelle Bouie has his own podcast together with John Ganz, called Unclear and Present Danger https://podcasts.apple.com/us/podcast/unclear-and-present-danger/id1592411580 and a video podcast on YouTube called Takes https://www.youtube.com/@jamelle-bouie

This post originally appeared on the ProDA-Progressive Caucus of Democrats Abroad Substack.

An over-caffeinated view of the Russia-Ukraine War

“For Europe, this means that it will not be able to maintain or even improve its comparatively liberal political order if it proves incapable of stopping such a campaign of annihilation [by Russia against Ukraine]." (Timm Grassmann) (1)

It’s worth noting that the term “war of annihilation” is typically used to describe wars in which the goal is to exterminate large parts of the enemy population, the German Eastern Front in the Second World War being a very notable case that is often described that way.

This is the sort of statement that would fit well into a speech or article by American or European hawks who want to emphasize the threat of Russia. It’s a nice applause line for a receptive audience.

Yet such rhetoric needs to be grounded in the geopolitical realities. Grassman’s comment itself would mean on its face that unless Europe (presumably meaning mainly Britain, France, Germany, Spain, Italy and Poland) stops the Russia-Ukraine War, that liberal democracies in Europe will collapse into, well, apparently something not liberal and not democratic.

We could characterize that as well as an argument that if Russia defeats Ukraine – or takes over the whole country? – that the entire current political orders in the EU countries will collapse. How? By Russia invading and occupying the whole continent? By the populations of Europe being so distraught that Ukraine has not been pushed completely out of Ukraine’s legal territory that they all right up and set up, what, Orbánist or Trumpist regimes?

The article is sprinkled with odd statements. Grassman writes that the war “did not first begin with the full invasion of 2022, but rather in 2014; it was long prepared for and was denied for many years by Russia.” Four and a half years into the war, is anybody who has been paying more than casual attention to the news about it surprised to learn that Russia illegally seized the province/oblast of Crimea in 2014 after the fall of the pro-Russian Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych as a result of the Euromaidan protests? Russia also didn’t deny seizing Crimea. They openly declared they had taken it over as part of Russia and intended to keep it.

At the same time, they supported irregular fighters in eastern Ukrainian provinces who presented themselves as local nationalists, but Russia also began annexing and ruling parts of that territory. That relatively low-level but real military conflict continued until the “full invasion’” in 2022. Aside from descriptions that use the Russian propaganda names for occupied territories as part of Russia, none of that is new or surprising to anyone with minimal familiarity with the conflict.

Grassman’s pitch on its face is basically that European nations should go to war with Russia over Ukraine:

Russia's war is aimed at the whole of Europe – and has long since taken on a global dimension, also considering North Korea's military involvement and China's political backing – but so far it has only been waged against Ukraine. Ukraine is fighting a threat that treats Europe primarily as a Ukrainian problem. The European policy of denying Ukraine the weapons it needs and at the same time continuing to indirectly supply Russia with money and technology therefore not only betrays Ukraine, but also endangers Europe's security.

This war is essentially a conventional war of attrition in which the lines of conflict have been more-or-less unchanged since 2023, when Ukraine’s army tried with limited success to roll back the Russian lines. Ukraine has made important advances in drone technology, which Grassman of course emphasizes. (Somehow Grassman manages to read that fact as showing the “half-heartedness” of other Europeans nations!) But it hasn’t changed the essentially frozen front lines. Doing so on either side would require acceptance of huge losses of soldiers, even more so than the ones currently taking place. And Russia, despite all the hype we hear from the less critical war boosters in the West, has a substantial advantage over Ukraine in manpower and economic strength.

Until both sides decide they have less to win than to lose from continuing the war, it can be expected to go on.

Yes, Ukraine is fighting back impressively. Russia might have drawn better lessons from the many wars in which countries push back hard and are not inclined to throw down their weapons when a hostile foreign invader crosses their borders. The US also could and should have learned the same lesson long ago. But neither did.

This line is one of those that makes me want to go, “huh?” “Individual attacks are currently being carried out [against Ukraine] with up to 1500 long-range drones and 50 ballistic missiles. What other European country could withstand such waves of attacks?” Britain and Germany come to mind, both of which suffered major bombing attacks for years during the Second World War. Do we really need to pretend that history began on the day the major February 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine began?

And Grassman includes the seemingly obligatory references in pieces like this to Putin’s vague historical claims about what happened hundreds of years ago. And he includes details about various Russian abuses against the Ukrainian civilian population, many of which have been well documented.

But in the end, his article is basically a recitation of the general European public diplomatic position that Russia is big and scary, which it is. Consumers of articles like his should keep in mind that the notion of big, direct military intervention by other European armies into Ukraine to fight directly against Russia is just not realistic to expect at this point. Ukraine is not a NATO member. And it certainly part of Russia’s motive for invading was fear that Ukraine would become one – NATO officially stated in 2008 that Ukraine would become a member – that figured into their decision to first to seize Crimea, conduct low-level warfare in parts of the eastern provinces, and stage the full-blown invasion of 2022.

The European NATO members are now faced with building a new approach to defense against possible military threats from Russia. The expansion of NATO in the 1990s and 2000s was seen by both Democratic and Republican Administrations as basically “freebees,” i.e., Russia couldn’t and wouldn’t do anything to push back against it. Russia’s mini-war against Georgia in 2008 was their immediate answer to NATO’s declaration that both Ukraine and Georgia would become members of the alliance. But that meant that what looked like freebees, including adding former Soviet republics of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, which have since been points of potential conflict that would require direct military responses by NATO members.

And starting with the Trump 2.0 regime in 2025, the European allies now recognize that they cannot count on the United States to engage in any military conflict against Russia, even if it involved clear aggression against the territory of NATO members. This is a huge adjustment, not least because not only are NATO’s weapons to a large extent American weapons, and the intelligence arrangements and the structures for joint NATO actions are also predicated on American leadership, equipment, and intelligence.

This is inevitably a messy process. It will involve NATO countries building up domestic defense industries – with all the real problems involved in that, including corruption and the use of overblown war warnings to justify the increased expenses. It also raises a key issue to new intensity. If the rearmament means cuts to civilian services, that will make the process much less popular, even if the “military Keynesianism” of rearmament and expanding domestic arms industries do generate economic growth. It also in practice makes the conservative-leaning austerity economics which still plagues the EU even more of a problem. The obvious main solution – requiring billionaires to pay higher taxes – is heresy to the austerity economics so successfully championed by Germany’s Angela Merkel during the euro and debt crises of the last two decades.

Looking actively for wars to fight, like the United States did from the Korean War to the US-Israel War on Iran, will not make matters better. The above-mentioned nations of Britain, France, Germany, Spain, Italy and Poland are the countries with the biggest armies in the EU-plus-Britain and so they will play critical roles. When we think back to the aftermath of the Second World War on some of the foreign policy decision Britain and France have made in their foreign policy – France’s Vietnam and Algerian Wars and the Suez crisis of 1956 that became a body blow to the influence of Britain and France in the Middle East to name just three examples – the EU publics need to keep in mind what kind of messes that imperial arrogance and irresponsible war-mongering can do a lot of substantive damage to their own well-being.

This is a messy process that has just begun. And since, as James Madison famously observed, earthly governments are not run by angels, we can’t count on all those decisions over the next couple of decades being optimal ones. That’s why citizens of Europe and Russia – Russia is also partly European, of course – need to insist that their governments put at least as much emphasis on building international structures of peace as they do to planning and arming for wars.

An end to the current Russia-Ukraine War that would be constructive and realistic enough to last for a while is currently the most obvious step in that direction.

But the US isn’t going to fade away out of European politics any time soon, even if the US itself were to formally leave NATO. And we are currently seeing with both the Russia-Ukraine War and the US-Israel War on Iran that having a US President who is not only in visibly poor health, notably including his cognitive abilities and his general lack of any strategic vision in foreign policy beyond enriching himself, his family, and their assorted cronies, is unlikely to result in stable peace agreements for those two wars.

Notes:

(1) Grassman, Timm (2026): Die Fehler von gestern, die Drohnen von heute. Blätter 2026-10, 109-116. My translation to English.

(2) Putin in War Mode: Escalation on All Fronts? DW News YouTube channel 10/01/2026. <https://youtu.be/o8cubEmu5pI?si=-brkVTgEZfCYL_-t> (Accessed: 2026-02-10).

Robert Pape on political violence

I haven’t had a chance yet to read Robert Pape’s new book, Our Own Worst Enemies: America and the Age of Violent Populism (2026). But many American political podcast junkies are already familiar with Pape through his frequent commentaries on the current Iran War since it began in later January, and more recently through his interviews on the new book.

He was already the author of two important political science books, Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism (2005) and Bombing to Win: Air Power and Coercion in War (1996).

Personal anecdote

Earlier this year I did a paper in German for a university history class on the bombing campaigns in Europe during the Second World War. And Pape’s book on strategic bombing was an important source, in which he elaborates the point he repeatedly makes today about how bombing of civilian areas of a country has by itself never in the history of aerial bombing produced a mass demand from the citizens of the country being bombed that their government should surrender to the enemy doing the bombing. Early military prophets of bombing that targeting civilian areas like Giulio Douhet had a remarkably strong and persistent faith that bombing civilian areas would cause public support in the enemy country to collapse, and quickly. To this day, all the evidence to the contrary – i.e., the absence of any instance where that actually worked – there are fools like the US Secretary of “War” Pete Hegseth who have a devout faith in that happening.

In my paper, I cited a passage from Pape saying that British post-World War One experience with colonial bombing in Mesopotamia (Iraq) was an inadequate model of a punishment campaign – i.e., bombing targeting civilians - because it was used on an underdeveloped society. The professor noted on my paper that this seemed to be a disparaging characterization. I explained to her that in my German translation I actually had cleaned up what Pape said in the 1996 book and showed her Pape’s statement that the British bombing campaigns there had been “small campaigns over relatively minor issues against primitive peoples with no means of defense [which] had limited relevance to a future European war.” [emphasis added] (1) She was surprised to see the “primitive” description used in a scholarly book as late as 1996.)

Pape’s view of current political violence attitudes in the US

Pape is an actual expert on war with Iran. He was also a student of Über-Realist John Mearsheimer, whose commentary I often cite as frustrating but more often than not correct. So he also uses a “realist” approach to international affairs.

But how he defines the problem of actual and potential political violence in the US is notable for its seeming illiberalism. He wrote in 2025, “the greatest source of danger [of political violence] comes from a cultural clash over the nature of the United States’ identity - one with profound implications for who gets to be a citizen. Its key actors are not isolated radicals but large numbers of ordinary Americans.” (2)

He also writes there:

The country’s fight over its national identity has multiple dimensions. But the most serious is demographic change. In 1990, 76 percent of the U.S. population identified as white. In 2023, the U.S. Census Bureau put that figure at a little over 58 percent. By 2035, the share is set to fall to 54 percent; a decade later, it will dip below 50 percent. These changes have led to rising anger among conservatives, many of whom see increased ethnic diversity as an existential threat to their way of life. These voters have embraced Trump and his nationalist movement, which promise to stop such change in its tracks. Trump’s exclusionary policies and rhetoric have, in turn, prompted a ferocious backlash from liberals, who embrace demographic change—or who at least fear that conservative success will cost Americans hard-won freedoms. [emphasis added]

We could also say very accurately, there are xenophobic a******s like Stephen Miller and Elon Musk out there, and the Republican Party – especially but not only Donald Trump – has engaged in shameless, dishonest fear-mongering over that issue.

Before I comment further on Pape’s arguments, I want to mention two other excellent books dealing with political violence by the seriously under-appreciated journalist and author, David Neiwert: The Age of Insurrection: The Radical Right’s Assault on America Democracy (2023) and the earlier And Hell Followed With Her: Crossing the Dark Side of the American Border (2013).

Despite Pape’s claim that there is more-or-less equal acceptance of “political violence” on both “the right” and “the left” in the US, the actual practice of domestic terrorism or directed, planned violence over some political causes has come from the far right for decades in the US. Trump’s fantasy claims (lies) about “antifa” burning down Portland and similar nonsense, the organized violence connected to political causes including immigration is coming from people who understand themselves as far right, and who pretty much everyone else would consider to be far right.

In The Age of Insurrection, published in 2023 after the January 6 insurrection but before Trump’s second successful run for the Presidency, Neiwert describes how Rush Limbaugh, a rightwing commentator who was very influential in turning the Republican Party into the Trump cult and making “owning the libs” more important to Republicans than any single concrete policy goals, responded to the mass violence of January 6:

Right-wing talk-show host Rush Limbaugh-who, more than any other cultural figure, could lay claim, as the person who had fed seditionist rhetoric to them for three decades, to being the godfather of the insurrection-took to the airwaves the day afterward, comparing the rioters to the Founders. "We're supposed to be horrified by the protesters. There's a lot of people out there calling for the end of violence," he said. "A lot of conservatives, social media, who say that any violence or aggression at all is unacceptable regardless of the circumstances. I am glad Sam Adams, Thomas Paine, the actual Tea Party guys, the men at Lexington and Concord, didn't feel that way." (He also suggested that the violence was actually the work of "Antifa and Democrat-sponsored instigators" in the Capitol and "a coup launched in the office of Barack Obama four years ago.")

He ends the paragraph on a Biblical note: “Limbaugh died of cancer a little over a month later.”

Self-styled Constitutional patriots in the Republican Party expressed themselves as follows:

Republican politicians and pundits, following Limbaugh's lead, came to their defense, labeling them "political prisoners." Five Trumpist members of Congress-Matt Gaetz of Florida, Marjorie Taylor Greene of Georgia, Louie Gohmert of Texas, and Paul Gosar and Andy Biggs of Arizona, all of whom (not coincidentally) had voted against accepting the Electoral College count on January 6-held a press conference outside of the Justice Department, denouncing the detention of the "political prisoners," on the same day that the House's January 6 committee opened its hearings. Gosar called on Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, and the ACLU to investigate the treatment of Capitol rioters.

Shortly afterward, three of them - Gaetz, Greene, and Gohmert - went to the D.C. detention center and demanded to be let in, but were turned away. "We're in totalitarian, Marxist territory here," Gohmert told reporters. "This is the way Third World people get treated."

There is simply no parallel on the Democratic side of US politics to this kind of defense of violent and murderous militias. And unless we take Trump’s present-day fantasy about violent “antifa” groups running wild in the US, there is no similar activity on anything remotely like this scale on anything that could be reasonably called “the left.” The closest the Democratic Party comes to stuff like this is Senate Majority Leader Chuck Schumer solemnly declaring that he’s sent President Trump a “strongly worded letter.” A Threads user using the handle trenthasthoughts posted this:

In other words, Both Sides Do It doesn’t come close to describing the current situation.

Is there widespread support for political violence in the US?

Here is a clip of Pape on Breaking Points with Ryan Grim talking about political violence (3):

Pape in the clip above warns that the 2026 election “is likely going to be the most dangerous election of our life” – not in the sense that he expects major violence to occur at polling places, but rather because of the possible violent and treasonous reaction of the losers, who are very likely to be the Trumpista Republicans. I haven’t yet received a copy of his book. But he says that his work includes detailed research from the last five years, and included reviews of all the January 6 criminals who

One possible occasion for violence on Election Day itself could arise if the Trump regime illegally sends federal officials like the FBI or the ICE Gestapo into local polling places and local officials send the police to block and/or arrest them. The ICE goons don’t receive anything like the level of training that municipal police typically receive. So a violent confrontation with them would likely not work out well for the ICE Gestapo. We could even see leftwing, pro-democracy protesters carrying “Support Your Local Police” signs if it comes to that. (I’m only half-kidding there!)

Pape is the director of the Chicago Project on Security and Threats and comments in the video clip above that he has worked with US security officials, including on advising on sting operations. In other words, he could be considered kind of a “narc” on this issue. Ryan Grim evens jokes (?) to him at the end that “I did not know you were a fed.”

But, like his academic mentor Mearsheimer, Pape is worth listening to even when he’s irritating.

Here is a September 17 presentation he made on his work on political violence and what he calls “violent populism,” which he uses to the phenomenon of “extremism” moving from “the fringe to the mainstream.” A definition that includes terms on which there is not widespread agreement on their precise meanings: populism, extremism, fringe, mainstream. For the Trump and his cult, all those opposing Trump are Communists and “extremists.” For the cult followers, ranting about sex-change operations on minors – which are illegal in all 50 states of the US and therefore a non-problem there – is “mainstream.” While supporting laws prohibiting racial or gender discrimination in employment is “fringe” for them.

Pape talks about some of these definitional and polling problems in this talk (4):

One concern with Pape’s analysis is that his formulations sometimes sound as though increased diversity in and of itself leads to political violence. This is an argument made by far right parties in Europe, and also by way too many European conservatives who are looking for a reason to pander to the far right rather than challenging them directly on the hate-filled nonsense.

What does “support for political violence” mean in the US in 2026?

Pape in other podcasts has estimated that there are up to 30% of the American public who support political violence. There’s good reason to be leery of such estimates.

For one thing, “political violence” is a broad category. This year is the 250th anniversary of the Declaration of Independence that continued the American Revolution already under way by then. Very, very few Americans who are not radical religious pacifists would say that it was wrong or sinful or whatever for the patriots in 1776 to fight violently against the British king, his royal army, and the Prussian mercenaries (“Hessians”) they hired to fight against the democratic and national-independence revolution of that time.

On the other hand, it is common as dirt to hear US conservatives – even ones without white hoods or Patriot Militia jackets – argue that the Second Amendment to the US Constitution guarantees a right to armed rebellion against the government. This is a completely ahistorical reading of that Amendment. No government is going to declare a right for its opponents to overthrow it. Political and moral arguments for an armed revolt would have to come from somewhere else. (William Hogeland has done a number of blog posts on the history of the 2nd Amendment.)

For that matter, even if we assume the 2nd Amendment actually does mean what the rightwingers say, an actual violent revolt would have to adopt some kind of justification, e.g., the January 6 attack on the Capitol using “stolen election” and “Trump said do it” and “Hang Mike Pence” as particular justifications.

In other words, “political violence” is a vague and concept, as is the notion of what “support” for it would mean. A PNAS (National Academy of Sciences) paper from earlier this year addresses the difficulties of polling on it, raising cautions like this: “supposedly significant public support for political violence [needs to be reconciled] with minimal actual instances of violent political action.” (5)

The study also finds that “ambiguous survey questions cause overestimates of support for violence.” Are the respondents thinking about retroactive approval for the American Revolution, or about blowing up statues of public figures they don’t like?

They also found in the studies they analyze:

Prior survey questions force respondents to select a response without providing a neutral midpoint or a “don’t know” option. This causes disengaged respondents … to select an arbitrary or random response. Current violence support scales are coded such that four of five choices indicate acceptance of violence. In the presence of arbitrary responding, such a scale will overstate support for violence. Across all four studies, we show that disengaged respondents report higher support for violence. [emphasis added]

They estimate that the studies they examine very significantly overstate how many people in the US express explicit support for political violence:

Depending on how the question is asked, we show that the median of existing estimates of the public’s support for partisan violence is nearly 6 times larger than the median of our estimates (18.5% versus 2.9%). While recent political events show that extreme political groups are willing to engage in violence, these groups are likely to overlap with the narrow segment of the population who already support political violence. As policy makers consider interventions designed to dampen support for violence, our results demonstrate that support for violence is not a mass phenomenon, indicating that antiviolence measures should be appropriately tailored to match the scale of the problem. [emphasis added]

I’m looking forward to reading Pape’s new book and will most likely have more comments after I’ve done that.

Other articles on Pape’s research:

(Book Review) Everything You Know About Political Violence Is Probably Wrong. Wired 09/22/2026. <https://www.wired.com/story/book-excerpt-political-violence-robert-pape-our-own-worst-enemies/>

Steimer, Sarah (2026): Why the Normalization of Political Violence Changes Everything. University of Chicago Dept. of Political Science 09/02/2026. <https://political-science.uchicago.edu/news/why-normalization-political-violence-changes-everything>

Pape et al (2024): The Political Geography of the January 6 Insurrectionists. July 2024. <https://www.cambridge.org/core/services/aop-cambridge-core/content/view/3C59F4E94F90B63F0E80A86DFB487D01/S1049096524000040a.pdf/political_geography_of_the_january_6_insurrectionists.pdf>

Notes:

(1) Pope, Robert (1996): Bombing to Win: Air Power and Coercion in War, 62. Ithica: Cornell University Press.

(2) Pape, Robert (2025): Our Own Worst Enemies: The Violent Style in American Politics. Foreign Affairs Nov/Dec 2024, 141-151.

(3) Professor Pape DIRE WARNING: Most Dangerous Election In History! Breaking Points YouTube channel 09/24/2026. <https://youtu.be/HUtpmQ3j_NQ?si=IsNpwgwFRGDz1a2M> (Accessed: 2026-27-09).

(4) The Iran War and the Most Dangerous Elections in our Lifetime featuring Robert Pape. Pitt-Institute of Politics YouTube channel 09/28/2026. <https://youtu.be/M9KxJ7LrjU0?si=1l5e3QG2Gd2hkPTx> (Accessed: 2026-09-30).

(5) Westwooda, Sean et al (2026): Current research overstates American support for political Violence. PNAS 119:12 02/02/2026. <https://www.pnas.org/doi/10.1073/pnas.2116870119> (Accessed: 2026-27-09).