A new article in the German Der Spiegel discusses what the author perceives as an intense power struggle within the current Iranian regime. This is understandable, since the current leader of Iran is Mojtaba Khamenei, the son of the previous Ayatollah who died along with several other senior Iranian leaders in the decapitation strikes by the US and Israel early in the current war, has not been seen in public since that event. The official Iranian position is that he was wounded but is currently very much in charge. Iran pretty clearly had multiple layers in its chain of command who were ready to step in after the previous top leaders were assassinated. (1)
Reuter’s article speculates about whether the Revolutionary Guard, which in the Iranian system is considered a secular institution subordinated to the Supreme religious leader, is now moving into the dominant role within the Iranian system. Such suggestions should be regarded with caution. After all, the current war started after Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu convinced a gullible Donald Trump that the Iranians were on the verge of overthrowing the current regime completely and that the US and Israel going to war against Iran would result in a near-term overthrow of Iranian regime to be replaced by something more malleable for Israel and the US. And, as the current war illustrates for the umpteenth time in human history that when a country is attacked, the people of that country tend to rally around their leaders in the short run. And often in the long run, as well.
John Kenneth Galbraith wrote in 1992:
Almost any military venture receives strong popular approval in the short run; the citizenry rallies to the flag and to the forces engaged in combat. The strategy and technology of the new war evoke admiration and applause. This reaction is related not to economics or politics but more deeply to anthropology. As in ancient times, when the drums sound in the distant forest, there is an assured tribal response. It is the rallying beat of the drums, not the virtue of the cause, that is the vital mobilizing force. (2)Dexter Filkins did a long profile in 2020 of the now-deceased Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. Filkins relates that when Khamenei achieved that position in 1989:
The job gave Khamenei nearly absolute power: control of every branch of the government, command of the armed forces, and supervision of the judiciary. He proved to be a nimble and energetic autocrat, creating a parallel structure for each institution. “This is how he kept everyone weak,” Mehdi Khalaji, a former Shiite cleric in Iran who is now a fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, said. Khamenei also oversaw the country’s largest concentrations of wealth: an array of institutional funds, built on property seized from the Shah’s élite, which came to be worth hundreds of billions of dollars. (3)That aspect of the late Khameini’s structuring of the government and its power centers is important background for evaluating the claim that Reuter makes about the IRGC, to which he refers as the Pasdaran (it’s also called Sepah). It is a branch of the Iranian armed forces, though it reports directly to the Supreme Leader. But, similar to the multiple capabilities of the various armed forces branches in the US, the various branch have overlapping types of functions. The IRGC itself is formally considered a terrorist group by the US and several other Western governments.
As an analysis from the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) published a month before the current war began on February 28 puts it:
The IRGC is also highly influential in Iran’s national politics. Many corps veterans have moved on to senior government roles, including in the cabinet, parliament, and provinces. The corps has meanwhile enriched itself with billions of dollars by running illicit commercial and financial networks around international sanctions. Many regional experts expect the IRGC to play a pivotal role in selecting a successor to the aging Khamenei, which could further consolidate the group’s power and increase barriers to political reform. (4)One implication of that structure is that the IRGC is very much part of the current regime. Reuter’s article might be taken to suggest that a shift to a more dominant role by the Pasdaran could produce some kind of qualitative “regime change.” But Reuter cautions against any such interpretation:
But the omnipresent power of the Revolutionary Guards suggests that the changes of course [within the government] are not the result of a dispute between two power blocs - with a dangerous vacuum at the top - but rather maneuvers so as not to alienate the most radical regime supporters.But the anthropological impulse that Galbraith described is a strong one, even when a major portion of the population hates the existing regime. And the Iranians are very much aware that they were attacked by an illegal war of aggression on the part of the US and Israel – neither of which were regarded as particularly friendly to Iran before the war.
The actual line of conflict in Iran has long been between the regime as a whole and the majority of the population, which has been rapidly impoverished because of the previous mismanagement, the sanctions, and the consequences of the war, and is likely to take to the streets again sooner or later.
The CFR analysis a month before the beginning of the current war observed:
The IRGC has … become a central player in Iran’s domestic politics, evolving into what CFR’s Ray Takeyh has called the most important organization in the country. Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei—who led the IRGC during the Iran-Iraq War—has appointed former IRGC commanders to top political posts, and former guards in parliament tend to advocate a hard-line foreign policy, as well as support for developing a civilian nuclear program.So, whatever power shifts may be happening within the ruling structures in Iran, it’s not as though the IRGC has been some completely separate power center within the regime. And pro-American or pro-Israeli, they definitely are not.
Because the IRGC marches in lockstep with the supreme leader’s policy positions, its powers at times seem to outshine that of Iran’s president, who does not control any of the armed forces and has relatively few powers of his own. (Only men have been president, and whether Iranian law requires this is unclear.) Although the president has sway over domestic policy—he controls the national budget, for example—his influence over foreign policy is limited. [my emphasis]
Reuter’s description of the IRGC as controlling half or more of the country’s economy raises interesting questions how to understand their economic system. Can we say that half their economy has been “nationalized”? That it’s an oligarch-dominated kleptocracy? A theological kleptocracy dominated by oligarchs?
This is an explainer video from April by Middle East Eye on the IRGC which presents it as a major element of the governing structure. It also provides a reminder of the Iran-Iraq War of 1980-1988, in which the US backed Saddam Hussein’s Iraq against Iran, in a war Iran clearly won, at great cost to itself:
Notes:
(1) Reuter, Christoph (2026): Die unheimlichen Herscher. Der Spiegel 30:17.07.2026, 56-57. My translation to English.
(2) Galbraith, John Kenneth (1992): The Culture of Contentment, 166-167. Boston: Houghton Mifflin.
(3) Filkins, Dexter (2020): The Enemy Is Here. New Yorker 05/25/2020, 28-39.
(4) The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). Council on Foreign Relations 01/30/2026. <https://www.cfr.org/backgrounders/irans-revolutionary-guards> (Accessed: 2026-17-07).










