Michael Doran from the Hudson Institute writing in the conservative Tablet, looks on the bright side of the Iran War: “while Trump has repeatedly defied the Beltway consensus on Iran and its allies over the past year and a half, none of the dire consequences that influential commentators predicted have come to pass. World War III hasn’t erupted.” (my emphasis) (1)
Nothing to see here, folks, move right along. Mission Accomplished!
Also, “The global economy hasn’t collapsed.” Everything’s fine!
For those of us “old enough to remember” the Iraq War, this all sounds sadly familiar.
At the end of this post I’ve included a link to a podcast in which Doran explains why he thinks Trump’s threat to wipe out Iranian civilization was way cool. And he and his podcast partner express their general contempt for any pesky laws of war against deliberately targeting civilians.
Doran’s piece is worth reading, though, as a good example of how to be a cheerleader for a misguided (and criminal) war that by any meaningful measure, the US is losing. Also, during the Iraq War the neocon war fans were endlessly saying things like Doran says here: “In doing so, they advance the very arguments that serve America’s enemies, undermining the credibility of a successful deterrent action and weakening the case for strong, burden-sharing alliances in the 21st century.” The libs are siding with the mullahs!!
The rest of the article is in the same vein, neocon talking points from the Iraq War days recycled to insert “Iran” for “Iraq.” Doran says the critics of Trump’s wars are operating on “fixed principles, which provide the lens through which events are narrativized.” In other words, he’s using stock neocon rhetoric and accused the Mean Libruls and dissident MAGA types of being stuck with unchanging rhetoric and (bad, rally bad) principles.
He even lays out seven ways to “own the libs” (my words, not his):
Myth 1: This was a “war of choice.”
A war of aggression in blatant violation of international law would be a better description. Iran did not initiate the current war. The US and Israel did so jointly.
Myth 2: The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action [the Obama Administration’s nuclear agreement with Iran] had moderated Iran and stabilized the Middle East before Trump broke it.
The JCPOA did what it was supposed to do. It limited Iran’s nuclear enrichment below the threshold that would allow them to reach the nuclear weapons capability, with unprecedently intrusive inspections by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). I don’t recall seeing any Mean Libruls arguing that the JCPOA had stabilized the whole Middle East or transformed Iran into a liberal democracy. But maybe I just missed it.
Myth 3: Biden extracted America from wars in the Middle East.
Funny, I seem to recall Biden being severely criticized by activists for his support of Israel’s genocidal war on Gaza and that polls showed that criticism of that support was a key factor in suppressing the Democratic turnout in 2024 and returning Trump to the White House.
Myth 4: Tehran was ready to compromise.
The JCPOA was quite a compromise. But Obama negotiated it, so it must have been evil by definition in the eyes of the Trump cult. In the real world, as Joe Cirincione explains. “The Iran Nuclear Deal was the most effective non-proliferation agreement ever negotiated. … The JCPOA was the most important security agreement of this century. It solved the problem” of nuclear proliferation from Iran. (2) But it didn’t meet the goal of the Netanyahu government which the US has now embraced of attempted to turn Iran into a failed state. Or, as Trump has threatened, to wipe out the entirety of Iranian civilization.
Myth 5: Israel dragged America into the war.
Israel doesn’t have the capability to “drag” the US into a war, though the Israel Lobby is very influential. Certainly, there is a lot of criticism from the “restrainers” on the left and the right of the Biden and Trump Administrations for going along with Israel advocacy for its wars, including the Gaza War and now the Iran War – as well as Israel’s current annexationist efforts in Gaza, the West Bank, Lebanon, and Syria.
Myth 6: Confronting Iran distracts from China.
Well, duh! The official national security policy of the United States since the Obama Administration has been to focus on counterbalancing China’s increasing geopolitical power. There has been and will continue to be legitimate criticisms of what assumptions the US makes and what actions it takes in that regard. But Trump’s second regime has definitely tilted away that priority. As well as running foreign policy like a Mob protection racket for the Trump crime family.
Myth 7: Trump and Netanyahu are warmongering megalomaniacs.
No, you DEI Libruls! Trump is the Peace President and Benjamin Netanyahu is the Mahatma Ghandi of the 21st century!!
Doran does manage, perhaps by accident, to sneak in some accurate statements here and there. For instance: “Iran’s drones and ballistic missiles can overwhelm the air and missile defenses of Israel, the United States, and their Gulf allies.” That’s true, although there is no evidence I’ve heard that Iran currently has the capability to strike the United States directly with their missiles.
The problem with hackery
Conservative propagandists are going to grind out own-the-libs diatribes for the foreseeable future. Probably until the whole world is running on wind and solar power.
But when governments start making policy based on it, that where I.F. Stone’s famous warning comes in: “All governments lie, but disaster lies in wait for countries whose officials smoke the same hashish they give out.”
If you want to hear “Mike” Doran directly, here is an hour-plus-long podcast of his from a week ago. (3) How much he indulges the same propaganda hashish he hands out, you can make your own guesses. In it, he calls the US-Israeli war against Iran as a war on behalf of the entire “West.” Except, you know, for parts of the “West” like Britain, Germany, France and several other countries usually considered part “the West.”
Notes:
(1) Doran, Michael (2026): Seven Myths About the Iran War. Tablet 04/13/2026. (3) <https://www.tabletmag.com/sections/news/articles/seven-myths-iran-war-michael-doran> (Accessed: 2026-14-04).
(2) Cirincione, Joe (2026): Obama’s Deal Was Better Than Trump's War. Strategy & History 04/09/2026. <https://joecirincione.substack.com/p/obamas-deal-was-better-than-trumps> (Accessed: 2026-14-04).
(3) Israel Update - with Michael Doran and Gadi Taub. YouTube channel 04/09/2026. <https://youtu.be/kpyhwmm7qrY?si=H_5PKBg5aNNhWYvC> (Accessed: 2026-14-04).
Thursday, April 16, 2026
Wednesday, April 15, 2026
Sorting through the noise on Israel’s current wars
Haaretz is an Israeli newspaper that has both English and Hebrew editions. The English edition unfortunately has most of its articles behind subscription. But because it’s willing to do actual critical reporting, even the headlines are sobering:
'Diseases Are Everywhere': Gaza's 'Catastrophic' Healthcare Crisis Is Worsening 04/14/2026
IDF Fire Kills Eight Palestinians in Gaza Over Past Day, Health Ministry Says 04/15/2026 (And you though Gaza was part of Trump’s Everlasting Peace Plan!)
Israel Doesn't Know How to Live Without War, and Maybe It Doesn't Want To 04/15/2026
As Iran War Dragged On, Israel Downed Fewer Missiles – and Cluster Missiles Wreaked Havoc 04/14/2026
Israel-Lebanon Talks Begin; Sources: Netanyahu Using Talks to Buy Time Against Hezbollah 04/14/2026
Declassified Files Expose Jewish Pre-state Underground Militia's Contacts With Nazi Germany 04/104/2026. (Wait! Say what?) The group referred to here is Lehi, also known as the Stern Gang.)
Israel Botched the Iran War – and Shattered Its Standing in the U.S. 04/08/2026
Netanyahu Ordered the War but the Opposition Sold It. Now Israel Will Pay the Price 04/08/2026
How Many Israelis Does It Take to Kill 300 Lebanese in 10 Minutes? 04/14/2026
Trailing in the Polls, Netanyahu Launches Another War: Restoring His Image 04/12/2026
The state of the current wars in Iran and Lebanon (and continuing military action against Gaza) is not giving Israelis much cause to celebrate. Linda Dayan reports on Israeli public opinion:
During the Vietnam War in the US, it became common for people to say, “We never should have been there in the first place. But now that we are there, we should go ahead and win it.” This was a classic Mugwump kind of position. If the US never should have been there, why should it be there now just because it made a bad decision to put in all those soldiers? And, of course, what would “win it” mean in that case? Unconditional surrender of North Vietnam?
But actually, that’s a lazy way to try to sound harmlessly centrist. Then and now.
That’s also why an approve/disapprove question in an opinion poll is hard to interpret. Generally, there is broad support in Israel for the illegal wars on Iran and Lebanon. So depending on the wording of the poll, “disapprove” could include a large of people who “disapprove” because the wars aren’t being pursued even more aggressively.
The main leader of the Israeli opposition, Jair Lapid of the “centrist” party Yesh Atid, enthusiastically supports the wars.
The politics of the wars internationally shows that Israel’s support in the US and Europe has seriously dropped. That doesn’t mean that it won’t rise again later. Time and Israel’s actual policies will tell.
The Christian Post, which speaks to a conservative to very conservative Protestant audience, ran an article recently which is basically a rote summary of pro-war, pro-Netanyahu talking points. The article is titled, “Yes, anti-Zionism is antisemitism.” (2) This is a theme that Israel has been pushing for decades. There has been a lot of excellent analysis in the last three years discussing the ways in which that slogan is dishonest. Because criticizing Israel’s foreign policy – especially when they practice genocide as they have been doing in Gaza since 2023 – is not equivalent to antisemitism.
Antisemites do attack Israel and consider Israel part of their fantasized World Jewish Conspiracy. But it’s dishonest to dismiss legitimate criticisms of Israel’s government and its actions as antisemitic. And in fact, American Christians like the late Pat Robertson and John Hagee of the Christian United For Israel (CUFI) group promote an End Times theology that is not only bad Christian theology.
It’s also based on a view of the divine march of history that Jewish critics have been rightly pointing out for years is about as antisemitic as it gets. Because most versions of it promote the idea that before Jesus can come again, all the Jews of the world will be “gathered” into Israel, where most of them will be slaughtered in a big war. And the survivors will all convert to Christianity, and the world will finally be free of Jews. And, yes, Israel actively encourages these Christian Zionist kooks. The current US Ambassador to Israel, Mike Huckabee, is one of them. He recently promoted an extreme Greater Israel view in an interview – not very diplomatically smooth for an US ambassador who should be taking his job seriously. (3)
The Christian Post includes this stock peace of knee-jerk support for Israel’s wars:
The story has various other pieces of stock defenses of Israel that we hear again and again and again. Not that it makes any difference to people who repeat such statement on podcasts and legacy TV news, but Israel is a member of the United Nations and is formally recognized by 164 countries (nine of them have “suspended” their recognition) and not recognized by 23. (4)
And, by the way, the government of China does not recognize Taiwan as a separate country – technically the US doesn’t either. North and South Korea are both UN members, but they both consider Korea to be a single country.
Notes:
(1) Dayan, Linda (2026): Most Israelis Disapprove of Government's Handling of Iran War, Survey Shows. Haaretz 04/14/2026. Gift link: <https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/israel-politics/2026-04-14/ty-article/.premium/most-israelis-disapprove-of-governments-handling-of-iran-war-survey-shows/0000019d-8a36-d290-afbf-aa76c9fe0000?gift=b057e7120263452fb0ea88b239ffa987> (Accessed: 20206-15-04).
(2) Huehl, Chris (2026): Yes, anti-Zionism is antisemitism: Why the distinction collapses under scrutiny. The Christian Post 04/06/2026. <https://www.christianpost.com/voices/yes-anti-zionism-is-antisemitism-why-the-distinction-collapses.html> (Accessed: 20206-15-04).
(3) Ghannoushi, Soumaya (2026): Mike Huckabee lifts the veil on US backing for Israeli expansionism. Middle East Eye 02/26/2026. <https://www.middleeasteye.net/opinion/mike-huckabee-lifts-veil-us-backing-israeli-expansionism> (Accessed: 2026-15-15).
(4) Countries that Recognize Israel 2026. World Population Review, n/d. <https://worldpopulationreview.com/country-rankings/countries-that-recognize-israel> (Accessed: 2026-15-15).
'Diseases Are Everywhere': Gaza's 'Catastrophic' Healthcare Crisis Is Worsening 04/14/2026
IDF Fire Kills Eight Palestinians in Gaza Over Past Day, Health Ministry Says 04/15/2026 (And you though Gaza was part of Trump’s Everlasting Peace Plan!)
Israel Doesn't Know How to Live Without War, and Maybe It Doesn't Want To 04/15/2026
As Iran War Dragged On, Israel Downed Fewer Missiles – and Cluster Missiles Wreaked Havoc 04/14/2026
Israel-Lebanon Talks Begin; Sources: Netanyahu Using Talks to Buy Time Against Hezbollah 04/14/2026
Declassified Files Expose Jewish Pre-state Underground Militia's Contacts With Nazi Germany 04/104/2026. (Wait! Say what?) The group referred to here is Lehi, also known as the Stern Gang.)
Israel Botched the Iran War – and Shattered Its Standing in the U.S. 04/08/2026
Netanyahu Ordered the War but the Opposition Sold It. Now Israel Will Pay the Price 04/08/2026
How Many Israelis Does It Take to Kill 300 Lebanese in 10 Minutes? 04/14/2026
Trailing in the Polls, Netanyahu Launches Another War: Restoring His Image 04/12/2026
The state of the current wars in Iran and Lebanon (and continuing military action against Gaza) is not giving Israelis much cause to celebrate. Linda Dayan reports on Israeli public opinion:
Jewish Israelis are dissatisfied with the government's handling of the war with Iran and are divided over whether it has improved Israel's overall security, according to a survey by the Israel Democracy Institute published Monday. …Like all public opinion polls, it’s always good to pay attention to what they are actually showing. For instance, “I disapprove of the government’s handling of the war” may mean that they think it’s a war in which their government shouldn’t be involved. Or it may mean they think the government isn’t prosecuting the war aggressively enough. Or both at the same time.
According to the survey, just 38 percent of Jewish Israeli respondents rated the government's management of the war as "good" or "excellent." Among Arab respondents, however, approval was lower, at 10 percent.
The data also shows variation within supporters of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's far-right coalition. Among voters for Netanyahu's Likud party, 59 percent gave the government high marks, the lowest rate among coalition parties. (1)
During the Vietnam War in the US, it became common for people to say, “We never should have been there in the first place. But now that we are there, we should go ahead and win it.” This was a classic Mugwump kind of position. If the US never should have been there, why should it be there now just because it made a bad decision to put in all those soldiers? And, of course, what would “win it” mean in that case? Unconditional surrender of North Vietnam?
But actually, that’s a lazy way to try to sound harmlessly centrist. Then and now.
That’s also why an approve/disapprove question in an opinion poll is hard to interpret. Generally, there is broad support in Israel for the illegal wars on Iran and Lebanon. So depending on the wording of the poll, “disapprove” could include a large of people who “disapprove” because the wars aren’t being pursued even more aggressively.
The main leader of the Israeli opposition, Jair Lapid of the “centrist” party Yesh Atid, enthusiastically supports the wars.
The politics of the wars internationally shows that Israel’s support in the US and Europe has seriously dropped. That doesn’t mean that it won’t rise again later. Time and Israel’s actual policies will tell.
The Christian Post, which speaks to a conservative to very conservative Protestant audience, ran an article recently which is basically a rote summary of pro-war, pro-Netanyahu talking points. The article is titled, “Yes, anti-Zionism is antisemitism.” (2) This is a theme that Israel has been pushing for decades. There has been a lot of excellent analysis in the last three years discussing the ways in which that slogan is dishonest. Because criticizing Israel’s foreign policy – especially when they practice genocide as they have been doing in Gaza since 2023 – is not equivalent to antisemitism.
Antisemites do attack Israel and consider Israel part of their fantasized World Jewish Conspiracy. But it’s dishonest to dismiss legitimate criticisms of Israel’s government and its actions as antisemitic. And in fact, American Christians like the late Pat Robertson and John Hagee of the Christian United For Israel (CUFI) group promote an End Times theology that is not only bad Christian theology.
It’s also based on a view of the divine march of history that Jewish critics have been rightly pointing out for years is about as antisemitic as it gets. Because most versions of it promote the idea that before Jesus can come again, all the Jews of the world will be “gathered” into Israel, where most of them will be slaughtered in a big war. And the survivors will all convert to Christianity, and the world will finally be free of Jews. And, yes, Israel actively encourages these Christian Zionist kooks. The current US Ambassador to Israel, Mike Huckabee, is one of them. He recently promoted an extreme Greater Israel view in an interview – not very diplomatically smooth for an US ambassador who should be taking his job seriously. (3)
The Christian Post includes this stock peace of knee-jerk support for Israel’s wars:
Israel stands alone as the only country on earth whose right to exist is routinely denied by people who claim to only oppose its policies. Many people frequently disagree with America, but this sentiment is never followed by the absolution of the nation. You never hear, “I don’t hate the Iranians, just their right to self-determination,” or the same statement applied to the Russians, French, or Brazilians. This selective standard exposes the deeper issue. [my emphasis]I think the writer probably meant to say “abolition” instead of “absolution.” “Absolution” is what Catholic priests give to people who confess their sins, i.e., forgiveness.
The story has various other pieces of stock defenses of Israel that we hear again and again and again. Not that it makes any difference to people who repeat such statement on podcasts and legacy TV news, but Israel is a member of the United Nations and is formally recognized by 164 countries (nine of them have “suspended” their recognition) and not recognized by 23. (4)
And, by the way, the government of China does not recognize Taiwan as a separate country – technically the US doesn’t either. North and South Korea are both UN members, but they both consider Korea to be a single country.
Notes:
(1) Dayan, Linda (2026): Most Israelis Disapprove of Government's Handling of Iran War, Survey Shows. Haaretz 04/14/2026. Gift link: <https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/israel-politics/2026-04-14/ty-article/.premium/most-israelis-disapprove-of-governments-handling-of-iran-war-survey-shows/0000019d-8a36-d290-afbf-aa76c9fe0000?gift=b057e7120263452fb0ea88b239ffa987> (Accessed: 20206-15-04).
(2) Huehl, Chris (2026): Yes, anti-Zionism is antisemitism: Why the distinction collapses under scrutiny. The Christian Post 04/06/2026. <https://www.christianpost.com/voices/yes-anti-zionism-is-antisemitism-why-the-distinction-collapses.html> (Accessed: 20206-15-04).
(3) Ghannoushi, Soumaya (2026): Mike Huckabee lifts the veil on US backing for Israeli expansionism. Middle East Eye 02/26/2026. <https://www.middleeasteye.net/opinion/mike-huckabee-lifts-veil-us-backing-israeli-expansionism> (Accessed: 2026-15-15).
(4) Countries that Recognize Israel 2026. World Population Review, n/d. <https://worldpopulationreview.com/country-rankings/countries-that-recognize-israel> (Accessed: 2026-15-15).
Monday, April 13, 2026
The latest round in Trump's and Netanyahu's Iran War
This is an interview with John Mearsheimer and Joshua Landis discussing the current state of the Iran War; (1)
Mearsheimer says near the end, "it can't be a long war, but it can be a long war." As enigmatic as that sounds, it's his way of saying that it would be a disaster to the US and much of the world if it does go on as a long, active war. But the US has made bad mistakes before, i.e., the Iran War.
Joshua Landis warns about the implications of Israel's "mowing the lawn" strategy in which it periodically attacks the Gaza Strip and various neighbors: Iran, Syria, and Lebannon. They also discuss the potential for Israel to go to war with Türkiye. The combination of reflexive support by the US for Israel and the increasing militarization of Israeli politics and society brought us to this point. And it's hard to see how Trump will back out of it.
As the old saying goes, it's a hell of a lot easier to get into a war than to get out of one.
And when foreign policy is being run by a malicious clown-show of a regime like Trump's, it becomes even harder.
Notes:
(1) Will Trump’s Naval Blockade of the Strait of Hormuz Work? - John Mearsheimer and Joshua Landis. Switzerland with Tom Switzer YouTube channel 04/12/2026. <https://youtu.be/fIhG1t-Uvac?si=n9Ohd3zdEaQKti4M> (Accessed: 2026-13-04).
Mearsheimer says near the end, "it can't be a long war, but it can be a long war." As enigmatic as that sounds, it's his way of saying that it would be a disaster to the US and much of the world if it does go on as a long, active war. But the US has made bad mistakes before, i.e., the Iran War.
Joshua Landis warns about the implications of Israel's "mowing the lawn" strategy in which it periodically attacks the Gaza Strip and various neighbors: Iran, Syria, and Lebannon. They also discuss the potential for Israel to go to war with Türkiye. The combination of reflexive support by the US for Israel and the increasing militarization of Israeli politics and society brought us to this point. And it's hard to see how Trump will back out of it.
As the old saying goes, it's a hell of a lot easier to get into a war than to get out of one.
And when foreign policy is being run by a malicious clown-show of a regime like Trump's, it becomes even harder.
Notes:
(1) Will Trump’s Naval Blockade of the Strait of Hormuz Work? - John Mearsheimer and Joshua Landis. Switzerland with Tom Switzer YouTube channel 04/12/2026. <https://youtu.be/fIhG1t-Uvac?si=n9Ohd3zdEaQKti4M> (Accessed: 2026-13-04).
Sunday, April 12, 2026
Jürgen Habermas and his contributions to history and political theory
The celebrated philosopher Jürgen Habermas passed away in March at age 96. There are many obituaries for him because he was one of the world’s best-known philosophers at the time of his death. (1)
Thomas Gregersen has a blog about Habermas and the liberal political philosopher John Rawls, and he has complied a long list of Habermas obituary links, many but not all in German. He includes pieces by the current German President Frank Walter Steinmeier, French President Emmanuel Macron, former Greek Prime Minister George Papandreou, and UN General Secretary António Guterres. (2)
For Americans, let’s pause just a moment to try to imagine President Donald Trump writing an informed obituary for a political philosopher who wrote books like The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere, The Theory of Communicative Action, and The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity. It would come out something like: “Yes, a German guy named Habermas just died. I don’t know much about him, but I heard he suffered from Trump derangement syndrome and was a very low IQ guy.”
Others in Gregersen’s list of Habermas obituary authors include: Eric Alterman, Seyla Benhabib, Micha Brumlik, Rainer Forst, Nancy Fraser, Norbert Frei, Axel Honneth, Martin Jay, Alexander Kluge, Robert Misik, Jan-Werner Müller, Herfried Münkler, Raimund Löw, Thomas Nagel, and Thomas Piketty.
Habermas and democracy
The eminent legal scholar Cass Sunstein did an obituary reflection on Habermas' work on his Substack. He writes:
Habermas and history
Habermas was often called Germany’s most famous philosopher during the last several decades, and that’s likely true. He was a prolific writer and often addressed current political concerns. He was even famous enough that his name has its own adjective, “Habermasian.” He is rightly given credit for initiating the Historikerstreit (Historians’ Debate) of the 1980s, a dispute over attempts be rightwing historians to minimize the significance of the Holocaust. Briefly put, the dispute initially was over a claim by a rightwing historian that actually Joe Stalin and the Soviet Communists were responsible for the Holocaust. Yes, that argument was as crackpot as it sounded. And now, you were pretty much have to seek out people with Nazi tattoos to find someone making that same claim.
But a lasting feature of that controversy was a new focus for both scholars and politicians on the most sensible and appropriate ways to compare the Holocaust in particular with other historical events. Genocide scholar Omer Bartov, who was one of the many genocide scholars who called out the Netanyahu government’s acts of genocide in the 1923-2026 (and continuing) Gaza War, wrote a retrospective piece on the Historikerstreit, in which he describes the implications for politics and history of that dispute. (4) When present-day figures like TechBro oligarch Elon Musk or our Opus Dei Vice President (and Viktor Orbán fan) J.D. Vance tell Germans it’s time for them to get over all this here reflecting on the evils of Nazism, you’re hearing similar themes to those promoted by de facto Nazi apologists during the Historikerstreit.
The Frankfurt School and Politics
Habermas was the most famous figure of what is called the Second Generation of the Frankfurt School. It actually had and still has its own academic institution, the Institute for Social Research. This is the description of some of its leading figures from the Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy:
During the first six decades of the 20th century, there were two dominant schools of left theory in European politics, most notably those associated with the Social Democratic Parties and the Soviet-line Communist Parties. Pretty much since the Bolshevik Revolution in 1917, those two broad schools of thought and politics considered themselves Marxist socialists. The polemics between the Social Democrats and Communists over who represented the true and pure version of Marxism and socialism. Although not nearly as significant as those two in actual political participation, Trotskyism was a split-off from Communist that also considered itself Marxist and socialist (and Communist) that has influenced a lot of historical accounts in particular. Not having much actual political power after Trotsky left the Soviet Union, Trotskyists became famous for their hair-splitting polemics against other who claimed to be Marxists. The best working definition I’ve ever heard of that trend is: Trotskyists are the people who support revolutions everywhere except where there is one going on. Actual revolutions are never pure enough for them.
It was disputes like that over the purest version of Marxism that promoted Karl Marx himself to write to his friend and collaborator Friedrich Engels that he was happy that “I, at least, am not a Marxist.”
That context is important for the Frankfurt School’s history. Their political positioning was more-or-less militant left social-democracy, though their militance was more intellectual and theoretical. They didn’t personally play major roles in political parties and didn’t plot sabotage attacks against arms manufacturers, or whatever. But they were very concerned with politics and were generally committed to a Marxist model of social revolution that was not focused on promoting violent uprisings but was also not pacifist.
Skipping over a few rabbit-holes that could be explored here, it’s also notable that another well-known Frankfurt School adherent, legal theorist Franz Neumann, who authored on of the best early studies of the German Nazi system, Behemoth: The Structure and Practice of National Socialism 1933-1944 (1944). Neumann came to the United States and worked for the US Board of Economic Warfare and the Intelligence Division of the US Chief of Staff, joining the now-legendary Office of Strategic Services (OSS), the major predecessor organization of the CIA. Herbert Marcuse was one of the analysts he brought to work in the OSS, and Marcuse later worked with the State Department Intelligence.
After Marcuse became an icon of the “student revolution” in the 1960s, he was wrongly reported to have worked for the CIA, which he didn’t. Tim Müller wrote a detailed account of Marcuse's intelligence career, Krieger und Gelehrte: Herbert Marcuse und die Denksysteme im Kalten Krieg. (7) It was a chronic problem for US intelligence during the 1950s that they wanted and needed good intelligence information on the Communist world. But the atmosphere of the McCarthy period made anyone who was extremely familiar with Marxism almost automatically suspicious. That lack of expertise contributed significantly to misunderstanding of events in Vietnam and even of the Soviet-China splits, which actually began in the mid-1950s but wasn’t understood by US intelligence dominated by an assumption of a World Communist Conspiracy centered in Moscow. Müller observes that Marcuse’s 1958 book Soviet Marxism: A Critical Analysis was reflective of the kind of intelligence evaluations he provided to the State Department. Among other things, he rightly predicted that a post-Stalin Soviet Union would likely be opening to moving to a position of peaceful coexistence with the US. Something that the State Department was reluctant to believe given its ideological assumptions about Soviet Communism.
Habermas and Politics
That was the political and philosophical environment of the school of thought in which Habermas was educated and which he himself developed further. As part of the Frankfurt School tradition, he identified with the left of the German Social Democratic Party of the 1960s, which had in 1959 adopted what was called the Godesberg Program, which adopted reform proposals that retreated from such classical Marxist goals as the eventual nationalizing of the means of production. The left of the party and later the larger student movement viewed it as a conservative capitulation to the right and an abandonment of desirable ideals.
Habermas had a particular vision of radical democratization that focused on encouraging broad engagement by ordinary citizens. But he also rejected what he saw as something like disruption for the sake of disruption by student activists. Because he wanted to promote grassroots dialogue and real discussion among ordinary citizens, not disruption in the hope that it would produce some kind of radical social transformation for the better. But that didn’t mean he was shy about debating. On the contrary. He saw sharp and intense arguments as necessary processes in a dialectical process of democratization. In one argument that became famous, he accused radical students of “left fascism” for some of their approaches to confrontation. But he took the mobilization of students in The Sixties and their increased engagement in political action as basically a healthy sign for democracy, which he articulated in his books on Structural Transformation and Communicative Action.
Habermas and another 2nd generation Frankfurt School figure, Claus Offe, publicized the concept of “late capitalism” to characterize the period from 1970 or so on with its new priorities like grappling with ecological challenges, in which the “legitimation problems” of capitalist democracies appeared to be growing.
One of the stranger rightwing crackpot theories of recent decades is one that starts from the authoritarian right’s resentment of Horkheimer’s Studies in Prejudice series. It goes like this: The Frankfurt School was a group of German Jewish Marxists who begat Postmodernism which begat Political Correctness which begot Critical Race Theory which begat Wokeism. Far right stars like Christopher Rufo have pimped this silly narrative.
Because it refers to things that most rightwing podcast fans are never going to read, most of them won’t know or care that this is vapid nonsense. The Frankfurt School figures were Marxists, or at least significantly influenced by Marxism. Marxism is a theory based on a materialist philosophical outlook and a materialist theory of history. Postmodernism is “a late 20th-century movement characterized by broad skepticism, subjectivism, or relativism; a general suspicion of reason; and an acute sensitivity to the role of ideology in asserting and maintaining political and economic power.” (8)
Quick Check: Frankfurt School thought is based or “broad skepticism”? In the philosophical sense, no, although Critical Theory relies on, well, critical analysis which involves methodological skepticism. Subjectivism? Well, their Freudian perspective does recognize that people are motivated by subjective feelings and impressions, but assumes they are based on material processes, both individual and social. Relativism? “Relativists characteristically insist, furthermore, that if something is only relatively so, then there can be no framework-independent vantage point from which the matter of whether the thing in question is so can be established.” (9) Nope, that’s not Frankfurt School. Critical Theory. either. Sensitivity to ideology in power relations? Well, yes, but not in the reductionist and rather fuzzy-headed way postmodernism approaches it. Also, good grief? How could any social theory of politics ignore the role of ideology? General suspicion of reason? Not even close to a fit. Habermas warned in a 2006 essay, “A ‘post-truth democracy’, such as the New York Times saw on the horizon during the last Presidential elections [of 2004], would no longer be a democracy” - another sharp difference from the postmodern conceptions. (10)
Habermas’ book The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity takes a highly critical view of tthe postmodernists’ approach. In it he writes, “Postmodernism is characterized by the withering away of every form of unifying, principle-led interpretation of the world; it carries the anarchistic features of a polycentric world that has lost its previous categorical differentiations.” (11)
Crackpot theories are par for the course on the radical right. But that bizarre theory is just goofy.
Habermas is also known for promoting the concept of constitutional patriotism, which originated with Dolf Sternberger, a conservative thinker, in 1979. Habermas expanded this concept and held it up as a constructive alternative to the traditional patriotism founded on a more narrow nationalism. Which also fit well with his enthusiastic advocacy for the European Union and a post-national project.
He was a member of the publishing board of the German journal on politics and history Blätter für deutsche und international Politik from 1998 until his passing. The April 2026 issue of Blätter includes an obituary essay for him titled “World Spirit on Paper” by Hauke Brunkhorst – a play on Hegel’s famous description of Napoleon as the World Spirit on a Horse, after seeing himself ride through Hegel’s then city of residence, Jena. (12)
Habermas and Religion
Habermas’ last major work, published in 2019, was a large (over 1700 pages) two-volume work about the relationship of religion and philosophy in Western philosophy. It deals with the interaction of the two ways of viewing the world, such as his analysis of the evolution of the concept of universal human rights from that of John Locke’s religion-based concept of natural law to the secularized social forms it took with David Hume and Emmanuel Kant.
The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy has a long article on Habermas by James Godron Finlayson and Dafydd Huw Rees.
This is a German-language retrospective on Habermas and his impact: (13)
Notes:
(1) Stefan Dege & Stuart Braun (2026): Deutsche Welle 03/14/2026. https://www.dw.com/en/celebrated-philosopher-j%C3%BCrgen-habermas-dies-aged-96/a-76361563> (Accessed: 2026-10-04).
(2) Jürgen Habermas 1929–2026: Obituaries and Tributes. Political Theory - Habermas and Rawls, 03/14/2026. https://habermas-rawls.blogspot.com/2026/03/habermas-dies-at-age-96.html (Accessed: 2026-10-04).
(3) Sunstein, Cass (2024): On the Death of Jurgen Habermas: A Day to Mourn, A Hero to Celebrate. Cass’s Substack 03/14/2026. <https://casssunstein.substack.com/p/on-the-death-of-jurgen-habermas> (Accessed: 2026-10-04).
(4) Bartov, Omer (1992): Time Present and Time Past: The Historikerstreit and German Reunification. New German Critique 55, 173-190. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/488296?seq=1>
(5) Corradetti, Claudio (2026): The Frankfurt School and Critical Theory. <https://iep.utm.edu/critical-theory-frankfurt-school/> (Accessed: 2026-11-04).
(6) Horkheimer, Max (1937): Traditionelle und kritische Theorie. Zeitschrift für Sozialforschung Jahrgang 6, 245-294.
Horkheimer, Max & Marcuse, Herbert: (1937): Zeitschrift für Sozialforschung Jahrgang 6, 625-647.
(7) Müller, Tim M. (2010): Krieger und Gelehrte: Herbert Marcuse und die Denksysteme im Kalten Krieg. Hamburg: Hamburger Edition.
(8) Duignan, Brian (2026): "postmodernism". Encyclopedia Britannica 03/26/2026, <https://www.britannica.com/topic/postmodernism-philosophy> (Accessed 2026-11-04).
(9) Maria Baghramian and J. Adam Carter: Relativism. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 01/10/2025. <https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/relativism/> (Accessed 2026-11-04).
(10) Habermas, Jürgen (2006): Religion in the Public Sphere. European Journal of Philosophy 14:1, 18.
(11) Habermas, Jürgen (1988): Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne. Zwölf Vorlesungen. Chapter VI.II. Frankfurt am Main. My translation into English.
(12) Brunkhorst, Hauke (2026): Weltgeist auf Papier. Zum Tode von Jürgen Habermas. Blätter 4:2026, 49-58.
(13) Habermas - Ein europäischer Vordenker. Irgendwas mit ARTE und Kultur YouTube channel 03/16/2026. <https://youtu.be/5_9JJJjIAFc?si=i4Vn2F3zIq7C1CFn> (Accessed 2026-12-04).
Thomas Gregersen has a blog about Habermas and the liberal political philosopher John Rawls, and he has complied a long list of Habermas obituary links, many but not all in German. He includes pieces by the current German President Frank Walter Steinmeier, French President Emmanuel Macron, former Greek Prime Minister George Papandreou, and UN General Secretary António Guterres. (2)
For Americans, let’s pause just a moment to try to imagine President Donald Trump writing an informed obituary for a political philosopher who wrote books like The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere, The Theory of Communicative Action, and The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity. It would come out something like: “Yes, a German guy named Habermas just died. I don’t know much about him, but I heard he suffered from Trump derangement syndrome and was a very low IQ guy.”
Others in Gregersen’s list of Habermas obituary authors include: Eric Alterman, Seyla Benhabib, Micha Brumlik, Rainer Forst, Nancy Fraser, Norbert Frei, Axel Honneth, Martin Jay, Alexander Kluge, Robert Misik, Jan-Werner Müller, Herfried Münkler, Raimund Löw, Thomas Nagel, and Thomas Piketty.
Habermas and democracy
The eminent legal scholar Cass Sunstein did an obituary reflection on Habermas' work on his Substack. He writes:
Jurgen Habermas is one of the most important political philosophers of the 20th century; he has been preoccupied for much of his life with the problem of political legitimacy. Under what circumstances is it legitimate for political authorities, mere human beings, to exercise power over other human beings? It is unsurprising that a German philosopher - in his teens during the Nazi period and a witness to countless other atrocities since - should direct his attention to this question. Mr. Habermas thinks that the question is especially urgent in an era that is “postmetaphysical,” in the sense that it has lost the sense that we have wholly external foundations by which to ground our judgments and choices. Whether or not we believe that God exists, it seems clear that as citizens in a heterogeneous society we must proceed on the understanding that our choices are our own. But even as he insists on this point, Mr. Habermas draws a line against modern irrationalists, many of them - like Michel Foucault and Jacques Derrida - influential within the modern academy. Mr. Habermas says, tellingly, that those who oppose reason and the Enlightenment can give no account of the basis for their own rhetoric, which seems inspired by the Enlightenment commitment to human liberation. [my emphasis] (3)Habermas wrote a lot about the philosophy of law. He stressed the connection between democracy and the rule of law, i.e., each is essential to the other. The rule of law in democratic theory means not only that the laws apply to everyone equally but also that the laws are legitimate only when there is valid democratic representation in their making. And likewise the laws are essential to establishing and maintain democracy. The Trump and Orbáns of the world want to do away with both, because democracy and the rule of law are inextricably intertwined concepts and systems of governance. His work fits into the field of “critical legal studies.”
Habermas and history
Habermas was often called Germany’s most famous philosopher during the last several decades, and that’s likely true. He was a prolific writer and often addressed current political concerns. He was even famous enough that his name has its own adjective, “Habermasian.” He is rightly given credit for initiating the Historikerstreit (Historians’ Debate) of the 1980s, a dispute over attempts be rightwing historians to minimize the significance of the Holocaust. Briefly put, the dispute initially was over a claim by a rightwing historian that actually Joe Stalin and the Soviet Communists were responsible for the Holocaust. Yes, that argument was as crackpot as it sounded. And now, you were pretty much have to seek out people with Nazi tattoos to find someone making that same claim.
But a lasting feature of that controversy was a new focus for both scholars and politicians on the most sensible and appropriate ways to compare the Holocaust in particular with other historical events. Genocide scholar Omer Bartov, who was one of the many genocide scholars who called out the Netanyahu government’s acts of genocide in the 1923-2026 (and continuing) Gaza War, wrote a retrospective piece on the Historikerstreit, in which he describes the implications for politics and history of that dispute. (4) When present-day figures like TechBro oligarch Elon Musk or our Opus Dei Vice President (and Viktor Orbán fan) J.D. Vance tell Germans it’s time for them to get over all this here reflecting on the evils of Nazism, you’re hearing similar themes to those promoted by de facto Nazi apologists during the Historikerstreit.
The Frankfurt School and Politics
Habermas was the most famous figure of what is called the Second Generation of the Frankfurt School. It actually had and still has its own academic institution, the Institute for Social Research. This is the description of some of its leading figures from the Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy:
Some of the most prominent figures of the first generation of Critical Theorists were Max Horkheimer (1895-1973), Theodor Adorno (1903-1969), Herbert Marcuse (1898-1979), Walter Benjamin (1892-1940), Friedrich Pollock (1894-1970), Leo Lowenthal (1900-1993), and Eric Fromm (1900-1980). Since the 1970s, a second generation began with Jürgen Habermas, who, among other merits, contributed to the opening of a dialogue between so-called continental and the analytic traditions. With Habermas, the Frankfurt School turned global, influencing methodological approaches in other European academic contexts and disciplines. It was during this phase that Richard Bernstein, a philosopher and contemporary of Habermas, embraced the research agenda of Critical Theory and significantly helped its development in American universities starting from the New School for Social Research in New York. (5)The Frankfurt School is often described, accurately enough, as working on social theory with particular emphasis on the theories of Karl Marx, Sigmund Freud, and Max Weber. The became especially known for their sociological studies on the “authoritarian personality” to try to understand the social and psychological characteristics of people who are attracted to authoritarian movements, including work in the United States directed by Max Horkheimer known as the Studies in Prejudice series. Max Horkheimer and Herbert Marcuse later started using the term Critical Theory for their perspective, a label that has endured for a while, i.e., since 1937. (6)
During the first six decades of the 20th century, there were two dominant schools of left theory in European politics, most notably those associated with the Social Democratic Parties and the Soviet-line Communist Parties. Pretty much since the Bolshevik Revolution in 1917, those two broad schools of thought and politics considered themselves Marxist socialists. The polemics between the Social Democrats and Communists over who represented the true and pure version of Marxism and socialism. Although not nearly as significant as those two in actual political participation, Trotskyism was a split-off from Communist that also considered itself Marxist and socialist (and Communist) that has influenced a lot of historical accounts in particular. Not having much actual political power after Trotsky left the Soviet Union, Trotskyists became famous for their hair-splitting polemics against other who claimed to be Marxists. The best working definition I’ve ever heard of that trend is: Trotskyists are the people who support revolutions everywhere except where there is one going on. Actual revolutions are never pure enough for them.
It was disputes like that over the purest version of Marxism that promoted Karl Marx himself to write to his friend and collaborator Friedrich Engels that he was happy that “I, at least, am not a Marxist.”
That context is important for the Frankfurt School’s history. Their political positioning was more-or-less militant left social-democracy, though their militance was more intellectual and theoretical. They didn’t personally play major roles in political parties and didn’t plot sabotage attacks against arms manufacturers, or whatever. But they were very concerned with politics and were generally committed to a Marxist model of social revolution that was not focused on promoting violent uprisings but was also not pacifist.
Skipping over a few rabbit-holes that could be explored here, it’s also notable that another well-known Frankfurt School adherent, legal theorist Franz Neumann, who authored on of the best early studies of the German Nazi system, Behemoth: The Structure and Practice of National Socialism 1933-1944 (1944). Neumann came to the United States and worked for the US Board of Economic Warfare and the Intelligence Division of the US Chief of Staff, joining the now-legendary Office of Strategic Services (OSS), the major predecessor organization of the CIA. Herbert Marcuse was one of the analysts he brought to work in the OSS, and Marcuse later worked with the State Department Intelligence.
After Marcuse became an icon of the “student revolution” in the 1960s, he was wrongly reported to have worked for the CIA, which he didn’t. Tim Müller wrote a detailed account of Marcuse's intelligence career, Krieger und Gelehrte: Herbert Marcuse und die Denksysteme im Kalten Krieg. (7) It was a chronic problem for US intelligence during the 1950s that they wanted and needed good intelligence information on the Communist world. But the atmosphere of the McCarthy period made anyone who was extremely familiar with Marxism almost automatically suspicious. That lack of expertise contributed significantly to misunderstanding of events in Vietnam and even of the Soviet-China splits, which actually began in the mid-1950s but wasn’t understood by US intelligence dominated by an assumption of a World Communist Conspiracy centered in Moscow. Müller observes that Marcuse’s 1958 book Soviet Marxism: A Critical Analysis was reflective of the kind of intelligence evaluations he provided to the State Department. Among other things, he rightly predicted that a post-Stalin Soviet Union would likely be opening to moving to a position of peaceful coexistence with the US. Something that the State Department was reluctant to believe given its ideological assumptions about Soviet Communism.
Habermas and Politics
That was the political and philosophical environment of the school of thought in which Habermas was educated and which he himself developed further. As part of the Frankfurt School tradition, he identified with the left of the German Social Democratic Party of the 1960s, which had in 1959 adopted what was called the Godesberg Program, which adopted reform proposals that retreated from such classical Marxist goals as the eventual nationalizing of the means of production. The left of the party and later the larger student movement viewed it as a conservative capitulation to the right and an abandonment of desirable ideals.
Habermas had a particular vision of radical democratization that focused on encouraging broad engagement by ordinary citizens. But he also rejected what he saw as something like disruption for the sake of disruption by student activists. Because he wanted to promote grassroots dialogue and real discussion among ordinary citizens, not disruption in the hope that it would produce some kind of radical social transformation for the better. But that didn’t mean he was shy about debating. On the contrary. He saw sharp and intense arguments as necessary processes in a dialectical process of democratization. In one argument that became famous, he accused radical students of “left fascism” for some of their approaches to confrontation. But he took the mobilization of students in The Sixties and their increased engagement in political action as basically a healthy sign for democracy, which he articulated in his books on Structural Transformation and Communicative Action.
Habermas and another 2nd generation Frankfurt School figure, Claus Offe, publicized the concept of “late capitalism” to characterize the period from 1970 or so on with its new priorities like grappling with ecological challenges, in which the “legitimation problems” of capitalist democracies appeared to be growing.
One of the stranger rightwing crackpot theories of recent decades is one that starts from the authoritarian right’s resentment of Horkheimer’s Studies in Prejudice series. It goes like this: The Frankfurt School was a group of German Jewish Marxists who begat Postmodernism which begat Political Correctness which begot Critical Race Theory which begat Wokeism. Far right stars like Christopher Rufo have pimped this silly narrative.
Because it refers to things that most rightwing podcast fans are never going to read, most of them won’t know or care that this is vapid nonsense. The Frankfurt School figures were Marxists, or at least significantly influenced by Marxism. Marxism is a theory based on a materialist philosophical outlook and a materialist theory of history. Postmodernism is “a late 20th-century movement characterized by broad skepticism, subjectivism, or relativism; a general suspicion of reason; and an acute sensitivity to the role of ideology in asserting and maintaining political and economic power.” (8)
Quick Check: Frankfurt School thought is based or “broad skepticism”? In the philosophical sense, no, although Critical Theory relies on, well, critical analysis which involves methodological skepticism. Subjectivism? Well, their Freudian perspective does recognize that people are motivated by subjective feelings and impressions, but assumes they are based on material processes, both individual and social. Relativism? “Relativists characteristically insist, furthermore, that if something is only relatively so, then there can be no framework-independent vantage point from which the matter of whether the thing in question is so can be established.” (9) Nope, that’s not Frankfurt School. Critical Theory. either. Sensitivity to ideology in power relations? Well, yes, but not in the reductionist and rather fuzzy-headed way postmodernism approaches it. Also, good grief? How could any social theory of politics ignore the role of ideology? General suspicion of reason? Not even close to a fit. Habermas warned in a 2006 essay, “A ‘post-truth democracy’, such as the New York Times saw on the horizon during the last Presidential elections [of 2004], would no longer be a democracy” - another sharp difference from the postmodern conceptions. (10)
Habermas’ book The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity takes a highly critical view of tthe postmodernists’ approach. In it he writes, “Postmodernism is characterized by the withering away of every form of unifying, principle-led interpretation of the world; it carries the anarchistic features of a polycentric world that has lost its previous categorical differentiations.” (11)
Crackpot theories are par for the course on the radical right. But that bizarre theory is just goofy.
Habermas is also known for promoting the concept of constitutional patriotism, which originated with Dolf Sternberger, a conservative thinker, in 1979. Habermas expanded this concept and held it up as a constructive alternative to the traditional patriotism founded on a more narrow nationalism. Which also fit well with his enthusiastic advocacy for the European Union and a post-national project.
He was a member of the publishing board of the German journal on politics and history Blätter für deutsche und international Politik from 1998 until his passing. The April 2026 issue of Blätter includes an obituary essay for him titled “World Spirit on Paper” by Hauke Brunkhorst – a play on Hegel’s famous description of Napoleon as the World Spirit on a Horse, after seeing himself ride through Hegel’s then city of residence, Jena. (12)
Habermas and Religion
Habermas’ last major work, published in 2019, was a large (over 1700 pages) two-volume work about the relationship of religion and philosophy in Western philosophy. It deals with the interaction of the two ways of viewing the world, such as his analysis of the evolution of the concept of universal human rights from that of John Locke’s religion-based concept of natural law to the secularized social forms it took with David Hume and Emmanuel Kant.
The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy has a long article on Habermas by James Godron Finlayson and Dafydd Huw Rees.
This is a German-language retrospective on Habermas and his impact: (13)
Notes:
(1) Stefan Dege & Stuart Braun (2026): Deutsche Welle 03/14/2026. https://www.dw.com/en/celebrated-philosopher-j%C3%BCrgen-habermas-dies-aged-96/a-76361563> (Accessed: 2026-10-04).
(2) Jürgen Habermas 1929–2026: Obituaries and Tributes. Political Theory - Habermas and Rawls, 03/14/2026. https://habermas-rawls.blogspot.com/2026/03/habermas-dies-at-age-96.html (Accessed: 2026-10-04).
(3) Sunstein, Cass (2024): On the Death of Jurgen Habermas: A Day to Mourn, A Hero to Celebrate. Cass’s Substack 03/14/2026. <https://casssunstein.substack.com/p/on-the-death-of-jurgen-habermas> (Accessed: 2026-10-04).
(4) Bartov, Omer (1992): Time Present and Time Past: The Historikerstreit and German Reunification. New German Critique 55, 173-190. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/488296?seq=1>
(5) Corradetti, Claudio (2026): The Frankfurt School and Critical Theory. <https://iep.utm.edu/critical-theory-frankfurt-school/> (Accessed: 2026-11-04).
(6) Horkheimer, Max (1937): Traditionelle und kritische Theorie. Zeitschrift für Sozialforschung Jahrgang 6, 245-294.
Horkheimer, Max & Marcuse, Herbert: (1937): Zeitschrift für Sozialforschung Jahrgang 6, 625-647.
(7) Müller, Tim M. (2010): Krieger und Gelehrte: Herbert Marcuse und die Denksysteme im Kalten Krieg. Hamburg: Hamburger Edition.
(8) Duignan, Brian (2026): "postmodernism". Encyclopedia Britannica 03/26/2026, <https://www.britannica.com/topic/postmodernism-philosophy> (Accessed 2026-11-04).
(9) Maria Baghramian and J. Adam Carter: Relativism. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 01/10/2025. <https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/relativism/> (Accessed 2026-11-04).
(10) Habermas, Jürgen (2006): Religion in the Public Sphere. European Journal of Philosophy 14:1, 18.
(11) Habermas, Jürgen (1988): Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne. Zwölf Vorlesungen. Chapter VI.II. Frankfurt am Main. My translation into English.
(12) Brunkhorst, Hauke (2026): Weltgeist auf Papier. Zum Tode von Jürgen Habermas. Blätter 4:2026, 49-58.
(13) Habermas - Ein europäischer Vordenker. Irgendwas mit ARTE und Kultur YouTube channel 03/16/2026. <https://youtu.be/5_9JJJjIAFc?si=i4Vn2F3zIq7C1CFn> (Accessed 2026-12-04).
Friday, April 10, 2026
Decapitation Strikes
With the President openly bragging about targeted assassinations against Iranian government leaders, it’s worth remembering that it’s not a new idea. And it has always been a dubious one, at best.
Robert Pape, who has been giving lots of interviews in the first month-plus of the Iran War, is an authority on the history of aerial bombing. In his 2014 book Bombing To Win, he writes about bombing in the Gulf War, i.e, the war of 1990-1991 in which the US intervened under legitimate and specific United Nations authority to push Iraq’s armies under Saddam Hussein out of Kuwait, which Iraq had illegally occupied. (There was no formal Congressional declaration of war, of course.)
The goals of bombing
Pape uses the conventional distinction between tactical and strategic bombing. Tactical bombing employed in direct support of land and/or sea forces. Strategic bombing is used to attack civilian and military infrastructure such as factories or key transportation facilities, which are often found in urban areas far from the front lines. There is a long-standing controversy going back to the First World War as to whether it is legitimate to deliberately target civilian areas for the purpose of undermining civilian morale. The latter even in its most sanitized expressions, sounds awfully like a sanitized excuse, i.e., we’re not trying to bomb civilians to kill them, only to kill their war morale.
What was once called “morale bombing” is now more often referred to as “punishment campaigns.” Although that term can also be used (a bit fuzzily) to include targeting infrastructure to convince the other side to give up or come to terms. Some confusion comes in here derived from classical 19th century military concepts, especially those identified with Carl von Clausewitz (1780-1831), which stressed that the real political goal of any war was to destroy the enemy’s will to fight. This is sometimes taken as a deep psychological insight. But what it really means is convincing the enemy side that they no longer consider continuing the fight to be less onerous than making a peace agreement.
When combined with the notion of “total war” that has developed since the Napoleonic wars, which stressed that notion that wars are between whole societies, not just the formal armed forces, we wind up with the notion that undermining the civilian public’s “war morale.” The idea that such a goal can be achieved by bombing cities and driving civilian into mass panic and even a revolution (“regime change”) against their own government. The First World War experience of both Britain and Germany showed clearly that this assumption was wrong.
And the experience has been repeated many times since then, most recently by the Iranian people’s unwillingness to overthrow their own government on behalf of a two hostile powers, the US and Israel, which are bombing their country in a war of aggression and killing large numbers of civilians. But the fact that such expectations have been disappointed for over a century won’t stop a meathead like white Christian nationalist Secretary of “War” Pete Hegseth from praying to God to help him inflict death on the heathen hordes as send them all to Hell for eternity.
Decapitation strategies
The concept of “decapitation” can refer to both targeted assassinations of senior leaders and to the effort to interference with the enemy country’s military command and control functions.
Times have changed since the Gulf War, because back then public acknowledgment that assassination of leaders was a deliberate goal was considered at least bad form, even among Republicans. The Bush Senior Administration actually fired a general who spoke too bluntly in public about what Bush and his Defense Secretary Dick Cheney were planning to do. Time magazine adopted a diplomatic tone in describing what happened:
The Gulf War decapitation plan was in line with a goal of introducing what its proponents called strategic paralysis. That term probably had slightly more nuance than “killing a bunch of senior officials and hope everything falls apart.” But that was the core idea.
Robert Pape was blunt in a 1997 assessment: “a strategic bombing strategy, designed by [John] Warden and aimed at decapitating the Iraqi leadership, was executed during the opening days of the air war against Iraq, and failed completely.” (3)
Pape also wrote:
Robert Farley in 2021 also speculated on what might have happened had the initial decapitation strike in Iraq had succeeded:
(1) Ready, Aim, Fired. Time 10/01/1990. <https://time.com/archive/6716028/ready-aim-fired/> (Accessed: 2026-04-04).
(2) Schmitt, Eric (1990): Confrontation in the Gulf: Air Force Chief Is Dismissed for Remarks on Gulf Plan: Cheney Cites Bad Judgment. New York Times 09/18/2026.l (Accessed: 2026-04-04).
(3) Pape, Robert (1997): The Air Force Strikes Back: A Reply to Barry Watts and John Warden. Security Studies 7:2, 213. <https://doi.org/10.1080/09636419708429346>
(4) Pape, Robert (2014): Bombing To Win: Air Power and Coercion in War, 211-214. Ithica and London: Cornell University Press.
(5) Farley, Robert (2021): Counterfactual: What If Saddam Hussein Had Died in the First Gulf War? The National Interest 11/14/2021. <https://nationalinterest.org/blog/reboot/counterfactual-what-if-saddam-hussein-had-died-first-gulf-war-196220> (Accessed: 2026-04-04).
(6) Naegele, Tobias (2022): Chiefs, Part 10: The Invisible Chief’. Air & Space Forces Magazine 11/09/2022. <https://www.airandspaceforces.com/chiefs-part-10-dugan-the-invisible-chief/> (Accessed: 2026-10-04).
Robert Pape, who has been giving lots of interviews in the first month-plus of the Iran War, is an authority on the history of aerial bombing. In his 2014 book Bombing To Win, he writes about bombing in the Gulf War, i.e, the war of 1990-1991 in which the US intervened under legitimate and specific United Nations authority to push Iraq’s armies under Saddam Hussein out of Kuwait, which Iraq had illegally occupied. (There was no formal Congressional declaration of war, of course.)
The goals of bombing
Pape uses the conventional distinction between tactical and strategic bombing. Tactical bombing employed in direct support of land and/or sea forces. Strategic bombing is used to attack civilian and military infrastructure such as factories or key transportation facilities, which are often found in urban areas far from the front lines. There is a long-standing controversy going back to the First World War as to whether it is legitimate to deliberately target civilian areas for the purpose of undermining civilian morale. The latter even in its most sanitized expressions, sounds awfully like a sanitized excuse, i.e., we’re not trying to bomb civilians to kill them, only to kill their war morale.
What was once called “morale bombing” is now more often referred to as “punishment campaigns.” Although that term can also be used (a bit fuzzily) to include targeting infrastructure to convince the other side to give up or come to terms. Some confusion comes in here derived from classical 19th century military concepts, especially those identified with Carl von Clausewitz (1780-1831), which stressed that the real political goal of any war was to destroy the enemy’s will to fight. This is sometimes taken as a deep psychological insight. But what it really means is convincing the enemy side that they no longer consider continuing the fight to be less onerous than making a peace agreement.
When combined with the notion of “total war” that has developed since the Napoleonic wars, which stressed that notion that wars are between whole societies, not just the formal armed forces, we wind up with the notion that undermining the civilian public’s “war morale.” The idea that such a goal can be achieved by bombing cities and driving civilian into mass panic and even a revolution (“regime change”) against their own government. The First World War experience of both Britain and Germany showed clearly that this assumption was wrong.
And the experience has been repeated many times since then, most recently by the Iranian people’s unwillingness to overthrow their own government on behalf of a two hostile powers, the US and Israel, which are bombing their country in a war of aggression and killing large numbers of civilians. But the fact that such expectations have been disappointed for over a century won’t stop a meathead like white Christian nationalist Secretary of “War” Pete Hegseth from praying to God to help him inflict death on the heathen hordes as send them all to Hell for eternity.
Decapitation strategies
The concept of “decapitation” can refer to both targeted assassinations of senior leaders and to the effort to interference with the enemy country’s military command and control functions.
Times have changed since the Gulf War, because back then public acknowledgment that assassination of leaders was a deliberate goal was considered at least bad form, even among Republicans. The Bush Senior Administration actually fired a general who spoke too bluntly in public about what Bush and his Defense Secretary Dick Cheney were planning to do. Time magazine adopted a diplomatic tone in describing what happened:
Last week [in November 1990] Cheney fired the highly decorated Air Force Chief of Staff, General Michael Dugan, for “poor judgment at a sensitive time” in speaking indiscreetly on secret and diplomatically touchy issues relating to the gulf crisis. Dugan was the first member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to be dismissed since President Harry Truman in 1949 sacked Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Louis Denfeld and the first military commander to be dismissed since Truman ousted General Douglas MacArthur in 1951.The New York Times was a bit more clear:
Cheney blew up after reading on-the-record comments that Dugan, in office only 79 days, made to Washington Post and Los Angeles Times correspondents accompanying him on a week-long trip through the Middle East. Dugan, a West Point graduate, talked in considerable detail about classified operational plans, including the use of Saudi bases for American B-52 flights in wartime and training routines for the supersecret F-117A Stealth fighters. In comments deeply distressing to America’s allies, Dugan advocated bombing Iraqi cities –including downtown Baghdad – and said, “I don’t expect to be concerned” about political constraints. [my emphasis] (1)
General Dugan, in articles published on Sunday by The Washington Post and The Los Angeles Times, said the Joint Chiefs of Staff had concluded that the only effective military option for driving Iraqi forces out of Kuwait was heavy bombing of Baghdad to “decapitate“ the senior Iraqi leadership, making President Saddam Hussein of Iraq, his family and senior commanders primary targets.Back then, it was too much even for Dick Cheney that a US general would describe war plans so bluntly! He was the first senior general at that level to be fired since Douglas MacArthur in 1951. Four decades later, it was still considered a big deal. Today “War” Secretary Pete Hegseth firs generals if they seem to be too little sympathetic to his Christian nationalist Crusader mentality.
“The cutting edge would be in downtown Baghdad," General Dugan was quoted by The Post as saying. “If I want to hurt you, it would be at home, not out in the woods someplace.“ (2)
Michael Dugan
The Gulf War decapitation plan was in line with a goal of introducing what its proponents called strategic paralysis. That term probably had slightly more nuance than “killing a bunch of senior officials and hope everything falls apart.” But that was the core idea.
Robert Pape was blunt in a 1997 assessment: “a strategic bombing strategy, designed by [John] Warden and aimed at decapitating the Iraqi leadership, was executed during the opening days of the air war against Iraq, and failed completely.” (3)
Pape also wrote:
The decapitation campaign, known as Instant Thunder, pursued victory solely through strategic bombing of a small number of political and economic targets in the hope of isolating Saddam Hussein's regime from its political and military control structures, thus leading to its overthrow or strategic paralysis, either of which would force Iraq to abandon Kuwait. (4)Pape emphasizes that air power was critical to pushing back the Iraqi army in the Gulf War because of its tactical role: “Air power did succeed in coercing Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait, but it did so by undermining its ability to defend against the Coalition's ground threat.” (p. 212) He refers to this as the use of “theater air power” (a similar concept to tactical air power). He also points out that the Gulf War saw “the first major use of strategic bombing to decapitate an opponent's leadership in order to achieve victory by changing or paralyzing the enemy government.” He also takes it as an example showing that tactical air power has become even more effective compared to “strategic air campaigns against an enemy’s political and economic centers,” i.e., strategic bombing.
Robert Farley in 2021 also speculated on what might have happened had the initial decapitation strike in Iraq had succeeded:
In the early days of the air campaign of the 1991 Gulf War, the United States undertook a concerted effort to track and strike Iraqi President Saddam Hussein. The effort was predicated on the belief that eliminating Saddam Hussein would have two effects; it would throw the Iraqi military hierarchy into chaos, and it would make the surviving Iraqi leadership more amenable to a negotiated solution.Notes:
The effort to kill Hussein was only one episode in the U.S. pursuit of “decapitation” as a politico-military strategy. In the post-Cold War era, the United States has faced a variety of tyrants and terrorists. U.S. leaders reasoned that steps to crush the head of the snake might make it unnecessary to kill the entire body, thus sparing much destruction and civilian death.
The 1991 decapitation attacks, and similar attacks launched in 2003, failed. [my emphasis] (5)
(1) Ready, Aim, Fired. Time 10/01/1990. <https://time.com/archive/6716028/ready-aim-fired/> (Accessed: 2026-04-04).
(2) Schmitt, Eric (1990): Confrontation in the Gulf: Air Force Chief Is Dismissed for Remarks on Gulf Plan: Cheney Cites Bad Judgment. New York Times 09/18/2026.
(3) Pape, Robert (1997): The Air Force Strikes Back: A Reply to Barry Watts and John Warden. Security Studies 7:2, 213. <https://doi.org/10.1080/09636419708429346>
(4) Pape, Robert (2014): Bombing To Win: Air Power and Coercion in War, 211-214. Ithica and London: Cornell University Press.
(5) Farley, Robert (2021): Counterfactual: What If Saddam Hussein Had Died in the First Gulf War? The National Interest 11/14/2021. <https://nationalinterest.org/blog/reboot/counterfactual-what-if-saddam-hussein-had-died-first-gulf-war-196220> (Accessed: 2026-04-04).
(6) Naegele, Tobias (2022): Chiefs, Part 10: The Invisible Chief’. Air & Space Forces Magazine 11/09/2022. <https://www.airandspaceforces.com/chiefs-part-10-dugan-the-invisible-chief/> (Accessed: 2026-10-04).
Thursday, April 9, 2026
Dying at sea for European xenophobia and the parties that promote it
Rightwing Italien Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni’s sometimes pragmatic-sounding public rhetoric on immigration and refugees doesn’t match her government’s actual policies:
Experts dealing with immigration and rescue operations have been saying for years to anyone who will listen to them that there are well-established ways to humanely and practically manage refugee flows, save people in immediate danger of drowning at sea, and reducing illegal people-smuggling operations.
But the politics of xenophobia that has been the main cause pushed by the anti-democracy rightwing parties in Europe and the US is not about practical policy ideas. It’s about fear- and hate-mongering driven by lies and cruelty. Trump’s ICE Gestapo goons have been one of the most dramatic cases of this in the last two years, but it’s only a variant of the common xenophobic political playbook.
The rightwingers are not going to give up on this until it starts completely wrecking their political appeal. When (non-rightwing-radical) conservative parties like the Christian Democrats in Germany and center-left policies like the Democrats in the US try to pander to the nationalist xenophobia by some version of “we hate the foreigners as much as the rightwingers if not more” – and that was the point Kamala Harris stressed in her 2024 Presidential campaign – that approach has been remarkably successful in strengthening the rightwing parties.
Xenophobic politics is based on hatred, fear, and lies. Democratic parties should offer practical and non-xenophobic policies as an alternative. But xenophobia politics is not primarily about policy issues, often not really at all about policy issues. Unless the pro-democracy parties are willing to fight directly against the lies and hysteria from the xenophobes and call them out as such, the rational talk about sensible policies will never be heard in the way they need to be.
We’ve seen that in a dramatic way the last 14 months or so in the US in the grassroots opposition to the Trump ICE Gestapo, which has primarily been a grassroots movement, not one led by the Democratic Party. There are certainly real exceptions like Sen. Chris Van Hollen, Mike Walz and other Democratic leaders – even Gavin Newsom. But having Democratic leaders like Chuck Schumer groaning that they will push back against Trump’s racist and xenophobic actions some way, somehow, someday, will never be enough.
Notes:
(1) Jakob. Christian (2026): Als Wal wäre ihnen das nicht passiert. taz 04/04/2026. <https://taz.de/Todeszone-Mittelmeer/!6164508/> (Accessed: 2026-04-04). My translation from German.
(2) 19 dead after hours without help: New evidence incriminates European authorities. Sea-Watch 04/02/2026. <https://sea-watch.org/en/19-dead-after-hours-without-help-new-evidence-incriminates-european-authorities/> (Accessed: 2026-09-04).
At the same time [as European news was reporting on the plight of a stranded whale on the shore of the Baltic Sea], about 80 people were drifting between Libya and the Italian island of Lampedusa in the Mediterranean. It looks like the reconnaissance aircraft IAM4101 the Italian Air Force flew over the sea area very close to the rubber boat on Monday. The Frontex aircraft "Eagle 2" provided information twice on the same day about a rubber boat in distress. But it was not until more than 24 hours later, on Tuesday, that the Italian coast guard came to the aid of the people. By then, 19 of the occupants were dead, apparently frozen, five were in critical condition. (1)This is deliberate neglect on the part of Meloni’s government to communicate to her core far-right voting base that she shares their murderous hatred for immigrants and refugees. But Italy isn’t alone in such criminal neglect: “A day later, on Wednesday, 20 migrants died in a boat accident off the coast of Bodrum in Turkey. On Sunday, at least 40 people drowned eleven miles off the coast of Sfax in Tunisia.”
Experts dealing with immigration and rescue operations have been saying for years to anyone who will listen to them that there are well-established ways to humanely and practically manage refugee flows, save people in immediate danger of drowning at sea, and reducing illegal people-smuggling operations.
But the politics of xenophobia that has been the main cause pushed by the anti-democracy rightwing parties in Europe and the US is not about practical policy ideas. It’s about fear- and hate-mongering driven by lies and cruelty. Trump’s ICE Gestapo goons have been one of the most dramatic cases of this in the last two years, but it’s only a variant of the common xenophobic political playbook.
The rightwingers are not going to give up on this until it starts completely wrecking their political appeal. When (non-rightwing-radical) conservative parties like the Christian Democrats in Germany and center-left policies like the Democrats in the US try to pander to the nationalist xenophobia by some version of “we hate the foreigners as much as the rightwingers if not more” – and that was the point Kamala Harris stressed in her 2024 Presidential campaign – that approach has been remarkably successful in strengthening the rightwing parties.
Xenophobic politics is based on hatred, fear, and lies. Democratic parties should offer practical and non-xenophobic policies as an alternative. But xenophobia politics is not primarily about policy issues, often not really at all about policy issues. Unless the pro-democracy parties are willing to fight directly against the lies and hysteria from the xenophobes and call them out as such, the rational talk about sensible policies will never be heard in the way they need to be.
We’ve seen that in a dramatic way the last 14 months or so in the US in the grassroots opposition to the Trump ICE Gestapo, which has primarily been a grassroots movement, not one led by the Democratic Party. There are certainly real exceptions like Sen. Chris Van Hollen, Mike Walz and other Democratic leaders – even Gavin Newsom. But having Democratic leaders like Chuck Schumer groaning that they will push back against Trump’s racist and xenophobic actions some way, somehow, someday, will never be enough.
Meloni speaking to CPAC 2022
Notes:
(1) Jakob. Christian (2026): Als Wal wäre ihnen das nicht passiert. taz 04/04/2026. <https://taz.de/Todeszone-Mittelmeer/!6164508/> (Accessed: 2026-04-04). My translation from German.
(2) 19 dead after hours without help: New evidence incriminates European authorities. Sea-Watch 04/02/2026. <https://sea-watch.org/en/19-dead-after-hours-without-help-new-evidence-incriminates-european-authorities/> (Accessed: 2026-09-04).
Canada and … EU membership?
BNN Bloomberg reports on polling results showing that many Canadians view the idea of joining the European Union favorably. And gives some background on the issue:
And there are political initiatives to increase the ties between Canada and the EU: (2)
This is important issue that is very complex in practice. The EU is very resourceful at creating partnerships and associations with countries not formally part of the Union. But it’s important to remember that the European Union treaty includes a mutual defense obligation, which on its face is more binding than the NATO Treaty version. In practice, NATO has been far more prominent as a defense organization because it’s primarily directed at defending against Russia. And European NATO countries’ strategy actual military planning and organization have been closely tied in with American weapons, intelligence, and military organization. It’s a major priority right now for European NATO members to rearrange their defense planning and their own military-industrial capabilities to get out of the current level of dependence of the US.
They will of course make their own mistakes in the process, and war profiteers will play the dubious role they always do. European leaders may not agree on exactly what adjustments will be needed and how fast they can and should be achieved. But they clearly see that the security situation has radically changed under Trump 2.0.
But this also creates real complications for Canada actually joining the EU. Canada is a current NATO member. But if NATO is formally abolished, or if the US formally leaves it, that means that Canada joining the EU with a full mutual-defense commitment would be an extremely touchy issue. It might not flip out the American foreign policy establishment as much as, say, a mutual-defense treaty between China and Mexico. But they also wouldn’t be likely to swallow it without pushing back hard.
But it would be hard to overstate the seriousness of the situation we had within the last year in which Britain, France, Germany, Spain, Italy and even Poland publicly stated when the US was seriously threatening Denmark with invading and seizing Greenland, that that took seriously their mutual-defense obligation under NATO to defend Denmark against any illegal foreign attack. It seems that a lot of American commentators, though, blipped right past that as though it was just another daily episode of the Trump Reality-TV Show. The EU countries are presumably relieved (maybe with the exception of Hungary!) that Trump TACOed out on that particular threat for the time being.
And it’s understandable that the EU and Canada seem to be treading lightly on this issue. But it’s still one to watch.
Notes:
(1) Canada in the European Union? Poll suggests broad openness to the idea. The Canadian Press 04/06/2026. <https://www.bnnbloomberg.ca/business/economics/2026/04/06/canada-in-the-european-union-poll-suggests-broad-openness-to-the-idea/> (Accessed: 2026-07-04).
(2) 'The case almost makes itself': Should Canada and the EU develop closer ties? CBC News YouTube channel 05/22/2026. <https://youtu.be/pptSbsUbR9I?si=GB0sKFfb53m3NOU8> (Accessed: 2026-09-04).
The prospect of Canada joining the European bloc — despite the obvious geographical barriers — has come up recently on both sides of the Atlantic Ocean.Canada in the 1990s and 2000s was generally very favorable to eastward expansion of the EU because many Canadian diplomats saw this as an opportunity for deeper engagement with Europe.
Speaking at the Europe 2026 conference in Berlin in March, French Foreign Minister Jean-Noel Barrot said the European Union is attracting more candidate countries, such as Iceland, and suggested “maybe Canada at some point” will sign up.
Barrot smiled while mentioning Canada and his comments generated some laughter from a panel moderator and applause from the audience.
The European Parliament adopted a report last month calling on the EU to deepen ties with Canada. Members said in an accompanying statement that Canada is “perhaps the most European country outside Europe.” (1)
And there are political initiatives to increase the ties between Canada and the EU: (2)
This is important issue that is very complex in practice. The EU is very resourceful at creating partnerships and associations with countries not formally part of the Union. But it’s important to remember that the European Union treaty includes a mutual defense obligation, which on its face is more binding than the NATO Treaty version. In practice, NATO has been far more prominent as a defense organization because it’s primarily directed at defending against Russia. And European NATO countries’ strategy actual military planning and organization have been closely tied in with American weapons, intelligence, and military organization. It’s a major priority right now for European NATO members to rearrange their defense planning and their own military-industrial capabilities to get out of the current level of dependence of the US.
They will of course make their own mistakes in the process, and war profiteers will play the dubious role they always do. European leaders may not agree on exactly what adjustments will be needed and how fast they can and should be achieved. But they clearly see that the security situation has radically changed under Trump 2.0.
But this also creates real complications for Canada actually joining the EU. Canada is a current NATO member. But if NATO is formally abolished, or if the US formally leaves it, that means that Canada joining the EU with a full mutual-defense commitment would be an extremely touchy issue. It might not flip out the American foreign policy establishment as much as, say, a mutual-defense treaty between China and Mexico. But they also wouldn’t be likely to swallow it without pushing back hard.
But it would be hard to overstate the seriousness of the situation we had within the last year in which Britain, France, Germany, Spain, Italy and even Poland publicly stated when the US was seriously threatening Denmark with invading and seizing Greenland, that that took seriously their mutual-defense obligation under NATO to defend Denmark against any illegal foreign attack. It seems that a lot of American commentators, though, blipped right past that as though it was just another daily episode of the Trump Reality-TV Show. The EU countries are presumably relieved (maybe with the exception of Hungary!) that Trump TACOed out on that particular threat for the time being.
And it’s understandable that the EU and Canada seem to be treading lightly on this issue. But it’s still one to watch.
Notes:
(1) Canada in the European Union? Poll suggests broad openness to the idea. The Canadian Press 04/06/2026. <https://www.bnnbloomberg.ca/business/economics/2026/04/06/canada-in-the-european-union-poll-suggests-broad-openness-to-the-idea/> (Accessed: 2026-07-04).
(2) 'The case almost makes itself': Should Canada and the EU develop closer ties? CBC News YouTube channel 05/22/2026. <https://youtu.be/pptSbsUbR9I?si=GB0sKFfb53m3NOU8> (Accessed: 2026-09-04).
Wednesday, April 8, 2026
Peace President Trump's new mess after his Iran War ... ceasefire (?)
Newsweek published a list of Members of Congress who have called J.D. Vance and the Cabinet use the 25th Amendment to remove Trump from office. As of the time of its publication midday Tuesday, the list includes only Democrats. The list does not include Senate Minority Leader Chuck Schumer who supports the Iran War and House Minority Leader Hakeem Jeffries. Former Democrats House Leader Nancy Pelosi is on the list. (1)
After supposedly agreeing to a two-week ceasefire, the United States’ co-belligerent Israel is staging a new round of attacks on Lebanon, which it wants to keep in a failed-state condition which it will periodically strike with what it calls mowing-the-lawn attacks. It is obviously also trying to annex part of Lebanon’s territory.
Ryan Cooper reports:
Jeremy Scahill reports on the Iranian negotiating position in this report, including comments on China’s role in the diplomacy over the war: (3)
Juan Cole speculates on the implications of the US-Israeli war on Iran for the world standing of the US:
John Feffer reminds us what a militarized foreign policy the Trump regime is running:
(1) Lawmakers Demand 25th Amendment Be Invoked Against Trump: Full List. Newsweek 04/07/2026 1:08PM EDT. <https://www.newsweek.com/invoke-25th-amendment-donald-trump-officials-list-1179479191> (Accessed: 2026-08-04).
(2) Cooper, Ryan (2026): Donald Trump, Wrecker of American Empire. The American Prospect 04/08/2026. <https://prospect.org/2026/04/08/donald-trump-wrecker-of-american-empire-iran-war/> (Accessed: 2026-08-04).
(3) Iran READY FOR WAR To Resume ANY DAY. Breaking Points YouTube channel 04/08/2026. <https://youtu.be/iehAHCZrrnM?si=Yk48AOaIEb1BcKEm> (Accessed: 2026-08-04).
(4) Cole, Juan (2026): How Iran won the Iran War. Informed Comment 04/08/2026. <https://www.juancole.com/2026/04/how-iran-won.html> (Accessed: 2026-08-04).
(5) Lieblich, Eliav (2026): Reprisals and the Paradox of Trust: Why Threats of Retaliation in the Iran War are Unlikely to Work. Just Security 04/07/2026. <https://www.justsecurity.org/135894/reprisals-paradox-trust-iran-war/> (Accessed: 2026-08-04).
(6) Feffer, John (2026): Negotiating with bombs. Hankyoreh [South Korea] 04/08/2026. <https://english.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/english_editorials/1252900.html> (Accessed: 2026-08-04).
After supposedly agreeing to a two-week ceasefire, the United States’ co-belligerent Israel is staging a new round of attacks on Lebanon, which it wants to keep in a failed-state condition which it will periodically strike with what it calls mowing-the-lawn attacks. It is obviously also trying to annex part of Lebanon’s territory.
Ryan Cooper reports:
Donald Trump is setting records. His war on Iran is certainly the stupidest war in American history - and that’s saying something - and Trump has now lost it more quickly than any previous war. It took 20 years to lose in Afghanistan, about ten years to lose in Vietnam, and two and a half years to lose the War of 1812, but Trump managed to get utterly dog-walked in a mere six weeks.Trump is so erratic and demented that the war could go on for much longer. But Iran still has the escalation dominance. And Israel is entirely unreliable as a partner for doing anything other than turning Iran into a failed state.
That’s the only possible conclusion from Trump’s announcement on Tuesday evening—after threatening to obliterate Iran’s entire civilization - that he had reached a deal with Iran based on an Iranian proposal. The ten-point plan includes acceptance of Iranian control of the Strait of Hormuz and the country’s continued uranium enrichment, an end to all primary and secondary sanctions, war reparations, withdrawal of all American forces from the region, and an end to the Israeli bombing of Lebanon. (The last one is already being violated right now with a huge barrage by the Israelis, leading Iran to close the strait again, so the durability of this cease-fire is in deep question.) [my emphasis] (2)
Jeremy Scahill reports on the Iranian negotiating position in this report, including comments on China’s role in the diplomacy over the war: (3)
Juan Cole speculates on the implications of the US-Israeli war on Iran for the world standing of the US:
Going into the war, the Iranian government had just committed a massacre of thousands of protesters and was without a friend in the world. Trump and Netanyahu committed breathtaking war crimes on Iran and acted and spoke so monstrously that many countries ended up at least rhetorically supporting Iran, or at least opposing the war on it. Israel comes out of the war a pariah. The US is too rich, big and powerful to be a pariah but its standing has certainly plummeted and it can expect much less cooperation going forward. [my emphasis] (4)It’s always important to remember that there are real issues about violations of international law at stake in this war. (5)
John Feffer reminds us what a militarized foreign policy the Trump regime is running:
The United States has long operated in these two registers: deploying overwhelming military force and using its diplomatic skills to broker peace deals. The two strategies have often gone hand in hand, as they did with [Henry] Kissinger [during the Nixon Administration].Notes:
But what was once a matter of some sophistication — if often wrapped in secret violence — has now simply become heavy-handed and transparently brutal. The Trump administration has touted a series of peace deals that, at least in their sheer quantity, rival the successes of Henry Kissinger. Examined more carefully, however, those deals are either premature, non-existent, or largely a function of showmanship. The “peace deal” in Gaza, for instance, was hastily assembled and poorly thought through; it’s no wonder that it hasn’t gotten to its second stage. [my emphasis] (6)
(1) Lawmakers Demand 25th Amendment Be Invoked Against Trump: Full List. Newsweek 04/07/2026 1:08PM EDT. <https://www.newsweek.com/invoke-25th-amendment-donald-trump-officials-list-1179479191> (Accessed: 2026-08-04).
(2) Cooper, Ryan (2026): Donald Trump, Wrecker of American Empire. The American Prospect 04/08/2026. <https://prospect.org/2026/04/08/donald-trump-wrecker-of-american-empire-iran-war/> (Accessed: 2026-08-04).
(3) Iran READY FOR WAR To Resume ANY DAY. Breaking Points YouTube channel 04/08/2026. <https://youtu.be/iehAHCZrrnM?si=Yk48AOaIEb1BcKEm> (Accessed: 2026-08-04).
(4) Cole, Juan (2026): How Iran won the Iran War. Informed Comment 04/08/2026. <https://www.juancole.com/2026/04/how-iran-won.html> (Accessed: 2026-08-04).
(5) Lieblich, Eliav (2026): Reprisals and the Paradox of Trust: Why Threats of Retaliation in the Iran War are Unlikely to Work. Just Security 04/07/2026. <https://www.justsecurity.org/135894/reprisals-paradox-trust-iran-war/> (Accessed: 2026-08-04).
(6) Feffer, John (2026): Negotiating with bombs. Hankyoreh [South Korea] 04/08/2026. <https://english.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/english_editorials/1252900.html> (Accessed: 2026-08-04).
The new Trump-Netanyahu escalation - and new TACO (for the moment) - in the Iran War
Trump’s completely deranged public threat to wipe out all of Iranian civilization is further evidence of his unfitness for any position of responsibility, much less President of the United States in command of its nuclear arsenal.
Zeteo provided this early reaction to the latest TACO, including the Quincy Institute’s Trita Parsi: (1)
Peter Beaumont explains the key problem with Trump’s and Netanyahu’s regime-change-by-bombing approach to regime change in Iran this way:
Zvi Bar'el elaborates on the same theme:
Wajahat Ali interviews Robert Pape on the state of affairs after Trump’s latest TACO – however long or short of a time it may last. Pape is the historian of strategic bombing who has been warning that Iran has had “escalation dominance” in the current war against the US and Israel. Among other things, Pape warns that Israel may very well be a “spoiler” once again on the new two-week ceasefire. (4)
Notes:
(1) Mehdi Hasan and Experts REACT to Trump's Iran Decision. Zeteo YouTube channel 03/07/2026. <https://www.youtube.com/live/X-6Li9Az7Yk?si=zDNq5Gq1_gQhcnkO> (Accessed: 2026-08-04).
(2) Beaumont, Peter (2026): Will bombing Iran back to the ‘stone ages’ achieve any war objectives? Guardian 04/07/2026. <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2026/apr/07/will-bombing-iran-back-to-the-stone-ages-achieve-any-war-objectives> (Accessed: 2026-07-04).
(3) Bar'el, Zvi (2026): Will bombing Iran back to the ‘stone ages’ achieve any war objectives? Haaretz 04/07/2026. <https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/israel-security/2026-04-03/ty-article/.premium/no-matter-which-path-he-chooses-trump-will-pay-a-heavy-price-for-the-iran-war/0000019d-4f5a-d257-a5dd-6fdb0cb50000?gift=7dff37e4654d499ea8646c3a4df5a1a3> (Accessed: 2026-07-04).
(4) BREAKING NEWS! Trump and Iran Agree to a Ceasefire Deal: Will It Hold and What's the Blowback? Wahahat Ali YouTube channel 04/08/2026. <https://youtu.be/ZjOMfGrFc-c?si=tU53Qmelqhh9Tb4r> (Accessed: 2026-08-04).
Zeteo provided this early reaction to the latest TACO, including the Quincy Institute’s Trita Parsi: (1)
Peter Beaumont explains the key problem with Trump’s and Netanyahu’s regime-change-by-bombing approach to regime change in Iran this way:
Will the national humanitarian disaster visited on millions of Iranians make them love the United States? Israel has already learned a lesson or two from imposing horrifying humanitarian sanctions on Gaza residents, only to realize too late that they lead to no strategic gains and merely turn it into a pariah. (1)
Zvi Bar'el elaborates on the same theme:
Even if Trump pushes back his deadline once again, recent history does not suggest that strikes on infrastructure – widely seen as war crime – are likely to force Iran on to a new path.
More recent than Lebanon is the experience of Ukraine under four years of sustained Russian bombardment, after Moscow’s own illegal war of aggression. That culminated this year in Kyiv’s worst winter of blackouts as Russia hammered the country’s heating and power plants, but failed to force Ukraine to concede. (2)
Wajahat Ali interviews Robert Pape on the state of affairs after Trump’s latest TACO – however long or short of a time it may last. Pape is the historian of strategic bombing who has been warning that Iran has had “escalation dominance” in the current war against the US and Israel. Among other things, Pape warns that Israel may very well be a “spoiler” once again on the new two-week ceasefire. (4)
Notes:
(1) Mehdi Hasan and Experts REACT to Trump's Iran Decision. Zeteo YouTube channel 03/07/2026. <https://www.youtube.com/live/X-6Li9Az7Yk?si=zDNq5Gq1_gQhcnkO> (Accessed: 2026-08-04).
(2) Beaumont, Peter (2026): Will bombing Iran back to the ‘stone ages’ achieve any war objectives? Guardian 04/07/2026. <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2026/apr/07/will-bombing-iran-back-to-the-stone-ages-achieve-any-war-objectives> (Accessed: 2026-07-04).
(3) Bar'el, Zvi (2026): Will bombing Iran back to the ‘stone ages’ achieve any war objectives? Haaretz 04/07/2026. <https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/israel-security/2026-04-03/ty-article/.premium/no-matter-which-path-he-chooses-trump-will-pay-a-heavy-price-for-the-iran-war/0000019d-4f5a-d257-a5dd-6fdb0cb50000?gift=7dff37e4654d499ea8646c3a4df5a1a3> (Accessed: 2026-07-04).
(4) BREAKING NEWS! Trump and Iran Agree to a Ceasefire Deal: Will It Hold and What's the Blowback? Wahahat Ali YouTube channel 04/08/2026. <https://youtu.be/ZjOMfGrFc-c?si=tU53Qmelqhh9Tb4r> (Accessed: 2026-08-04).
Monday, April 6, 2026
How did Trump get convinced to start the Iran War?
Peter Beaumont summarizes a number of the ways in which the Netanyahu government in Israel enticed Trump with the idea that attacking Iran as the US and Israel did on February 28 was a grand idea. (1)
In the end, of course, the US is responsible for its own foreign policy decisions. They don’t get to use “But Bibi told me it would be easy!” as an excuse for disastrously bad decisions.
But there’s no question that Israel’s view of the Middle East has won a lot of support among American officials over the decades, with the active help of the Israel Lobby. And Netanyahu in his recent actions in Gaza, the West Bank, Lebanon, Syria, and now Iran is pursuing a policy of seeking to illegally annex further territories while carrying out ethnic cleansing against Palestinians with a goal of making itself the Mideast’s superpower.
The catch is that Israel still is in no position to carry out these ambitions without the diplomatic and material support of the US.
Beaumont also reports:
We’ll soon see what happens with Trump’s latest obscene deadline, whether it sets off a new level of escalation by Iran – which currently has the escalation dominance in the situation – or it turns out to be another TACO moment.
Trump also announced on April 6:
(1) Beaumont, Peter (2026): Was Trump oblivious to the realities of Netanyahu’s promised ‘easy’ war on Iran? Guardian 04/06/2026. <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2026/apr/06/trump-iran-war-netanyahu-israel> (Accessed: 2026-06-04).
(2) Critics say the US war in Iran is a ‘strategic defeat’. Semafor 04/06/2026. <https://www.semafor.com/article/04/06/2026/washingtons-iran-strategy-questioned> (Accessed: 2026-06-04).
(3) Trump's Disturbed MELTDOWN Over Iran - w/. Stephen Wertheim. Owen Jones YouTube channel 04/05/2026. <https://youtu.be/dKNmHFi0c2w?si=xNzKYJxZrCR-tAax> (Accessed: 2026-06-04).
(4) Trump says Iranians 'animals' when asked why he would bomb power plants. Middle East Eye 04/06/2026. <https://www.middleeasteye.net/live-blog/live-blog-update/trump-says-iranians-animals-when-asked-why-he-would-bomb-power-plants> (Accessed: 2026-06-04).
- When Netanyahu visited Trump in Washington in late December, he gave him the Israel Prize for Trunp’s alleged “tremendous contributions to Israel and the Jewish people.” Trump is notoriously interested in getting such honorary awards.
- The Israeli intelligence service Mossad presented an evaluation that the Iranian regime was on the verge of collapse in the face of mass protests.
- Netanyahu promised the Orange Sucker that it would be a quick and easy war.
- The decapitation strategy of assassinating top Iranian leaders that Israel successfully carried out as part of its joint war effort with the US failed to cripple the regime and to instigate new instigate moves for regime change.
- Trump got a big boost in his confidence in winning wars quickly by his kidnapping operation against Venezuela’s Nicolas Maduro and his wife.
- “Axios, quoting a US source using Netanyahu’s nickname, reported last week: ‘Before the war, Bibi really sold it to the president as being easy, as regime change being a lot likelier than it was. And the VP was clear-eyed about some of those statements’.”
In the end, of course, the US is responsible for its own foreign policy decisions. They don’t get to use “But Bibi told me it would be easy!” as an excuse for disastrously bad decisions.
But there’s no question that Israel’s view of the Middle East has won a lot of support among American officials over the decades, with the active help of the Israel Lobby. And Netanyahu in his recent actions in Gaza, the West Bank, Lebanon, Syria, and now Iran is pursuing a policy of seeking to illegally annex further territories while carrying out ethnic cleansing against Palestinians with a goal of making itself the Mideast’s superpower.
The catch is that Israel still is in no position to carry out these ambitions without the diplomatic and material support of the US.
Beaumont also reports:
What is clear from what has subsequently emerged is that Netanyahu – a self-styled “expert” on Iran – and the wider Israeli military establishment were fully invested in their pitch of an easy war. …Semafor is taking a pretty dim view of the prospects for success in the war by the US-Israeli side:
When viewed as a discrete conflict, it is as much owned by the US as Israel, but it is part of Israel’s war; the latest front in Netanyahu’s state of permanent conflict that has raged since Hamas’s attack on Israel on 7 October 2023.
That attack altered the country’s strategic calculations. And in the expanding regional conflicts that have followed in Gaza, Lebanon and now Iran, with the Houthis in Yemen and in the Syrian hinterland, a common theme has emerged: Netanyahu has promised and declared victories of which the realities are always more ephemeral and hubristic.
The conflict looks set to batter allies’ economies by driving inflation up and hitting economic growth, while analysts have questioned the feasibility of Washington’s goals — whether regime change, or destruction of Tehran’s nuclear program or its missile stockpiles. Instead, “the war has empowered Iranian hardliners, blocked a vital shipping lane, and handed a windfall to Russia,” Fareed Zakaria wrote in The Washington Post.Owen Jones just did an informative interview with Stephen Wertheim on the developing Iran War disaster: (3)
At best, the political scientist Dan Drezner argued, US President Donald Trump is “stuck trying to sell a strategic defeat as a tactical victory,” while The New York Times’ Nicholas Kristof said: “We’ve botched our way into an Iran cul-de-sac.” (2)
We’ll soon see what happens with Trump’s latest obscene deadline, whether it sets off a new level of escalation by Iran – which currently has the escalation dominance in the situation – or it turns out to be another TACO moment.
Trump also announced on April 6:
US President Donald Trump said on Monday that Iranians are "animals," therefore bombing their civilian infrastructure like power plants would not be considered a war crime.
"How would it not be a war crime to strike Iran’s bridges and power plants?" A reporter asked Trump.
"Because they killed 45,000 people in the last month...they are animals," Trump said, referring to casualty numbers from a brutal crackdown on demonstrations earlier this year. (4)
Notes:
(1) Beaumont, Peter (2026): Was Trump oblivious to the realities of Netanyahu’s promised ‘easy’ war on Iran? Guardian 04/06/2026. <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2026/apr/06/trump-iran-war-netanyahu-israel> (Accessed: 2026-06-04).
(2) Critics say the US war in Iran is a ‘strategic defeat’. Semafor 04/06/2026. <https://www.semafor.com/article/04/06/2026/washingtons-iran-strategy-questioned> (Accessed: 2026-06-04).
(3) Trump's Disturbed MELTDOWN Over Iran - w/. Stephen Wertheim. Owen Jones YouTube channel 04/05/2026. <https://youtu.be/dKNmHFi0c2w?si=xNzKYJxZrCR-tAax> (Accessed: 2026-06-04).
(4) Trump says Iranians 'animals' when asked why he would bomb power plants. Middle East Eye 04/06/2026. <https://www.middleeasteye.net/live-blog/live-blog-update/trump-says-iranians-animals-when-asked-why-he-would-bomb-power-plants> (Accessed: 2026-06-04).
Saturday, April 4, 2026
Europe and the Iran War
Even European commentators still often use the tired old line about how disunited Europe is. But what looks like disunity can also be tag-team diplomacy.
Polish Foreign Minister Radosław Sikorski was publicly critical of the US-Israeli war against Iran a couple of weeks after they attacked Iran. (1) When a foreign minister says there was no “direct threat” in this context as Sikorski did, he’s saying that it’s an illegal war of aggression. The US State Department doesn’t seem very keen these days on this boring “diplomacy” business. But most of the rest of the world is still practicing it.
Poland has also “rejected calls from the United States to deploy an MIM-104 Patriot air defense system to the Middle East, where it could be used to counter Iranian missiles and drones. Warsaw has said that the weapons are needed to deter Russian aggression in Europe.” (2)
As a country sharing a border with Russia, Poland has to take seriously the kind of standard, routine military games that go on there:
Britain as the long-tine staunch ally of the US, even on the Iraq War, has been taking a cuatious position on the Iran War. They are sending military assistance to various oil monarchies being directly attacked by Iran, i.e., Bahrain, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar.
Macron said such an operation would take excessive time and expose those crossing the strait to "coastal threats," particularly from Iran's Revolutionary Guards, "who possess significant resources as well as ballistic missiles." "This can only be done in concert with Iran," the French leader added, calling first for a ceasefire and a return to negotiations. (6)
But Macron also announced that France was sending a nuclear aircraft carrier to the eastern Mediterranean declaring it was for defensive purposes. And it has been participating in some defensive operations as a way to get up-to-date on drone warfare: “French warplanes and air defense systems are currently deployed in countries such as the United Arab Emirates to fend off Iranian drone counterattacks.” (7)
Now that the US has all but formally bailed on its NATO commitments, the European powers have to concentrate more on a new credible defensive posture against possible Russian aggression – although there is no real sign that Russia has any such intentions for the immediate future.
Germany: Germany has spent decades diplomatically investing itself in having good relations with Israel. But that goal is in conflict with their official commitment to international law, which they take far more seriously than either the Biden or Trump Administration did, especially when it came to the Gaza genocide. In practice, it is diplomatically very awkward for Germany to take a direct position of opposition to Israel, although in this case Israel and the US are engaged are engaged in an illegal “aggressive war” in the sense of the Nuremburg Trials.
Spain: Spain’s Socialist Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez has been more blunt in his rejection of any part in the US-Israeli war on Iran. His government has refused to use US bases in Spain to conduct acts of war against Iran, and later expanded that the banning even US overflights for war missions. (9)
Italy: Italy’s current rightwing government under Georgia Meloni does not take the pro-Russian tilt that various other European rightwing parties – including her own coalition partner party, the Liga – have been taking. And Italy also seems to be taking very seriously the current challenge of building a European deterrent not dependent on the US.
Apologies to the Incredible Hulk, btw. The Big Green Guy may have a limited vocabulary. But he has a much better grasp on reality than the Big Orange Guy.
Cover of Hulk: Smash Everything #1 (2025) Image by Adam Kubert.
Notes:
(1) Knapp, Ferdinand (2026): No ‘direct threat’ from Iran to Europe, US before war, Polish foreign minister says. Politico EU 03/12/2026. <https://www.politico.eu/article/no-direct-threat-from-iran-eu-europe-us-before-war-began-poland-foreign-minister/> (Accessed: 2026-03-04).
(2) Suciu, Peter (2026): This NATO Member Won’t Send Patriot Launchers to Help America Against Iran. The National Interest 04/03/2026 <https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/this-nato-member-wont-send-patriot-launchers-help-america-against-iran-ps-040326> (Accessed: 2026-03-04).
(3) Asem, Sondos (2026): Over 100 US-based legal experts declare Trump's strikes on Iran as possible war crimes. Middle East Eye 04/03/20206. <https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/over-100-us-based-legal-experts-say-trumps-war-iran-may-amount-war-crimes> (Accessed: 2026-03-04).
(4) Letter of over 100 international law experts on Iran war. Just Security 04/02/2026. <https://www.justsecurity.org/135423/professors-letter-international-law-iran-war/> (Accessed: 2026-03-04).
(5) Smith, Cachella et al (2026): More UK troops to be sent to Middle East, defence secretary announces. BBC News 03/31/2026. <https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c7vq76g45rvo> (Accessed: 2026-03-04).
(6) Macron says military operation to liberate Strait of Hormuz 'unrealistic'. Le Monde/AFP 04/02/2026. <https://www.lemonde.fr/en/international/article/2026/04/02/macron-says-military-operation-to-liberate-strait-of-hormuz-unrealistic_6752051_4.html> (Accessed: 2026-03-04).
(7) Kavali, Laura (2026): Politico EU 03/30/2026). <https://www.politico.eu/article/how-the-war-ukraine-iran-made-france-rethink-military-plans/> (Accessed: 2026-03-04).
(8) More, Rache & Mackenzie, James (2026): German Chancellor Merz says he has doubts over Iran war aims. Reuters 03/27/2026. (Accessed: 2026-03-04).
(9) Brugen, Stephen (2026): Spain closes airspace to US military over Iran war, widening rift with US. Guardian 03/30/2026. <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2026/mar/30/spain-closes-airspace-to-us-military-over-iran-war-widening-rift-with-us> (Accessed: 2026-03-04).
(10) Giuffrida, Angela (2026): Italy denies use of Sicily airbase to US planes carrying weapons for Iran war. Guardian 03/31/2026. <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2026/mar/31/italy-denies-sicily-airbase-us-planes-carrying-weapons-iran-war> (Accessed: 2026-03-04).
Polish Foreign Minister Radosław Sikorski was publicly critical of the US-Israeli war against Iran a couple of weeks after they attacked Iran. (1) When a foreign minister says there was no “direct threat” in this context as Sikorski did, he’s saying that it’s an illegal war of aggression. The US State Department doesn’t seem very keen these days on this boring “diplomacy” business. But most of the rest of the world is still practicing it.
Poland has also “rejected calls from the United States to deploy an MIM-104 Patriot air defense system to the Middle East, where it could be used to counter Iranian missiles and drones. Warsaw has said that the weapons are needed to deter Russian aggression in Europe.” (2)
As a country sharing a border with Russia, Poland has to take seriously the kind of standard, routine military games that go on there:
Poland sits on the border with Ukraine, and Russian drones attacking targets in western Ukraine have come perilously close to detonating across the border. Poland also borders Russia’s Kaliningrad exclave, the hub of its Baltic Fleet. Poland and Lithuania have each played a significant role in preparing for war in the “Suwalki Gap,” the narrow strip of land between Poland and Lithuania separating Kaliningrad from Russian-allied Belarus and a likely flashpoint for a future land war in Europe. In preparation for such a conflict, Poland and the three Baltic states have also withdrawn from the Ottawa Convention banning anti-personnel landmines.With European NATO countries concerned about their own borders as well as those of Ukraine, they are also diplomatically stressing the importance of international law, especially as regarding borders and wars of aggression. And there are at least a lot of international law experts who say bluntly:
Last September, NATO and Polish forces intercepted multiple Russian drones that had violated Polish airspace. At the time, a German-operated Patriot system was even placed on high alert. However, Polish F-16 Fighting Falcons and Dutch F-35 Lightning IIs were credited with downing the Russian unmanned aerial systems (UAS).
“The initiation of the campaign was a clear violation of the United Nations Charter, and the conduct of United States forces since, as well as statements made by senior government officials, raise serious concerns about violations of international human rights law and international humanitarian law, including potential war crimes,” said the letter.The legal experts highlighted the loose lips of the US Secretary of “War” Pete Hegseth, too:
While the letter is focused on the conduct of the US government, it also denounced the Iranian government’s crackdown on dissent and its “ongoing unlawful strikes on civilian infrastructure using explosive weapons in densely populated areas”. (3)
We collectively affirm the importance of equal application of international law to all, including countries that hold themselves out as global leaders. Recent statements from senior U.S. government officials describing the rules governing military engagement as “stupid” and prioritizing “lethality” over “legality” are profoundly alarming and dangerously short-sighted. These claims, particularly in combination with the observable conduct of U.S. forces, are harming the international legal order and the system of international law that we have devoted our lives to promoting. (4)Britain, France, Germany, Spain, Italy, and Portugal are currently playing major roles in the transition to what is looking more and more like a coming post-NATO future, not least because they have the six largest armies of the current NATO members. And Britain and France are both nuclear powers who will have to play a more prominent role now in the nuclear deterrence system in relation to Russia, especially as the Trump regime follows such a Russia-friendly direction as it is now doing.
Britain as the long-tine staunch ally of the US, even on the Iraq War, has been taking a cuatious position on the Iran War. They are sending military assistance to various oil monarchies being directly attacked by Iran, i.e., Bahrain, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar.
Prime Minister Sir Keir Starmer said on Monday the UK is "not going to get dragged into this war" but would continue to defend its interests and allies in the region.France: President Emmanuel Macron told the Orange US President that he was bonkers if he thought opening the Strait of Hormuz with military operations is feasible. Although he phrased it more diplomatically: “it is never the option we have chosen and we consider it unrealistic.”
The defence secretary [John Healey] has been visiting Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Bahrain as the government announced the deployment of further systems, and associated teams, for the nations and for Kuwait. …
Speaking on Monday, Starmer reiterated that UK troops will not be deployed on the ground in Iran.
"This is not our war and we're not going to get drawn into it," he said while responding to a question from reporters.
The UK previously gave permission for the US to use British military bases for "defensive" strikes on Iranian missile sites after Starmer denied a request for the use of UK bases for the initial US-Israeli strikes against Iran in February. (5)
Macron said such an operation would take excessive time and expose those crossing the strait to "coastal threats," particularly from Iran's Revolutionary Guards, "who possess significant resources as well as ballistic missiles." "This can only be done in concert with Iran," the French leader added, calling first for a ceasefire and a return to negotiations. (6)
But Macron also announced that France was sending a nuclear aircraft carrier to the eastern Mediterranean declaring it was for defensive purposes. And it has been participating in some defensive operations as a way to get up-to-date on drone warfare: “French warplanes and air defense systems are currently deployed in countries such as the United Arab Emirates to fend off Iranian drone counterattacks.” (7)
Now that the US has all but formally bailed on its NATO commitments, the European powers have to concentrate more on a new credible defensive posture against possible Russian aggression – although there is no real sign that Russia has any such intentions for the immediate future.
Germany: Germany has spent decades diplomatically investing itself in having good relations with Israel. But that goal is in conflict with their official commitment to international law, which they take far more seriously than either the Biden or Trump Administration did, especially when it came to the Gaza genocide. In practice, it is diplomatically very awkward for Germany to take a direct position of opposition to Israel, although in this case Israel and the US are engaged are engaged in an illegal “aggressive war” in the sense of the Nuremburg Trials.
Spain: Spain’s Socialist Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez has been more blunt in his rejection of any part in the US-Israeli war on Iran. His government has refused to use US bases in Spain to conduct acts of war against Iran, and later expanded that the banning even US overflights for war missions. (9)
Italy: Italy’s current rightwing government under Georgia Meloni does not take the pro-Russian tilt that various other European rightwing parties – including her own coalition partner party, the Liga – have been taking. And Italy also seems to be taking very seriously the current challenge of building a European deterrent not dependent on the US.
Italy has denied the use of an airbase in Sicily to US military planes carrying weapons for the war in Iran after the US did not follow the required authorisation procedure.This may look like confusion. But for countries that practice more complicated diplomacy than the Incredible Hulk version - “Me drop big bombs. Big bombs go boom,” they can coordinate the national position in ways that maximize their collective political influence on US and Russian policy.
A source at the Italian defence ministry confirmed a report in Corriere della Sera that “some US bombers” had been due to land at Sigonella – one of seven US navy bases in Italy – before heading to the Middle East, but that use of the base had been denied because the US sought authorisation to land only while the aircraft were already en route to Sicily. …
In Italy, where there is a deep-rooted anti-war culture, opinion polls consistently show very strong opposition to the conflict and strong dislike towards Trump. The unpopularity of Trump in Italy has also started to erode the popularity of Meloni, who is ideologically in tune with the US president and has established good working relations with him.
Opposition parties have for weeks been urging the government to block the US from using Italy’s bases for involvement in the Middle East conflict. (10)
Apologies to the Incredible Hulk, btw. The Big Green Guy may have a limited vocabulary. But he has a much better grasp on reality than the Big Orange Guy.
Cover of Hulk: Smash Everything #1 (2025) Image by Adam Kubert.
(1) Knapp, Ferdinand (2026): No ‘direct threat’ from Iran to Europe, US before war, Polish foreign minister says. Politico EU 03/12/2026. <https://www.politico.eu/article/no-direct-threat-from-iran-eu-europe-us-before-war-began-poland-foreign-minister/> (Accessed: 2026-03-04).
(2) Suciu, Peter (2026): This NATO Member Won’t Send Patriot Launchers to Help America Against Iran. The National Interest 04/03/2026 <https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/this-nato-member-wont-send-patriot-launchers-help-america-against-iran-ps-040326> (Accessed: 2026-03-04).
(3) Asem, Sondos (2026): Over 100 US-based legal experts declare Trump's strikes on Iran as possible war crimes. Middle East Eye 04/03/20206. <https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/over-100-us-based-legal-experts-say-trumps-war-iran-may-amount-war-crimes> (Accessed: 2026-03-04).
(4) Letter of over 100 international law experts on Iran war. Just Security 04/02/2026. <https://www.justsecurity.org/135423/professors-letter-international-law-iran-war/> (Accessed: 2026-03-04).
(5) Smith, Cachella et al (2026): More UK troops to be sent to Middle East, defence secretary announces. BBC News 03/31/2026. <https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c7vq76g45rvo> (Accessed: 2026-03-04).
(6) Macron says military operation to liberate Strait of Hormuz 'unrealistic'. Le Monde/AFP 04/02/2026. <https://www.lemonde.fr/en/international/article/2026/04/02/macron-says-military-operation-to-liberate-strait-of-hormuz-unrealistic_6752051_4.html> (Accessed: 2026-03-04).
(7) Kavali, Laura (2026): Politico EU 03/30/2026). <https://www.politico.eu/article/how-the-war-ukraine-iran-made-france-rethink-military-plans/> (Accessed: 2026-03-04).
(8) More, Rache & Mackenzie, James (2026): German Chancellor Merz says he has doubts over Iran war aims. Reuters 03/27/2026.
(9) Brugen, Stephen (2026): Spain closes airspace to US military over Iran war, widening rift with US. Guardian 03/30/2026. <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2026/mar/30/spain-closes-airspace-to-us-military-over-iran-war-widening-rift-with-us> (Accessed: 2026-03-04).
(10) Giuffrida, Angela (2026): Italy denies use of Sicily airbase to US planes carrying weapons for Iran war. Guardian 03/31/2026. <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2026/mar/31/italy-denies-sicily-airbase-us-planes-carrying-weapons-iran-war> (Accessed: 2026-03-04).
Friday, April 3, 2026
What’s up in post-Maduro Venezuela these days?
This is a helpful conference discussion about Venezuela from the Quincy Institute, founded by Andrew Bacevich and an excellent cite for foreign policy information and analysis. (1)
The participants talk about the fact that Venezuela has been reasonably stable since the US kidnapped Venezuela’s then-President Nicolas Maduro and his wife in January.
Fracisco Rodriguez of the Center for Economic and Policy Research (CEPR) notes that US sanctions have been rolled back. But Venezuelan revenue for oil sales still have to go through the Venezuela Government Deposit Fund the Trump regime set up after kidnapping Maduro. But the national state-owned oil company PDVSA (Petróleos de Venezuela) has a lot of flexibility in transactions, which Rodriguez expects will likely to provide new investment inside Venezuela that will strengthen the economy.
The sanctions on Interim President Delcy Rodriguez have also been lifted. From the BBC:
Julia Buxton of Oxford Analytica on the panel suggests the current government is looking to reinvigorate the politics of Chavismo, which she distinguishes from Madurismo. She also notes the cocaine traffic, which the Trump regime used as an excuse for his mini-invasion, is actually cheap these days, unlike the 1970s when many of US popular impression on narcotrafficking were established. The Forever War On Drugs that the Nixon Administration began will surely be remembered as on of the more destructive delusions in which the US has indulged.
But Orlando Perez emphasizes that the basic structure of Maduro’s regime seems to be stable. He notes that some of the most senior military leaders have been removed. But their replacements were figures that apparently support the basic structure of Maduro’s government, so that it’s “continuity, not really reform.” He also notes that Trump’s general policies in Latin America are creating new political opportunities for left populists in the region going forward.
Venezuela has the longtime blessing and curse of being a petrostate with a huge part of its economic directly dependent on the vagaries of the world oil market. Thanks to the Trump regime’s Iran War, Venezuela stands go get a big boost in its national income, as Fracisco Rodriguez noted. I expect there will be some very interesting developments with the Venezuela Government Deposit Fund Trump’s government controls. The grift always has the highest priority with the Orange Man and his cronies. It unimaginable that this crew will be scrupulous in managing that fund for the benefit of Venezuela and its people. As Trump himself periodically blurts out, the points of wars and “military operations” against petrostates is to take the oil. By which he mainly means, take the money.
As Trump himself said just this week in the speech about the Iran War that sent oil prices soaring: “We could just take their oil. But, you know, I’m not sure that the people in our country have the patience to do that, which is unfortunate. You know, they want to see it end. If we stayed there, I, you know, I’d prefer just to take the oil. We could do it so easily.” (3)
As the BBC reports:
And, more to the point on the international law front, how much of a security threat to the US can Venezuela really be, if the US was able to conspire with senior members of Maduro’s government who were willing to have the US kidnap and imprison him with minimal military resistance? Compare that to Iran’s preparations for the current US-Israel war against them, in which they are able to do massive damage to the world economy and directly to Israel, US bases in the regions, and other Middle Eastern governments who allied with the US and Israel.
Notes:
(1) What is the New Paradigm of US-Venezuela Relations Post-Maduro? Quincy Institute YouTube channel 04/02/2026. <https://www.youtube.com/live/KDErgdUE_PE> (Accessed: 2026-04-03).
(2) Buschschlüter, Vanessa (2026): US lifts sanctions on Venezuelan interim leader Delcy Rodríguez. BBC News 07/02/2026. <https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cje4l9de0d1o> (Accessed: 2026-03-04).
(3) Breaking News. The New Republic 04/02/2026. <https://newrepublic.com/post/208535/white-house-accidentally-easter-lunch-trump-speech> (Accessed: 2026-03-04).
The participants talk about the fact that Venezuela has been reasonably stable since the US kidnapped Venezuela’s then-President Nicolas Maduro and his wife in January.
Fracisco Rodriguez of the Center for Economic and Policy Research (CEPR) notes that US sanctions have been rolled back. But Venezuelan revenue for oil sales still have to go through the Venezuela Government Deposit Fund the Trump regime set up after kidnapping Maduro. But the national state-owned oil company PDVSA (Petróleos de Venezuela) has a lot of flexibility in transactions, which Rodriguez expects will likely to provide new investment inside Venezuela that will strengthen the economy.
The sanctions on Interim President Delcy Rodriguez have also been lifted. From the BBC:
Rodríguez, a close ally of Maduro who served as his vice-president, had been placed on the sanctions list in 2018, with the US accusing her of undermining democracy.Having Donald Trump describe you as "a terrific person" is a real stigma!
She was sworn in as interim president by Venezuela's National Assembly, which is dominated by Maduro loyalists, days after the US raid and has been described by US President Donald Trump as "a terrific person". (2)
Julia Buxton of Oxford Analytica on the panel suggests the current government is looking to reinvigorate the politics of Chavismo, which she distinguishes from Madurismo. She also notes the cocaine traffic, which the Trump regime used as an excuse for his mini-invasion, is actually cheap these days, unlike the 1970s when many of US popular impression on narcotrafficking were established. The Forever War On Drugs that the Nixon Administration began will surely be remembered as on of the more destructive delusions in which the US has indulged.
But Orlando Perez emphasizes that the basic structure of Maduro’s regime seems to be stable. He notes that some of the most senior military leaders have been removed. But their replacements were figures that apparently support the basic structure of Maduro’s government, so that it’s “continuity, not really reform.” He also notes that Trump’s general policies in Latin America are creating new political opportunities for left populists in the region going forward.
Venezuela has the longtime blessing and curse of being a petrostate with a huge part of its economic directly dependent on the vagaries of the world oil market. Thanks to the Trump regime’s Iran War, Venezuela stands go get a big boost in its national income, as Fracisco Rodriguez noted. I expect there will be some very interesting developments with the Venezuela Government Deposit Fund Trump’s government controls. The grift always has the highest priority with the Orange Man and his cronies. It unimaginable that this crew will be scrupulous in managing that fund for the benefit of Venezuela and its people. As Trump himself periodically blurts out, the points of wars and “military operations” against petrostates is to take the oil. By which he mainly means, take the money.
As Trump himself said just this week in the speech about the Iran War that sent oil prices soaring: “We could just take their oil. But, you know, I’m not sure that the people in our country have the patience to do that, which is unfortunate. You know, they want to see it end. If we stayed there, I, you know, I’d prefer just to take the oil. We could do it so easily.” (3)
As the BBC reports:
In the months since Maduro's removal from office, several high-level US delegations have travelled to Venezuela to discuss how the US could expand its access to Venezuela's oil and mineral wealth.An obvious question that corporate media will be reluctant to ask is, if Marco Rubio and other advocates for the rightwing, anti-Cuba and anti-Venezuela voting bloc are okay with Delcy Rodriguez’ regime, which is actually a direct continuation of Maduro’s regime, just how bad could Maduro’s regime have been?
Critics of Rodríguez have, however, bemoaned the fact that there has been little talk of democratic elections.
Opposition leader María Corina Machado, who has been living in exile since leaving Venezuela to collect the Nobel Peace Prize she was awarded in December, met Rubio on Tuesday.
Despite having been sidelined by Trump in favour of Rodríguez, Machado struck an optimistic note, calling the meeting "excellent" and praising the US secretary of state's "dedication to democracy, freedom and Venezuelans' well-being".
And, more to the point on the international law front, how much of a security threat to the US can Venezuela really be, if the US was able to conspire with senior members of Maduro’s government who were willing to have the US kidnap and imprison him with minimal military resistance? Compare that to Iran’s preparations for the current US-Israel war against them, in which they are able to do massive damage to the world economy and directly to Israel, US bases in the regions, and other Middle Eastern governments who allied with the US and Israel.
Notes:
(1) What is the New Paradigm of US-Venezuela Relations Post-Maduro? Quincy Institute YouTube channel 04/02/2026. <https://www.youtube.com/live/KDErgdUE_PE> (Accessed: 2026-04-03).
(2) Buschschlüter, Vanessa (2026): US lifts sanctions on Venezuelan interim leader Delcy Rodríguez. BBC News 07/02/2026. <https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cje4l9de0d1o> (Accessed: 2026-03-04).
(3) Breaking News. The New Republic 04/02/2026. <https://newrepublic.com/post/208535/white-house-accidentally-easter-lunch-trump-speech> (Accessed: 2026-03-04).
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