It is the case, of course, that Russian seized Crimea in 2014 and a low-level irregular war between Russia and Ukraine continued in eastern Ukraine until now. But when we hear about the “Russia-Ukraine War,” that is generally understood to mean the ongoing war since Russia’s large-scale invasion of 2022.
Milanovic notes that the strongest reaction to the 2022 invasion came from the United States under President Joe Biden. “Europe’s reaction was several octavos lower as it generally was during the Cold War. Finally, the rest of the world, while mostly condemning Russia for an obvious violation of the international law and UN rules, was not overly concerned.” He reminds us that Biden initially insisted that Ukraine refrain from strikes on Russian territory. “But even under Biden that policy was gradually abandoned and the US de facto entered the war through its selection and direct targeting of places in Russia.”
A critical part of the story is the bull-headed decision by the Cheney-Bush Administration to insist on a NATO declaration in 2008 that both Ukraine and Georgia, both former Soviet Republics, would become members of NATO at some unspecified time in the future. John Mearsheimer, the leading advocate of “offensive realist” approach to understanding great-power foreign policies, wrote a piece in the ultra-respectable Foreign Affairs magazine in 2014 “Why the Ukraine Crisis Is the West's Fault,” that has provoked much gnashing of teeth and rending of clothing among foreign policy bigwigs and media figures ever since.
But you would have to listen very carefully these days to find anyone who would say that NATO’s 2008 declaration was a clever foreign policy move. Neither Ukraine nor Georgia in 2008 were anywhere close to meeting the minimum requirements for NATO membership. And still are not. Russia had never liked the idea of NATO expansion. But they hadn’t raised big objections, even when the former Soviet republics of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania became members. But they had made it clear that Ukrainian membership in NATO was something they considered a serious threat to their national interest. And had made that clear, publicly and explicitly.
Even people who think that perception on their part was wrong, or overblown, or whatever, should also be able to recognize that declaring explicitly that Georgia and Ukraine would become NATO members – even though they weren’t ready and NATO was not ready in 2008 to go directly to war against Russia over either country – was a dumb move.
The Russians didn’t seize Crimea and begin the active guerilla war in western Ukraine until 2014, just after the pro-Russian regime of President Viktor Yanukovych fell and was replaced by the pro-Western Petro Poroschenko. Both Russia and the US were playing active roles in supporting their preferred side in the Ukrainian internal political struggle. For all the usual highfalutin talk about democracy and national sovereignty from the US, what played out was very much hardnosed practical geopolitics. How right or wrong each side was is another question.
The European Union was pushing Yanukovych’s government to accelerate Ukraine’s accession to the EU. As Ursula Koch-Laugwitz explained at the time:
Yanukovych feared that his re-election could be endangered through the "adjustment costs" and structural reforms that would be generated by a closer association to the EU. Instead of asking for support for the integration, Brussels threatened to deny Ukraine the association if three EU conditions were not met: the release of [imprisoned former President] Yulia Tymoshenko [of the Fatherland party], an election law reform and an end to selective justice. At the same time, Russia, which most prefers to integrate Ukraine into Putin's pet project of a Eurasian Union, put the country under massive economic pressure and tempted the Ukrainian government in the short term with comprehensive financial assistance - successfully. But Yanukovych's decision to put the agreement with the European Union on ice placed his grip on power even more in question. (2)Also in 2014, Paul Pillar commented on the considerations that the Obama Administration and Secretary of State John Kerry were applying to regime changes of the time in Egypt and Ukraine:
There are many criteria by which we in the West can assess what is good and what is bad about the events in these countries and any others in which similar political change occurs. What happens to democracy is only one of those criteria.Now, 12 years later, we’re in the fifth year of war in Ukraine, in which there has been an essentially stalemated war of attrition on the ground since 2023, and which will leave Ukraine badly damaged with no reasonable prospects of becoming a NATO member, even if NATO survive the Trump policies in something like its current form.
There are the various issues of human rights and governmental integrity, and in this respect an end to the more thuggish and corrupt aspects of Yanukovych’s presidency may be a good thing. (Zbigniew Brzezinski describes Yanukovych as “a mendacious schemer, a coward and a thief.”) And for realist observers, the foreign policy orientation of a government may be at least as important as any of the internal considerations.
Each individual case is worthy of assessment in its own right. The two cases mentioned here are quite different in important respects. Some of the cheering over Morsi’s ouster reflected an ignoble Islamophobia that is not a factor in Ukraine. The alternatives to the ousted leadership are also quite different; in Egypt it is a restored authoritarian military regime, while in Ukraine we can still hope it will be something not just different but more to the benefit of the Ukrainian people. [emphasis added] (3)
As Milanovic writes:
Over the past two years, the situation has further evolved. The US has continued with a policy where it is a de facto participant in the war but has also shown a desire to wrap-up the conflict in one form or another. What was surprising is that the thirst for war has become almost insatiable in several European countries, principally in the Nordic and Baltic countries, but more recently also in Germany, and, for long-term historical reasons that go to the 18th century, in the UK too. [my emphasis]We hear from other commentators, too, that warmongering attitudes toward Russia are prevalent in European NATO countries. To paraphrase a famous Gospel verse, warmongers we will have with us always. But I’m not convinced that specifically an aggressive policy toward Russia is something driving most European policymakers. It’s fairly obvious that European policymakers see some relative advantage in having Russia tied down in the war with Ukraine. That’s just how national security analysts look at things.
But Russia and Europe for the foreseeable future will look at each other as potential adversaries. And in a serious military confrontation, the European allies can no longer count on the United States to be a reliable partner in deterrence or in actual combat. In order to have a credible deterrence, the process that has already begun of Europe developing new arrangements for joint defense independent of the US will have to continue for the next several years. Whether or not the Russia-Ukraine War continues for years more, the idea of the EU countries actually promoting war against Russia is unlikely in the extreme. Unless maybe Britain, Germany, France, Spain, Italy and Poland all come under the leadership of crackpots and mobsters of the Donald Trump type.
There are certainly plenty of risks of which we all need to be aware! But Milanovic overstates the present situation when he writes, “The Nordic-Baltic coalition is essentially calling for a war with Russia, citing its own fears and traumas of Russian/Soviet control and occupation.”
But he has a valid point on a Korea-style protracted armistice for Ukraine:
The Nordic-Baltic alliance also forgets that if the cease-fire is established along the current lines of control, the [Ukrainian] territory of the Donbass etc. will indeed be controlled by Russia but no single country in the world would officially recognize it. Did they not notice that no country from the [Russia-aligned] Commonwealth of Independent States has recognized it? Did they not notice that not even Belarus recognizes it? Such, indeed fragile, peace not only puts an end to today’s carnage, but leaves open a possibility of eventual long-term solution between Russia and Ukraine. Neither Putin, nor Zelensky, nor the social forces that support them are eternal. Things will change in Russia, and in Ukraine. Negotiations can take place in ten or twenty years—but at least people would be alive rather than dead. [emphasis added]What we are seeing right now are things like the following. Germany is responding to the recent appearance of what they claim to have been Russian drones sent with explosives to the Leipzig airport. Although there were no actual explosions involved. Although German Defense Minister Alexander Dobrindt describes the incident as being directed by a “foreign power.” Germany is publicly suggesting it may call for a NATO “Article 4” consultation.
Article 4 of the NATO Treaty foresees consultations, if according to one of the allies the integrity of their territory, the political independence or the security of one of the parties is threatened. In distinction to Article 5 [which authorizes joint action in defense of a member state under military attack], it doesn’t involve the triggering of the military defense obligations of the alliance. The outcome of such [Article 4] consultations is open. (4)This is the European world of 2026: threats and counterthreats, provocations and responses, all in the world in which the NATO commitments of the US can no longer be trusted as they once were. It’s normal that the states of what Milanovic calls “the Nordic-Baltic alliance” would take the more role of making the most dire and urgent warnings. Because they would be the most likely targets of any military invasion by Russia. While a country like Germany, which has had both extremely hostile and relatively friendly relationships with Russia since 1918 or so, is better positioned to play the role of serious but cautious authority.
Here’s a very brief summary of what Articles 4 and 5 are. (5)
Notes:
(1) Milanovic, Branko (2026): On European hypocrisy and warmongering. Global Inequality and More 3.0 08/26/2026. <https://branko2f7.substack.com/p/on-european-hypocrisy-and-warmongering> (Accessed : 2026-29-08).
(2) Koch-Laugwitz, Ursula (2014): Ukraine: Protest ohne Projekt. Blätter für deutsche und internationale Politik 3/2014. <https://www.blaetter.de/ausgabe/2014/maerz/ukraine-protest-ohne-projekt> (Accessed 2014-07-02). My translation to English.
(3) Pillar, Paul (2014): A Selective View of ‘Democracy’. Consortium News 02/26/2014. <https://consortiumnews.com/2014/02/26/a-selective-view-of-democracy/> (Accessed 20236-30-08).
(4) Balser, Markus & Brössler, Daniel (2026): Suche nach Antworten an den Kreml. Süddeutsche Zeitung für Österreich 29-30-Aug-2026.
(5) What are NATO's Article 4 and Article 5 - AP explains. AP Archive YouTube channel 09/28/2025. <https://youtu.be/Y8j0mAF9qV8?si=YxCryta202Q-EZkw> (Accessed: 2026-30-08).




