It’s not hard to imagine that both Vladimir’s are sick of the clown-show diplomacy of Jared Kushner and Steve Witkoff. Although it seems to have worked better for Putin’s purposes than for Zelenskyy’s. Still, ultra-amateur diplomacy is the last thing this situation needed. (Which is even more true for the current Iran War!)
The BBC summarizes the current position of the two countries on territorial issues:
Putin's longstanding position has been that Ukraine should withdraw from four regions largely occupied by Russia - Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson and Zaporizhzhia - and give up its efforts to join Nato.And the BBC report notes:
Ukraine has ruled out ceding territory, saying it would embolden Russia to invade again, as it had in 2022 when it launched its full-scale war eight years after illegally annexing Crimea. (1)
Putin's longstanding position has been that Ukraine should withdraw from four regions largely occupied by Russia - Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson and Zaporizhzhia - and give up its efforts to join Nato.It’s a bit surprising that the BBC report didn’t mention Crimea there. In current international law, Crimea (seized by Russia in 2014), Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson and Zaporizhzhia are Ukraine’s territory. The Russia position that they have officially incorporated Crimea and parts of the other four oblasts into Russia proper is not valid in international law and has never been recognized by Ukraine as valid.
Ukraine has ruled out ceding territory, saying it would embolden Russia to invade again, as it had in 2022 when it launched its full-scale war eight years after illegally annexing Crimea.
Ceasefire negotiations have stalled in recent months, while previous peace talks in Geneva, Abu Dhabi and Istanbul have failed.
Oleksandr Kyselov, a left-leaning Ukrainian from the Donetsk oblast (province) and currently of Uppsala University in Sweden, provided a helpful context this past December for what geographical issues that would be involved in a settlement of the current war. He was reacting to a particular peace proposal put forward by Russia last November 21.
Precedents exist for lasting ceasefires even when underlying territorial claims remained unresolved - Cyprus since 1974, Korea since 1953, Kashmir since 1972. But Cyprus has United Nations peacekeepers and foreign troops on both sides. Korea has one of the world’s most militarized borders. Kashmir sees regular outbreaks of violence, prevented from full war only by nuclear deterrence. None offers templates for sustainable peace in Ukraine fitting the deals discussed. [my emphasis] (2)
Crimea has the most important port for the Russian Black Sea Fleet. Russia’s involvement in Crimea is also not new. Russia officially annexed the peninsula 1783. The Crimean War of 1853-1856 was, as the name suggests, was a war with Britian and France against Russia over control of Crimea. Two Ukrainian experts, Alina Frolova and Stepan Yakymiak, write for the Carnegie Institute:
Moscow’s determination to dominate the Black Sea runs deep in its strategic culture.But Russia’s ability to use Crimea to produce a military advantage in the Black Sea has also been inhibited by Ukrainian drones and missiles in the current war. So at the moment, Crimea is not a critical to Russia’s power position as it seemed before the war. But that does not mean that Russia is inclined to cede it back to Ukraine. The current state of drone technology may have far-reaching effects on naval strategies and types of vessels used.
Russia’s full-scale invasion of 2022 aimed not only to seize Ukrainian land but also to reimpose its dominance at sea. Its initial war plans foresaw a rapid occupation of Ukraine’s coastline, including the critical port cities of Odesa and Mykolaiv. If it had succeeded in that, Moscow would have been able to restore much of its Cold War-era control over the Black Sea, strangle Ukraine’s economy, and use control over the flow of food and energy for coercion. The world learned in 2022 that Ukraine is vital to global food security. Russia’s blockade of Ukrainian ports triggered a surge in grain prices, placing millions—particularly in Africa and the Middle East—at risk of hunger until a UN-brokered agreement, and later Ukraine’s military power, prompted Moscow to retreat. [my emphasis] (3)
Frolova’s and Yakymiak’s position doesn’t seem to anticipate a harmonious resolution of the Crimea issue anytime soon:
The only way to achieve lasting peace and security in the Black Sea, therefore, is to ensure that Russia’s naval capabilities are not just degraded temporarily but kept structurally paralyzed. …I think it’s safe to say that if Russia’s leaders think that is the goal Western powers include Ukraine are pursuing, it could be a very long time before the control of Crimea is resolved in any way acceptable to both Ukraine and to Russia!
Ukraine’s primary objective in the Black Sea, working alongside its partners, should be the preservation of the current balance of power. But consolidating this achievement demands long-term commitment: scaling up Ukraine’s maritime strike capacity, institutionalizing the support of its coalition of partners, and integrating Black Sea security into NATO and EU frameworks. In other words, the Black Sea will remain insecure until Russia’s fleet ceases to be able to function as an offensive force. That is the starting point from which any serious strategy must proceed.
Türkiye is also a key player on Black Sea security matters and has also focused on restricting Russia naval power there. Countries bordering on the Black Sea include Bulgaria, Romania, Ukraine (even without Crimea) Russia, Georgia, and Türkiye. So the Crimea issues involves much more than just Ukraine and Russia agreeing on new boundary markers.
2014 Black Sea Map from Encyclopedia Britannica:
Zelenskyy’s new offer for talks at least hints that there could be a longterm ceasefire like those Oleksandr Kyselov cites for Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson and Zaporizhzhia. On the surface, there seems to be a lot to be said for such an arrangement. Although the three examples Kyselov cites involve frozen conflicts that have lasted since 1953, 1972 and 1974. So a settlement along those lines could mean in practice something that would look to those directly affected a lot like a permanent settlement. The example of China and Taiwan, divided since the end of the Second World War, is on an even longer timeline.
At the very least, a stable and protracted ceasefire could give both sides a chance to begin removing the massive number of landmines and other unexploded ordinance on both sides of the conflict lines there. It could also offer a chance to resolve the heartbreaking issues of the many Ukrainian children illegally deported by Russia, many of them given to Russian families for adoption. And it would allow war refugees to return to their homes if they want to do so – although in many cases their actual homes may no longer exist.
A key issue for Ukraine of their 50-meter-long “fortress belt” in Donetsk. A 2025 analysis from the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) describes the importance of that part of Donetsk – still controlled by Ukraine – as a key defensive position for any new military drive on the Ukrainian capital Kyiv by Russian forces. The ISW report discusses them in the context of proposals Russia had on the table at the time of the report:
The surrender of the rest of Donetsk Oblast as the prerequisite of a ceasefire with no commitment to a final peace settlement ending the war would force Ukraine to abandon its "fortress belt," the main fortified defensive line in Donetsk Oblast since 2014, with no guarantee that fighting will not resume. Putin's reported proposal reportedly demands that Ukraine concede this critical defensive position, which Russian forces currently have no means of rapidly enveloping or penetrating, apparently in exchange for nothing. (4)John Mearsheimer describes the current context of the war is that Russia is winning in the war of attrition and advancing slowly, but advancing. He doesn’t see much credibility in claims that Putin is facing critical challenges politically because of the Russian economy or claims that the occasional drone attacks by Ukraine deep inside Russia are putting huge new political pressure on Putin to end the war. (5)
Scott Lucas is a good analyst of American diplomacy and on Trump’s regime generally. But He’s a bit too starry-eyed on things like the Ukrainian strikes inside Russia. It’s not that Ukraine isn’t successful in hitting some strategic economic infrastructure targets. But it’s hard to imagine that those are having any large economic effect on Russia’s industrial capabilities, especially in comparison to using those attacks for tactical operations on the Russian forces on the border. But Lucas also comments that he thinks Zelenskyy is seeking a ceasefire in place now. (6)
At this stage, a prolonged ceasefire along the current front lines is likely the very best Ukraine can do. There’s a good argument that it also makes sense for Russia, and Mearsheimer gives the impression that there is some possibility to Putin’s government will see it that way. He recent suggest that Zelenskyy’s current optimistic rhetoric would be a good way for Zelenskyy to spin the results if Russia should agree to a stable ceasefire-in-place. But that would be a best-we-can-do type settlement from Ukraine’s viewpoint. And the Russian government may decide that maintaining something like the current position with sporadic rounds of fighting without a ceasefire is a preferable position.
The Ukraine-can’t-join-NATO demand is sounding a little obsolescent these days, since the European allies and even Canada are scrambling to find alternative military-defense commitments and arrangement now that they can no longer count on the US in anything like the way they could pre-2025. But if Putin wants to do a deal, he probably could convince Trump to make some kind of pledge that the US would veto any Ukrainian bid for membership.
Still, a firm agreement with he US on sanctions relief would be a likely thing for Russia to demand in a major ceasefire agreement. And that would require the US to conduct something more like actual diplomacy than the current Kushner-Witkoff Laurel-and-Hardy act.
Jared and Steve prepare for their next round of negotiations with Russia
Notes:
(1) Shevchenko, Mann, Toby (2026): Zelensky proposes face-to-face talks in open letter to Putin. BBC News 2026-05-06). <https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cwy2ypyp4x4o> Accessed: 2026-09-04).
(2) Kyselov, Oleksandr (2025): Ukraine Faces an Imperial Carve-Up. Jacobin 2025-04-12. <https://jacobin.com/2025/12/ukraine-russia-war-concessions-trump> (Accessed : 2026-09-06).
(3) Frolova, Alina & Yakymiak, Stepan (2026): The Changing Military Balance in the Black Sea: A Ukrainian Perspective. Carnegie Institute 04/02/2026. <https://carnegieendowment.org/russia-eurasia/research/2026/04/the-changing-military-balance-in-the-black-sea-a-ukrainian-perspective> (Accessed: 2026-09-06).
(4) Ukraine’s Fortress Belt in Donetsk Oblast ISW 12-Aug-2025. <https://understandingwar.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/08/The20Critical20Importance20of20UkraineE28099s20Fortress20Belt20in20Donetsk2C20August20122C2020252C20final20PDF.pdf> (Accessed: 2026-09-06).
(5) Prof. John Mearsheimer: Why Ukraine Will Lose. Judge Napolitano YouTube channel 06/09/2026. (5) <https://www.youtube.com/live/XtINoZon8as?si=4labuv1wjoCc5u4g> (Accessed: 2026-09-06).
(6) Why Ukraine's Show of Strength in St. Petersburg Matters. Scott Lucas Worldview YouTube channel06/09/2026. <https://youtu.be/iFOfGT-f1iQ?si=ZjJh0c90Qh4pTjnX> (Accessed: 2026-09-06).


