Looking at a sloppy German news report on immigrants

The German news service Tagesschau just ran an article about expulsion of refugees from Afghanistan that illustrates part of the problem with the politics of xenophobia in Germany and other European countries.

The three opening paragraphs read as follows:

Afghan criminals are to be deported more consistently in the future, according to the German government. A corresponding increase in flights was agreed at a confidential meeting with representatives of the Taliban government [of Afghanistan].

According to a media report, the German government is significantly expanding the deportations of Afghan criminals to their homeland. After confidential negotiations at technical working level between representatives of the Federal Ministry of the Interior and the Afghan Taliban government, the number of deportation flights to Kabul is to be increased, reports the Bild am Sonntag [a notoriously conservative tabloid].

So in the future, up to three charter flights per month will be possible. In addition to charter flights, repatriations via regular scheduled flights will continue to be possible at any time, the newspaper writes. With the increase to the almost weekly frequency, the Ministry of the Interior wants to establish a permanent "deportation airlift". (1)

As a general rule, the earlier paragraphs in a news story get read more than the later ones. And sometimes what some readers would find to be the most important information may be in the middle or later parts of the story.

So what does a casual reader get from the first three paragraphs?

We are talking about “criminals” from Afghanistan. What kinds of crimes? Murder? Rape? Petty theft? Assault-and-battery? Speeding in a 30-kilometers-per-hour zone? Spray-painting graffiti on a wall? Walking in a demonstration where some people are chanting “from the river to the sea”?

Well, it doesn’t say. But it matters. The xenophobes understandably try to associate immigrants of a type they don’t approve with violence, crime, fanaticism and immorality. Yet vague references to “criminals” in news articles like this just reinforce general and often mindless or malicious stereotypes - which plays exactly to the nationalist-xenophobic political agitation from groups like the far-right AfD in Germany or the UK Reform Party in Britain.

Before readers even get to the first three paragraphs, they are presented with this image of a large plane flying in the direction of strands of razor wire.

Because we must be talking here about some really dangerous characters, right?

A few more factual assertions creep into view in the fourth paragraph: “This has to do with serious criminals and dangerous people who are in prison in Germany. According to the report, at least 100 Afghan offenders willing for deportation are currently still in regular detention or in detention pending deportation.” And it adds, “According to the information, the criminals are rapists, dangerous people [Gefährder] and drug dealers.”

The Gefährder category refers to people who in American terms would be persons detained under suspicion of having committed a crime and who are considered a flight risk. It’s a category often applied in Germany to suspected Muslim terrorists.

But if you’re not just looking for a fig-leaf reason to rant about how foreign Muslim criminals are all over the place, there come some obvious questions. Germany is a country of nearly 84 million people. So according to the skimpy factual information in the article, there are around one hundred people who are Afghan citizens that fall into this category of dangerous characters who need to be sent to Afghanistan who are (apparently) in custody in Germany, including rapists, drug dealers, and Gefährder (suspicious characters). We could be generous to the Tagesschau and assume we’re not talking about two convicted rapists, five people who were illegally selling cannabis, and 93 people who some local cop busted because he thought they “looked suspicious.”

My point in writing more words about the article than it contains is to say that sloppy reporting like this helps give credibility to some of the most irresponsible and antidemocratic elements in European politics. There are also laws - German laws, EU laws, international humanitarian laws – that address whether it is legal to repatriate people to a country where there is a likelihood they will be killed or tortured by the government or subject to lawless conduct in violent civil conflict or extreme gang violence. It’s also worth remembering that Germany was one of the NATO allies officially supporting the US war in Afghanistan. Sending a Gefährder suspected of illegally selling pot back to Afghanistan could be a death sentence - especially if they had worked for NATO during the war. Which for xenophobes is a feature, not a bug.

There‘s also a factor at play that articles like this don’t help address. Too much of the official rhetoric on immigration enforcement in the EU is based on proposals that are essentially scams, sometimes expensive scams. The repeated talk of exiling immigrants to “third countries” for indefinite warehousing are often largely scams. And prolonged detention of asylum seekers in substandard “processing centers” for months are years is not much different from the ICE concentration camps that the Trump 2.0 regime has established for accused unauthorized immigrants in the United States. The “third country” approach is also called “externalizing” immigration and asylum issues. As the immigration scholar Judith Kohlenberger wrote in 2024:

Externalizing asylum responsibility is still being hailed as a key instrument, if not indeed the solution to the EU’s “migration question” - from processing asylum claims off territory to providing neighbouring countries with aid and monetary incentives to host refugees to full-scale offshoring of migrants to third countries with which they have no actual ties. Despite growing evidence that such deals offer no sustainable solution (see the notorious EU-Turkey Declaration or the intended deal with Tunesia struck in summer 2023) or are not, in face, practically feasible (e.g. various European governments’ botched attempts to offshore asylum seekers to Rwanda), both heads of state and the EU commission continue to consider such “partnerships” with third countries a viable solution to growing anti-refugee sentiment, the rise of right-wing populist parties and deteriorating social cohesion across Europe. [my emphasis in bold] (2)

It’s important to remember that “third country” solutions can be practical and effective in the face of an immediate refugee crisis. But the idea of just warehousing refugees indefinitely in a third country is not a decent long-term solution. It needs to be followed up with a systematic resettlement policy like that of the 1970s in the crisis of the Vietnamese “boat people.” (3)

I would say that much of Europe, including Germany, are still struggling with the disastrous effects of how the euro crisis that reached its apex in the confrontation with Greece in 2015 coincided so closely with the peak immigration surge of that same year when nationalistic posturing among EU countries became a barrier to a decent solution.

And though it’s not discussed very prominently in this context, it is always worth remembering that the surge of Ukrainian refugees into EU countries after the Russian invasion of 2022, a surge considerably larger than that of 2015-16, was handled without the massive freakout and the prolonged retention of refugees in a third country (Turkey) that occurred in that earlier situation.

Kohlenberger rightly says, “The long-term effects of externalization on the EU includes diminished credibility, increased vulnerability to coercion, and the legitimization of an authoritarian, deterrence-focused stance on migration control.”

They need to do better.

And the United States should be setting a better example itself than sending masked Gestapo goons into US cities to terrorize the Latino population, both immigrants and native-born.

Notes:

(1) Deutlich mehr Abschiebeflüge nach Afghanistan. Tagesschau 21.06.2026. <https://www.tagesschau.de/inland/innenpolitik/afghanistan-abschiebungen-dobrindt-100.html> (Accessed: 2026-15-10). My translation to English.

(2) Kohlenberger, Judith (2024): Migration Policy: European Union Increasingly Outsources Responsibility for Asylum Heinrich Böll Stiftung 10/15/2024. <https://www.boell.de/en/2024/10/15/migration-policy-european-union-increasingly-outsources-responsibility-asylum> (Accessed : 2026-15-10).

(3) See: Knaus, Gerald (2024): Statement on Migration agreements with safe third countries. European Stability Initiative June 2024. <https://www.esiweb.org/pdf/Knaus-BMI-Statement-on-migration-agreements-with-safe-third-countries-June-2024.pdf> (Accessed: 2026-15-10).

Arthur Schlesinger Jr.'s 1991 book on multiculturalism and nationalism (It's more interesting than you might think)

I’ve been looking through some retrospectives on the 250th anniversary of the American Revolution. I’ve been mostly thinking of it in its Enlightenment context (With all the ambiguity that comes with that!)

In the process, I took a look at Arthur Schlesinger, Jr.’s 1991 book, The Disuniting of America: Reflections on a Multicultural Society. (1)

That year 1991 was part of a particular transition time, when Reaganite neoliberal thought combined with Christian-nationalist social conservatism was dominant in American politics. But it was also the period when the Warsaw Pact was disappearing into history’s rearview mirror, and then the Soviet Union itself. (Spoiler: results were mixed!)

Dramatic changes in politics were taking place and the Western countries were looking for liberal-democratic approaches with a fresh eye. At least nominally, with some misfires like “the end of history” idea that was famously applied to the moment. More wars and rampant oligarchic abuses changed that tone soon enough.

One of the trends of the time was “multiculturalism,” which for people who are now Trumpistas was a horror vision that threatened their cherished goal of America as a white Christian homeland, in which African-Americans, Latinos, immigrants, and uppity wimmin all knew their assigned places in the social hierarchy.

Along with the increasing popularity of Rush Limbaugh, who used the term “feminazi” to describe those uppity wimmin – truly one of the weirdest rightwing concepts ever – many good conservatives started weeping over “political correctness.” That was yet another schizophrenic rightwing concept by which they meant ideas like equal protection of the law with which they disagreed, So conservatives were bragging about being politically INcorrect, meaning to them being right about political issues, i.e., politically correct from their own viewpoint.

Yes, that whole schtick was demented. But that’s the direction the Republicans went, a direction that wound up with the Orange Anomaly in the White House.

And that weird conservative trend is still with us, thanks to a crackpot narrative popularized by William Lind, which said that a group of German Jewish Marxists (the Frankfurt School) who invented something called Cultural Marxism (they didn’t) that spawned Postmodernism (it didn’t) that created Political Correctness (it didn’t) which spawned Critical Race Theory (it didn’t) that morphed into DEI and Wokeism, which stills seems to be the current Trumpista term. Because Asleepism is the Trump Cult’s preferred state of mind among voters and citizens.

This strange conspiracy theory was analyzed just recently. by Patrick Iber:

In this telling, the movements for civil rights, women’s rights, and gay liberation are not responding to real forms of discrimination. Instead, the cultural shifts that have taken place since the 1960s can be dismissed as the influence of radical foreign Marxists who have undermined the foundational unities of American life through their control of cultural institutions. It is poor intellectual history, but powerful pseudo-history. It frees the believer from considering the demands of people facing oppression as legitimate and justifies the destruction of knowledge-producing institutions. For the right, it replaces hard questions with obfuscation, using obscurity to create a false sense of clarity. [my emphasis] (2)

Schlesinger was never part of that kind of crackpot thinking. But in his Disuniting period, he was particularly irritated by some instances of what he considered to be sloppy history-writing by some historians who indulged in an ethno-nationalist approach to history. John Henrik Clarke, Asa Hillard, Leonard Jeffries, and Maulana Karenga were four historians who he particularly criticized on those grounds. As he put it in Disuniting:

Cultural pluralism is not the issue. Nor is the teaching of Afro-American or African history the issue; of course these are legitimate subjects. The issue is the kind of history that the New York task force, the Portland Baseline essayists, and other Afrocentric ideologues propose for American children. The issue is the teaching of bad history under whatever ethnic banner. [my emphasis]

He also cites several major black scholars who contributed solid historical accounts of race-related issues: W. M. Brewer, John Hope Franklin, Rayford W. Logan, Alruthius Taylor, Charles Wesley, Carter G. Woodson. Franklin’s textbook From Slavery to Freedom went through many editions and is one of the most important contributions to African-American history.

Schlesinger did have a very pro-democracy, New Deal/Great Society liberal who was opposed to the kind of racial discrimination and xenophobic politics that are central to Trumpist attitudes and ideology – to the extent that a “Trumpist ideology” can be said to exist. Massive corruption and illegal diversion of public funds don’t really count as an ideology. Schlesinger was very much a liberal Cold Warrior, though he became critical of ill-conceived imperial wars and the authoritarianism of the “imperial Presidency.”

He is known especially for his books on John and Robert Kennedy and for his early book, The Age of Jackson (1945). It focused in particular on the Jacksonian reform era as a predecessor of the New Deal. He later expressed regret that he had not dealt with Jackson’s Indian policy in that work. I’m a bit cranky in today’s terms by insisting that the Jeffersonian and Jacksonian democratic movements were an important part of the development of what we know today as democracy. Because history involves processes. By today’s standards, America in 1900 could be considered a democracy because black citizens and women did not have the right to vote nationally. But the US was radically more democratic in 1900 than it was a century earlier.

In his 1991 book, Schlesinger praised the work of Frederick Douglass (1818-1895) and W. E. B. Du Bois (1868-1963), neither of whom could be considered conservatives on racial issues and democracy in American history.

Notes:

(1) 1991 edition from The Larger Agenda Series. Knoxville: Whitttle Direct Books. See also: the 1992 edition at the Internet Archive: <https://archive.org/details/disunitingofamer00arth>

(2) Iber, Patrick (2026): Dissent 73:2 Summer 2026, 101-108. <https://dissentmagazine.org/article/cultural-marxism-conspiracy-frankfurt-school/>

The US, Israel, and the MOU with Iran

We do have an official Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between the US and Iran. It establishes a 60-day period of discussions designed to lead to definite agreements. The version published by Haaretz and Reuters continues this wording in the first if 14 points.

Commentators have noted the symbolism of the US and Iran official signing this agreement in Versailles, the site of the German acceptance of the Versailles Treaty in June of 1919. It was a humiliating moment for Germany, who was the loser in the agreement. And the Treaty itself is genuinely recognized as having been a terrible one from the viewpoint of preventing a future war.

At the moment, many politicians and news analysts are noting that in that analogy, the US is in the position of Germany, having started a war in partnership with Israel and is now essentially surrendering. It’s a valid point and critics are right to point out how it acknowledges in practice what a spectacular failure the war has been for the US and Israel since they began it on February 28.

The MOU text provided by the US even contains 14 numbered paragraphs, which surely some diplomats involved recognized as a remainder of Woodrow Wilson’s 14 Points that he had hoped to make the basis for the peace treaty at Versailles.

Trita Parsi cautions antiwar critics about framing that point in such a way that it gives surface validation to the neocons, whose only objection to the MOU is that it could stop the war they want to see continued.

The criticism coming from some Democrats is particularly disappointing because it echoes the same bad-faith tactics Republicans deployed against the JCPOA in 2015. To be sure, Trump has invited some of this treatment. He spent years attacking Obama’s agreement with a barrage of misleading arguments and exaggerated claims.

But that does not make it wise for Democrats to return the favor.

Trump currently owns this failed war, but if the Democrats help torpedo the MOU and war resumes, then they will co-own the next war. Trump’s disaster will become theirs as well. (1)

He has this advice for opponents of the war:

Rather than attacking the terms of the MOU, Democrats should pressure the administration to protect it from those who are determined to see it fail. The main external threat is the Israeli government and Benjamin Netanyahu’s obsession with sabotaging any opportunity for Iran and the United States to bury the hatchet.

Instead of relying solely on angry phone calls and public rebukes of Netanyahu, supporters of ending the war should press Trump to act now: suspend military aid to Israel and curtail military and intelligence cooperation. Such measures would limit Israel’s ability to reignite the conflict and dispel any notion in Tel Aviv that Washington will automatically follow Israel into another war. If Israeli leaders understand that the United States will not be drawn into a future conflict on their behalf, their incentive to start one in the first place will be significantly reduced. [my emphasis]

The MOU is not a peace settlement. But the alternative for the US right now in not using the opportunity to push forward to one based on the MOU’s 60-day timetable is basically a choice between resuming the war (Israel’s and Netanyahu goal) or risking Iran continuing the blockade of the Strait of Hormuz indefinitely.

Trita on Substack Notes focuses on the potential political appeal of making a successful peace agreement with Iran:

However, Israel can be expected to work intensely during the MOU period to sabotage any peace deal. And is already doing so.

But the MOU itself states:

The United States of America and the Islamic Republic of Iran and their allies in the current war, by signing this MOU (Memorandum of Understanding), declare the immediate and permanent termination of military operations on all fronts, including in Lebanon, and undertake from now on not to initiate any war or any military operation against each other, and to refrain from the threat or use of force against each other, and ensuring the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Lebanon. The final deal will confirm the permanent termination of the war on all fronts, including in Lebanon, and other provisions of this paragraph. [my emphasis]

To make Israel comply with a ceasefire with Lebanon, Washington will almost certainly have to actually cut off a significant portion of US aid to Israel and be willing to back that up with a basically complete halt if Netanyahu’s government doesn’t cooperate. Since Netanyahu’s critics in the current Israeli election campaign are criticizing him for not being hard enough with the US, Iran, Lebanon and with the illegal ethnic cleansing and land theft in Gaza and the West Bank, keeping Israel on-side with the ceasefire will require more determination and diplomatic skill than Trump has ever shown in his dealings with Israel so far.

David Hearst speculates that scuttling this deal will be a significant challenge for Israel, although they certainly are trying to do so already:

The pieces of the jigsaw of Israel’s regional strategy that could survive Netanyahu’s strategic setback - the land that Israel has occupied and cleansed of its inhabitants in Gaza, South Lebanon and Syria, the undeclared security pact with Abu Dhabi, the use of Somaliland as base of forward projection - all these remain.

The project could be continued at any time. But what Netanyahu has lost is the interest of the current US president in backing this dream.

It will be a long time before another Israeli prime minister will be allowed to sit opposite a serving US president in the situation room under the White House, as Netanyahu did with Trump on 11 February, this year, and spin him a bunch of lies. [my emphasis] (2)

After decades of both parties in the US celebrating Israel as a loyal and valuable ally of the US, that’s a hard argument for even Israel’s most devout supporters among in Congress to make coherently. The US support for Netanyahu’s literally genocidal response to the October 7 attack in 2023 drastically changed Israel’s image in American politics and implicated the US in that grotesque war. Now going along with Israel on the Iraq War has turned into a serious strategic setback for the US and further alienated the traditional European allies – who Trump doesn’t want to be allied with any longer anyway. Plus, it demonstrated how little meaning American security guarantees to its Arab allies like Saudi Arabia and Qatar may actually have.

Israel has even been saber-rattling against Türkiye, which is a NATO ally even though they can’t count on the Trump 2.0 regime’s support in a conflict. But the European NATO members do take their NATO commitments seriously. And with the US-Iran MOU:

Trump once again counted Turkey, alongside Pakistan and Qatar, among the countries that had significantly helped secure a memorandum of understanding with Iran. He also adopted an increasingly combative tone towards Israel.

... Turkish officials activated contingency plans along the eastern border with Iran to prevent a possible wave of refugees from entering the country. Secondly, Israeli officials had been pushing plans to use Iranian Kurds to spearhead an insurgency in western Iran.

Ankara was worried that the use of Kurdish groups could affect its own peace talks with the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) and push Turkey into a Syria-like scenario, in which Kurds based near its border took control of territory and posed a security challenge [to the Syrian state from its viewpoint].

As Israeli and US attacks on Iranian targets intensified, so too did rhetoric from within Netanyahu's cabinet that "Turkey is next after Iran", heightening concerns in Ankara about the potential spillover effects of a collapse in Iranian state authority. [my emphasis] (3)

Michael Nilshtein at Ynet Global looks at the current situation from an Israeli perspective:

Decision-makers are trying to present the difficult situation created by the bad agreement with Iran, the Lebanon entanglement and the crisis with Washington as a “collective challenge.” The damage and the threat are indeed national, but the failure that led to them stems from the policy of a leadership that does not enjoy internal consensus. …

In the face of the multi-front strategic trap in which Israel is sinking, only one achievement remains to wave about: the seizure of territory on three fronts and the claim that this has changed reality and strengthened Israel’s security. Some in the government are even promising to move toward expulsion, annexation and settlement in areas that were taken, in other words, imposing a sectoral vision disguised as “a project that serves us all.”

This is exactly the point at which the public must prove that it has learned the lessons of October 7 and challenge the assumptions handed down to it from above with such certainty. It must ask what the meaning is of a prolonged presence in all the territories that have been captured, what security and diplomatic price that presence carries, and whether there is a sober alternative in the form of bringing local and foreign forces into hostile areas while preserving freedom of action against the enemy. [my emphasis] (4)

Netanyahu’s current strategic approach involves establishing military hegemony of Israel in the Middle East, with weak regimes in Iran, Lebanon, and Syria; permanent Israeli control and eventual annexation of Gaza and the West Bank; and, periodic “mowing the lawn” attacks on its neighbors to keep their governments weak. Israel is also illegally occupying territory in southern Lebanon and conducting an ethnic cleansing operation there, as well. It has also annexed the Golan Heights and other Syrian territory.

So, achieving international stability in the Middle East and orderly passage through the Strait of Hormuz means that the US will have to restrain Israel, now and for the foreseeable future, from its habitual military aggressions against its neighbors.

And in that sense, American national interests are in serious conflict at the moment with the self-definition of Israeli national interest on which the Israeli government is currently operating.

But if the first couple of days of the 60-day ceasefire in the MOU are any measure, it’s going to be a major challenge to keep up with which side is saying what about who violated it when and how.

John Mearsheimer, perhaps defying Trita Parsi’s advice, argues that the MOU represents “unconditional surrender” on Trump’s part. (5)

Notes:

(1) Parsi, Trita (2026): Trump ended his idiotic Iran war. Good. Responsible Statecraft 06/18/2026. <https://responsiblestatecraft.org/trump-ends-war-critics/> (Accessed: 2026-20-06),

(2) Hearst, David (2026): Trump's U-turn on Iran war has ended Israel's Middle East dream. Middle East Eye 06/17/2026. > (Accessed: 2026-20-06),

(3) Soyhu, Ragip (2026): Turkey emerges unscathed from the Iran war. Middle East Eye 06/17/2026. <https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/turkey-emerges-unscathed-iran-war> (Accessed: 2026-23-06).

(4) Milshtein, Michael (2026): Israel’s self-inflicted trap: How fantasy gave way to strategic retreat. Ynet Global 06/21/2026. <https://www.ynetnews.com/opinions-analysis/article/ry11hglrffl> Accessed: 2026-23-06).

(5) Prof. John Mearsheimer : Israel Undermining US/Iran Deal. Judge Napolitano-Judging Freedom. YouTube channel 06/20/2026. <https://www.youtube.com/live/YNME3CUvYpk?si=VDLFjoEQfYKK0VoC> (Accessed: 2026-21-06).

How does a Netanyahu ceasefire work?

Like this: they cease, we fire.

Iran is continuing to demand a settlement with Israel agreeing to stop invading and attacking Lebanon. This is not promising:

Haaretz, 4:36PM 06/19/2026:

Haaretz, around 45 minutes later:

Has the US-Israel War on Iran ended? (Hint: No)

The US-Israel War on Iran was a massive blunder for US foreign policy. Various commentators like Robert Pape are saying this may be the biggest US strategic defeat in the history of US foreign policy. Not in terms of lives lost, of course. But in terms of the failure to achieve the political goals of the war and in terms of a great increase in Iran strategic clout.

Hamish de Bretton-Gordon discusses the current situation in an interview with Maddie Hale of The Trump Report. (1)

Dan Perry – optimistically assuming the war is now over – writes:

A war that began with immense ambition has ended with profound setbacks for both the United States and Israel.

With an emerging U.S.-Iran peace agreement, what initially appeared to be a historic demonstration of military dominance evolved into a vivid illustration of the limits of both Israeli and American power. The conflict also exposed profound failures in strategic competence within that alliance. Washington and Jerusalem planned effectively for the initial decapitation strikes, but were unprepared for the economic and geopolitical consequences that followed.

The result is a war that may ultimately strengthen the Iranian regime politically, despite the damage it suffered militarily; has weakened international perceptions of American military might; and has diminished both Israel’s own strategic circumstances and its most important alliance. [my emphasis] (2)

Israel remains a wild card in the war. Iran is demanding that Israel pull out of Lebanon and Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu is carrying on the conflict there. Netanyahu’s goal is to make Israel the undisputed hegemon in the Middle East that will have the freedom to periodically attack its neighboring countries: “mowing the grass” periodically, as Israel describes its many colonial military operations in Gaza.

The US and Israel have divergent goals here. Netanyahu’s government wants the US to continually support its military attacks on its neighbors including Iran. That is not in the US national interest. And the public opinion polls in this election year show broad public support in Israel for an even more aggressive policy against Iran and the Palestinians. The blatantly illegal and violent aggressions against Gaza and the West Bank are continuing, and the ethnic cleansing of Palestinians proceeds. So even if Netanyahu is not able to stay as Prime Minister after this year’s elections, there is no obvious immediate prospect that a new Israeli government would back away from the attempt to have the US continue to back an aggressive Israeli military policy against its neighbors and its colonial possession in Gaza and the West Bank.

Meanwhile, Trump just bizarrely suggested that he wanted the current Islamist government of Syria under former Al-Qaida and ISIS terrorist leader Ahmed al-Sharaa.

Zvi Bar'el explains what a ridiculous idea that is – though that certainly doesn’t guarantee that Trump and Netanyahu won’t give it a try. It’s a New York real estate negotiating approach to the Middle East:

The president of the United States, in a moment of honesty and based on his experience as a real estate entrepreneur, presented his new plan for solving the war in Lebanon. "If Israel can't do the job without killing everyone else, he'll do the job, Syria will do the job," Donald Trump said on Tuesday, referring to Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa, during a meeting with the Qatari prime minister at the G7 meeting in France.

"He's [al-Sharaa] very capable. And he's been very good for me. He's protected everything that I've asked for… And if Israel can't do the job without killing everyone else, he'll do the job."

That's how it is in a business where time is money. When a construction project takes too long to complete and results in too many houses being needlessly demolished, there's no choice but to replace the contractor. Israel should have been alert to the fact that Trump doesn't see eye to eye with it about the Lebanon theatre, which has rapidly turned from an Israeli battleground into a bargaining chip for Iran in a game Trump has already forfeited. [my emphasis] (3)

He also reminds us, “Lebanon is an inseparable part of the tangible guarantees Tehran is demanding as proof that the U.S. can meet its commitments.”

This war will not be over until there is actually a peace agreement that all relevant parties support. And it appears in the current political climate in Israel that the US will only be able to assure Israel’s compliance will be to credibly threaten them with a loss of US military support, which is only likely to be credible now if the US actually does seriously and visibly restrict that support, not just threaten it.

Is the current US President capable of managing the kind of international diplomatic moves that would be required to really establish a stable peace?

Also: Illy Pe’ery provides a description of the Israel army’s public-information efforts, aka, official propaganda:

[A]s a recent investigation by The Hottest Place in Hell revealed, the military does not limit these methods to the realm of “personal enrichment.” Between October 2023 and December 2024, the IDF Spokesperson’s Unit conducted a psychological operation targeting both Israeli and international audiences, under the guise of a “non-profit news organization” specializing in “fact-checking” claims surrounding Israel’s war on Gaza.

As part of that operation, dozens of videos promoting the Israeli military’s talking points were published without proper disclosure, while influencers in Israel and abroad were recruited to amplify messages dictated directly by the military. What was exposed at the time as a discrete initiative now appears to be part of a broader, long-term effort by Israel’s defense establishment to institutionalize influence operations on a national - and even international - scale. [my emphasis] (4)

Notes:

(1) Perry, Dan (2026): The Iran war ended terribly for the US, and even worse for Israel. Pittsburg Jewish Chronicle 06/17/2026. <https://jewishchronicle.timesofisrael.com/the-iran-war-ended-terribly-for-the-us-and-even-worse-for-israel/> (Accessed: 2026-18-06).

(2) Trump would be 'completely bonkers' to make this next move - Hamish de Bretton-Gordon. The Trump Report YouTube channel 06/17/2026. <https://youtu.be/vTUlEhn3dbY?si=_Ln7H55bbMuwCcSC> (Accessed: 2026-18-06).

(3) Bar’el, Zvi (2026): Trump Wants a New Contractor in the War on Hezbollah. Syria Doesn't Want the Job. Haaretz 06/18/2026. Gift link: <https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/israel-security/2026-06-18/ty-article/.premium/trump-wants-a-new-contractor-in-the-war-on-hezbollah-syria-doesnt-want-the-job/0000019e-d7bf-d6a3-a5be-f7ff7ab30000?gift=1af2dbefa2984378890abeb5d6da4241> (Accessed: 2026-18-06).

(4) Pe’ery, Illy (2026): Revealed: Israel’s curriculum for ‘influencing public consciousness’. +972 Magazine 06/04/2026. <https://www.972mag.com/leaked-idf-propaganda-israel-intelligence/> (Accessed: 2026-18-06).

Early commentary on the latest memo-scheduled-to-be-signed event on the US-Israel War on Iran.

David Rothkopf was an editor and CEO of Foreign Policy magazine for several years. He does a podcast with two much younger reporters which give their commentary a kind of Grandpa-and-the-kids vibe that works well for them!

Here they talk about the proposed memorandum that would agree to work on setting up a deal between Iran and the US that may or may not still be on the table by the time this gets posted. (1)

Jeremy Scahill gives his take as of Monday on the latest memo-to-agree-to-talk-about-an-agreement. (2)

Notes:

(1) Peace in the Middle East...Maybe? The DSR Network YouTube channel 06/15/2026. <https://youtu.be/rXM0STBV8ZY?si=YJvPj3RLAFpU33l8> (Accessed: 2026-15-06).

(2) COMPLETE CAPITULATION': Jeremy Scahill Breaks Down Iran. YouTube channel 06/15/2026. <https://youtu.be/1kcBP3itmbM?si=CgUi1CQWUI8VXw2I> (Accessed: 2026-15-06).

Keeping our heads about war enthusiasm, Russia-Ukraine version

I’m genuinely surprised at some of the outspoken optimism of some of Ukraine’s most eager supporters in the commentariat.

The real issue practical issue right now as I understand it is, are Ukraine and Russia willing and able to make a long-term ceasefire agreement that freezes the current lines of occupation in place and addresses issues like prisoner-of-war exchanges and return of Ukrainian children kidnapped and sent into Russia?

If not, the most likely outcome is that the current war of attrition continues indefinitely. Russia’s occupation of one-fifth or so of Ukraine’s territory, Russia’s presumed (and clearly stated) goal of keeping Ukraine out of NATO is achieved for now. Since Trump has radically – and almost certainly permanently - undercut NATO’s reliability and Europe is scrambling to make collective-defense plans that do not rely on US participation, it’s understandable that European politicians and governments are stressing potential security issues with Russia. And, of course, companies that make huge profit margins on armaments have their own narrow incentives to promote a bogeyman of Russia as much as possible.

But neither unrealistic Russophobia or Russophilia – the latter at the moment most common among far-right parties (and some of them like Georgia Meloni’s ruling party in Italy are anti-Russia) – are conducive to realistic understanding of actual threats and opportunities. Reality does matter.

Ironically, the USSR and its Communist ideology are long gone, but the Western powers’ emphasis on ideology in its Cold War standoffs (and bouts of détente) with Moscow. Now Russia has a capitalist system with an authoritarian government based on rule through billionaire oligarchs – and Russia is still a favorite bogeyman. Trump’s weird admiration for Russia and Putin, whether it’s based on incompetence, corruption and/or blackmail – has not led to some more stable security arrangements or a resolution of the war with Ukraine. In fact, the last formal nuclear-arms-control agreement between the US and Russia expired under Trump 2.0. With no replacement, of course.

But when commentary and analysis become simple war boosterism, that can and often lead to real-world consequences. The Guardian’s Simon Tisdall often provides good analysis. But in a current column on the Russia-Ukraine war, he seems to get carried away by boosterism. (1)

Here’s a sample from just one paragraph:

“For Ukraine, the latest news is mostly good. Using sophisticated Ukrainian-made drones and missiles, it has forced the invaders on to the back foot.”

The front lines haven’t moved much from what it was by the end of 2023. But there does seem to be little question that Ukraine has been able to drone warfare with a notable measure of effectiveness.

“Russia’s tally of dead and wounded is said to be running to 30,000 each month.”

But the lines of engagement are largely unchanged. Russia also still has a volunteer army while Ukraine has been relying on draftees and is apparently having series difficulties with desertions. Russia does have large advantages in personnel and industrial capacity. However, Ukraine is fighting for what presumably most of its citizens consider to be its own territory and even its own national survival.

Ukrainian airstrikes deep into Russian territory are bringing the war home to a misled, disillusioned public.”

Yes, being bombed by an enemy country creates mass demands from the public of the country being bombed to immediately give up its war aims as has been shown by many examples since wartime bombing from airplanes began in the First Balkan War of 1912 including, uh, well … no examples. Because that has never happened.

“St Petersburg burns.“

Or, more precisely, Ukraine has made some attacks in Russia well behind the front lines. Whether those attacks have significantly reduced Russia’s warmaking capacity is very questionable. Also, this makes the limited strikes on Petersburg sound like the American firebombing of Tokyo in March 1945, which killed 80-100 thousand people. This is just silly.

“Fuel shortages cause panic buying. Prices and taxes are rising.“

Isn’t this happening pretty much everywhere thanks to the blockade of the Strait of Hormuz?

“Putin’s 2022 ‘special military operation’, which was supposed to bring swift victory, has now lasted longer than the first world war.”

The First World War was a good deal bigger than the current Ukraine war, though it was also heavily a war of attrition.

Tisdall does give examples of he presents likely Russian provocations in NATO countries:

Russia’s offensive is becoming more physically aggressive, too. Armed drone and combat jet incursions into Nato airspace are multiplying. Thousands of GPS interference incidents, disrupting civilian aviation and maritime navigation, are blamed on Russia. Poland’s rail network, which supplies Ukraine, has been sabotaged. Germany and the UK have suffered similar attacks. Baltic undersea pipelines and internet cables have been cut. In this undeclared war, Norway’s land border with Russia, the North Sea and the North Atlantic approaches are emerging fronts.

The big problem with claims like this is that they are often based on partial information that is often not independently verifiable. The sabotage of the Nord Stream pipelines in 2022, for instance, has still not been definitively clarified in the public record. And it’s very possible that the US and/or Ukraine sabotaged them, although the story involving Ukraine doing it has also struck me as dubious. (2)

Scott Lucas, who is a good political analyst and one I follow regularly, also seems to fall into boosterism in this clip title, “Can Ukraine Cut Off Russian-Occupied Crimea?” (3)

The podcast episode is titled, “Can Ukraine Cut Off Russian-Occupied Crimea?” Which also raises the question: Given Ukraine’s success with drone warfare, how much does “cutting off” Crimea do for Ukraine’s side in the current war of attrition? If Ukraine were able to take back their Kherson province, they would cut off Russia’s land access to Crimea through Kherson it currently has. It’s not clear what the advantage of prioritizing isolating the Crimean Peninsula would be at this time if that doesn’t directly include re-securing Ukrainian land connection to Crimea.

The hawkish-leaning Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) did a report in early 2025 about Russia sabotage in Europe that I wouldn’t dismiss out of hand. (Welcome to international politics!) Its opening paragraph claims:

Russia is engaged in an aggressive campaign of subversion and sabotage against European and U.S. targets, which complement Russia’s brutal conventional war in Ukraine. The number of Russian attacks in Europe nearly tripled between 2023 and 2024, after quadrupling between 2022 and 2023. Russia’s military intelligence service, the Main Directorate of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation (or GRU), was likely responsible for many of these attacks, either directly by their own officers or indirectly through recruited agents. The GRU and other Russian intelligence agencies frequently recruited local assets to plan and execute sabotage and subversion missions. Other operations relied on Russia’s “shadow fleet,” commercial ships used to circumvent Western sanctions, for undersea attacks. [my emphasis] (4)

Not to be overly cynical, but this kind of stuff goes at various levels between adversary powers all the time. It’s still very important to evaluate the specificity and reliability of reporting on such incidents, from Russia or any other international actors including the US.

It’s also important to be mindful of what is being described as “hybrid war.” For instance, one of the Russian “active measures” is “Undermining the democratic norms and values that underpin the West.” Against, welcome to international politics. And, yes, Trump and J.D. Vance engage in doing exactly that with their political allies in the anti-democracy “Nationalist International.”

Notes:

(1) Tisdall, Simon (2026): Russia is losing the war in Ukraine, and Putin is desperate. But that’s when he’s at his most dangerous. Guardian 06/14/2026. <https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2026/jun/14/vladimir-putin-ukraine-war-borders-russian-president> (Accessed: 2026-14-06).

(2) Walker, Shun & Cole, Deborah (2026): The Nord Stream riddle: echoes of mistrust ripple through Europe. Guardian 11/03/2025. <https://www.theguardian.com/business/2025/nov/03/the-nord-stream-riddle-echoes-of-mistrust-ripple-through-europe> (Accessed: 2026-14-06).

(3) Scott Lucas Worldview YouTube channel 06/14/2026. <https://youtu.be/izJkqpZC5Co?si=RwF_lHhnWQqV_GU4> (Accessed: 2026-14-06).

(4) Jones, Seth (2026): Russia’s Shadow War Against the West. CSIS 03/18/2025. <https://csis-website-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/2025-03/250318_Jones_Russia_Shadow.pdf?VersionId=LHamL2L7HJwLgZ7a_wq6xkTIwMh3TFpk> (Accessed: 2026-14-06).

Navigating the Ukraine War narratives

John Mearsheimer talked about Russia and Europe in this interview with Tom Switzer. (1)

And among other things, he talks about how stereotypical Western images of Russia may be tempting some Western countries to indulge in threat inflation in thinking about the actual possible challenges from Russia, which also can fall prey to misleading stereotypes. And the temptation to start believing one’s own side’s hype about wars. As the investigative journalist Izzy Stone famously put it, “All governments lie, but disaster lies in wait for countries whose officials smoke the same hashish they give out.”

In my previous post, I included a video of a lecture giving a staunchly conservative account of the Russian Civil war of 1918-20 by British historian Antony Beevor. It provides a good example of the kind of Western Russophobia that Mearsheimer often mentions.

At one point, Beevor refers to the “Asiatic savagery” displayed by both sides in the Civil War. Presumably this “Asiatic” quality includes Russians from both the European and Asian parts of the country. And I would guess that’s supposed to apply to Ukrainians. It’s less clear whether he’s suggesting that the British, French, American, Polish, Czech, and Slovakian participants involved also count as Asians in that characterization.

European leaders are stepping up try to fill the diplomatic space on the Russia-Ukraine War left by what has been essentially the collapse of normal diplomacy with Russia that we’re seen under the Trump 2.0 regime:

British, French and German ambassadors to Russia held talks Thursday in Russia's Foreign Ministry, several days after a London summit with Ukraine's Volodymyr Zelensky. The United Kingdom hosted Zelensky and the leaders of France and Germany earlier this week, supporting Kyiv's call for direct talks with Russia to end more than four years of war. The envoys met with Russia's deputy foreign minister, Mikhail Galuzin. …

Russian President Vladimir Putin this month rejected Zelensky's offer for a face-to-face meeting to end the fighting. In London, the UK's Keir Starmer, France's Emmanuel Macron and Germany's Friedrich Merz said they supported Zelensky's proposal and that the current frontline should be a "starting point for negotiations." (2)

Ukraine’s supporters understandably indulge in some combination of optimism and standard war propaganda to make it sound like Russia’s willingness and/or ability to keep the war going is failing. But the front lines have scarcely changed in a long time. Part of the confusion is that Western governments and commentators tend to talk about Russia’s aim as being to conquer all of Ukraine. In fact, it looks like Russia right now is continuing to focus on holding the one-fifth or so of the Ukrainian territory they currently occupy. That gives them enormous leverage in blocking Ukraine from entering NATO or any other kind of formal military alliance with the current European NATO members.

Ukraine is still far from meeting the conditions to immediately become a full EU member. Ukraine benefits from the EU’s “Eastern Partnership” without becoming a full EU member. The EU Treaty also contains an explicit mutual-defense commitment. This hasn’t received a lot of attention, especially before 2025, because NATO had been the key (mostly) defensive alliance before Trump started making explicit threats to attack US allies like Denmark (Greenland) and Canada. But the Russians are unlikely in the foreseeable future to accept Ukrainian membership in an alliance with potential adversary European powers.

The European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR) – a reliably “establishment” group like its American counterpart – sponsored a poll among EU nations that “confirms the collapse in European faith in the US. Only 11% of respondents now consider it an ally, down from 16% half a year ago and 22% in November 2024. Meanwhile fully 25% see it as either a rival or an adversary.” (3)

Scott Lucas has been a good analyst on the Russia-Ukraine War and the US-Israeli War on Iran. But he sometimes seems to get a bit too enthusiastic about symbolic events, like the Russian cutback of its Victory Day Parade last month, which Lucas sees as a particularly important symbolic victory. He again cites that in this discussion with two Ukrainian journalists: (4)

I’m very skeptical about the usefulness from the Ukrainian attempts to use strikes deep inside Russia. It’s hard to imagine that Ukraine is seriously damaging Russia ability to wage war with those “strategic” attacks. My nonspecialist assumption is that concentrating on tactical strikes at the Russian forces occupying Ukrainian territory and those immediately near the Ukrainian border would be a more effective use of firepower.

In the real existing game of power politics in Europe, the EU countries and Britain do have to make calculations about potential military threats from Russia. That’s just a standard power-political consideration. John Feffer argues that Russia is not likely in practice to attempt any serious military aggression against current NATO countries like Poland, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. That doesn’t mean their won’t be the occasional (non-combat) testing of air space defenses – which is pretty routine procedure – or sometimes a case where a drone “accidentally” crashes in one of those countries. As Feffer puts it:

Putin is not so dumb as to double down on his Ukrainian blunder by sending military forces into Poland or even the Baltic states. Cyberattacks and clandestine operations can be more effective since they don’t cross the threshold that mandates a NATO counterattack. Meanwhile, influence operations - disinformation campaigns, strategic political alliances, and the marketing of illiberalism - are even more effective in undermining the ideological underpinnings of the EU.

This latter campaign has more than double the impact when it’s mirrored on the Atlantic side by the actions of Trump, Vance, and Hegseth. (5)

Feffer’s article does not use the concept of “hybrid warfare” for those attempts at political interventions. It’s inevitable that terms like “propaganda war” pop up. But it is also very important to remember warfare is military conflict. It’s a current part of the politics of the parties and activist groups that are part of the Trumpist Nationalist International to claim that immigration is a type of hybrid warfare and an invasion. Democratic parties should be encouraging the use of that rhetoric, which is clearly xenophobic hate- and fear-mongering.

Notes:

(1) Why the war is not over - John Mearsheimer. Switzerland with Tom Switzer YouTube channel 06/12/2026. <https://www.youtube.com/live/xAspI4jxvWI?si=YFnX4Grk6tl2wYbz> (Accessed: 2026-12-06).

(2) Le Monde/AFP (2026): British, French and German envoys hold talks in Russian Foreign Ministry. 06/11/2026. <https://www.lemonde.fr/en/international/article/2026/06/11/british-french-and-german-envoys-hold-talks-in-russian-foreign-ministry_6754349_4.html> (Accessed: 2026-13-06).

(3) Kobzová, Jana & Zerka, Pawel (2026): Home alone: Europeans are ready to defend themselves. ECFR 06/10/2026. <https://ecfr.eu/publication/home-alone-europeans-are-ready-to-defend-themselves/> (Accessed: 2026-13-06).

(4) Crimea CUT OFF — Putin’s bridges ON FIRE! No FUEL at all. War & Politics 24 and Scott Lucas Worldview YouTube channel 06/12/2026. <https://youtu.be/P18bRWDUnyQ?si=eWYRE6GwPlbZMHBn> (Accessed: 2026-13-06).

(5) Feffer, John (2026): Pete Hegseth’s Invasions. Foreign Policy in Focus 06/10/2026. <https://fpif.org/pete-hegseths-invasions/> (Accessed: 2026-13-06).

War termination and the “will to fight”

The Bulwark is a bit hard to characterize. They have some decent content. I would describe it as taking a Never Trumper position while wishing they could just be straightforward neocon hawks. When they started up in 2019 they drew on a lot of the former writers from The Weekly Standard. Jennifer Rubin wrote about its founding in a 2010 column in which she noted some of the “familiar faces” there: professional warmonger Butcher’s Bill Kristol, Charlie Sykes, Jim Swift and Janathan Last. (1)

I’m all for Never Trumpists supporting pro-democracy Democrats. But it reminds me a bit of the post-World War II former-Communists-turned-rightwingers whose pitch was: “I used to be a horrible person who was ready to lie, steal, kill, and commit all sorts of treason, so now that I’ve switched sides you should put particular trust in what I say because now I’m a total Good Guy.”

The imagined virtuous pre-Trump Republican Party was led in the 1950s by Dwight Eisenhower, who had some bad ideas of his own but who was a raving left-liberal in comparison to the Trumpified Republican Party of 2026. The liberal/conservative divides in those days cut across Republican and Democratic Party lines. But that hasn’t been true for a long time, though of course there are still some occasional crossovers – more often Democrats finking out to support Republicans’ conservative positions. For example, Joe Manchin and Kristen Sinema blocking Senate approval of the John L. Lewis Voting Rights Act in 2022.

But the heads of the Republican Party since Eisenhower have included segregation supporter Barry Goldwater, Dick Nixon, Gerald Ford who pardoned Dick Nixon, Ronald Reagan, Old Man Bush, Shrub Bush (with Dark Lord Dick Cheney in tow), and now Donald Trump. The road to Trumpism was paved by Watergate, the Nixon pardon, Reagan’s Iran-Contra caper (and the “October Surprise” deal with Iran in 1980, the “Gingrich Revolution” and the hysteria over the “Whitewater” pseudo-scandals.

Brynn Tannehill did a piece this week for The Bulwark that is basically a cheerleading pitch for the Ukrainians in the current war in the form of an all-you-Russians-bound-to-lose argument. The gist of her piece is this:

For years, casual and expert observers alike assumed that if one of the armies in Ukraine were to collapse—to suddenly lose the wherewithal to fight - it would be the Ukrainians. But now it seems more likely to be the Russians. And that’s no accident, as it appears the Ukrainians’ theory of victory is not that they will drive the Russians from their land in great, sweeping offensives like those of late 2022 but that they will break the Russian army’s back by attacking its logistics, its manpower, and its will to fight. [my emphasis] (2)

It’s worth remembering what the concept of “will to fight” means in the military context. In polemics over a particular war, it’s often used to mean something like patriotic fervor or enthusiasm in cheering for the home team.

It actually means something more specific and more prosaic. At some point in every war, One or both sides decide that continuing the war is more costly than ending it. That is not usually an unconditional surrender like Germany in the Second World War. And usually not the complete collapse or disintegration of one side’s government. It’s one or both sides deciding it’s not worth in lives, treasure, and/or territory to keep on with the war.

Whether that’s a good or bad decision, or whether it was made through an adequate decision-making process, are different questions. And while subjective support and enthusiasm for the war is part of those decisions, the will to fight in war is about conscious cost-benefit decisions on both sides. It’s not primarily about team spirit or personal grit.

Tannehill offers as a grand historical lesson that “history teaches that as long as a country has the will to continue to fight, it will find a way to do so until it either loses the will or fighting becomes materially impossible.” Those lessons that History teaches, though, often require a good bit of reflection and inspection to see what they are, much less how to apply them. Those two elements she names there are also not two distinct things. If fighting becomes materially impossible, one side can decide to go Masada and commit suicide rather than surrender. But those cases are real outliers in actual wars.

She offers four historical lessons as boosting her outlook that Ukraine has the advantage in the war and that the Russians are more likely to go soft and lose the “will to fight.”

One example: The German Army in 1918. Her quickie summary is this:

Exhausted and demoralized German troops faced hordes of fresh Americans who brought the industrial and agricultural capacity of the United States with them. After four fruitless years of fighting in France, German troops began surrendering at the Battle of Amiens in August 1918, believing that the war was lost, and the quickest way to end it and live was to capitulate.

This looks like a soft version of the infamous stab-in-the-back theory that wound up playing such a toxic role in the politics of Weimar Germany. The two main military leaders were Erich Ludendorrf and Paul von Hindenburg. They persuaded Kaiser Bill to flee Germany and hand the government over to the Social Democratic Party so they could make the SPD the scapegoats for their loss. The SPD leaders could have played their role more adroitly, but that’s a bigger story. Ludendorrf went on to participate Hitler’s failed 1923 “Beer Hall Putsch” in Munich. Hindenburg was elected as President of Germany and it was he who appointed Hitler as Chancellor in 1933.

The fact was that the German army and political leaders knew the war was lost and made a rational decision to surrender based on their military situation and prospects. How well the victorious allies handled the peace negotiations is a whole different story. But the surrender was not the result of treacherous commies wrecking the government as the stab-in-the-back theory framed it.

Second World War Burma Campaign

She uses the 1944 defeat of the Japanese army Burma (now Myanmar) as another example. This one seems an odd choice because her own description of it describes it as a defeat that different planning and execution by the Japanese Army might have averted. Not as a case where weak-willed, sissy leaders panicked and ran from a fight they could have won.

This was also a case in which Japan was fighting to retain its occupation of the British colony of Burma, not one that directly involved the Japanese homeland.

South Vietnamese Army in 1975

The United States was actively involved in the war of South Vietnam against the Communist government in the north. For ten years or more, depending on when you start the count. This was famously a situation in which the US won every battle and lost the war. Here she repeats the Republicans’ stab-in-the-back version of the war’s end for the US, which Henry Kissinger persuaded President Ford and the Republicans to set up. “Despite pleas from the South Vietnamese government, the United States refused to intervene. North Vietnamese troops retained the support of China and the Soviet Union.”

This is the concept of “will to fight” that Republican and neocon hawks favor. The folks at the fervently pro-war neocon think-tank, the Foundation for the Defense of Democracies (FDD) and likeminded hawks love the Munich Analogy, in which a feckless Neville Chamberlain had a testosterone contest with Adolf Hitler in their 1938 negotiations, and Chamberlain chickened out in the face of Hitler’s mighty macho presence. Sadly, this is the canonical version of the Munich story, which manages to miss pretty much everything important that made the Munich Agreement a bad deal. (3)

Another favorite testosterone tale is the one during the Cuban Missile Crisis at a critical moment when Secretary of State Dean Rusk said, “We’re eyeball-to-eyeball, and I think he other fellow just blinked.” That was a crisis that was resolved with creative and difficult diplomacy in the middle of a military standoff and dang near triggered a nuclear war between the US and the Soviet Union. It was not solved by a staring contest. And here the outcome was less a matter of the “will to fight” on either side buts rather of having the brains and the will to avoid a nuclear war. Fidel Castro was initially angry with the Soviet for pulling out the nuclear missiles, although he later conceded that it was a better outcome than what might have happened if it hadn’t been resolved in the way it was.

In the case of the Vietnam War, the Americans had the will to fight for years, even though it was a bad idea to enter the conflict directly in the way they did. In the end, after all those years of “winning,” they made the rational decision to stop stringing out their participation in a war they knew they had lost. (Neocon ideologues notwithstanding!) And the South Vietnamese leadership decided – whatever their testosterone levels - not to keep fighting in a war they were clearly losing and had no plausible path to avoiding that defeat. In the last sentence

Tannehill closing comment on Vietnam carefully concedes that the South Vietnamese regime never was able to convince its own people that it had the nationalist legitimacy that the regime in the North achieved – but she still blames the loss on wimpy, stab-in-the-back US Congressional Democrats.

Russian Army in 1917

The case she cites first of all is the strangest of her four examples. She kinda-sorta tries to make this another stab-in-the-back case, in this case the Bolsheviks being the backstabbers. In her account, Czar Nicholas was doing a bad job of running the war (which Imperial Germany had started), and so did the interim regime of Alexander Karensky. She says that the Kerensky Offensive of mid-1917, “Russian soldiers lost all faith and quit fighting en masse.”

But she (of course) blames Lenin’s new Communist government for this particular loss-of-will-to-fight. They agreed to the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk in December 1917, which surrendered “huge swaths of [Russia] land and people to the Germans and all but ending the war in the east.” Which is true.

But the new government then prosecuted the Civil War of 1918-20, which resulted in as many as 10 civilian lives lost in fighting and other side-effects of the war. The Civil War including fighting Ukraine, Poland and Czechoslovakians. There were also interventions by the Allies, including Britain, France, and the US, who wanted to force Russia back into the war against Germany – and were obviously not happy about having a Communist government in Russia. “As many as 10 million lives were lost as a result of the Russian Civil War.” (4)

The relevant point here is that Lenin’s government made big territorial concessions at Brest- Litovsk, not because of testosterone deficiencies in their leaders, but rather based on their assessment of what were the practical possibilities for keeping the revolutionary government in power and getting out of the war against Germany. The new Russian government pulled out of the Czarist government’s war based on a practical assessment of their military capabilities. But based on the experience of the Civil War, that was not because of psychological loss of their subjective “will to fight.”

Here is an hour-long documentary on the Russian Civil narrated by British military historian Antony Beevor provided by the Jerry Ford Presidential Foundation, so it’s safe to assume it’s not a leftie take on the situation. (See the cited Britannica article for a non-polemical version. (5)

Notes:

(1) Rubin, Jennifer (2019): A bulwark against Trump and Trumpism. Washington Post 01/08/2026. <https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2019/01/08/bulwark-against-trump-trumpianism/> (Accessed: 20026-10-06).

(2) Tannehill, Brynn (2026): What a Russian Army Collapse Might Look Like. The Bulwark 06/08/2026. <https://www.thebulwark.com/p/what-a-russian-army-collapse-might-look-like-ukraine-drones-logistics-war-ukraine-zelensky-putin> (Accessed: 2026-10-06).

(3) Jeffrey Record offers a very good, reality-based account in: The Specter of Munich: Reconsidering the Lessons of Appeasing Hitler (2007). Washington: Potomac Books.

(4) Britannica Editors (2026): Russian Civil War. Encyclopedia Britannica, 06/01/2026. <https://www.britannica.com/event/Russian-Civil-War> (Accessed:2026-11-06).

(5) Russia: Revolution and Civil War with Sir Antony Beevor. Gerald R. Ford Presidential Foundation YouTube channel 10/11/2026. <https://youtu.be/WbGz2x_v1ho?si=hF-CwNkQ9gKWhWgP> (Accessed:2026-11-06).

Zelenskyy’s new proposals for ceasefire talks with Russia

In the long and continuing Russia-Ukraine War, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy recently issued a new proposal for negotiations, proposing a face-to-face meeting with Vladimir Putin. (“Volodymyr” is the Ukrainian version of the “Russian Vladimir”.)

It’s not hard to imagine that both Vladimir’s are sick of the clown-show diplomacy of Jared Kushner and Steve Witkoff. Although it seems to have worked better for Putin’s purposes than for Zelenskyy’s. Still, ultra-amateur diplomacy is the last thing this situation needed. (Which is even more true for the current Iran War!)

The BBC summarizes the current position of the two countries on territorial issues:

Putin's longstanding position has been that Ukraine should withdraw from four regions largely occupied by Russia - Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson and Zaporizhzhia - and give up its efforts to join Nato.

Ukraine has ruled out ceding territory, saying it would embolden Russia to invade again, as it had in 2022 when it launched its full-scale war eight years after illegally annexing Crimea. (1)

And the BBC report notes:

Putin's longstanding position has been that Ukraine should withdraw from four regions largely occupied by Russia - Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson and Zaporizhzhia - and give up its efforts to join Nato.

Ukraine has ruled out ceding territory, saying it would embolden Russia to invade again, as it had in 2022 when it launched its full-scale war eight years after illegally annexing Crimea.

Ceasefire negotiations have stalled in recent months, while previous peace talks in Geneva, Abu Dhabi and Istanbul have failed.

It’s a bit surprising that the BBC report didn’t mention Crimea there. In current international law, Crimea (seized by Russia in 2014), Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson and Zaporizhzhia are Ukraine’s territory. The Russia position that they have officially incorporated Crimea and parts of the other four oblasts into Russia proper is not valid in international law and has never been recognized by Ukraine as valid.

Oleksandr Kyselov, a left-leaning Ukrainian from the Donetsk oblast (province) and currently of Uppsala University in Sweden, provided a helpful context this past December for what geographical issues that would be involved in a settlement of the current war. He was reacting to a particular peace proposal put forward by Russia last November 21.

Precedents exist for lasting ceasefires even when underlying territorial claims remained unresolved - Cyprus since 1974, Korea since 1953, Kashmir since 1972. But Cyprus has United Nations peacekeepers and foreign troops on both sides. Korea has one of the world’s most militarized borders. Kashmir sees regular outbreaks of violence, prevented from full war only by nuclear deterrence. None offers templates for sustainable peace in Ukraine fitting the deals discussed. [my emphasis] (2)

The Crimea problem(s)

Crimea has the most important port for the Russian Black Sea Fleet. Russia’s involvement in Crimea is also not new. Russia officially annexed the peninsula 1783. The Crimean War of 1853-1856 was, as the name suggests, was a war with Britian and France against Russia over control of Crimea. Two Ukrainian experts, Alina Frolova and Stepan Yakymiak, write for the Carnegie Institute:

Moscow’s determination to dominate the Black Sea runs deep in its strategic culture.

Russia’s full-scale invasion of 2022 aimed not only to seize Ukrainian land but also to reimpose its dominance at sea. Its initial war plans foresaw a rapid occupation of Ukraine’s coastline, including the critical port cities of Odesa and Mykolaiv. If it had succeeded in that, Moscow would have been able to restore much of its Cold War-era control over the Black Sea, strangle Ukraine’s economy, and use control over the flow of food and energy for coercion. The world learned in 2022 that Ukraine is vital to global food security. Russia’s blockade of Ukrainian ports triggered a surge in grain prices, placing millions—particularly in Africa and the Middle East—at risk of hunger until a UN-brokered agreement, and later Ukraine’s military power, prompted Moscow to retreat. [my emphasis] (3)

But Russia’s ability to use Crimea to produce a military advantage in the Black Sea has also been inhibited by Ukrainian drones and missiles in the current war. So at the moment, Crimea is not a critical to Russia’s power position as it seemed before the war. But that does not mean that Russia is inclined to cede it back to Ukraine. The current state of drone technology may have far-reaching effects on naval strategies and types of vessels used.

Frolova’s and Yakymiak’s position doesn’t seem to anticipate a harmonious resolution of the Crimea issue anytime soon:

The only way to achieve lasting peace and security in the Black Sea, therefore, is to ensure that Russia’s naval capabilities are not just degraded temporarily but kept structurally paralyzed. …

Ukraine’s primary objective in the Black Sea, working alongside its partners, should be the preservation of the current balance of power. But consolidating this achievement demands long-term commitment: scaling up Ukraine’s maritime strike capacity, institutionalizing the support of its coalition of partners, and integrating Black Sea security into NATO and EU frameworks. In other words, the Black Sea will remain insecure until Russia’s fleet ceases to be able to function as an offensive force. That is the starting point from which any serious strategy must proceed.

I think it’s safe to say that if Russia’s leaders think that is the goal Western powers include Ukraine are pursuing, it could be a very long time before the control of Crimea is resolved in any way acceptable to both Ukraine and to Russia!

Türkiye is also a key player on Black Sea security matters and has also focused on restricting Russia naval power there. Countries bordering on the Black Sea include Bulgaria, Romania, Ukraine (even without Crimea) Russia, Georgia, and Türkiye. So the Crimea issues involves much more than just Ukraine and Russia agreeing on new boundary markers.

2014 Black Sea Map from Encyclopedia Britannica:

The occupied eastern Ukrainian oblasts

Zelenskyy’s new offer for talks at least hints that there could be a longterm ceasefire like those Oleksandr Kyselov cites for Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson and Zaporizhzhia. On the surface, there seems to be a lot to be said for such an arrangement. Although the three examples Kyselov cites involve frozen conflicts that have lasted since 1953, 1972 and 1974. So a settlement along those lines could mean in practice something that would look to those directly affected a lot like a permanent settlement. The example of China and Taiwan, divided since the end of the Second World War, is on an even longer timeline.

At the very least, a stable and protracted ceasefire could give both sides a chance to begin removing the massive number of landmines and other unexploded ordinance on both sides of the conflict lines there. It could also offer a chance to resolve the heartbreaking issues of the many Ukrainian children illegally deported by Russia, many of them given to Russian families for adoption. And it would allow war refugees to return to their homes if they want to do so – although in many cases their actual homes may no longer exist.

A key issue for Ukraine of their 50-meter-long “fortress belt” in Donetsk. A 2025 analysis from the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) describes the importance of that part of Donetsk – still controlled by Ukraine – as a key defensive position for any new military drive on the Ukrainian capital Kyiv by Russian forces. The ISW report discusses them in the context of proposals Russia had on the table at the time of the report:

The surrender of the rest of Donetsk Oblast as the prerequisite of a ceasefire with no commitment to a final peace settlement ending the war would force Ukraine to abandon its "fortress belt," the main fortified defensive line in Donetsk Oblast since 2014, with no guarantee that fighting will not resume. Putin's reported proposal reportedly demands that Ukraine concede this critical defensive position, which Russian forces currently have no means of rapidly enveloping or penetrating, apparently in exchange for nothing. (4)

John Mearsheimer describes the current context of the war is that Russia is winning in the war of attrition and advancing slowly, but advancing. He doesn’t see much credibility in claims that Putin is facing critical challenges politically because of the Russian economy or claims that the occasional drone attacks by Ukraine deep inside Russia are putting huge new political pressure on Putin to end the war. (5)

Scott Lucas is a good analyst of American diplomacy and on Trump’s regime generally. But He’s a bit too starry-eyed on things like the Ukrainian strikes inside Russia. It’s not that Ukraine isn’t successful in hitting some strategic economic infrastructure targets. But it’s hard to imagine that those are having any large economic effect on Russia’s industrial capabilities, especially in comparison to using those attacks for tactical operations on the Russian forces on the border. But Lucas also comments that he thinks Zelenskyy is seeking a ceasefire in place now. (6)

At this stage, a prolonged ceasefire along the current front lines is likely the very best Ukraine can do. There’s a good argument that it also makes sense for Russia, and Mearsheimer gives the impression that there is some possibility to Putin’s government will see it that way. He recent suggest that Zelenskyy’s current optimistic rhetoric would be a good way for Zelenskyy to spin the results if Russia should agree to a stable ceasefire-in-place. But that would be a best-we-can-do type settlement from Ukraine’s viewpoint. And the Russian government may decide that maintaining something like the current position with sporadic rounds of fighting without a ceasefire is a preferable position.

The Ukraine-can’t-join-NATO demand is sounding a little obsolescent these days, since the European allies and even Canada are scrambling to find alternative military-defense commitments and arrangement now that they can no longer count on the US in anything like the way they could pre-2025. But if Putin wants to do a deal, he probably could convince Trump to make some kind of pledge that the US would veto any Ukrainian bid for membership.

Still, a firm agreement with he US on sanctions relief would be a likely thing for Russia to demand in a major ceasefire agreement. And that would require the US to conduct something more like actual diplomacy than the current Kushner-Witkoff Laurel-and-Hardy act.

Jared and Steve prepare for their next round of negotiations with Russia

Notes:

(1) Shevchenko, Mann, Toby (2026): Zelensky proposes face-to-face talks in open letter to Putin. BBC News 2026-05-06). <https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cwy2ypyp4x4o> Accessed: 2026-09-04).

(2) Kyselov, Oleksandr (2025): Ukraine Faces an Imperial Carve-Up. Jacobin 2025-04-12. <https://jacobin.com/2025/12/ukraine-russia-war-concessions-trump> (Accessed : 2026-09-06).

(3) Frolova, Alina & Yakymiak, Stepan (2026): The Changing Military Balance in the Black Sea: A Ukrainian Perspective. Carnegie Institute 04/02/2026. <https://carnegieendowment.org/russia-eurasia/research/2026/04/the-changing-military-balance-in-the-black-sea-a-ukrainian-perspective> (Accessed: 2026-09-06).

(4) Ukraine’s Fortress Belt in Donetsk Oblast ISW 12-Aug-2025. <https://understandingwar.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/08/The20Critical20Importance20of20UkraineE28099s20Fortress20Belt20in20Donetsk2C20August20122C2020252C20final20PDF.pdf> (Accessed: 2026-09-06).

(5) Prof. John Mearsheimer: Why Ukraine Will Lose. Judge Napolitano YouTube channel 06/09/2026. (5) <https://www.youtube.com/live/XtINoZon8as?si=4labuv1wjoCc5u4g> (Accessed: 2026-09-06).

(6) Why Ukraine's Show of Strength in St. Petersburg Matters. Scott Lucas Worldview YouTube channel06/09/2026. <https://youtu.be/iFOfGT-f1iQ?si=ZjJh0c90Qh4pTjnX> (Accessed: 2026-09-06).

The latest escalation in the Iran War

I’ve been around for several US wars. But at least from today’s perspective, it seems as if in earlier wars there was a plausible off-ramp that even Republicans could reasonably see as a plausible option.

In the current Iran War, the only option the US has to limit the growing catastrophe is to cut off all military aid to Israel until they agree to an enforceable peace treaty with Iran. And it seems completely unrealistic to expect the Republican Party to demand or even accept such a thing. And it seems at this point impossible to imagine the incompetent and seriously mentally impaired Donald Trump doing it as long as he’s President.

Another two and a half years of a Middle East policy of the kind we’ve had since Trump and Benjamin Netanyahu initiated their war of aggression against Iran on February 28 will have seriously catastrophic consequences for the entire world economy. And we’re now on the verge of having Middle East oil production capability radically reduced, with Saudi Arabia, Iran, and numerous other major oil producers looking at radical damage to their oil infrastructure.

We’re on the verge of things becoming so bad that even the chances for insider traders to reap weekly financial windfalls may be drastically curtailed. (Patrick Wintour, Guardian)

Israel launched airstrikes early on Monday targeting central and western Iran in response to missile fire from Tehran, attacks that threatened to drag the wider Middle East back into a regional war.

Iranian state TV reported the sound of explosions being heard in the cities of Isfahan, Karaj, Tabriz and Tehran. A witness in Tehran described hearing at least one large blast somewhere to the west of the capital.

Iran closed the airspace around Tehran’s Imam Khomeini international airport – the main airfield in the country – after the Israeli attack.

Multiple explosions were heard over Jerusalem later on Monday as Israel said a new wave of Iranian missiles was incoming. The Israeli military said it “identified missiles launched from Iran” and was working to intercept the threat. (Guardian)

Iran has said that any US or Israeli strikes on major Iranian oil infrastructure would be met with attacks against oil infrastructure of other US Middle East allies. They have also threatened to attack desalinization plants, which those countries depend upon for potable water. That would be a war crime on Iran’s part, but it doesn’t mean they want do it. Which could be seriously catastrophic for the countries affected. As David Michel wrote during the first month of the current war:

The economies of the Persian Gulf countries depend on oil and natural gas. Their populations depend on desalinated water. Nature endows the Arabian Peninsula with scant freshwater resources. Consequently, all of the six Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) nations lining the Gulf’s southern shores critically rely on desalination plants drawing seawater from the Persian Gulf and Arabian Sea. The war on Iran that began on February 28 puts these essential water systems at risk. Desalination facilities in Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) suffered indirect damage from missile and drone strikes early in the conflict. Subsequently, plants in Bahrain and Iran have reportedly been intentionally attacked. Deliberate targeting of desalination infrastructure would represent a significant conflict escalation, potentially threatening vital water supplies for millions of people across the region. (1)

On the American side, this mess is the result of years of the US Republican Party indulging the politics of crackpots and bigots like Glenn Beck and Rush Limbaugh.

Reckless warmongering has left the world economy is a bad place, as Politico reports: (2)

Did the year 1989 actually happen, when it seemed practically possible to reduce preparations for wars and develop a much more peaceful world?

Simon Tisdall resorts to a sports analogy – which is at least better than talking about who “holds the cards”:

There are visionary statesmen and high-minded negotiators, pragmatic mediators and professional diplomats – and then there are meddling fools. As ceasefires implode, vast numbers of civilians die or flee, and wars Donald Trump started, fuelled or pledged to resolve rage unchecked, there’s no doubt which category he belongs to. In baseball parlance, in Ukraine, Iran-Lebanon and Israel-Palestine, Trump is “0 for 3”. He boasted he alone could cut deals and bring peace. He’s delivered neither. In striking out, he mostly makes matters worse. [my emphasis] (3)

If anyone is interested in seeing Trump’s Meet the Press meltdown from Sunday, it’s available on YouTube. Weirdly, it was held in a location where rain on the roof is very loud during the interview.

Notes:

(1) Michel, David (2026): Could Iran Disrupt the Gulf Countries’ Desalinated Water Supplies? CSIS 03/19/2026. <https://www.csis.org/analysis/could-iran-disrupt-gulf-countries-desalinated-water-supplies> (Accessed: 2026-08-06).

(2) Politico EU 06/05/2026. <https://www.politico.eu/article/global-shipping-industry-prepares-for-permanent-disruption/> (Accessed: 2026-08-06).

Tisdall, Simon (2026): Trump’s failure to maintain ceasefires is part of the new world disorder – and ordinary people pay the price. Guardian 06/07/2026. <https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2026/jun/07/donald-trump-ceasefire-failure-ukraine-iran-gaza-lebanon-gaza> (Accessed: 2026-08-06).