The Trump Administration is becoming more and more a chaos agent. European allies can no longer count on Trump to side with them in a possible conflict with Russia. Trump’s new arrangement to exempt Russian diesel from the economic sanctions is a further signal that the US is pursuing a different and more accommodating policy toward Putin’s Russia – to the extent there is a coherent policy on that conflict from the Trump regime at all.
Russia-Ukraine War
It’s obvious that Trump himself is increasingly incapable of operating anything resembling a normal foreign policy. His primary focus in office is maximizing his own wealth. It’s very hard to see how he could achieve a stable peace agreement with Iran or facilitate one in the Russia-Ukraine War.
It certainly appears that what John Mearsheimer has been saying about the latter conflict for a while is essentially correct. The Russia-Ukraine War is a brutal mess. Despite the hype around this strike or that by Ukraine into Russia, it’s not at all clear to me that Ukraine is doing more damage with their attacks on strategic infrastructure targets than Russia is doing to it. The leap in drone capabilities that Ukraine has achieved has been impressive. But since Ukraine’s offensive in 2023 that temporarily won back some territory, it’s basically been a long war of attrition, alternating between gains and reverses for both sides. The drones on both sides have made gaining ground nearly impossible on the front lines, with huge casualties for any offensive.
The best case in the current situation would most likely be some kind of semi-permanent ceasefire along the current lines without Ukraine formally conceding any territory. But as long as they are stuck in the current war of attrition, Russia’s advantages in population and economic strength - even without of the latest boost from Trump agreeing to exempt some diesel fuel from the US economic embargo) are big.
Even as unsatisfactory as a deal like that would be, I just don’t see how the Trump-Kushner-Wikoff malicious clown show could accomplish even that. Russia would demand US assurances and specific commitments before they agreed to any substantive solution. And unfortunately I just don’t see how this crew is able to pull off anything as complicated as a Russia-Ukraine armistice would be.
So Europe is looking at very likely having two more years of war between Russia and Ukraine, at least. And the war means that Russia has a much bigger and battle-experienced army than it had when they started this in 2022. Of course, war always takes a toll on a country. And many Russian officials and citizens will surely look very unfavorably on aggressive moves against Europe which could lead to another war like the current one, or worse.
Additional threats from Russia
But that does not mean that Russia will refrain from threats and actions short of actual war against the EU/NATO countries. Politico recently reported:
The talks about a nightmare attack scenario have taken place in recent weeks among EU ambassadors from all 27 countries gathering in “restricted format,” meaning without phones or assistants. Discussions have ramped up since the discovery of an explosives-laden drone at Leipzig airport in August, said the diplomats and officials, who were granted anonymity to discuss the confidential exchanges.But, as always, there are a lot of angles being promoted by people representing various different interests and perspectives. For example, the former Ukrainian foreign minister, Dmytro Kuleba, gives his spin on reported events:
While the EU has discussed such scenarios for years — unveiling a “hybrid toolbox” geared at coordinating responses to cyberattacks, election interference, and sabotage — the latest talks zeroed in on the risk of more serious attacks that cause large-scale casualties. Two diplomats said a meeting among EU ambassadors last Wednesday focused specifically on such examples.
Since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the EU says Moscow has intensified a campaign of cyberattacks, sabotage and other covert operations across the bloc. (1)
"Anti-European hysteria is being fueled in Russia, which I interpret as the preparation for a broader conflict with the rest of Europe," said Kuleba, before adding: "We [Ukrainians] don't have to drag you — Putin will drag you into the war."As always, it’s worth being caution about phrases like “hybrid war.” A violations of a country’s air space or some kind of cyber-hacking attack may or may not be war or a cause for war, depending on the severity and the particular situation. The use of “hybrid war” to describe immigration or refugee movements, even when it’s being consciously used as a provocative act by another country (which rarely happens), describing that a “war,” hybrid or not, is particularly problematic.
European officials say Moscow has upped its hybrid campaign across the continent in recent months, using cyberattacks, sabotage and disinformation to disrupt critical infrastructure and weaken support for Ukraine.
Kuleba said the failed drone attack on the Leipzig airport in Germany in August was a sign of "growing preparation" for an offensive on the continent. "They see how your intelligence operates. They see how your security forces operate. They see how you react and they draw conclusions," he added.
In the aftermath of the incident, the German government concluded that Moscow was responsible for the attack, and ordered a review of security around sensitive locations. (2)
Intermingled political narratives
One constant feature in discussions over military spending is that war is profitable, especially for war industries and their financiers. That’s true regardless of the legal or moral aspects of the war. And, of course, if one side suffers enough damage, that can cut into profits, as well. Although the damage to corporate profits is not the same as the damage done to the human beings affected.
But this also means that there are vested interests who have a financial stake in hyping foreign threats. Anne Applebaum (who is married to Poland’s Foreign Minister) recently wrote:
All Vladimir Putin has to do is tell his soldiers to stop fighting, and then the war is over. The Ukrainians cannot stop fighting because, if they do, their country will be conquered and they will suffer the fate of their occupied territories: leaders murdered, children kidnapped, repression and concentration camps for everyone else. (3)This is understandable as a polemical formulation. Russia did illegally invade Ukraine, first by seizing Crimea in 2014 and more in the current war that began in 2022. But it appears very unlikely that Russia has as its aim to take all of Ukraine. John Mearsheimer has argued repeatedly that Russia’s goal has been to hold Crimea and significant portions of eastern Ukraine, and to have a Russia-friendly government in Kiev. Or, failing that, having a weak government in Kiev that functions as the head of a dysfunctional rump state. As Mearsheimer notes, Russia occupying all of a hostile Ukraine would be a nightmare for Russia because it would be a significant military drain because of hostility from the local population. It would also give Europe that chance if they chose to do so of backing the irregular military resistance inside Ukraine.
We always have to be careful to remember that the calculations that countries make in such situations includes making assumptions about uncertainties. And national leaderships may not always make an accurate evaluation of their options. And even smart and experienced leaders can make dumb decisions.
The other huge uncertainty hanging over all this is the debility of the Trump 2.0 regime in diplomacy.
As low an opinion as I have for Trump diplomacy, I’m still surprised at all the instances we’re seeing of their inability to conduct anything like what we could call even half-competent foreign policy. It’s painfully obvious that Trump, Jared, and Steve Witkoff are laser-focused on deals that enrich themselves and their cronies. It’s been about as disastrous as it could be on the Iran War. And on Gaza. And they are hardly making a pretense these days that they could arrange a peace between Russia and Ukraine.
Former US Ambassador to Ukraine Steven Pifer wrote this week:
“You don’t have the cards,” President Donald Trump angrily told Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy during their infamous February 2025 Oval Office meeting. Trump issued this assessment just days after he had launched his effort to mediate an end to the Russia-Ukraine War. Some 19 months later, the cards have been shuffled and redealt.The following is a discussion at the Warsaw Security Forum of the European situation with Russia. It includes the foreign ministers of Britain, German, Norway, and Poland. Which of course includes Mr. Applebaum, Polish Foreign Minister Radosław Sikorski. Of course, they are speaking here as the foreign ministers of their countries, not as independent experts. (5)
But does Trump know how to play cards? Apparently not. (4)
A particular feature of the debate is that far-right European parties that favor a pro-Russia foreign policy are opposed to boosting European military budgets. And they will take the opportunity to make “guns and butter” arguments that government programs that benefit the public will need to be further cut back if the military buildup goes forever. Part of the scam of far-right parties like the Alternative for Germany (AfD) and Austria’s Freedom Party (FPÖ) is that they pretend that the support social services and public institutions for ordinary people. But generally they are happy to follow the policies advocated by TechBro oligarchs like Elon Musk and Peter Thiel – and those kinds of supporters aren’t going to be shelling out campaign money for parties that demand that they pay higher taxes! (6)
The dead weight of bad economic ideas
Europe suffers from two really bad policy problems: austerity economics and a serious fault in the construction of the euro currency.
Germany is well known for its chronic tendency toward conservative economic policies, despite its substantial social-welfare state. There are a couple of basic ways to remedy a shortage of funds: cut programs or increase government revenue. And since a big expansion of defense spending will require a substantial dose of one or both.
Germany’s current Chancellor Friedrich Merz of the conservative Christian Democratic Union (CDU) is heavily inclined toward the former and against the latter. Because raising more revenue will require wealthier Germany including the sacred billionaires paying more to support their country. Merz and the CDU would rather not hear about any need to do that.
Politico reports under this title image: (7)
Germany and its allies rebuffed Ireland’s plan to downsize the [EU] bloc’s next seven-year budget, arguing that the proposed cuts are not enough.Paul Krugman, an actual authority on international finance who closely followed the euro crisis following the 2008 economic slump warns that the structure of the euro currency remains highly risky.
On Saturday, the Irish presidency of the Council of the EU, which is steering the talks, proposed cutting around 8% from the bloc’s total budget from 2028 to 2034 in a bid to assuage a German-led camp demanding reductions of several hundred billions euros.
But Dublin’s hopes of facilitating a deal were immediately dashed by German Chancellor Friedrich Merz, one the key players in the negotiations as his country contributes to approximately one-quarter of the bloc’s common budget. [emphasis added]
What is France’s problem? France is on a fiscally unsustainable path. Debt is already very high as a percentage of GDP, and the French government is adding to that debt by running large budget deficits even though there is no emergency like a war, a severe recession, or a pandemic to justify such deficits. Furthermore, France has an aging population, which means that pension costs will, other things equal, grow much faster than revenue.Krugman spent years arguing that the EU needed to fix the euro currency zone to meet the requirements of what economists call an “optimal currency area” (OCA). I won’t try to elaborate what that is here, though there are plenty of accessible descriptions available online. (9)
Now, everything I just said about France’s fiscal situation is true for other major advanced economies too, the United States very much included. But France does stand out, even among fiscally troubled nations, in one main way: its persistent inability to get realistic about retirement. …
And France’s reliance on the euro means that it’s all too easy to see how [a] loss of [market] confidence [in French debt] could turn into an ugly crisis. (8)
Notes:
(1) Vincour, Nicholas (2026): EU quietly braces for nightmare scenario of multiple-casualty hybrid attack. Politico EU 10/07/2026. <https://www.politico.eu/article/eu-nightmare-scenario-multiple-casualty-hybrid-attack/> (Accessed 2026-11-10).
(2) Ronzheimer, Paul and Caulcutt, Clea (2026): ‘Putin will drag you into the war,’ former Ukrainian foreign minister tells Europeans. Politico EU 10/11/2026. <https://www.politico.eu/article/ukraine-former-fm-europe-vladimir-putin-will-drag-you-into-war/> (Accessed 2026-11-10).
(3) Applebaum, Anne (2026): Trump’s Message to Ukraine Is Now Crystal Clear. Atlantic 10/12/2026. <https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/2026/10/trump-ukraine-putin-fuel/688974/?gift=hVZeG3M9DnxL4CekrWGK372rbdCi0mU0IdJSunXI0Sk> (Accessed 2026-13-10).
(4) Pifer, Steven (2026): In the Russia-Ukraine War, Does Trump Know How to Play Cards? Just Security 10/12/2026. <https://www.justsecurity.org/160357/russia-ukraine-trump-cards/> (Accessed 2026-13-10).
(5) UK, Germany, Poland and Norway Foreign Ministers Discuss Russia and Ukraine. DRM News YouTube channel 10/13/2026. <https://youtu.be/MPx9XH8h6sg?si=hjez_RM2hbePT6Q-> (Accessed: 2026-13-10).
(6) Jack, Victor & Barigazzi & Chris Lunday (2026): Far-right surge threatens Europe’s drive to rearm. Politico 10/08/2026. <https://www.politico.eu/article/europe-far-right-nato-defense-spending-ukraine-aid/> (Accessed: 2026-13-10).
(7) Sorgi, Gregorio (2026): Germany warns EU that €159B budget cuts are not enough. Politico EU 10/10/2026. <https://www.politico.eu/article/friedrich-merz-germany-warns-eu-e159b-budget-cuts-not-enough/> (Accessed: 2026-12-10).
(8) Krugman, Paul (2026): What’s the Matter With France? Paul Krugman Substack 10/08/2026. <https://paulkrugman.substack.com/p/whats-the-matter-with-france> (Accessed: 2026-13-10).
(9) Schelkle, Waltraud & Editors (2026): "optimum currency area." Encyclopedia Britannica, 06/06/2023. <https://www.britannica.com/money/optimum-currency-area> (Accessed: 2026-13-10).
Albert Alesina & Robert Barro & Silvana Tenreyro (2002): Optimal Currency Areas. National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper 9072 (July 2002). <https://www.nber.org/system/files/working_papers/w9072/w9072.pdf>
Beck, Krzysztof & Okhrimenko (2024): Optimum Currency Area in the Eurozone: The Regional Origins of the European Business Cycle. Springer Nature Link 03/06/2024. <https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11079-024-09750-z>




