It is an illusion to believe that once the far right gets what it wants, it might pause its demands. In Brussels, pressure from Italian leader Giorgia Meloni, allied with Danish Social Democrat Mette Frederiksen, has not abated. Together, they led 22 out of 27 member states to condemn what they saw as Spain's negligence during the Ceuta crisis in July, when 50,000 Moroccans entered the Spanish enclave. As negotiations resume on the common EU budget, the two leaders are demanding that the Union finance return hubs for migrants. The European Commission has consistently stated it will not foot the bill. (1)The sudden influx of over 70 thousand immigrants/refugees/asylum seekers into the Spanish city of Ceuta from neighboring Morocco in late July gave European xenophobes a new opportunity to promote fear and hatred against foreigners – because that’s what xenophobes do.
As of the end of August, Spain’s Socialist Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez took an interesting diplomatic position:
The prime minister carefully avoided blaming Morocco for the crisis, instead attributing the surge to human-smuggling mafias, as well as to online campaigns orchestrated by Russia, Israel and “an international far-right group that always uses migration not only to attack Spain but also Europe, and divide it.”The Guardian reports:
“Continuing to spread defamatory lies will not distract from Sánchez’s disgraceful failure to manage his country’s affairs,” Israel’s Foreign Minister Gideon Sa’ar said on X in response to Sánchez’s interview. (2)
As many as 141 people are thought to have died trying to enter the Spanish enclave at the end of July. The influx of about 70,000 men, women and children unleashed a political crisis, a humanitarian emergency and reignited tensions within the EU over immigration.That last point is extremely important. He’s warning fellow Europeans that pandering to xenophobic agitators plays nicely into the hands of unfriendly actors like Russia. With the German government as of September 1 directly blaming Russia for the strange incident of armed drones showing up at the Leipzig airport, that’s a not-so-subtle reminder that they have good reason not to boost the far right’s propaganda against immigrants.
Despite speculation that Rabat may have engineered the mass crossing as a means of showing its displeasure at Spain’s rapprochement with Algeria, Sánchez said there was nothing to indicate the involvement of the Moroccan authorities.
“There’s no information from any intelligence agency that raises doubts over the involvement of Moroccan authorities,” he told Cadena Ser radio on Monday. “Cooperation with Morocco is frankly positive. I’d like to stress that we need to be aware that this crisis can be resolved only through cooperation – and not through a lack of trust in Morocco, which would only further aggravate the already complex situation we have in Ceuta.”
Sánchez said fake news had been pumped out on social media accounts “associated with Russia, Israel and the international far right that always use migration to attack not just Spain but also Europe”. (3)
Israel and the US are angry with Spain because it banned the use of Spanish airspace for military flights taking part in the illegal war of aggression the US and Israel launched against Iran in February. So that is at least plausible, as is the (unspecific) reference to a far right group. But it is also hard to ignore that the governments of the US, Russia, and Israel all in various ways currently encourage and defend far-right xenophobic parties and groups in Europe. And, yes, those xenophobic parties include a lot of supporters with antisemitic sentiments, to put it mildly.
But it’s also doesn’t seem plausible that the Moroccan government played no significant role because of the large numbers of people crossing the border in such a short time. And surely it was very aware of the massive social media campaign targeting Moroccan’s leading up to that situation. Spain opposes Morocco’s demand to take over Western Sahara. And Morocco is also part of the US-backed Abraham Accords with Israel.
There certainly are lots of provocative incidents that seem to be emanating from Putin’s Russia, including attempts to interfere in European elections. That kind of interference is tricky to define. But there are national and international laws and established diplomatic practices to define which of those are legitimate and which not.
Le Monde recently reported:
France has also faced highly targeted political destabilization operations. In early August, the Paris public prosecutor's office opened an investigation into suspected Russian interference targeting two of Emmanuel Macron's former prime ministers, Gabriel Attal (Renaissance, the centrist party founded by Macron) and Edouard Philippe (center-right Horizons), as well as the Member of the European Parliament Raphaël Glucksmann (center-left Place Publique). All three, who are candidates in the 2027 presidential election, filed complaints after the circulation of deepfakes and fake news reports produced by media outlets alleging they had health problems or had committed acts of corruption. Viginum, the government agency responsible for combating foreign digital interference, lamented the publicity surrounding these operations, which, according to the agency, provides "greater visibility to content that is seen by very few citizens." (4)Overblown fears of immigration are often more like mass panic or mass delusion than any kind of practical approach to or understanding of immigration issues. So a carefully orchestrated campaign that some countries or group of countries like that over the Ceuta incident in July can have damaging political effects if the pro-democracy parties are willing and able to direct discredit the scare narratives.
Eric Albert reports on an important report on a 2026 study published by the European Central Bank (ECB), Shaping Europe’s future: innovation, growth and stability by Giovanni Peri. (5) That report says in its opening Abstract:
OECD countries experienced declining native population growth and rising net immigration over 1990-2024. [I.e., a quarter of a century] We compile a new dataset of net immigration rates to OECD countries from all origins and show that most of the increase came from non-OECD countries and was predominantly high-skilled. Push factors, network effects, and policy indices explain little of the large cross-country heterogeneity in immigration dynamics; unexpected shocks and surges were common. Using local projections and several sources of identifying variation, we then estimate the relationship between immigration and growth in GDP per capita, labor productivity, capital investment, and total factor productivity (TFP). Immigration from non-OECD countries was a significant predictor of GDP per worker growth, primarily through higher investment. High-skilled immigration, in particular, was associated with stronger human capital accumulation, faster TFP growth, and greater capital deepening. Native population growth, by contrast, had no or weakly negative effects on GDP per capita and productivity. These results are consistent with a large literature documenting the positive productivity and growth effects of immigration, especially high-skilled immigration. [emphasis added]None of that is novel or surprising to people who actually take some time to understand that issue. Every country has its own particular challenges with immigration, of course. But do European countries want to continue to have growing GDPs? (Assuming that there is no immediate breakthrough to establishing no-growth abundance economies.)
Albert writes:
[Peri] is well aware, however, that his research – even with supporting evidence – struggles to compete with populist rhetoric: "The problem is that people like me have not managed to find a slogan as effective as 'immigrants take your jobs,'" he noted. "It is false, no data shows it, but it works."Democratic parties in Europe need to get much more serious about pushing back on that narrative. They should certainly not be encouraging xenophobic politics!
Notes:
(1) Le Monde Editorial (2026): The far right's immigration trap closes in on Europe. Le Monde English 08/27/2026. <https://www.lemonde.fr/en/opinion/article/2026/08/27/the-far-right-s-immigration-trap-closes-in-on-europe_6756902_23.html> (Accessed: 2026-27-08).
(2) Hernández, Aitor (2026): Sánchez takes rare swipe at Spain’s king over Ceuta crisis. Politico EU 08/31/2026. <https://www.politico.eu/article/pedro-sanchez-takes-rare-swipe-at-spains-king-felipe-vi-over-ceuta-crisis/> (Accessed: 2026-01-09).
(3) Jones, Sam (2026): Morocco not to blame for Ceuta border breach, says Spanish PM. Guardian 08/31/2026. <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2026/aug/31/morocco-ceuta-border-breach-spanish-pm-migration-pedro-sanchez> (Accessed: 2026-01-09).
(4) Conesa, Elsa et al (2026): How Russia is trying to influence Europe's upcoming elections. Le Monde English 08/27/2026. <https://www.lemonde.fr/en/international/article/2026/08/27/how-russia-is-trying-to-influence-europe-s-upcoming-elections_6756901_4.html> (Accessed: 2026-27-08).
(5) Albert, Eric (2026): 'Immigration is beneficial for the economy as a whole. Why is it so unpopular?' Le Monde English 07/14/2026. <https://www.lemonde.fr/en/opinion/article/2026/07/14/immigration-is-beneficial-for-the-economy-as-a-whole-why-is-it-so-unpopular_6755467_23.html> (Accessed: 2026-27-08).
Peri, Giovanni (2026): Shaping Europe’s future: innovation, growth and stability. European Central Bank website. <https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/sintra/ecb.forumcentbankpub2026_Peri_paper.en.pdf> (Accessed: 2026-27-08).



