How the EU's refugee policy hogties its relations with the Taliban (and others!)

Eldar Mamedov about considerations in European Union relations to the new Taliban regime in Afghanistan. (How the EU should — and should not —deal with the Taliban Responsible Statecraft 08/23/2021)

He points to a fact that is discouraging to anyone hoping the EU could develop a more constructive immigration and refugee policy than just paying Turkey for years on end to hold 3.5 million or more refugees. That was a constructive and sensible agreement when Angela Merkel first negotiated it in 2016. But instead of using the ensuring half-decade to come up with a broader and practical policy, the EU has just punted.

(I often use somewhat dismissive language in talking about EU immigration and refugee policy. I don't mean to imply that it's an easy problem, particularly in cases where wars or their aftermaths suddenly generate a surge of refugees. My main criticism is that the approach of mainstream parties is often a head-in-the-sand posture while the xenophobic demagogues too often drive the public conversation and official policy.)

Rightwing xenophobic populists still drive the EU politics of immigration and refugees. If the center-left and center-right parties just ape the xenophobes in their immigration politics as they have tended to do, it will be hard to develop better alternatives. Unless mainstream politicians can do a much better political vocabulary for talking about the real issues involved, the far right nationalists will continue to drive the narrative. And, while waiting for the next actual refugee crisis, diplomatically kiss Turkish President Tayyip Erdoğan's behind. Because he can unleash a 2015-style refugee inflow to the EU in a matter of days under the current arrangements.

Meanwhile, paranoia and panic over possible refugees dominate EU foreign policy to a ridiculous extent, as in dealing with Belarus. (See my post EU trembles before "hybrid operations" (i.e., a few thousand refugees) from Belarus' Lukashenko 08/03/2021)

And Mamedov explains that it makes a pragmatic approach to the new Taliban government particularly difficult for the EU:

Human rights activists suspect that such an about-face on the Taliban is mainly due to concerns about “migratory flows” that the crisis in Afghanistan would unleash and ultimately impact the EU, much the way the Syrian refugee crisis did in 2015. Indeed, one day after the foreign ministers met, their colleagues responsible for home and justice affairs followed suit.

The statement produced by the European Commission as a result of that meeting is a painstakingly negotiated compromise. On the one hand, it sets out to protect the borders from the “migratory pressures;” on the other, it acknowledges that the EU cannot completely close itself off to Afghans seeking refuge and should use resettlement and other legal pathways to help them out.

The implementation of these provisions, however, depends on the good will of the bloc’s member states. This is where the problem lies — the refugees/migration debate in the EU, while valid, is poisoned by the xenophobic, particularly Islamophobic, tropes pushed by nativist politicians. [my emphasis]

Gerald Knaus, an Austrian refugee expert who serves as the Chair of the European Stability Initiative think tank and was a key player in negotiating the 2016 agreement with Turkey, calls attention to how problematic the framing of refugee and even normal immigration issue in "hydraulic" terms is, i.e., "migratory pressures" (above), gigantic "flows" of refugees, a "flood" of refugees, etc. This frames the entire issue in terms of menace, threat, and danger. "The faster we put behind us hydraulic metaphors about borders and migration, the quicker we will find our way to a solutions-oriented debate." ("An den Grenzen Europas" in [Österreichische] Sicherheitspolitische Jahresvorschau 2021, p. 95)
Mamedov:

This context dangerously narrows the European conversation on Afghanistan to migration and its alleged threat to the European way of life. Seen from this angle, seeking transactional deals with the Taliban in order to “keep the migrants out” might look superficially attractive. In the longer run, however, they would not only make a further mockery of European ideals, such as women’s rights, but would also be short-sighted as they won’t contribute to creating conditions in Afghanistan less conducive to migration in the first place.

Instead, the EU should engage with the Taliban on a much broader agenda, including development, regional stability, human rights, and security. [my emphasis]

One of several ways the EU limits itself in ways that are not only morally shabby but unnecessary risky in straight-up realist terms.

Mamedov mentions several ways in which an understanding of what happened in the Afghanistan War could improve EU policies. This kind of advice is the standard tone of professional foreign policy articles, even in situations where the willingness of the parties being addressed may be small to nonexistent.

But even EU foreign ministers might be able to grasp this part:

But any European engagement must begin with a recognition that, as a U.S. junior partner for the past twenty years, the EU holds a weak hand in the new Afghanistan. That means that the EU should shed the notion of Afghanistan as another arena of global competition with Russia and China. To the contrary, it should leave Moscow and Beijing in the driving seat when it comes to relations with Kabul. [my emphasis]

Maybe China or Russia will take another shot at installing a regime in Kabul more suitable to them. For the last 180 years or so, i.e., since the start of the First Anglo-Afghan War in 1839, that has not tended to produce happy results for those foreign powers making the attempt. My favorite stodgy-but-reliable source, Britannica Online, summarizes how that British effort worked out, "On January 6, 1842, some 4,500 British and Indian troops, with 12,000 camp followers, marched out of Kabul. Bands of Afghans swarmed around them, and the retreat ended in a bloodbath." Although I find the term "political Islam" problematic, this observation of Mamedov's is also important:

The swift Taliban victory should prompt a broader rethink in the EU on how it deals with political Islam. Islamic militants everywhere interpret the Taliban’s success and the failure of the Muslim Brotherhood-style parliamentary Islamism in Egypt, Palestine or Tunisia, as proof that violent resistance, not compromise and accommodation, works best.

Although this particular "swift" Taliban victory took the better part of 20 years. The final collapse calls to mind the comment economist Rudi Dornbusch about the Mexican financial crisis of 1994: "It took forever and then it took a night." (Frontline Murder Money & Mexico WGBH 1995)