The range of issues includes the long-standing dispute between Turkey and Greece over Cyprus, Turkey's role in the conflicts in Libya and Syria, travel between Turkey and the EU, and human rights issues, including Turkey's recent decision to leave the Council of Europe treaty on combatting violence against women known as the Istanbul Convention. (Turkey quits Istanbul Convention on violence against women Deutsche Welle 20.03.2021)
Turkey's human and diplomatic club: refugees
One connection between Turkey and the EU that I don't think receives sufficient prominence in news reports is the 2016 deal Angela Merkel negotiated with Erdoğan to hold millions of refugees from conflicts in the Greater Middle East. Robin Alexander gave a good account of the negotiating of that deal in Die Getriebenen: Merkel und die Flüchtlingspolitik (2018).The Oberösterrichische Nachrichten describes it this way (Die EU-Spitzen reisten mit Zuckerbrot und Peitsche zu Erdogan nach Ankara 07.04.2021):
Beide brauchen einander – auch in der Flüchtlingsfrage. Diese nannte die Kommissionspräsidentin als eines von vier Themenfeldern, um die es in einem ersten Gespräch mit Erdogan gegangen sei. Themenfelder, "in denen beide von einer verstärkten Zusammenarbeit profitieren können".That mention comes at the very end of the news article. But it's not only an intense issue between Turkey and the EU. It's also dramatic evidence of a current weakness in the EU, which is to rely far too heavily on a kick-the-can-down-the-road approach to significant problems. The EU faced a big and very unusual surge of refugees in 2015-16, which was met with a great deal of disarray among EU member nations. And not only far-right parties responded in many countries with a xenophobic political reactions to which the center-right and left parties generally did a poor job of responding in a constructive way.
2016 hatte die EU mit der Türkei einen Deal geschlossen, wonach das Land keine Flüchtlinge in die EU durchwinkt und dafür sechs Milliarden Euro für deren Versorgung erhält. Geflossen sind davon bisher mehr als vier Milliarden Euro. Erdogan fordert mehr Geld, die EU will ihre Außengrenze dicht halten. Also wird es auf eine Verlängerung des Deals hinauslaufen.
[Both {Turkey and the EU} need each other, including on the refugee issue. The President of the Commission mentioned this as one of the four topics discussed in an initial discussion with Erdogan. topics "in which both can benefit from enhanced cooperation".
In 2016, the EU struck a deal with Turkey under which the country will not to wave refugees through into the EU and receives six billion euros for its trouble. More than four billion euros have been spent so far. Erdogan is demanding more money, the EU wants to keep its external border close. So it will result in an extension of the deal.] {my translation}
The agreement with Turkey was established in early 2016, and it gives Turkey the ability to pressure European governments by threatening to send more refugees north. As of last September, there were some 3.6 million refugees in Turkey. (UNHCR Turkey - Fact Sheet September 2020 22.09.2020) As Robin Alexander reported in his 2018 book, "Erdoğan nutzt seinen Machtzuwachs und sein Erpressungspotenzial gegenüber der EU dazu, die Demonrage der jahrzehntelang gewachsenen Demokratie in der Türkei zu beschleunigen." ("Erdoğan is using his increased power and his blackmail potential against the EU to accelerate the dismantling of Turkey's democracy, which has been growing for decades.") He threatened the EU just over a year ago with sending a large number of refugees north toward Europe. (Turkey says millions of migrants may head to EU BBC News 03/02/2020)
The EU has had five years now to work on reducing this threat, which is basically only seen as a threat because of xenophobic and Islamophobic sentiments in various EU countries that way too many EU leaders would rather duck that deal with them straightforwardly. An EU burden-sharing agreement to absorb a significant number of those refugees could have steadily reduced that particular blackmail potential. And would have been a decent thing to do. A concerted effort during that time to reduce European arms sales to warring parties in Libya and the Middle East would have also been very helpful.
All this compromises the EU's human rights position considerably. Turkey has used some of the Syrian refugees to carry out an ethnic cleansing operation in formerly Kurdish areas it gained military control over in northern Syria, moving out Kurds and repopulating those areas with non-Kurdish Syrian refugees. The 2016 deal makes the EU at least passively complicit in that kind of operation.
And whether the issues are human rights or democratic governance or Turkish foreign policy mischief, the current refugee situation gives Turkey a big addition of diplomatic clout. Erdoğan knows it, and EU leaders know it. In Germany and Austria, rightwing politicians like to bitch and moan about Turkish funding of mosques that my promote jihadism and worries that Turkey tries to inappropriately manipulate the considerable Turkish minorities in those countries in service of Turkish foreign policy. Whatever real concerns there may be on that score - and my impression is that those are relatively limited - those are legitimate concerns. But, for better or worse, Germany and Austria are significantly constrained in taking action on such perceived threats because of Turkey's refugee club.
So it's not surprising to see Wolfgang Münchau's Eurointelligence blog expressing low expectations and a bit of disgust at the EU's current situation with Turkey (Beware of photo-ops with Erdogan 04/07/2021):
They had to have the photo op with Recep Tayyip Erdogan, and it turned out to be bad idea, as we predicted. ...He's referring there to this obnoxious symbolic move by Erdoğan, Ursula Von der Leyen snubbed in chair gaffe at EU-Erdoğan talks Guardian News 04/07/2021:
A video clip from the meeting went viral. It showed Charles Michel taking the seat next to Erdogan, forcing Ursula von der Leyen to sit on the sofa opposite the Turkish foreign minister. Symbols speak more than words, especially in countries like Turkey. The same is true for the official photo in which the two EU leaders smiled, while Erdogan looked like he just wanted to get it over and done with. If the EU does not know how speak in images, they are better off keeping meetings behind closed doors.
Erdogan may not be Sergey Lavrov, but his seating arrangements were enough to display the rift between European Council and the Commission, and male dominance over a female leader. The EU's concern over Turkey's exit from the Istanbul Convention on Discrimination and Violence against Women suddenly lost its bite.
Erdoğan pulled a similar stunt when Angela Merkel came to Ankara in 2016 to negotiate the refugee deal.
In the press briefing afterwards, von der Leyen said human rights are non-negotiable and that Turkey should respect the recent rulings of the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) for the release Turkish businessman Osman Kavala and Kurdish politician Selahattin Demirtain. She said the Commission will come up with a proposal for how to support Syrian refugees in Turkey in a show of good will. So goodwill first, non-negotiables after?Hiding under the covers from the refugee challenge has a significant price for the EU, diplomatic as well as financial.
Joe Biden's early positioning with Turkey
US President Joe Biden sent an important diplomatic signal at the time of the recent EU (video) summit by singling out Greek Prime Minister Kyriakos Misotakis as the only one of the Greek heads of government to whom he made a personal call, a significant diplomatic signal early in his administration that he's leaning toward Greece in its current disputes with their fellow NATO member Turkey.
Ekathimerini reports (Biden offers full support to Mitsotakis 03/28/2021):
Washington’s intention to support Athens was reportedly made loud and clear in the telephone call between US President Joe Biden and Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis last Thursday on the occasion of the 200th anniversary of the start of the Greek War of Independence.Biden doesn't have hotel branding deals to worry about for his personal business, so he can take a more Presidential posture in dealings with other countries including Turkey than Trump did. (John Haltiwanger and Sonam Sheth, Trump’s disastrous retreat from Syria raises new questions about his financial interests in Turkey Business Insider 10/18/2019) You can check out photos of Trump Tower Istanbul here.
“If you need anything, call me. I’m here to help,” Biden reportedly told Mitsotakis – an offer which carries added significance given that no one can discount Ankara’s stance in the coming months. At the same time the foundations were laid for Mitsotakis to visit to the White House within the year.
If anything, the phone call reflected the open line of communication between the two capitals, and the US involvement in the region after its resounding absence during the era of Biden’s predecessor Donald Trump, during which time Ankara challenged Greece’s sovereign rights, not least with its Oruc Reis research vessel conducting surveys over several months last year.
Biden also doesn't seem to share Trump's particular fondness for leaders like who strike authoritarian tough-guy postures.
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