EU summit positions on Russia, Hungary, and Turkey

The Munich Süddeutsche Zeitung reports on the recently concluded summit of the EU heads of government in Ein Flop zum Schluss (Björn Finke and Matthias Kolb, 28.06.2021) Relations with Russia and Turkey were issues highlighted in the summit, as was a new human rights issue in member state Hungary.

There was some diplomatic Kabuki theater over proposals to have a formal EU summit with Russia. Poland and the Baltic states of Estonia and Latvia and Lithuania all opposed the initiative, which was presented as a joint proposal of German Chancellor Angela Merkel and French President Immanuel Macron. On the face of it, it’s a dispute about whether such a summit would somehow reward Russia for misconduct. Lithuanian Prime Minister Krisjanis Karins said Russia would have to “pay a price” for such a summit.

Finke and Kolb interpret that, presumably following official guidance, as meaning, “Erst müsse Putin seine Politik des Spaltens, der Cyberangriffe und Desinformationskampagnen beenden, dann wird mal geschaut.” ("First, Putin has to end his policy of divisions, cyber attacks and disinformation campaigns, then we'll see.") This is a standard thing in diplomacy. Of course, in the grand scheme of things, countries need to talk especially about things on which they disagree. So, “you concede all these things first and then we’ll consider talking to you,” is diplomatic signaling. Since Merkel and Macron from the two strongest powers in the EU are making the proposal, they can now say to the Russians and to their publics, look, we’d like to do this but these former countries from “the eastern bloc” won’t go along.

There was also some additional Kabuki around the anti-LGBTI law that Viktor Orbán’s authoritarian Hungary just passed. My impression is that the law is likely to be overturned by an EU court action against it. Mark Rutte of the Netherlands and António Costa of Portugal asked Orbán if Hungary wanted to pass such a law obviously departing from minimum EU human rights standards, why they didn’t just leave the EU. But Hungary is not going to do that, because its economy is so heavily integrated into the EU’s and because it is a net beneficiary from EU financial assistance.

This is part of a wider EU pushback on Hungary’s violations of the Union’s minimal standards for democracy and the rule of law. For better or worse, economic requirements are more easily enforced under the EU treaties on a recalcitrant member state that standards for democracy and the rule of law (outside of the trade-related ones).

Finke's and Kolb's report also describe how central the refuee agreement of 2016 with Turkey is to EU-Turkish relations. Turkish President Tayyip Erdoğan has caused problems for fellow NATO and EU members by dubious military interventions interventions in Libya, Syria, and Nagorno-Karabakh and disputes over maritime territorial rights with Greece. But the refugee agreement, which in some ways was a constructive model, is the way the EU "solved" the immediate refugee crisis of 2015-16. The EU adopted a kick-the-can-down-the-road approach to taking further substantial steps to better deal with a similar crisis. In other words, it still hasn't come up with one.

This gives Turkey a lot of clout in tempering EU criticism, whether its foreign policy, human rights concerns, or security question about the Turkish government's interactions with Turkish political and religious groups in the EU.

Erstaunlich kurz verläuft die Debatte über die Türkei. Der Gipfel stimmt dem Vorschlag der EU-Kommission zu, der Türkei bei einem bis 2024 verlängerten Migrationsabkommen 3,5 Milliarden Euro für die Unterbringung von etwa 3,7 Millionen syrischen Flüchtlingen zu zahlen. Das Geld würde aus dem Budget ihrer Behörde kommen, sagt von der Leyen. Auch wenn in der Abschlusserklärung weiter Defizite der Türkei bei Rechtsstaat und Demokratie beklagt und der Beginn formeller Verhandlungen zur Lösung der Zypernfrage verlangt werden, sollen nun "auf fachlicher Ebene" Vorbereitungen für die Modernisierung der Zollunion beginnen.

Wie sich die Stimmung verändert hat, beweist die Pressekonferenz des französischen Präsidenten. Die Spannungen hätten abgenommen und auch wenn er Griechen und Zyprern verspricht, den Sommer über weiter wachsam zu sein, sagt Macron in Richtung Ankara: "Wir werden auch die Zusammenarbeit wiederaufnehmen." So ein Satz von Macron, der dem türkischen Präsidenten Recep Tayyip Erdoğan in inniger Feindschaft verbunden schien, ist auch etwas, was man sich in Brüssel vor Monaten nicht vorstellen konnte.

[The debate on Turkey was surprisingly short. The summit agrees with the EU Commission's proposal to pay Turkey 3.5 billion euros for the accommodation of around 3.7 million Syrian refugees under a migration [sic] agreement extended until 2024. The money would come from her agency's budget, [EU Commission President Ursula] von der Leyen says. Even though the final declaration continues to complain about Turkey's shortcomings in the rule of law and democracy and calls for the start of formal negotiations to resolve the Cyprus question, preparations for the modernization of the customs union are now to begin "on a technical level."

How the mood has changed is demonstrated by the press conference of the French President. Tensions have eased and even though he promises Greeks and Cypriots that he will continue to be vigilant throughout the summer, Macron says to Ankara: "We will also resume cooperation." Such a sentence by Macron, who seemed to be intimately attached to Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, is also something that could not have been imagined in Brussels months ago.] (my translation)

Lessons from the 2020 Armenia-Azerbaijan military clashes

Annelle Sheline wrote about the recent conclusion of the conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia over the Nagorno-Karabakh enclave controlled by Armenia along with other Azerbaijani territory in What’s next after the Azerbaijan-Armenia ceasefire? Responsible Statecraft 11/19/2020:

Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Russia just signed a peace deal to end six weeks of war over the disputed region of Nagorno-Karabakh. The deal represents a victory for Azerbaijan, which used its superior military strength to retake territory that Armenian forces had held since a Russian-brokered ceasefire ended the most recent war in 1994.

In response to the peace deal, anguished Armenians stormed their parliament building in Yerevan, while jubilant Azerbaijanis celebrated in Baku and around the country. On Sunday [Nov. 15], Azerbaijan captured the religiously significant city of Shusha, (known as Shushi to Armenians), and was prepared to advance further, until Armenia sued for peace. Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan described the peace deal as “incredibly painful” but agreed to it in order to prevent the inexorable advance of Azerbaijan’s forces northward towards Nagorno-Karabakh’s capital, Stepanakert.

This is an intriguing analysis. A more cautious stance to influencing the "near abroad“ (see Wladimir Frolow's argument below) would seem to be consistent with Russia's position in the latest Armenian-Azerbaijan conflict, where Russia seemed to tilt away from its alignment with Armenia.

The conflict was framed by some as a contest between Turkey and Russia, using Azerbaijan and Armenia as their respective proxies. However, the outcome does not represent a loss for Russia. Brokering the ceasefire and sending in troops reinforces Russia’s prestige as the region’s most powerful actor.

Although Russia has a mutual defense pact with Armenia, and a military base near Armenia’s border with Turkey, Russia’s willingness to sell Azerbaijan ammunitions, specifically BM30 “Smerch” (Tornado) missiles, contributed to Azerbaijan’s military advantage. Furthermore, Moscow was surprised by Armenia’s “Velvet Revolution” that overthrew Armenia’s former prime minister and president Serzh Sagsyan in 2018. Putin’s emphasis on Russia’s good relations with Azerbaijan may have reflected his desire to punish Armenia’s democratically elected Prime Minister Pashinyan. Armenia’s loss will reinforce and likely deepen its dependence on Russia.

Wladimir Frolow argues in the conservative Neue Zürcher Zeitung, Abschied vom «Russki Mir»? – Über eine mögliche strategische Wende in der russischen Aussenpolitik 17.11.2020 that the outcome is one of several signs that Russia is shifting to a less risky policy in relation to nearby countries it considers its "near abroad":

Solch grandiose Ideen existieren zwar in den Talkshows der Staatssender, aber diejenigen, die die russische Politik in den Regionen machen, bedienen sich viel realistischerer Narrative. Denn es herrscht die Meinung, dass der Traum von der russischen Dominanz im postsowjetischen Raum zwar eine gute Sache sei, aber der Preis für seine Verwirklichung viel zu hoch; de facto kann er nur in Ausnahmeszenarien realisiert werden – im Falle, dass existenzielle Staatsinteressen bedroht sind. In den meisten Fällen aber, und insbesondere dort, wo es keine gemeinsame Grenze mit Russland gibt, ist die postsowjetische Dominanz eher ein Luxus als ein Vehikel für nationale Entwicklungsziele.

[Such grandiose ideas [about a more dominant role for Russia over its neighbor] exist in the state broadcaster's talk shows, but Russian politics in the regions uses much more realistic narrative. For there is a prevailing view that the dream of Russian dominance in the post-Soviet area is a good thing, but the price of its realization is far too high; de facto, it can only be realized in exceptional scenarios – in the event that existential state interests are threatened. In most cases, however, and especially where there is no common border with Russia, post-Soviet dominance is a luxury rather than a vehicle for national development goals.] [my translation]

Svante Cornell took a look back at the conflict just before the ceasefire was concluded(How Did Armenia So Badly Miscalculate Its War with Azerbaijan? The National Interest 11/14/2020)

One of the notable outcomes of the conflict is that Russia, which has closer ties to Armenia, essentially pushed them into a settlement that forced them to make significant concessions, of course after the military of Azerbaijan had seized the territory. The dispute is a long way from fully settled. The international community recognizes the disputed territory as rightly belonging to Azerbaijan. Cornell's articles gives additional background on that status.

He sees the results as showing "four grave miscalculations on the part of Armenian leaders." The first of those is that "the rhetoric of 'liberated territories' [Ayerbaijani territory occupied by Armenia] reflects a deliberate attempt to take advantage of the weakening of international law and institutions."

Second, and perhaps more importantly, Armenia failed to internalize the fact that it could not take Russian support for granted. Russian influence over Armenia had grown so strong that Vladimir Putin saw little risk in also courting [Ayerbaijan's] Ilham Aliyev and working to draw Azerbaijan into the Russian orbit. Students of Russian strategy had long understood that the Kremlin viewed its influence on Armenia as a lever to achieve influence over Georgia and Azerbaijan, both of which carry much greater geopolitical significance. Several years ago, Moscow began selling large amounts of weaponry to Azerbaijan. Baku [Azerbaijan] certainly paid higher prices than Yerevan [Armenia], but this move should have caused Armenian leaders to fundamentally question their strategy of dependence on Russia, as Russia also worked hard to entice Baku to join Russian-led organizations like the Eurasian Economic Union. But no such rethink happened in Yerevan, even after Russia failed to intervene during the 2016 flare up [between Armenia and Azerbaijan]. [my emphasis]

Cornell observes that "Armenian leaders may have fundamentally failed to see that Russia, for all its bluster, is a declining power globally as well as regionally." (my emphasis)

He sees the third big miscalculation as seriously underestimating Turkey's willingness to intervene on Azerbaijan's side, even though there were strong signals. "For Armenia, the fact that Turkish drones outsmarted Russian air defenses, at least in the Libyan case, should have led to considerable alarm and signaled the need for great caution."

And fourth:

Finally, Armenian leaders failed to grasp the recent internal transformation of Azerbaijan. For many years, Ilham Aliyev was hamstrung by the presence of various oligarchs around him. But in the past several years, Azerbaijan’s leader has embarked on a far-reaching purge seeking to make the state more efficient. Aliyev was liberating himself from the shackles of the regime he took over from his father seventeen years ago. Armenian leaders appear not to have understood that Aliyev’s more assertive approach would affect Azerbaijan’s most pressing problem, the unresolved conflict over and the occupation of Azerbaijani territories, although Aliyev had many times signaled his great frustration over this situation. [my emphasis]

Nagorno-Karabakh: a new peace deal goes into effect

Jack Losh and Andrew Roth report on a new peace deal just announced between Armeani and Azerbaijan, Nagorno-Karabakh peace deal brokered by Moscow prompts anger in Armenia Guardian 11/10/2020:

The truce, announced late on Monday night, calls for the deployment of nearly 2,000 Russian peacekeepers to the disputed enclave, where Azerbaijan will receive significant territorial concessions from an Armenian-backed local government.

The ceasefire may end a six-week war in which Azerbaijan launched its largest offensive in a generation to retake Nagorno-Karabakh and surrounding regions under Armenian control. Since fighting began in late September, thousands have been killed and more than 100,000 displaced in the worst fighting since the early 1990s.

The agreement confirmed the influence of Russia and Turkey in the region, while sidelining western powers. Russia on Tuesday denied that Turkish peacekeepers would be allowed to deploy to Nagorno-Karabakh despite claims that they would by Azerbaijan’s president, Ilham Aliyev.

They turned to someone associated with Joe Biden's team for a comment. "Michael Carpenter, an adviser to the US president-elect, Joe Biden, described the deal as a geopolitical victory for Vladimir Putin."

The deal involves Russian peacekeepers to enforce new demarcation lines, "establishing Russia’s role as peacemaker in the region for the foreseeable future." But it's not clear that this is the victory to which Carpenter was referring. Although the disputed region belongs to Azerbaijan in international law, Russia has been more aligned with Armenia is this dispute. And this agreement concedes part of the disputed area to Azerbaijan.

Al Jazeera English reports on the new deal, Nagorno-Karabakh agreement: Azeris celebrate after peace deal 11/10/2020:

This is an early report on the deal from Euronews, Nagorno-Karabakh truce: Armenia, Azerbaijan & Russia sign peace deal over disputed enclave 11/10/2020:

BBC News provides this report, with maps, Nagorno-Karabakh: Russia deploys peacekeeping troops to region 11/10/2020. It notes, "The enclave [Nagorno-Karabakh] is internationally recognised as Azerbaijani but has been run by ethnic Armenians since 1994."

Andrew Roth and Michael Safi report on how various external powers are affected by the arrangement of a peace deal in Nagorno-Karabakh peace deal reshapes regional geopolitics Guardian 11/10/2020

Joshua Kucera wrote in In Nagorno-Karabakh, the Cycle of Ethnic Cleansing Continues Guardian 11/09/2020 about the emerging stakes in the war. He describes the legacy of the war of the early 1990s that was ended by a 1994 ceasefire this way:

The roots of the current fighting lie the ethnic cleansing that took place as a result of that first war. Then, as the Soviet Union was collapsing, Armenians sought to take control of Nagorno-Karabakh, a majority-Armenian enclave within the borders of Azerbaijan, then a fellow Soviet republic. Azerbaijanis resisted, and ethnic tensions spiked. Ethnic Armenians living in Azerbaijan were targeted by pogroms, and hundreds of thousands of Armenians fled Azerbaijan, as did Azerbaijanis who had been living in Armenia. In the war that ensued, Armenians managed to take control not only of Nagorno-Karabakh, but of large parts of Azerbaijani territory surrounding it that had previously had a negligible Armenian population. More than 600,000 ethnic Azerbaijanis were forced to flee their homes.

This is how he describes the emerging situation just prior to the new agreement:

Now that Azerbaijan has launched this offensive, with the aim of taking back at least some of its lost territories, Armenians’ worst fears have been realized. The way that Azerbaijan has been conducting the war has only confirmed Armenians’ fears that they now face a real threat of ethnic cleansing.

Azerbaijani forces have been indiscriminately bombarding Stepanakert, the de facto capital of Nagorno-Karabakh with a population of about 55,000, including with cluster bombs. (Armenia also has been documented as using cluster bombs.) They bombed a historic church. Tens of thousands of people have already fled Nagorno-Karabakh.

Azerbaijani forces have just retaken Shusha, the center of Azerbaijani history in Nagorno-Karabakh. They now have a clear firing line onto nearby, downhill Stepanakert. The last remaining journalists have been evacuated from Stepanakert, but as they were leaving they documented thousands more fleeing the city ahead of an expected Azerbaijani assault. It seems likely that the entire Armenian population may flee, and that the territory will again be ethnically cleansed.

Armenia and Azerbaijan

They aren't yet calling it a war. But Armenia and Azerbaijan in the Caucasus region have been engaging in armed conflict with each other recently over the disputed territory of Nagorno-Karabakh. Nagorno-Karabakh is legally part of Azerbaijan but has been controlled by Armenia since 1994, though Armenia has not formally annexed it.

Source: Google Maps (Captions in red added by me)

Source: Wikipedia

Politico EU has a backgrounder on the conflict: Zia Weise et al, The Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict explained 10/02/2020. Both Armenia and Azerbaijan were parts of the Russian Empire. Under the USSR, Armenia and Azerbaijan became Soviet republics, and the Nagorno-Karabkh territory was assigned to majority-Muslim Azerbaijan, though the area was mostly populated by Christian Armenians.

As Politico reports, some outside powers are very interested in the conflict:

The ongoing fighting has left more than 100 people dead — the most serious escalation in years.

The two former Soviet states have clashed over Nagorno-Karabakh, an Armenian-controlled enclave internationally recognized as part of Azerbaijan, for three decades. But the conflict is more than a Cold War-era relic. Both sides enjoy the support of powerful backers and with the South Caucasus occupying a strategic position in the global energy market, the fighting between Armenia and Azerbaijan could end up reverberating beyond the region. ...

The Nagorno-Karabakh clashes have the potential to draw in larger powers — in particular Russia and NATO member Turkey, two countries that already support opposing sides in Syria and Libya.

Turkey has long been a staunch supporter of Azerbaijan: Ankara and Baku share close cultural ties, given their shared Turkic heritage. Meanwhile, Turkey and Armenia have a long history of tensions, exacerbated by Ankara's refusal to recognize the 1915 Armenian genocide as well as the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. The latter prompted Turkey to seal its border with Armenia in 1993, which has remained shut ever since. The two countries do not have diplomatic relations.

Russia plays a more ambiguous role in the region, maintaining close economic ties with Armenia and Azerbaijan and supplying weapons to both. Its relationship with Yerevan is deeper, however — Armenia hosts a Russian military base and is part of the Moscow-led Eurasian Economic Union. [my emphasis]

Putin's government sees Armenia and Azerbaijan as part of its own "near abroad," which it sees aa a legitimate Russian sphere of influence.

The Guardian is reporting that Turkey is sending Syrian fighters to Azerbaijan to participate in the conflict with Armenia. Bethan McKernan in Istanbul, (Syrian recruit describes role of foreign fighters in Nagorno-Karabakh 10/02/2020)

The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) its through its Minsk Group chaired by Russia, France, and the EU "has tried and failed to bring a resolution to the conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh after the cease-fire in the region in 1994." (Politico) The co-chairs on September 27 called for an immediate cease-fire. But tensions are still escalating. Aljazeera reports (Nagorno-Karabakh: Fresh fighting erupts dashing ceasefire efforts 10/03/2020):

On Friday, Armenia’s foreign ministry said it was prepared to work with international mediators France, Russia and the United States to reach a ceasefire with Azerbaijan. While the three countries called for an end to hostilities, Turkey has staunchly supported its ally Azerbaijan and has repeated that what it called Armenian “occupiers” must withdraw.

“Superficial demands for an immediate end to hostilities and a permanent ceasefire will not be useful this time,” Mevlut Cavusoglu, Turkey’s foreign minister, was quoted as saying by Turkish state-run Anadolu news agency.

Both Azerbaijan and Turkey have repeatedly denied the involvement of Turkish forces in the fighting, as well as assertions by Armenia, Russia and France that Syrian rebels are fighting on the Azeri side.

BBC News reports, Avoiding war in the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict 10/02/2020:

James Palmer also has a background piece in Foreign Policy, Why Are Armenia and Azerbaijan Heading to War? 09/28/2020:

In order to keep a stronger position in negotiations and avoid allegations of aggression, Armenia has maintained Nagorno-Karabakh as a nominally independent republic rather than incorporating it into its own territory. Barely anyone recognizes the puppet state, officially called the Republic of Artsakh. Both the United States and Russia have played a significant role in the long-running but largely futile attempts at finding a permanent resolution to the issue. On the U.S. side, Armenian Americans are a moderately influential lobbying group, but Azerbaijan has invested heavily in ties with U.S. oil companies.

In theory, the two sides agreed the Madrid Principles in the mid-2000s: Armenia gives up the periphery of territory it occupies around Nagorno-Karabakh itself, displaced peoples return to their homes, both countries and outside powers guarantee the rights of the residents of the disputed region, and eventually the status of the territory is resolved. But Armenia has no desire to give up its de facto control, and Azerbaijan has no incentive to relinquish its claim—especially as nationalism plays a critical role in keeping leaders in power in both countries, where both publics heavily oppose compromise. It’s not the only frozen conflict in the region, where the Soviet collapse has left behind many disputed territories. [my emphasis]