Lessons from the 2020 Armenia-Azerbaijan military clashes

Annelle Sheline wrote about the recent conclusion of the conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia over the Nagorno-Karabakh enclave controlled by Armenia along with other Azerbaijani territory in What’s next after the Azerbaijan-Armenia ceasefire? Responsible Statecraft 11/19/2020:

Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Russia just signed a peace deal to end six weeks of war over the disputed region of Nagorno-Karabakh. The deal represents a victory for Azerbaijan, which used its superior military strength to retake territory that Armenian forces had held since a Russian-brokered ceasefire ended the most recent war in 1994.

In response to the peace deal, anguished Armenians stormed their parliament building in Yerevan, while jubilant Azerbaijanis celebrated in Baku and around the country. On Sunday [Nov. 15], Azerbaijan captured the religiously significant city of Shusha, (known as Shushi to Armenians), and was prepared to advance further, until Armenia sued for peace. Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan described the peace deal as “incredibly painful” but agreed to it in order to prevent the inexorable advance of Azerbaijan’s forces northward towards Nagorno-Karabakh’s capital, Stepanakert.

This is an intriguing analysis. A more cautious stance to influencing the "near abroad“ (see Wladimir Frolow's argument below) would seem to be consistent with Russia's position in the latest Armenian-Azerbaijan conflict, where Russia seemed to tilt away from its alignment with Armenia.

The conflict was framed by some as a contest between Turkey and Russia, using Azerbaijan and Armenia as their respective proxies. However, the outcome does not represent a loss for Russia. Brokering the ceasefire and sending in troops reinforces Russia’s prestige as the region’s most powerful actor.

Although Russia has a mutual defense pact with Armenia, and a military base near Armenia’s border with Turkey, Russia’s willingness to sell Azerbaijan ammunitions, specifically BM30 “Smerch” (Tornado) missiles, contributed to Azerbaijan’s military advantage. Furthermore, Moscow was surprised by Armenia’s “Velvet Revolution” that overthrew Armenia’s former prime minister and president Serzh Sagsyan in 2018. Putin’s emphasis on Russia’s good relations with Azerbaijan may have reflected his desire to punish Armenia’s democratically elected Prime Minister Pashinyan. Armenia’s loss will reinforce and likely deepen its dependence on Russia.

Wladimir Frolow argues in the conservative Neue Zürcher Zeitung, Abschied vom «Russki Mir»? – Über eine mögliche strategische Wende in der russischen Aussenpolitik 17.11.2020 that the outcome is one of several signs that Russia is shifting to a less risky policy in relation to nearby countries it considers its "near abroad":

Solch grandiose Ideen existieren zwar in den Talkshows der Staatssender, aber diejenigen, die die russische Politik in den Regionen machen, bedienen sich viel realistischerer Narrative. Denn es herrscht die Meinung, dass der Traum von der russischen Dominanz im postsowjetischen Raum zwar eine gute Sache sei, aber der Preis für seine Verwirklichung viel zu hoch; de facto kann er nur in Ausnahmeszenarien realisiert werden – im Falle, dass existenzielle Staatsinteressen bedroht sind. In den meisten Fällen aber, und insbesondere dort, wo es keine gemeinsame Grenze mit Russland gibt, ist die postsowjetische Dominanz eher ein Luxus als ein Vehikel für nationale Entwicklungsziele.

[Such grandiose ideas [about a more dominant role for Russia over its neighbor] exist in the state broadcaster's talk shows, but Russian politics in the regions uses much more realistic narrative. For there is a prevailing view that the dream of Russian dominance in the post-Soviet area is a good thing, but the price of its realization is far too high; de facto, it can only be realized in exceptional scenarios – in the event that existential state interests are threatened. In most cases, however, and especially where there is no common border with Russia, post-Soviet dominance is a luxury rather than a vehicle for national development goals.] [my translation]

Svante Cornell took a look back at the conflict just before the ceasefire was concluded(How Did Armenia So Badly Miscalculate Its War with Azerbaijan? The National Interest 11/14/2020)

One of the notable outcomes of the conflict is that Russia, which has closer ties to Armenia, essentially pushed them into a settlement that forced them to make significant concessions, of course after the military of Azerbaijan had seized the territory. The dispute is a long way from fully settled. The international community recognizes the disputed territory as rightly belonging to Azerbaijan. Cornell's articles gives additional background on that status.

He sees the results as showing "four grave miscalculations on the part of Armenian leaders." The first of those is that "the rhetoric of 'liberated territories' [Ayerbaijani territory occupied by Armenia] reflects a deliberate attempt to take advantage of the weakening of international law and institutions."

Second, and perhaps more importantly, Armenia failed to internalize the fact that it could not take Russian support for granted. Russian influence over Armenia had grown so strong that Vladimir Putin saw little risk in also courting [Ayerbaijan's] Ilham Aliyev and working to draw Azerbaijan into the Russian orbit. Students of Russian strategy had long understood that the Kremlin viewed its influence on Armenia as a lever to achieve influence over Georgia and Azerbaijan, both of which carry much greater geopolitical significance. Several years ago, Moscow began selling large amounts of weaponry to Azerbaijan. Baku [Azerbaijan] certainly paid higher prices than Yerevan [Armenia], but this move should have caused Armenian leaders to fundamentally question their strategy of dependence on Russia, as Russia also worked hard to entice Baku to join Russian-led organizations like the Eurasian Economic Union. But no such rethink happened in Yerevan, even after Russia failed to intervene during the 2016 flare up [between Armenia and Azerbaijan]. [my emphasis]

Cornell observes that "Armenian leaders may have fundamentally failed to see that Russia, for all its bluster, is a declining power globally as well as regionally." (my emphasis)

He sees the third big miscalculation as seriously underestimating Turkey's willingness to intervene on Azerbaijan's side, even though there were strong signals. "For Armenia, the fact that Turkish drones outsmarted Russian air defenses, at least in the Libyan case, should have led to considerable alarm and signaled the need for great caution."

And fourth:

Finally, Armenian leaders failed to grasp the recent internal transformation of Azerbaijan. For many years, Ilham Aliyev was hamstrung by the presence of various oligarchs around him. But in the past several years, Azerbaijan’s leader has embarked on a far-reaching purge seeking to make the state more efficient. Aliyev was liberating himself from the shackles of the regime he took over from his father seventeen years ago. Armenian leaders appear not to have understood that Aliyev’s more assertive approach would affect Azerbaijan’s most pressing problem, the unresolved conflict over and the occupation of Azerbaijani territories, although Aliyev had many times signaled his great frustration over this situation. [my emphasis]