Biden and the Armeania Genocide

President Joe Biden has made an important statement about the Armenian genocide. Daniel Politi reports (President to Formally Recognize Armenian Genocide Slate 04/24/2021):

President Joe Biden became the first commander in chief to officially recognize that the 1915 massacre of Armenians by the Ottoman Empire was a genocide, in a move that fulfilled a campaign promise and illustrated how Washington isn’t as worried as it once was about angering Turkey. ...

President Donald Trump and his predecessors had largely chosen to dance around the issue in order to avoid angering Turkey. The closest a U.S. president had come to this kind of statement was Ronald Reagan, who referred to the “genocide of the Armenians” in passing In a 1981 statement on the Holocaust but that was not followed up by a formal recognition. George W. Bush had vowed to recognize the genocide during the 2000 presidential campaign but didn’t end up following through as Turkey ended up becoming a key ally in the Iraq invasion. Barack Obama also said he would recognize the genocide during the 2008 presidential campaign but never ended up doing it during the eight years he was commander in chief. [my emphasis]

Aljazeera's Inside Story has this report and analysis, Is the US-Turkey relationship at risk of falling apart? 04/25/2021:

Nicholas Danforth of the Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy in the Inside Story discussion notes that US relations with Turkey are at a relatively low level at the moment, which removed some of the risks previous Presidents say in explicitly using "genocide" to describe the mass expulsion and systemic killings of Armenian civilians by the Ottoman Empire.

The Britannica Online article on the Armenian Genocide (Ronald Grigor Suny, 05/19/2020 version) describes it this way:

In January 1915 [Turkish leader] Enver Paşa attempted to push back the Russians at the battle of Sarıkamış, only to suffer the worst Ottoman defeat of the war. Although poor generalship and harsh conditions were the main reasons for the loss, the Young Turk government sought to shift the blame to Armenian treachery. Armenian soldiers and other non-Muslims in the army were demobilized and transferred into labour battalions. The disarmed Armenian soldiers were then systematically murdered by Ottoman troops, the first victims of what would become genocide. About the same time, irregular forces began to carry out mass killings in Armenian villages near the Russian border. ...

Armenian resistance, when it occurred, provided the authorities with a pretext for employing harsher measures. In April 1915 Armenians in Van barricaded themselves in the city’s Armenian neighborhood and fought back against Ottoman troops, On April 24, 1915, citing Van and several other episodes of Armenian resistance, Talat Paşa ordered the arrest of approximately 250 Armenian intellectuals and politicians in Istanbul, including several deputies to the Ottoman Parliament. Most of the men who were arrested were killed in the months that followed.

Soon after the defeat at Sarıkamış, the Ottoman government began to deport Armenians from Eastern Anatolia on the grounds that their presence near the front lines posed a threat to national security. In May the Ottoman Parliament passed legislation formally authorizing the deportation. Throughout summer and autumn of 1915, Armenian civilians were removed from their homes and marched through the valleys and mountains of Eastern Anatolia toward desert concentration camps. The deportation, which was overseen by civil and military officials, was accompanied by a systematic campaign of mass murder carried out by irregular forces as well as by local Kurds and Circassians. Survivors who reached the deserts of Syria languished in concentration camps, many starved to death, and massacres continued into 1916. Conservative estimates have calculated that some 600,000 to more than 1,000,000 Armenians were slaughtered or died on the marches. The events of 1915–16 were witnessed by a number of foreign journalists, missionaries, diplomats, and military officers who sent reports home about death marches and killing fields. [my emphasis]

Donald Bloxham provided the following description in The Armenian Genocide of 1915-1916 Past & Present 181: 2003 (Nov 2003):

From late summer 1914, Armenian settlements on either side of the Ottoman borders with Persia and the Caucasus were plundered by Ottoman forces, and the Armenian menfolk were killed. From 24 April 1915, prominent members of the Ottoman Armenian community were incarcerated en masse in Constantinople. From late March to late May, arrests and limited deportations from Armenian communities were also conducted in the Cilicia region to the south-east, around the Gulf of Alexandretta. Thereafter, in a wave spreading westwards and southwards throughout the empire from the provinces of eastern Anatolia - the areas of heaviest Armenian population – the Turkish government, led by the Ittihad ve Terakki Cemiyeti (Committee of Union and Progress: CUP), implemented an increasingly radical programme of deportation and murder.

Communal leaders and civilian men were incarcerated and/or murdered outright. The women, children and elderly were forced to emigrate to the southern desert regions, in modem-day Syria and Iraq, and along the way their numbers were decimated by depredations - rape, kidnap, mutilation, outright killing and death from exposure, starvation and thirst - at the hands of gendarmes and soldiers, irregulars, and Muslim tribespeople. Many surviving this process then perished from privation or disease in desert concentration centres, where they were left without provision and, in mid 1916, subjected to a further spate of massacres. A total of at least one million Armenians died, more than two-thirds of those deported. Many of the kidnapped, some of the other surviving women, and an indeterminate number of orphans were forcibly converted to Islam - in total 5 to 10 per cent of the Ottoman Armenians. Up to 400,000 survived the First World War within the empire, with a particular concentration in Constantinople, from which there were only selective deportations of the leadership and provincial sojourners. [my emphasis]

Turkey has had numerous tensions with its NATO allies in recent years, particularly as President Tayyip Erdoğan has he has become more of an authoritarian ruler. Recent tensions have involved conflicts with Greece over territorial waters, interventions in Syria and Libya, refugees, human rights issues, and performative arrogance. Turkey has provided assistance to Ukraine in its on-going standoff with Russia. But Russian arms sales to Turkey have also raised serious concerns in NATO.

Turkey also supported Azerbaijan in its conflict last year with Armenia. Armenia has been closer to Russia diplomatically than Azerbaijan. But Russia's position on last year's conflict wasn't entirely supportive of Armenia, either.

There is no Biden Tower in Turkey. So he is presumably more willing to consider a wider variety of policy options with Turkey than the Former Guy did.

Despite official Turkish claims that the death toll as recounted in those two sources is far too high, there's no real disagreement among actual genocide scholars and historians about the basic factual picture of what happened.

And regardless of how exactly it fits in with overall US policy toward Turkey, it's a good thing that Biden made that statement. The official text is here, Statement by President Joe Biden on Armenian Remembrance Day White House 04/24/2021.

Lessons from the 2020 Armenia-Azerbaijan military clashes

Annelle Sheline wrote about the recent conclusion of the conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia over the Nagorno-Karabakh enclave controlled by Armenia along with other Azerbaijani territory in What’s next after the Azerbaijan-Armenia ceasefire? Responsible Statecraft 11/19/2020:

Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Russia just signed a peace deal to end six weeks of war over the disputed region of Nagorno-Karabakh. The deal represents a victory for Azerbaijan, which used its superior military strength to retake territory that Armenian forces had held since a Russian-brokered ceasefire ended the most recent war in 1994.

In response to the peace deal, anguished Armenians stormed their parliament building in Yerevan, while jubilant Azerbaijanis celebrated in Baku and around the country. On Sunday [Nov. 15], Azerbaijan captured the religiously significant city of Shusha, (known as Shushi to Armenians), and was prepared to advance further, until Armenia sued for peace. Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan described the peace deal as “incredibly painful” but agreed to it in order to prevent the inexorable advance of Azerbaijan’s forces northward towards Nagorno-Karabakh’s capital, Stepanakert.

This is an intriguing analysis. A more cautious stance to influencing the "near abroad“ (see Wladimir Frolow's argument below) would seem to be consistent with Russia's position in the latest Armenian-Azerbaijan conflict, where Russia seemed to tilt away from its alignment with Armenia.

The conflict was framed by some as a contest between Turkey and Russia, using Azerbaijan and Armenia as their respective proxies. However, the outcome does not represent a loss for Russia. Brokering the ceasefire and sending in troops reinforces Russia’s prestige as the region’s most powerful actor.

Although Russia has a mutual defense pact with Armenia, and a military base near Armenia’s border with Turkey, Russia’s willingness to sell Azerbaijan ammunitions, specifically BM30 “Smerch” (Tornado) missiles, contributed to Azerbaijan’s military advantage. Furthermore, Moscow was surprised by Armenia’s “Velvet Revolution” that overthrew Armenia’s former prime minister and president Serzh Sagsyan in 2018. Putin’s emphasis on Russia’s good relations with Azerbaijan may have reflected his desire to punish Armenia’s democratically elected Prime Minister Pashinyan. Armenia’s loss will reinforce and likely deepen its dependence on Russia.

Wladimir Frolow argues in the conservative Neue Zürcher Zeitung, Abschied vom «Russki Mir»? – Über eine mögliche strategische Wende in der russischen Aussenpolitik 17.11.2020 that the outcome is one of several signs that Russia is shifting to a less risky policy in relation to nearby countries it considers its "near abroad":

Solch grandiose Ideen existieren zwar in den Talkshows der Staatssender, aber diejenigen, die die russische Politik in den Regionen machen, bedienen sich viel realistischerer Narrative. Denn es herrscht die Meinung, dass der Traum von der russischen Dominanz im postsowjetischen Raum zwar eine gute Sache sei, aber der Preis für seine Verwirklichung viel zu hoch; de facto kann er nur in Ausnahmeszenarien realisiert werden – im Falle, dass existenzielle Staatsinteressen bedroht sind. In den meisten Fällen aber, und insbesondere dort, wo es keine gemeinsame Grenze mit Russland gibt, ist die postsowjetische Dominanz eher ein Luxus als ein Vehikel für nationale Entwicklungsziele.

[Such grandiose ideas [about a more dominant role for Russia over its neighbor] exist in the state broadcaster's talk shows, but Russian politics in the regions uses much more realistic narrative. For there is a prevailing view that the dream of Russian dominance in the post-Soviet area is a good thing, but the price of its realization is far too high; de facto, it can only be realized in exceptional scenarios – in the event that existential state interests are threatened. In most cases, however, and especially where there is no common border with Russia, post-Soviet dominance is a luxury rather than a vehicle for national development goals.] [my translation]

Svante Cornell took a look back at the conflict just before the ceasefire was concluded(How Did Armenia So Badly Miscalculate Its War with Azerbaijan? The National Interest 11/14/2020)

One of the notable outcomes of the conflict is that Russia, which has closer ties to Armenia, essentially pushed them into a settlement that forced them to make significant concessions, of course after the military of Azerbaijan had seized the territory. The dispute is a long way from fully settled. The international community recognizes the disputed territory as rightly belonging to Azerbaijan. Cornell's articles gives additional background on that status.

He sees the results as showing "four grave miscalculations on the part of Armenian leaders." The first of those is that "the rhetoric of 'liberated territories' [Ayerbaijani territory occupied by Armenia] reflects a deliberate attempt to take advantage of the weakening of international law and institutions."

Second, and perhaps more importantly, Armenia failed to internalize the fact that it could not take Russian support for granted. Russian influence over Armenia had grown so strong that Vladimir Putin saw little risk in also courting [Ayerbaijan's] Ilham Aliyev and working to draw Azerbaijan into the Russian orbit. Students of Russian strategy had long understood that the Kremlin viewed its influence on Armenia as a lever to achieve influence over Georgia and Azerbaijan, both of which carry much greater geopolitical significance. Several years ago, Moscow began selling large amounts of weaponry to Azerbaijan. Baku [Azerbaijan] certainly paid higher prices than Yerevan [Armenia], but this move should have caused Armenian leaders to fundamentally question their strategy of dependence on Russia, as Russia also worked hard to entice Baku to join Russian-led organizations like the Eurasian Economic Union. But no such rethink happened in Yerevan, even after Russia failed to intervene during the 2016 flare up [between Armenia and Azerbaijan]. [my emphasis]

Cornell observes that "Armenian leaders may have fundamentally failed to see that Russia, for all its bluster, is a declining power globally as well as regionally." (my emphasis)

He sees the third big miscalculation as seriously underestimating Turkey's willingness to intervene on Azerbaijan's side, even though there were strong signals. "For Armenia, the fact that Turkish drones outsmarted Russian air defenses, at least in the Libyan case, should have led to considerable alarm and signaled the need for great caution."

And fourth:

Finally, Armenian leaders failed to grasp the recent internal transformation of Azerbaijan. For many years, Ilham Aliyev was hamstrung by the presence of various oligarchs around him. But in the past several years, Azerbaijan’s leader has embarked on a far-reaching purge seeking to make the state more efficient. Aliyev was liberating himself from the shackles of the regime he took over from his father seventeen years ago. Armenian leaders appear not to have understood that Aliyev’s more assertive approach would affect Azerbaijan’s most pressing problem, the unresolved conflict over and the occupation of Azerbaijani territories, although Aliyev had many times signaled his great frustration over this situation. [my emphasis]

Nagorno-Karabakh: a new peace deal goes into effect

Jack Losh and Andrew Roth report on a new peace deal just announced between Armeani and Azerbaijan, Nagorno-Karabakh peace deal brokered by Moscow prompts anger in Armenia Guardian 11/10/2020:

The truce, announced late on Monday night, calls for the deployment of nearly 2,000 Russian peacekeepers to the disputed enclave, where Azerbaijan will receive significant territorial concessions from an Armenian-backed local government.

The ceasefire may end a six-week war in which Azerbaijan launched its largest offensive in a generation to retake Nagorno-Karabakh and surrounding regions under Armenian control. Since fighting began in late September, thousands have been killed and more than 100,000 displaced in the worst fighting since the early 1990s.

The agreement confirmed the influence of Russia and Turkey in the region, while sidelining western powers. Russia on Tuesday denied that Turkish peacekeepers would be allowed to deploy to Nagorno-Karabakh despite claims that they would by Azerbaijan’s president, Ilham Aliyev.

They turned to someone associated with Joe Biden's team for a comment. "Michael Carpenter, an adviser to the US president-elect, Joe Biden, described the deal as a geopolitical victory for Vladimir Putin."

The deal involves Russian peacekeepers to enforce new demarcation lines, "establishing Russia’s role as peacemaker in the region for the foreseeable future." But it's not clear that this is the victory to which Carpenter was referring. Although the disputed region belongs to Azerbaijan in international law, Russia has been more aligned with Armenia is this dispute. And this agreement concedes part of the disputed area to Azerbaijan.

Al Jazeera English reports on the new deal, Nagorno-Karabakh agreement: Azeris celebrate after peace deal 11/10/2020:

This is an early report on the deal from Euronews, Nagorno-Karabakh truce: Armenia, Azerbaijan & Russia sign peace deal over disputed enclave 11/10/2020:

BBC News provides this report, with maps, Nagorno-Karabakh: Russia deploys peacekeeping troops to region 11/10/2020. It notes, "The enclave [Nagorno-Karabakh] is internationally recognised as Azerbaijani but has been run by ethnic Armenians since 1994."

Andrew Roth and Michael Safi report on how various external powers are affected by the arrangement of a peace deal in Nagorno-Karabakh peace deal reshapes regional geopolitics Guardian 11/10/2020

Joshua Kucera wrote in In Nagorno-Karabakh, the Cycle of Ethnic Cleansing Continues Guardian 11/09/2020 about the emerging stakes in the war. He describes the legacy of the war of the early 1990s that was ended by a 1994 ceasefire this way:

The roots of the current fighting lie the ethnic cleansing that took place as a result of that first war. Then, as the Soviet Union was collapsing, Armenians sought to take control of Nagorno-Karabakh, a majority-Armenian enclave within the borders of Azerbaijan, then a fellow Soviet republic. Azerbaijanis resisted, and ethnic tensions spiked. Ethnic Armenians living in Azerbaijan were targeted by pogroms, and hundreds of thousands of Armenians fled Azerbaijan, as did Azerbaijanis who had been living in Armenia. In the war that ensued, Armenians managed to take control not only of Nagorno-Karabakh, but of large parts of Azerbaijani territory surrounding it that had previously had a negligible Armenian population. More than 600,000 ethnic Azerbaijanis were forced to flee their homes.

This is how he describes the emerging situation just prior to the new agreement:

Now that Azerbaijan has launched this offensive, with the aim of taking back at least some of its lost territories, Armenians’ worst fears have been realized. The way that Azerbaijan has been conducting the war has only confirmed Armenians’ fears that they now face a real threat of ethnic cleansing.

Azerbaijani forces have been indiscriminately bombarding Stepanakert, the de facto capital of Nagorno-Karabakh with a population of about 55,000, including with cluster bombs. (Armenia also has been documented as using cluster bombs.) They bombed a historic church. Tens of thousands of people have already fled Nagorno-Karabakh.

Azerbaijani forces have just retaken Shusha, the center of Azerbaijani history in Nagorno-Karabakh. They now have a clear firing line onto nearby, downhill Stepanakert. The last remaining journalists have been evacuated from Stepanakert, but as they were leaving they documented thousands more fleeing the city ahead of an expected Azerbaijani assault. It seems likely that the entire Armenian population may flee, and that the territory will again be ethnically cleansed.

Turkey's ambitions and tensions with Europe

Wolfgang Münchau's EuroIntelligence sketches the current challenge that Tayyip Erdoğan's Turkey poses for the EU. Erdogan uses all means to keep Europe disunited and morally compromised 10/16/2020)

"Erdogan uses all means to keep Europe disunited and morally compromised," he writes. His general characterization of Turkey's policy may come off as a bit melodramatic: "Erdogan inspires Turks and Muslims with a vision of a modern empire stretching from Africa through Europe to Asia. You may not see New Turkey on the map, but it is becoming a reality."

But Erdoğan has been undertaking a more active policy in recent years:

Turkey already has a presence in Africa, the Middle East, Europe and Asia. It has military bases in Libya, Azerbaijan, Iraq, Qatar, Syria, Sudan, Somalia, Northern Cyprus and Albania. It is militarily engaged in civil wars in Libya and Syria, and now in Azerbaijan against Armenia. This way Turkey is extending its reach into the Caucasus. Once the Turkish military puts its foot down, it creates realities on the ground. The buffer zone in northern Syria has turned de facto into a Turkish administration zone, with Turkish lira and products circulating. There is no need to change border lines, as unity with Turkey is an everyday experience. [my emphasis]

There are even new complications with Israel, including one the outbreak of the latest military conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan. "Turkey is now blatantly antagonistic toward Israel. There is no reason for Jerusalem to continue to placate it." (Zev Chafets, Israel Must Choose Better in Nagorno-Karabakh Bloomberg Opinion 10/22/2020) But Israel has had good relations with Azerbaijan for a while. Israel gets arms from Azerbaijan and sells them weapons. Also, "The country shares a border with Iran, Israel’s arch enemy. At the very least, that makes Baku an important source for intelligence gathering. There are also reports that it is a potential launching pad for the Israeli air force. That makes Azerbaijan a rare and valuable asset, one that Israel is not going to abandon."

Turkey is currently the country in the world that hosts the largest number of refugees. (Ranking der zehn Länder mit den meisten aufgenommenen anerkannten Flüchtlingen (Stand: Ende 2019) Statista 19.06.2020), 3.6 million as of the end of 2019. Because of the EU's kick-the-can-down-the-road approach to external immigration and especially toward refugees and asylum-seekers, Turkey can use it's refugees as a political club against the EU. As EuroIntelligence recalls:

Erdogan is a master of manipulation and turning arguments upside down. He sent refugees towards the Greek border to remind the EU what they could expect if they crossed his red lines. Turkey has crossed Europe's red lines many times, but there were no consequences. He sends out drilling ships into Greek waters, calls them back just in time for the EU summit, and sends them out again, blaming Greece for not having kept its promises. Who is holding Erdogan accountable for his aggressive acts? Europeans still do not seem to want to see through his tactics. [my emphasis]

Erdoğan plays another cynical game with refugees in Turkey: "Refugees are hostages to his games. They are used as a threat or bargaining chip with the EU. And the men are being trained and sent into his proxy wars in Libya or Azerbaijan." (my emphasis)

As uncomfortable as it may be for EU politicians, the current refugee policy gives Erdoğan leverage that a sensible refugee policy. But, more than five years after the refugee crisis of 2015-16 began, the EU is still sticking with the completely overwhelmed Dublin System for immigration and with Angela Merkel's 2016 arrangement with Turkey to hold refugees in exchange for payments from the EU.

This is one of several ways the EU is experiencing limits on its foreign policy clout that in many ways are self-imposed. In the case of immigration policy, foreign policy deferral to Erdoğan's Turkey is a real part of the price of holding on to the Dublin System. (Jennifer Rankin, Erdoğan puts EU's failure to agree a common migration policy in spotlight Guardian 03/02/2020) Deutsche Welle recently described the situation this way (Seda Serdar, Can the EU-Turkey deal be fixed? ):

Turkey hosts more than 3.5 million refugees, more than any other country in the world. It has so far spent €36.7 billion ($40 billion) on dealing with the refugee crisis. The EU committed €6 billion ($6.5 billion) to help Turkey.

Turkey accuses the EU of making late payments, while the EU alleges that Turkey is not sticking to its end of the deal and loosening security controls on migration routes.

Nevertheless, both sides need each other. The refugee crisis is too big for a single country to cope with on its own — a reality that has led European leaders to signal that financial aid to Turkey could continue beyond the 2016-2019 deal.

Gerald Knaus of the European Stability Initiative (ESI) think tank spoke on the current situation at the Frankfurt Book Fair this month, Der Migrationsforscher Gerald Knaus über sein Buch "Welche Grenzen brauchen wir?" FAZ 10/02/2020:

Knaus notes that the vast majority refugees in Turkey, who are primarily Syrians, mostly seem content to stay in Turkey and don't attempt to move into the EU. The 3.5 million refugees in Turkey are mostly integrated in some way into Turkish society. Most aren't living in overcrowded refugee camps, in other words. And that makes intuitive sense, because many hope to return to Syria at some point and Turkey is a Muslim country. Obviously, there are conflicts, including the hostility of Erdoğan's to Kurdish refugees and the kind of ethnic cleansing which Turkey is enacting in its occupied zone of Syria, displacing Kurds and resettling non-Kurdish Syrians on their land.