EU summit positions on Russia, Hungary, and Turkey

The Munich Süddeutsche Zeitung reports on the recently concluded summit of the EU heads of government in Ein Flop zum Schluss (Björn Finke and Matthias Kolb, 28.06.2021) Relations with Russia and Turkey were issues highlighted in the summit, as was a new human rights issue in member state Hungary.

There was some diplomatic Kabuki theater over proposals to have a formal EU summit with Russia. Poland and the Baltic states of Estonia and Latvia and Lithuania all opposed the initiative, which was presented as a joint proposal of German Chancellor Angela Merkel and French President Immanuel Macron. On the face of it, it’s a dispute about whether such a summit would somehow reward Russia for misconduct. Lithuanian Prime Minister Krisjanis Karins said Russia would have to “pay a price” for such a summit.

Finke and Kolb interpret that, presumably following official guidance, as meaning, “Erst müsse Putin seine Politik des Spaltens, der Cyberangriffe und Desinformationskampagnen beenden, dann wird mal geschaut.” ("First, Putin has to end his policy of divisions, cyber attacks and disinformation campaigns, then we'll see.") This is a standard thing in diplomacy. Of course, in the grand scheme of things, countries need to talk especially about things on which they disagree. So, “you concede all these things first and then we’ll consider talking to you,” is diplomatic signaling. Since Merkel and Macron from the two strongest powers in the EU are making the proposal, they can now say to the Russians and to their publics, look, we’d like to do this but these former countries from “the eastern bloc” won’t go along.

There was also some additional Kabuki around the anti-LGBTI law that Viktor Orbán’s authoritarian Hungary just passed. My impression is that the law is likely to be overturned by an EU court action against it. Mark Rutte of the Netherlands and António Costa of Portugal asked Orbán if Hungary wanted to pass such a law obviously departing from minimum EU human rights standards, why they didn’t just leave the EU. But Hungary is not going to do that, because its economy is so heavily integrated into the EU’s and because it is a net beneficiary from EU financial assistance.

This is part of a wider EU pushback on Hungary’s violations of the Union’s minimal standards for democracy and the rule of law. For better or worse, economic requirements are more easily enforced under the EU treaties on a recalcitrant member state that standards for democracy and the rule of law (outside of the trade-related ones).

Finke's and Kolb's report also describe how central the refuee agreement of 2016 with Turkey is to EU-Turkish relations. Turkish President Tayyip Erdoğan has caused problems for fellow NATO and EU members by dubious military interventions interventions in Libya, Syria, and Nagorno-Karabakh and disputes over maritime territorial rights with Greece. But the refugee agreement, which in some ways was a constructive model, is the way the EU "solved" the immediate refugee crisis of 2015-16. The EU adopted a kick-the-can-down-the-road approach to taking further substantial steps to better deal with a similar crisis. In other words, it still hasn't come up with one.

This gives Turkey a lot of clout in tempering EU criticism, whether its foreign policy, human rights concerns, or security question about the Turkish government's interactions with Turkish political and religious groups in the EU.

Erstaunlich kurz verläuft die Debatte über die Türkei. Der Gipfel stimmt dem Vorschlag der EU-Kommission zu, der Türkei bei einem bis 2024 verlängerten Migrationsabkommen 3,5 Milliarden Euro für die Unterbringung von etwa 3,7 Millionen syrischen Flüchtlingen zu zahlen. Das Geld würde aus dem Budget ihrer Behörde kommen, sagt von der Leyen. Auch wenn in der Abschlusserklärung weiter Defizite der Türkei bei Rechtsstaat und Demokratie beklagt und der Beginn formeller Verhandlungen zur Lösung der Zypernfrage verlangt werden, sollen nun "auf fachlicher Ebene" Vorbereitungen für die Modernisierung der Zollunion beginnen.

Wie sich die Stimmung verändert hat, beweist die Pressekonferenz des französischen Präsidenten. Die Spannungen hätten abgenommen und auch wenn er Griechen und Zyprern verspricht, den Sommer über weiter wachsam zu sein, sagt Macron in Richtung Ankara: "Wir werden auch die Zusammenarbeit wiederaufnehmen." So ein Satz von Macron, der dem türkischen Präsidenten Recep Tayyip Erdoğan in inniger Feindschaft verbunden schien, ist auch etwas, was man sich in Brüssel vor Monaten nicht vorstellen konnte.

[The debate on Turkey was surprisingly short. The summit agrees with the EU Commission's proposal to pay Turkey 3.5 billion euros for the accommodation of around 3.7 million Syrian refugees under a migration [sic] agreement extended until 2024. The money would come from her agency's budget, [EU Commission President Ursula] von der Leyen says. Even though the final declaration continues to complain about Turkey's shortcomings in the rule of law and democracy and calls for the start of formal negotiations to resolve the Cyprus question, preparations for the modernization of the customs union are now to begin "on a technical level."

How the mood has changed is demonstrated by the press conference of the French President. Tensions have eased and even though he promises Greeks and Cypriots that he will continue to be vigilant throughout the summer, Macron says to Ankara: "We will also resume cooperation." Such a sentence by Macron, who seemed to be intimately attached to Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, is also something that could not have been imagined in Brussels months ago.] (my translation)