Italy and the Trump Administration's effort to concoct evidence for a conspiracy theory

There's an Italian piece of the Republicans' attempt to create phony foreign-election-interference stories about the Democrats and their effort to discredit the Mueller Report. Remember Joseph Mifsud? His name comes up in it, too.

Jason Horowitz reports on part of it in Former Italian Prime Minister Says He’s Suing Trump Aide for Slander New York Times 10/04/2019.

Wolfgang Münchau's Eurointelligece 10/07/2019 speculates based on reporting by the Huffington Post's Lucia Annunziata about whether the Trump Administration may have in some way triggered the recent change in government in Italy, in which the Mussolini-quoting former Interior Minister Matteo Salvini and his Lega party were excluded from the previous coalition government. The non-partisan Giuseppe Conte remains as Prime Minister with the Five Star party as senior partner and the Social Democrats as junior coalition partner. (What did Conte know? 10/07/2019)

See also:

• Barbie Latza Nadeau, Barr Went to Rome to Hear a Secret Tape From Joseph Mifsud, the Professor Who Helped Ignite the Russia Probe Daily Beast 10/05/2019
• Mark Mazzetti et al, Barr and a Top Prosecutor Cast a Wide Net in Reviewing the Russia Inquiry New York Times 10/06/2019
• Adam Goldman, Italy’s Connection to the Russia Investigation, Explained New York Times 10/06/2019
• Alessandro Speciale, Italy's Spy Chief Met Twice With Barr to Aid Inquiry: Repubblica Bloomberg News 10/06/2019
• John Follain and Ross Larsen, Conte Approved Barr Meetings With Italian Intelligence: Corriere Bloomberg News 10/02/2019
• Fiorenza Sarzanini, Russiagate, gli 007 italiani hanno indagato per conto degli Stati Uniti Corriere Della Sera 08.10.2019

Mazzetti in his Times report describes a September visit by our dubious Attorney General William Barr to Italy:

Everything about Mr. Barr’s visit was unusual — not least his companion and their mission: John H. Durham, a top federal prosecutor whom Mr. Barr has assigned to review the origins of the Russia investigation. They were seeking evidence that might bolster a conspiracy theory long nurtured by President Trump: that some of America’s closest allies plotted with his “deep state” enemies in 2016 to try to prevent him from winning the presidency.

After the special counsel, Robert S. Mueller III, testified to lawmakers in July that he found insufficient evidence to charge any Trump associates with conspiring with Russia, an emboldened Mr. Trump began pressing world leaders to cooperate with Mr. Barr.

Now, glimpses of the review are emerging. Mr. Barr is taking an active role, signaling that he has made it a priority and is personally overseeing it.

The Eurointelligence report also notes:

What is unclear to us is Salvini's role in all of this. Salvini has also been accused of entertaining deep links with Russia and having secured Russian funding for his campaigns. At first blush, it is not clear why Trump and his men would dump him?

We think the timing is also very strange. At the time of the Barr/Durham visit, the Italian government crisis had already started. Five days later, on August 20, Conte launched an attack against Salvini in the Senate which triggered the end of the coalition. On August 24, Conte met Trump at the G7 in Biarritz, where they held a warm bilateral meeting. On August 27 Trump tweeted that he hoped Conte would remain premier.

The Italian Parliament in currently conducting an inquiry on Prime Minister Conte's dealings with Barr and Durham and about what kind of intelligence information he shared with them.

Is Matteo Salvini's rightwing populism getting wobbly? Or is it uniquely potent?

Paul Taylor has a cautioously optimistic take on the possible weakening of rightwing populism in Europe, Has Europe reached peak populism? Politico EU 09/05/2019:

... a series of events and votes in Italy, Britain, France, Spain, Austria, Slovakia and the Czech Republic suggest the tide could be turning against the anti-establishment nationalist movements that have upended politics across the Continent, leaving the barbarians howling in frustration at the gates.

That doesn’t mean that the social and economic distress that turned many working-class, rural and poorer voters against the traditional political parties, the parliamentary system and the European Union has gone away. But the populists seem unable to secure a majority for their radical, anti-European course almost anywhere.

In thinking about authoritarian movements, it's important to be realistic in seeing both their strengths and their real limitations. But the difference between complacency and realitic optimism can sometimes be difficult to perceive. So can the difference between complacency and excessive pessimism. But in dealing with authoritarian movements will real strength, complacency is probably the worst attitude that pro-democracy voters and activists can take.

Rachel Donadio takes a look at The New Populist Playbook The Atlantic 09/05/2019. She describes his very recent setback when he tried to force new elections but was surprisingly thwarted by the left-populst Five Star Movmement and the center-left social-democrats:

The seemingly unstoppable momentum emboldened Salvini to put his popularity to the test. He withdrew his party’s support for the government, forcing a crisis in a bid for new elections that he hoped would make him prime minister of the first far-right government of a major European power. He didn’t get his wish this time. Instead, the Five Star Movement and the center-left Democratic Party - one representing the populist anti-establishment, the other the establishment - put aside their long-standing mutual animosity to form the strangest new government in recent Italian history, one with a sole purpose: to block Salvini.

But her analysis strikes me as exaggerated in describing the innovative appeal of Salvini. "He is not simply a Donald Trump facsimile in Europe, nor merely the archetype of an angry anti-immigrant nationalist in the Viktor Orbán mold. Salvini has been writing an entirely new playbook for 21st-century populism."

Donadio's article didn't convince me that Salvini has a strongly innovative approach to far-right demagoguery. But it's an in-depth look at Salvini and his movement that provides a much more detailed account than we usually see in the American press when it comes to continental European politics. She provides this illustration of how Salvini and his Lega party exploit a very legitimate issue, the EU rules banning procyclical Keynesian policies during recessions, and give it a rightwing, anti-Semitic spin:

Salvini and other senior League officials have said they want the EU to change its rules, including the one requiring countries using the euro to keep their budget deficits under 3 percent of GDP.

This would require changing European treaties, which is a long shot. It’s also too technical for most voters to comprehend. Instead, Salvini rails against what he calls a Europe run by “bankers, do-gooders, and bureaucrats.” And he often singles out the billionaire financier George Soros in conspiratorial tones. In Salvini’s speech in Milan before European Parliament elections in May, he accused some “elites” - Merkel, France’s Emmanuel Macron, Soros - of betraying Europe, and said Soros was paying NGOs to bring immigrants to Europe. Is his targeting of Soros not a classic anti-Semitic trope? I pressed [Lega spokesperson Claudio] Borghi on this. “Salvini talks about Soros because he’s a speculator, not because he’s Jewish,” he said. The Hungarian-born financier was indeed a currency speculator in the ’90s, but Salvini mentions him only in the context of immigration. Here Italy seems to be following Orbán’s Hungary: a country with few Jews but dog-whistle anti-Semitism. [my emphasis]

Salvini's Lega (the League) is also a Putinist party:

... it’s the only party in the country to have signed a cooperation agreement with Putin’s United Russia party, which it did on Salvini’s watch, in 2017. Sebastian Kurz’s People’s Party (ÖVP) in Austria and Le Pen’s National Rally signed similar accords with United Russia. (Kurz'

There's a flat-out mistake here. It was Austria's far-right Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ), not Sebastian Kurz' Christian Democratic People's Party (ÖVP), who signed the agreement with the United Russia party. The ÖVP and FPÖ were partners in a coalition government from 2017 to 2019. [Update 09/09/2019: The error has been corrected and acknowledged at The Atlantic website.]

After Le Pen’s party signed the agreement, it secured a loan from a Russian bank. The League has said that no money changed hands in its agreement.

Yet the relationship with Russia could damage the League’s credibility. In recent months, the Italian magazine L’Espresso and BuzzFeed News have published damning scoops about a meeting in Moscow last fall in which close associates of Salvini discussed an energy deal that allegedly would have diverted funds to the League ahead of European Parliament elections in May, in violation of Italian campaign-finance law. In July, BuzzFeed published audio recordings of the meeting - one of the clearest signs to emerge yet of how Russia is trying to influence and destabilize European politics. There’s no evidence that the energy deal happened, and Salvini and his associates have denied wrongdoing, but magistrates in Milan have opened an investigation. [my emphasis]

That's a reminder of an important one of many ways that far-right parties in Europe share themes and techniques and actively cooperate to some degree. Even though the notion of a Nationalist International is inherently strange, and problematic in practice.

Haben die EU-Wahlen gezeigt, dass die radikale Rechte an Stärke verloren oder gewonnen hat?

Mattia Zulianello argumentiert, dass die EU-Parlamentswahlen im vergangenen Monat zwar begrenzte Gewinne und einige erhebliche Verluste für die rechtsextremen Parteien gezeigt hatten, aber die Wahlen deuten auch darauf hin, dass der tatsächlicher Einfluss der Rechtsextremisten immer noch zunimmt. (Right-wing populist parties made only modest electoral gains in the EP elections, but their influence is now unprecedented EUROPP 05/30/2019; alle Übersetzungen aus dem Englischen in diesem Beitrag sind meine):

Abschließend möchte ich sagen, dass die bescheidenen Wahlgewinne der Rechtspopulisten bei den Wahlen 2019 nicht mit einer Eindämmung der Relevanz solcher Parteien verwechselt werden sollten. Im Gegenteil, es ist wichtig, daran zu erinnern, dass der Rechtspopulismus bei den Wahlen 2014 recht gut abgeschnitten hat und dass die Konsolidierung ihrer Unterstützung in ganz Europa im Jahr 2019 darauf hindeutet, dass Mitte-Rechts-Parteien und Mitte-Links-Parteien nur begrenzte Entwicklungsfähigkeit haben. Erfolgreiche Strategien, um die Wählerbasis ihrer populistischen Konkurrenten ins Visier zu nehmen.

Auch als es den gemäßigten Parteien der Mitte-Rechts und Mitte-Links gelang, Stimmen auf Kosten der Rechtspopulisten (vor allem in Dänemark) zu gewinnen, verfolgten die letzteren eine Strategie der Papageien und narrativen Rahmen des Rechtsradikalen Populisten. Radikale Rechte, vor allem in Bezug auf Einwanderung und Asyl. Paradoxerweise hat sich dies in die zunehmende Relevanz, den Einfluss und die Legitimation des Rechtspopulismus in der europäischen Politik übersetzt.

Einer der bemerkenswertesten Zuwächse für die radikale Rechte gab es in Italien. Die dortige Regierungskoalition wird von Ministerpräsident Luigi Di Maio von der linkspopulistischen Fünf-Sterne-Bewegung (M5S) mit der Lega von Innenminister Matteo Salvini als Partner angeführt. Di Maio scheint ein schwacher Regierungschef zu sein und Salvini scheint de facto Regierungschef zu sein. Die Lega gewann mit 34% die meisten Stimmen aller Parteien bei der EU Wahl. Angela Giuffrida berichtet (Salvini's far-right party tops Italy's EU election polls Guardian 05/27/2019):

Mattia Diletti, Politikprofessorin an der Universität Sapienza in Rom, sagte, Italien habe das "trumpianischte" Ergebnis in Europa geliefert . „Ich wusste, dass die Lega gewinnen würde, aber nicht so viel, sagte er, „Wir sind jetzt eine Provinz des Trumpismus". „Die Italiener baten um starke Gefühle und Emotionen, um wieder Stolz zu empfinden, und wie [Donald] Trump, das hat Salvini ihnen gegeben." [meine Hervorhebung]

Ein Teil der Geschichte des Aufstiegs der rechtsextremen Parteien in Europa im letzten Jahrzehnt ist die abnehmende Stärke der mittelinks sozialdemokratischen Parteien, die in Ländern wie Frankreich und Griechenland verwüstet wurden. Ich habe keine Wahlanalyse gesehen, die darauf hinweist, dass eine beträchtliche Zahl von links/links-Wähler nach rechts wechseln, obwohl es manchmal passiert. Und es gibt Ausnahmen von der sozialdemokratischen Geschichte des Niedergangs, zum Beispiel in Spanien und Portugal und, wie ich hinzufügen möchte, in Österreich. Aber Deutschland ist eine ganz andere Geschichte.

Nach dem schlechten Abschneiden der SPD bei der EU-Wahl und im deutschen Bundesland Bremen, bei dem schlechte Wahlleistungen in Bayern und Hessen folgten, tritt Andrea Nahles als Parteichefin und auch als Chefin des SPD Fraktion im Bundestag zurück. Andrea Nahles kündigt Rücktritt an Taggesschau 02.06.2019):

Germany: Andrea Nahles resigns as SPD leader and parliamentarianDW News In English 06/02/2019:

Sinkende Mitte-Links-Stärke, eine Zersplitterung der Stimmen gegenüber kleineren Parteien, Stagnation für linke Parteien, die rechtsextreme Beibehaltung ihrer Stimmgewalt und der Verlust von Stimmen an die Mitte-Rechts-Parteien, die fremdenfeindliche Positionen einnehmen. Das bedeutet: Verschiebung des „Overton Windows“ in Richtung der autoritären Rechten. Kein gutes Bild.

Did the EU elections show the radical right losing strength or gaining it?

Mattia Zulianello argues that last month's EU parliamentary elections may have shown limited gains and some significant losses for the far-right parties, but they also indicate that their actual influence is still increasing: (Right-wing populist parties made only modest electoral gains in the EP elections, but their influence is now unprecedented EUROPP 05/30/2019):

In conclusion, the modest electoral gains of right-wing populists in the 2019 elections should not be confused with a containment of the relevance of such parties. On the contrary, it is important to recall that right-wing populism performed rather well in the 2014 elections, and that the consolidation of their support across Europe in 2019 suggests centre-right and centre-left parties have limited capacity to develop successful strategies for targeting the electoral base of their populist competitors.

Even when the mainstream moderate parties of the centre-right and centre-left managed to gain votes at the expense of right-wing populists (most notably in Denmark), the former followed a strategy of parroting the policies and narrative frames of the populist radical right, most notably over immigration and asylum. Paradoxically, this has translated into the increasing relevance, influence and legitimation of right-wing populism in European politics.

One of the most notable gains for the radical right was in Italy. The governing coalition there is headed by Prime Minister Luigi Di Maio of the left-populist Five Stars Movement (M5S) with Interior Minister Matteo Salvini's Lega as the junior partner. Di Maio seems to be a weak leader and Salvini seems to be the de facto head of government. The Lega won the most votes of any party with 34% of the vote in the EU election. Angela Giuffrida reports (Salvini's far-right party tops Italy's EU election polls Guardian 05/27/2019):

Mattia Diletti, a politics professor at Rome’s Sapienza University, said Italy had delivered the “most Trumpian” result in Europe. “I knew the League would win, but not by this much, we are now a province of Trumpism,” he said. “Italians were asking for strong feelings and emotion, to feel pride again, and like [Donald] Trump, that’s what Salvini gave.” [my emphasis]

Part of the story of the rise of the far-right parties in Europe during the last decade is the decreasing strength of the center-left social democratic parties, which have been devastated in countries like France and Greece. I haven't seen any election analysis that indicates significant numbers of left/center-left voters switching to the far-right, although it does happen. And there are exceptions to the social-democratic story of decline, for example, in Spain and Portugal and, I would add, Austria. But Germany is a whole different story.

After the SPD's poor showing in the EU elections and in the German state of Bremen, whch followed poor election performances in Bavaria and Hessen, Andrea Nahles is resigning as party leader and also as the head of the SPD caucus in the Bundestag. Andrea Nahles kündigt Rücktritt an Taggesschau 02.06.2019, auf Deutsch):

Germany: Andrea Nahles resigns as SPD leader and parliamentarianDW News In English 06/02/2019:

Declining center-left strength, a fragmenting of votes to smaller parties, stagnation for parties to their left, the far right maintaining its voting power while losing some votes to the center-right parties who adopt xenophobic positions: this adds up to an Overton window shifting in the direction of the authoritarian right. Not a good picture.

Yanis Varoufakis on the current Italian government's stance on European issues

Former Greek Finance Minister has certainly shown he would defy bad policies from the EU Establishment.

He's not impressed with Italy's current approach to doing that. Varoufakis Says Italy's Actions Bring EU Closer to Disintegration Bloomberg Markets and Finance 10/09/2018:

Varoufakis regards the current Italian government de facto led by the far-right Matteo Salvini (Lega) as a "fascist moment".

This Italian government, and the fascist moment it represents, is perhaps the Left's last warning: We need a new, credible EU policy agenda. We must explain how the bloc, and the euro, could be run democratically & sustainably - while preparing for its end https://t.co/jGQ1Cg63zO

— Yanis Varoufakis (@yanisvaroufakis) July 17, 2018

Here is an interview on the Italian situation from a few days earlier than the date on the clip above, The 5S-Lega Italian government is continuing the failed Renzi strategy Varoufakis.eu 10/03/2018:

As for migration and sovereignty, I am very much afraid that what Mr Salvini is doing – by treating flesh and blood fellow humans floating on the Mediterranean as bargaining chips against Brussels – is to promote strategic misanthropy as a legitimate negotiating tactic within Europe. This Italian government is, to put it bluntly, a clear and present danger for European civilisation. [my emphasis]

Österreichs Kurz will keine NGO See-Rettungen

Österreichs Kanzler Sebatian "Milchgesicht" Kurz machte ein Gespräch mit Stephan Löwenstein und Thomas Gutschker von der FAZ (Sonntag): „Diese Politik beendet das Ertrinken“ 14.10.2018. (Die ganze Interview ist nur mit Abo erreichbar.)

Sie haben ihn bei einem zarten Punkt berüht: "Sie wollen in Ihrer Zeit als EU-Ratspräsident das Problem der illegalen Migration nach Europa angehen. Politisch hat sich seit Juli kaum etwas getan." Das stimmt. Und seine EU-Ratspräsidentschaft ist schon mehr als die Hälfte vorbei.

Der Standard berichtet über die FAZ-Sonntag Interview in Kurz setzt Schlepper und Hilfs-NGOs faktisch gleich 13.10.2018.

Der "Frankfurter Allgemeinen Sonntagszeitung" sagte Kurz: "Es kann doch nicht sein, dass ein paar Nichtregierungsorganisationen das klare Ziel der 28 Staats- und Regierungschefs in Europa konterkarieren. Und das nicht nur mit dem Ziel, Leben zu retten, sondern gemeinsam mit den Schleppern Menschen nach Mitteleuropa zu bringen."

Der ÖVP-Chef nannte das Schiff "Aquarius 2", das von Ärzte ohne Grenzen und SOS Mediterranee betrieben wird. Schiffe wie die "Aquarius" versuchten, der libyschen Küstenwache beim Bergen von Migranten zuvorzukommen. Das schaffe absurde Situationen. "Wenn nicht europäische Schiffe retten, sondern libysche oder ägyptische, stellen sich komplexe Rechtsfragen gar nicht erst", sagte Kurz.

Kanzler Milchgesicht liebt leere Rhetorik. Und Österreich hat natürlich keine Küste. Aber trotzdem sind solche Aussagen nicht ganz harmlos. Kurz gibt dabei verbale Unterstützung zu rechts-populistischer, anti-Immigration Parteien und Politiker wie Ungarns Viktor Orbán (Fidesz), Italiens Innenminister Matteo Salvini (Lega) (der auch de facto Regierungschef ist), und seinem eigenen Vizekanzler Heinz-Christian Strache (FPÖ).