Escalation in the Turkey-Syria conflict

The Turkey-Syria military confrontation is still heating up. (Turkey downs Syrian jets after three of its drones were targeted in Idlib Middle East Eye 03/02/2020; Juan Cole, Russia backs Damascus as it closes Syrian Airspace, Threatens to down Turkish Jets Informed Comment 03/02/2020)

Turkey launches self-defence military operation in Syria Aljazeera 03/01/2020:

One important factor here is that the conflict is currently taking place inside Syria. Turkey's involvement inside Syria was agreed with Russia at two separate meetings in the Russian city of Sochi.

The 2018 Sochi agreement had Syria's ally Russia agreeing that Turkey would be allowed to operate inside the Syrian province of Idlib (Maria Tsvetkova, Russia and Turkey agree to create buffer zone in Syria's Idlib Reuters 09/17/2018):

Russia, the biggest outside backer of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad in his fight against rebels, has been preparing for an offensive on the city of Idlib, which is controlled by rebels and now home to about 3 million people.

But after Putin’s talks with Turkish President Tayyip Erdogan, who has opposed a military operation against the rebels in Idlib, Russian Defence Minister Sergei Shoigu told reporters there would not now be an offensive.

The rebels to be targeted in that 2018 agreement were Sunni Islamist groups, which opposed the Alawite-dominated government of Syria. The Alawites are sometimes described as a variation of Shi'a Islam. In any case, the Shi'a government of Iran is supporting the Syrian government of Bashar al-Assad. Sunnis are a majority in Syria.

The 2019 agreement also concluded in Sochi was one in which Vladimir Putin gave Erdoğan permission to attack the Kurdish areas controlled by the leftwing Kurdish YPG in the Rojava area of northwestern Turkey: Full text of Turkey, Russia agreement on northeast Syria Aljazeera 10/22/2019

As Patrick Cockburn describes in, Erdogan’s ethnic cleansing of the Kurds is still happening now – and we have Trump to thank Independent 11/15/2019 Erdoğan had ethnic cleansing in mind:

In the case of the Turkish invasion of Syria last month, the motive is not a matter of speculation: William V Roebuck, a US diplomat stationed in northeast Syria at the time, wrote an internal memo about what he was seeing for the State Department. The memo later leaked. It is one of the best-informed analyses of what happened and is titled: “Present at the Catastrophe: Standing By as Turks Cleanse Kurds in Northern Syria and De-Stabilise our D-Isis [sic] Platform in the Northeast.”

Roebuck, with access to US intelligence about Turkish intentions, has no doubt that Ankara would like to expel the 1.8 million Kurds living in their semi-independent state of Rojava. He says: “Turkey’s military operation in northern Syria, spearheaded by armed Islamist groups on its payroll, represents an ... effort at ethnic cleansing, relying on widespread military conflict targeting part of the Kurdish heartland along the border and benefiting from several widely publicised, fear-inducing atrocities these forces committed.” [my emphasis]

Kurdish forces are currently hoping to make gains in the area of the city of Afrin, in northeast Syria, in cooperation with Syxrian forces. (Fehim Tastekin, Syrian Kurds ponder Afrin’s recapture in shadow of Idlib crisis Al-Monitor 03/02/2020)

We're currently seeing the serious failure of Erdoğan's foreign policy of the last few years. This report from the International Crisis Group by Nigar Göksel et al (Deadly Clashes in Syria’s Idlib Show Limits of Turkey’s Options 02/29/2020)looks at Turkey's current situation, including this on Turkey-Russia relations:

Turkey’s military options are limited by Russia’s current control over Syrian airspace. Nor does it have any reason to expect robust support from its traditional post-World War II allies in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), including the U.S., in the event of a confrontation with Russia in Syria. As for Moscow, it presumably has no interest in sabotaging its overall relations with Ankara, which, from the Kremlin’s viewpoint, have helped distance Turkey from the U.S. and NATO.

Still, tensions between the two seem bound to increase. In recent years, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s strategy has leaned toward “Eurasianists” in Turkey who strongly favour close ties with Moscow. The death toll of the 27 February airstrike was shockingly high for Turkey, however, and Turkish media played up reports (denied by Moscow) that Russia did not even allow Turkish helicopters into Idlib’s airspace to evacuate the dead and wounded. All this will strengthen the hand of those who seek a rebalancing of Ankara’s strategic orientation toward Turkey’s NATO allies.

And, of course, the war is still creating large numbers of refugees. "One million people have been displaced in Syria's Idlib region since December near Turkey's southern border, causing what the United Nations says may be the worst humanitarian crisis in nine years of war." (Erdogan says he hopes for Idlib ceasefire deal in Putin talks Aljazeera 03/02/2020)

Turkey, the Kurds, and other complications with US policy in Syria

Trump's impulsive, bumbling, and corrupt approach to foreign policy has recently shown itself in the sputtering policy of withdrawing US troops from Syria and adressing the change that would make in the situation with the Damscus government, Turkey, and the Syrian Kurds.

The Kurds in northern Syria have a fighting group, YPG (People's Protection Units), that has established an momentarily independent region referred to by various names, including Rojava, from Kurdistana Rojava (Western Kurdistan). This autonomous status is not liked or officially recognized by Damascus or Ankara. The YPG has been negotiating with Bashar al-Assad's government apparently angling to have Damascus agree to protect them from Turkey in exchange for the YPG to agreeing to only limited autonomy for Rojava as paart of Syria.

Turkish President Tayyip Erdoğan regards the YPG as a terrorist organization aligned with secessionist Kurds in Turkey led by the PKK (Kurdistan Workers' Party). He would like to send troops into Syria to fight them, as he has been doing during the Syrian civil war to some extent. A continuing risk with those operations has been that of US troops, which have been allied with the YPG against the Islamic State (IS), coming into military clashes with NATO ally Turkey's troops.

Russia, of course, has been a major player backing Assad's government against IS and internal rebels. Although Russia's involvement in that messy situation carries big risks for them as well, it is currently serving the Putin government's goals of becoming a more important world player. And they will also have a say in arrangements over the fate of the YPG.

Events in northern Syria, including a Turkish assault on Rojava or a Syrian assault on Irbil province, can also influence the number of refugees wanting to come into Europe. The current (2016-19) solution to mass immigration into the EU is primarily the EU's 2016 agreement with Turkey to hold refugees there in exchange for payments. Which also gives Turkey leverage against its NATO partners if they decide they need to retaliate for disagreements or military clashes in Syria.

Dilan Okcuoglu (How will Trump’s Withdrawal from Syria Affect the Turkish-Kurdish Conflict? Informed Comment 01/06/2019) explains that the Syrian Kurds "have already emerged as prominent actors who are capable of developing serious diplomatic and political ties." She also argues that US troops withdrawals are "likely to help ISIS adopt a new strategy and expand its territorial control while at the same time continuing its execution of unarmed civilians." And she gives some background on the Turkis-Kurdish conflict.

Steven Cook gives more background on Turkey's policies, including the Iranian angle, in Turkey Is Lying About Fighting ISIS Foreign Policy 12/28/2018:

In an odd way, the president’s moves on Syria and Turkey are related to his Iran policy. There are those within the administration who believe that by giving up the YPG—and agreeing to sell the Turks Patriot missiles — the United States will pull Turkey back into Washington’s orbit. This renewed American-Turkish alignment will in turn render Erdogan a willing partner to contain Iran. Yes, one of the justifications for having U.S. forces in Syria was rolling back Iran, but the Turks had never actually been a partner in this effort. They helped Iran evade sanctions during a good portion of Barack Obama’s presidency, and even now Ankara is demanding a permanent waiver to buy Iranian crude oil.

This is because Turkish officials do not regard Iran as a threat. To them, Turkey’s neighbor is an economic opportunity and provides diplomatic leverage with the United States.

This is important, because National Security Adviser John Bolton's mission in life is to start a war with Iran.

Aljazeera's Inside Story has this discussion of the current state of play, Can US and Turkey find common ground over Syrian Kurds? 01/08/2019:

Turkey is making threats (Turkey says will launch Syria attack if US delays troop pullout Aljazeera 01/10/2019):

Turkey will go ahead with an offensive against Syrian Kurdish fighters in Syria if the United States delays the withdrawal of its troops from the war-torn country, Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu has said.

"If the [withdrawal] is put off with ridiculous excuses like Turks are massacring Kurds, which do not reflect the reality, we will implement this decision," he told NTV channel on Thursday.

Cavusoglu said a military operation against the US-allied Kurdish People's Protection Units (YPG), which it has pledged to carry out in northeastern Syria, is not dependent on the pullout of US troops.

Bolton added to the diplomatic confusion by seeming to say that Trump's troops pullout wouldn't happen any time soon. Erdoğan refused to attend a scheduled meeting with Bolton over his statements. ("Bolton hat einen schweren Fehler begangen" Wiener Zeitung 09.01.2019; Carlotta Gall and Mark Landler, Turkish President Snubs Bolton Over Comments That Turkey Must Protect Kurds New York Times 01/09/2019)

Bolton also said that Turkey had to protect the Syrian Kurds. Which he should. But this is where the NATO alliance with Turkey adds complications. On the one hand, the US has a treaty obligation to protect Turkey against aggression, although it does not mean the support is automatic. So the US has a legitimate interest in Turkey not invading another sovereign state, in this case Syria, which is what cross-border incursions actually are. Implusive decisions and sloppy diplomacy are not how the US should be approaching this situation.

Syria, Turkey, and the Kurdish YPG

Juan Cole blogs about the Syrian Kurdish group YPG's adjustments to the Trump Administration's reported decision to withdraw remaining US troops from Syria: Abandoned by Trump, Syrian Kurds frantically turn to Moscow for Protection from Turkey Informed Comment 12/28/2018

Both Bashar al-Assad's government in Damascus and Tayyip Erdoğan's consider the Kurdish YPG a challenge to their national interests. The YPG currently controls part of Syrian territory. Turkey regards YPG as an ally of the PKK, an internal Turkish Kurdish opposition group that Turkey's government officially considers a terrorist group. The YPG has been cooperating with US forces against the Islamic State.

As Cole explains::

Turkey views the Kurdish Democratic Union Party in Syria and its People’s Protection Units (YPG) militia as indistinguishable from the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) guerrillas, which have been branded terrorists by both Turkey and the US. The Pentagon does not view the YPG in the same light, however, but the Pentagon is getting out of Syria so that its views will soon be irrelevant.

And he describes the current diplomatzic efforts as follows:

The Kurds now appear to be pinning their hopes on the establishment of a buffer zone between them and Turkey, to be established by the Syrian Arab Army. For Damascus to control the border areas could assuage Turkish fears that the YPG will conduct terrorist strikes over the border into Turkish territory against Turkish police or military in support of the PKK (which is now large based in the Qandil mountains of Iraq).

And, the Kurds hope they can convince Russia to lend them a security umbrella against Turkey, playing on Russia’s desire to see Syria reunified under a single government and Russian dislike of Turkish intervention.

Orhan Coskun and Lesley Wroughton report for Reuters (Syrian surprise: How Trump's phone call changed the war 12/28/2018) that even though Erdoğan wanted the US to remove its troops and its support for YPG, he may have gotten more than he actually wanted:

The U.S. withdrawal potentially frees Turkey’s military to push the YPG back from 500 km of border without risking a confrontation with American forces. It also removes a main cause of this year’s diplomatic crisis between the two countries.

But it also opens up an area of Syria far larger than anything Turkey had expected to fill, potentially pitting it against not just Kurdish forces but also the Damascus government - which is committed to regaining control of all of Syria - and its Russian and Iranian backers.

The YPG on Friday asked the Syrian government to take over the town of Manbij, which the Kurdish militia currently controls with U.S. support, to protect it from Turkish attack.

And if Turkish forces are to take on Islamic State in its last pocket of Syrian territory near the Iraqi border, they would first have to cross 250 km of territory controlled by the Kurdish-dominated Syrian Democratic Forces.

“Erdogan got more than he bargained for,” said Soner Cagaptay, Director of the Turkish Program at the Washington Institute. “He had asked the U.S. to drop the YPG, but not withdraw from Syria”.

Turkey is a NATO ally of the United States. So any diplomatic or military mischief Turkey gets into with Syria or the YPG is something that could implicate the US in its alliance commitments.

For instance:

Washington is also grappling with what to do with weapons it provided to the YPG militia and promised to take back after the campaign against Islamic State ended.

Turkey says the weapons must be collected so they are not used against Turkish troops, but U.S. officials say they cannot disarm their own allies when the fight is not yet over.

Mara Karlin and Tamara Cofman Wittes write in Foreign Affairs ("Americas Middle East Purgatory: The Case for Doing Less" Jan-Feb 2019)

U.S. efforts to train, equip, and advise the Syrian Democratic Forces in the fight against ISIS are yet another reminder that none of Washington’s partnerships has purely operational consequences: U.S. support of the sdf, seen by Ankara as a sister to the Kurdistan Workers’ Party, has made the United States’ relationship with Turkey knottier than ever.

This is a discussion from Al Jazeera English on the current US position in Syria and its immediate region featuring political analyst Ali Al-Nashmi, former US Ambassdor Peter Galbraith who has been an advocate for Kurdish autonomy in Iraq Peter Galbraith, and interntional relations scholar Afzal Ashraf. What is Trump's strategy for Syria and the region? 12/27/2018:

Shifting US Syria policy and the Kurdish YPG

In calling an end to our involvement in Syria, ... Trump did the right thing. (In case any of you are wondering, I found it hard to type that sentence.) But true to form, he has done it in the worst possible way. There seems to have been no advance warning or interagency preparation for the decision, which means that the timing, arrangements, and broader implications have not been gamed out in advance. (It is therefore no surprise that the decision on Syria was soon followed by the announcement that Secretary of Defense James Mattis would be retiring in February). As is typical for him, Trump did not consult with U.S. allies or inform them in advance. Nor did he make any serious effort to use the U.S. presence in Syria to orchestrate a diplomatic process to stabilize the country or use the possibility of a U.S. withdrawal to elicit parallel concessions from others. Like his phony nuclear summit with Kim Jong Un or his decision to move the U.S. Embassy in Israel to Jerusalem, Trump was once again demonstrating the “art of the giveaway”: making unilateral U.S. concessions and getting nothing in return.

That's Über-Realist Stephen Walt on Trump's much-discussed change in Syrian policy by pulling out troops. (Good Riddance to America’s Syria Policy Foreign Policy 12/21/2018)

So, yes, it is possible to criticize Trump's decision while still thinking it's a good result so far as it goes that American troops are being withdrawn. Assuming Trump is serious about that.

Walt also assesses the implications for the Syrian Kurds bluntly:

A more legitimate concern is the fate of Kurdish militias that have been vital partners in the anti-Islamic State campaign. Trump’s critics rightly point out that his decision in effect abandons the Kurds, and I have some sympathy for this view. But America’s moral obligation to the Kurds is not unlimited, and—rightly or wrongly—the long-term consequences for the United States are unlikely to be significant. The Kurds were not fighting the Islamic State in order to do Uncle Sam a favor; they did it out of their own self-interest. Welcome to the brutal world of international politics: Nations and states cooperate when their interests align, but cooperation often ceases once interests diverge. [my emphasis]

And Georgio Cafiero (After Trump’s Syria Announcement, YPG Looks To Moscow And Damascus LobeLog 12/23/2018) discusses how the Syrian Kurds are acting on their current "brutal world" reality. The YPG is the Syrian Kurdish militia.

Although the U.S.-YPG partnership will not necessarily be over after U.S. forces leave Syria—Washington may continue supporting the Kurdish militia in other ways—the YPG must contend with new realities in Syria, recognizing that President Bashar al-Assad has “won” the war. The Syrian regime’s “victory” combined with the U.S. exit will likely push the YPG closer to Russia and the Damascus regime. ...

Last year the Russians began facilitating the opening of channels of communication between the YPG and Damascus. Moscow’s objective was to push the parties toward a solution whereby the U.S.-backed group integrates into the Syrian state security apparatus in exchange for some concessions from the regime to the YPG. With limited options otherwise, it appears that the YPG must capitalize on such opportunities for an agreement with the regime that possibly began taking shape amid these Russia-brokered talks.

Cafiero also mentions the important NATO consideration in play with the US and Turkey pursuing non-unified policies in Syria:

While beneficial to the YPG’s interests in continuing to operate in and control large parts of northern Syria, the U.S.-Turkish standoff in northern Syria amounted to a dangerous game of chicken. Ankara views Donald Trump’s decision to pull U.S. forces out of northern Syria, announced last week, as cause for much optimism—albeit cautious optimism—about the two NATO allies overcoming what, for years, has been an extremely painful source of tension in bilateral affairs.

And December isn't the first time the Kurdish YPG has had reason to worry about the reliability of the US cooperation with them: Joost Hiltermann, The Kurds Once Again Face American Abandonment The Atlantic 08/30/2018. Hiltermann reminds us of an important fact about the YPG's politics:

Today, the YPG faces a similar predicament. It is a Syrian affiliate of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), which has fought an insurgency against the Turkish state since the 1980s; Turkey, the United States, and the European Union have designated the PKK a terrorist organization. Despite the YPG’s shared genealogy with the PKK, Washington supported the group because of its battlefield prowess. As it beat back isis, the YPG took control of additional non-Kurdish territory in Syria, including the mostly Arab cities of Manbij and Raqqa.