Shifting US Syria policy and the Kurdish YPG

In calling an end to our involvement in Syria, ... Trump did the right thing. (In case any of you are wondering, I found it hard to type that sentence.) But true to form, he has done it in the worst possible way. There seems to have been no advance warning or interagency preparation for the decision, which means that the timing, arrangements, and broader implications have not been gamed out in advance. (It is therefore no surprise that the decision on Syria was soon followed by the announcement that Secretary of Defense James Mattis would be retiring in February). As is typical for him, Trump did not consult with U.S. allies or inform them in advance. Nor did he make any serious effort to use the U.S. presence in Syria to orchestrate a diplomatic process to stabilize the country or use the possibility of a U.S. withdrawal to elicit parallel concessions from others. Like his phony nuclear summit with Kim Jong Un or his decision to move the U.S. Embassy in Israel to Jerusalem, Trump was once again demonstrating the “art of the giveaway”: making unilateral U.S. concessions and getting nothing in return.

That's Über-Realist Stephen Walt on Trump's much-discussed change in Syrian policy by pulling out troops. (Good Riddance to America’s Syria Policy Foreign Policy 12/21/2018)

So, yes, it is possible to criticize Trump's decision while still thinking it's a good result so far as it goes that American troops are being withdrawn. Assuming Trump is serious about that.

Walt also assesses the implications for the Syrian Kurds bluntly:

A more legitimate concern is the fate of Kurdish militias that have been vital partners in the anti-Islamic State campaign. Trump’s critics rightly point out that his decision in effect abandons the Kurds, and I have some sympathy for this view. But America’s moral obligation to the Kurds is not unlimited, and—rightly or wrongly—the long-term consequences for the United States are unlikely to be significant. The Kurds were not fighting the Islamic State in order to do Uncle Sam a favor; they did it out of their own self-interest. Welcome to the brutal world of international politics: Nations and states cooperate when their interests align, but cooperation often ceases once interests diverge. [my emphasis]

And Georgio Cafiero (After Trump’s Syria Announcement, YPG Looks To Moscow And Damascus LobeLog 12/23/2018) discusses how the Syrian Kurds are acting on their current "brutal world" reality. The YPG is the Syrian Kurdish militia.

Although the U.S.-YPG partnership will not necessarily be over after U.S. forces leave Syria—Washington may continue supporting the Kurdish militia in other ways—the YPG must contend with new realities in Syria, recognizing that President Bashar al-Assad has “won” the war. The Syrian regime’s “victory” combined with the U.S. exit will likely push the YPG closer to Russia and the Damascus regime. ...

Last year the Russians began facilitating the opening of channels of communication between the YPG and Damascus. Moscow’s objective was to push the parties toward a solution whereby the U.S.-backed group integrates into the Syrian state security apparatus in exchange for some concessions from the regime to the YPG. With limited options otherwise, it appears that the YPG must capitalize on such opportunities for an agreement with the regime that possibly began taking shape amid these Russia-brokered talks.

Cafiero also mentions the important NATO consideration in play with the US and Turkey pursuing non-unified policies in Syria:

While beneficial to the YPG’s interests in continuing to operate in and control large parts of northern Syria, the U.S.-Turkish standoff in northern Syria amounted to a dangerous game of chicken. Ankara views Donald Trump’s decision to pull U.S. forces out of northern Syria, announced last week, as cause for much optimism—albeit cautious optimism—about the two NATO allies overcoming what, for years, has been an extremely painful source of tension in bilateral affairs.

And December isn't the first time the Kurdish YPG has had reason to worry about the reliability of the US cooperation with them: Joost Hiltermann, The Kurds Once Again Face American Abandonment The Atlantic 08/30/2018. Hiltermann reminds us of an important fact about the YPG's politics:

Today, the YPG faces a similar predicament. It is a Syrian affiliate of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), which has fought an insurgency against the Turkish state since the 1980s; Turkey, the United States, and the European Union have designated the PKK a terrorist organization. Despite the YPG’s shared genealogy with the PKK, Washington supported the group because of its battlefield prowess. As it beat back isis, the YPG took control of additional non-Kurdish territory in Syria, including the mostly Arab cities of Manbij and Raqqa.

Syrian withdrawal - reason to panic?

The foreign policy establishment and commentators across the political spectrum seem to be a bit flummoxed by Trump's announcements that he's pulling US troops out of Syria and Afghanistan. (Thomas Gibbons-Neff and Mujib Mashal, U.S. to Withdraw About 7,000 Troops From Afghanistan, Officials Say New York Times 12/20/2018; Gregory Hellman and Connor O'Brien, Pulling out of Syria: A primer Politico 12/20/2018)

Elite reaction to the announced Syria pullout has been negative. It's worth keeping in mind that Trump is unpredictable, and may well have greenlighted some other kind of covert and/or mercenary intervention in Syria. Consistency and transparency have not so far been hallmarks of his Presidency.

Richard Haass and Fareed Zakaria provide an mild illustration here, talking about how the Syria withdrawal will reduce American "leverage" (What next for the US Syria strategy? CNN 2/22/2018):

Haass also tweeted:

The biggest casualty of @realDonaldTrump presidency may well be this country’s reputation for reliability. The abandonment of the Kurds adds to a pattern of turning on allies, cozying up to foes, and breaking agreements. US influence along with order in the world will plummet.

— Richard N. Haass (@RichardHaass) December 20, 2018

A reputation for reliability is essential to deter foes, to convince friends not to appease strong neighbors or proliferate, and to persuade others to compromise in a negotiation. By abandoning Syrian Kurds @realDonaldTrump is further undermining the US reputation for reliability

— Richard N. Haass (@RichardHaass) December 20, 2018

For some context, Haass, who is the longtime president of the prestigious Council on Foreign Relations, has been complaining about a lack of clarity in Syrian policy for a while.

And Secretary of Defense James Mattis' unusual step of resigning in protest after the pullout was announced lit the pundits' hair on fire.

Karen DeYoung et all (A tumultuous week began with a phone call between Trump and the Turkish president Washington Post 12/21/2018) write that Trump told Turkish President Tayyip Erdogan on a phone call about his Syiran withdrawal plan late on Friday a week ago:

[Trump] repeated his inability to understand why the United States was still arming and supporting Syrian Kurdish fighters to conduct a ground war against the Islamic State. To Turkey, which shared a 500-mile long border with Syria, they were a national security threat, allied with Turkish Kurds that even the United States considered terrorists.

The Islamic State, according to Trump himself, had been defeated, Erdogan said. Turkey’s military was strong and could take on any remaining militant pockets. Why did some 2,000 U.S. troops still need to be there?

“You know what? It’s yours,” Trump said of Syria. “I’m leaving.”

They also report, "The call, shorthanded in more or less the same words by several senior administration officials, set off events that, even by the whirlwind standards of Washington in the Trump years, have been cataclysmic."

The article also includes this video with Bipartisan objections to the Syria withdrawal:

For some on the antiwar left were perplexed on how to understand the withdrawal decision. Here's an example. Chomsky Says US Should Stay In Syria The Jimmy Dore Show 12/22/2018:

Some anarchists are particularly supportive of the Kurdish cause in Syria: Dan Arel, What is attracting anarchists to Syria? The New Arab 07/29/2017; David Graeber, Why are world leaders backing this brutal attack against Kurdish Afrin? Guardian 02/23/2018

Predicting what Trump will do or won't do is obviously exceptionally tricky. But I'll go out on a limb and suggest that he is unlikely in the extreme to intervene to support a radical-democratic anarchist experiment in democratic self-governance, if that is what is actually occurring.

Pulling US troops out reduces the very real risk of American forces coming into a direct clash with forces from NATO ally Turkey. But it does mean abandoning temporary allies. And plain decency would require the US to pressure Turkey not to go into Syria to crush the Kurds there. Do I need to add that we have little reason to expect plain decency from the Trump Administration?

Paul Pillar in Mattis Resigns: Sky Will Not Fall LobeLog 12/21/2018 notes the typical Trump sloppiness in the Syria withdrawal decision:

All indications are that Trump made the decision in an atrociously casual manner—trusting his instincts, deferring to his desire to fulfill a campaign promise, and consulting little or not at all with his advisors. In short, there was no policy process worthy of the name. There are important reasons that a thorough policy process should precede important foreign policy decisions. Such a process uncovers costs and risks that an otherwise favored course of action might entail. The most remarkable thing about the single worst U.S. foreign policy decision over the past couple of decades—the decision to invade Iraq in 2003—is that no policy process preceded it. There never was, prior to the invasion, an options paper or a meeting of National Security Council principals that discussed whether the invasion was a good idea.

But he still approves of the withdrawal:

Understandable opposition to Trump—driven by concern about both his decision-making style and the substance of many of his decisions—has heavily affected the current hysteria about Syria. Many voices that already were accustomed to criticizing Trump, including some generally pro-Democratic editorial pages and hawkish Republican never-Trumpers, have expressed full-throated dismay over the decision. There still are plenty of legitimate reasons to worry about Trump and foreign policy. But even a broken clock is correct twice a day. And the decision about military withdrawal from Syria was the right one...

And he cautions about the dangers of running wars and foreign policy by analogy, which actually is a serious problem:

To keep U.S. troops in Syria now implies a forever war, with no realistic ending imaginable. Once again one hears a familiar assertion—like the “light at the end of the tunnel” assurances during the Vietnam War and heard in other versions during the Iraq War—that events just happen to be at a highly unlikely cusp where a little more effort will make the difference between catastrophe and victory. Related to this is another mistaken way of thinking about combating ISIS: that it supposedly is similar to eradicating a viral disease such as smallpox, in which the war will be won when the last case in the last village in which the disease appears is stamped out. That time will never come with ISIS. The ideology, the resentment, and the capacity for political violence will still be there, to be dealt with through means other than fighting in Syrian villages. [my emphasis]

Pillar also indicates his approval of the arguments made by Doug Bandow of the libertarian Cato Institute in Why Trump Is Right to Withdraw Troops The National Interest 12/20/2018. Bandow writes:

Congress has not authorized military action in Syria, even against the Islamic State. The authorization for the utilization of military force passed after 9/11 was directed against Al Qaeda, not new groups which did not then exist and did not participate in the attacks. That AUMF cannot be stretched to cover Syria, Iran, Russia, Turkey, or anyone else.

Of course, Congress had no reason to authorize force in Syria, which is not a security problem for America. The U.S. prospered for decades while a hostile and even stronger Syrian Arab Republic was allied with the Soviet Union. Would it be good if Bashar al-Assad was a warm, loyal, devoted ally like, say, Saudi Arabia’s Mohammed bin Salman? Sure (well, probably). But the fact that Assad is not isn’t a cause for military intervention. As a superpower, America has interests all over the world. As a superpower, most of them aren’t particularly important. Very few are worth war. [my emphasis]

He also observes, "The ever-hysterical Sen. Graham complained of 'devastating consequences for our nation, the region, and throughout the world.' Actually, the Mideast matters far less these days, and would diminish in importance still further if Washington did not make that dismal assembly of nations central to American foreign and military policy."

Yes, it does look like an advantage to Turkish policy and to Russian ambitions. I wouldn't want to downplay either concern. But Turkey is a formal NATO ally of the United States, a fact the US cannot afford to take lightly. And Russian ambitions in the Middle East? If their more active presence there brings results similar to what America's military interventions there have brought us, they may decide sooner rather than later that such a mess damages their standing in the world rather than enhancing it.