Showing posts sorted by date for query replacement rate. Sort by relevance Show all posts
Showing posts sorted by date for query replacement rate. Sort by relevance Show all posts

Tuesday, February 10, 2026

Xenophobic ideology

Judith Kohlenberger is a sociologist at the Wirtschaftsuniversität in Vienna who heads the Research Institute for Refugee and Migration Management (FORM) (Forschungsinstitut für Migrations- und Fluchtforschung und -management). She has been making numerous public and media appearances recently to discuss her reality-based version of immigration issues.

In Europe in the US and some other countries, malicious demagoguery and general hate-mongering against immigrants from far-right parties whose commitment to democracy is dubious, are similar to claims that are all too familiar to Americans who hear the Trump cult’s anti-immigration rhetoric. Like the Trump regime’s version, this xenophobic agitation aims to undermine confidence in democratic political systems.

Kohlenberger recently posted on Facebook (01/31/2026: my translations from German): (1) 
Demographic change is not only one of the greatest but also one of the most ideologically contested challenges of our time. This was also shown by the exchange [I had] with the British demographer Dr. Paul Morland, known for his thoroughly provocative theses. As a migration researcher, I am of course particularly interested in the fact that the "theory" of the Great Replacement, invented on the drawing board of the extreme right (in quotation marks, because it is anything but a scientifically sound theory), was able to enter the political and social mainstream within a very short time. [my emphasis]
The Great Replacement Theory is one of the more prominent of the poisonous conspiracist narratives in the far-right gutter – which these days reaches into the White House:
[It is] in the United States and certain other Western countries whose populations are mostly white, a far-right conspiracy theory alleging, in one of its versions, that left-leaning domestic or international elites, on their own initiative or under the direction of Jewish co-conspirators, are attempting to replace white citizens with nonwhite (i.e., Black, Hispanic, Asian, or Arab) immigrants. The immigrants’ increased presence in white countries, as the theory goes, in combination with their higher birth rates as compared with those of whites, will enable new nonwhite majorities in those countries to take control of national political and economic institutions, to dilute or destroy their host countries’ distinctive cultures and societies, and eventually to eliminate the host countries’ white populations. Some adherents of replacement theory have characterized these predicted changes as “white genocide.” [my emphasis] (2)
Trump himself pimps this sleazy theory. From 2024:
When former President Donald Trump told millions of Americans during Tuesday's presidential debate that "our elections are bad, and a lot of these illegal immigrants coming in, they're trying to get them to vote," he was not just repeating a baseless claim intended to undermine the results of the upcoming 2024 election. 
He was also echoing the latest iteration of a once-fringe racist conspiracy theory that has now become mainstream in the Republican Party. The conspiracy — known as the "great replacement" — claims there is a plan to bring nonwhite immigrants into the United States and other Western countries to replace white voters to achieve a political agenda. [my emphasis] (3)
The current buildup by the Trump regime to deploy ICE/CBP Gestapo hooligans to intimidate voters from going into polling places to vote this year. Kohlenberger:
Behind this [Great Replacement Theory] is a recipe that is as simple as it is dangerous: "They" are becoming more and more, while "we" are becoming fewer and fewer. At the same time, it will not be possible to maintain our labor markets, our social and pension systems without migration, as all demographic forecasts show us. A resource-oriented migration debate and a non-völkisch, dynamic understanding of belonging ([in which] "those" who come, become part of the "we") is therefore not only a humanitarian imperative of humanity, but [is] also economically without alternative in the long term. 
After all, relying solely on measures to boost the birth rate of the native population to such an extent that they could stop or reverse the demographic transition is [a concept] oblivious to the future - even a migration-averse country like Hungary has recognized this and has begun to recruit seasonal workers (many of whom will probably stay permanently) on a large scale. Radical isolationism can only lead to insignificance of one’s own country. [my emphasis]
Spain recently decided to normalize the status of hundreds of thousands of immigrants including asylum seekers living there. Xenophobia can be contagious. So can obvious pragmatism and realism in the context of the rule of law: (4)

 
Notes: (1)  

 (2) Duignan, Brian (2025): "replacement theory". Encyclopedia Britannica 08/232025. <https://www.britannica.com/topic/replacement-theory> (Accessed: 2026-08-02).

(3) Joffe-Block, Jude & Yousef, Odette (2024): How Trump is relying on a racist conspiracy theory to question election results. NPR 09/13/2024. <https://www.npr.org/2024/09/13/g-s1-22583/trump-great-replacement-conspiracy-theory> (Accessed: 2026-08-02).

(4) Spain approves plan to grant legal status to thousands of migrants lacking right to stay. Euronews YouTube channel 01/27/2026. <https://youtu.be/LNEisoZLIH8?si=F89eFEIx5XnbEzsl> (Accessed: 2026-10-02).

Saturday, April 26, 2025

Is liberal democracy a tool of Russian and Chinese warfare? You might think so from this piece

Then-President Trump Hosted Hungary's authoritarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán to the Oval Office back in 2019 as a signal of his Administration's support for far-right governments restricting democratic processes and overriding the rule of law for the benefit of authoritarian governments and the oligarchs they represent.

The relationship of the Trumpists and the Republican Party to particular authoritarian movement provides an important perspective on the argument made by Buddhika Jayamaha and Jahara Matisek in an article for the US Army's Strategic Studies Institute's journal Parameters, "Social Media Warriors: Leveraging a New Battlespace" Parameters Winter 2018-19.

Jayamaha and Matisek make a disturbing argument treating foreign governments surreptitiously using Facebook ads as a form of warfare.

Hungary's Embassy put on a conference for Christian Right Republicans promoting Orbán's brand of völkish family policy in 2019. Ariana Eunjung Cha reported for the Washington Post. (2)

The conservative Christian Post carried this report by Samuel Smith, 'Make Families Great Again': Hungary seeing more babies, fewer abortions through pro-family policies 03/17/2019:
“I was very proud to be a minister here and hearing from our American friends how much they admired the Hungarian family policies,” Katalin Novák, the Hungarian minister of state for family, youth and international affairs who gave a keynote address at the event, told The Christian Post in an interview. ....

Today, the Hungarian government spends nearly 5 percent of its GDP towards incentives for those in the predominantly-Christian nation to get married and have children — lots of them. ...

Participants in the conference included White House director of strategic communications Mercedes Schlapp, President Trump’s special assistant on domestic policy Kathryn Talento and Health and Human Services senior policy advisor Valerie Huber.

The event also included Reps. Chris Smith, R-N.J., Andy Harris, R-Md., Paul Gosar, R-Ariz and Jeff Fortenberry, R-Neb.

Others included Family Research Council President and USCIRF commissioner Tony Perkins, former White House advisor Sebastian Gorka, American Conservative Union Chair Matt Schlapp and as Emilie Kao, the director of the Heritage Foundation's DeVos Center for Religion & Civil Society.

“We are working closely with the U.S. administration on family issues. They would also like to get some detail on our pro-family policies and the measures that we have introduced in the last nine years,” Novák, who is also the vice president of the Fidesz Party explained. (3)
The ever-odious Sebastian Gorka - whose public persona is that of a creepy James Bond movie villain - is now Senior Director for Counterterrorism in the Trump 2.0 regime. I'm not focusing here on Orbán's family policy, which is part of a broader xenophobic and anti-EU policy that promotes a conservative, traditionalist vision of society. It is also exceptionally unlikely to achieve even its stated goal of increasing Hungary's birth rate to the replacement rate by 2030. Rolling back time is just a hard thing to achieve.

But that 2019 conference, explicitly approved by the Trump 1.0 White House, is an illustration of one of many ways that politics in one country provides ideas to people elsewhere. And how governments promote that effect in ways that cover a full range from perfectly legitimate to illegal.

Jayamaha and Jahara Matisek in Parameters are addressing a real and legitimate national security issue. But I'm struck by their framing, which on a generous interpretation could be easily adapted to justify authoritarian policies. They lay out their perspective this way:
Civil society presents a fundamental blind spot in the American military understanding of warfare. Long associated by philosophers as a bulwark against tyranny in liberal democracies, civil society has been weaponized by hostile actors, such as Russia and China, and violent nonstate actors, such as the Islamic State. The adversaries’ strategy involves infiltrating Western civil society in order to foment dissent and create breaches along ethnic, racial, religious, and socioeconomic lines.

The new tactics create ideologically sympathetic individuals who desire policy changes that align with the adversarial state’s ideology or that promote detrimental and self-destructive views; these views, in turn, can undermine societal cohesion while disrupting foreign policy choices. This approach accentuates attacks on Western civil society across multiple dimensions by using social media warriors who indirectly receive orders from, and are secretly paid by, Moscow, Beijing, and other Western adversaries. These social media warriors and their handlers regard the internet as an unguarded, undersurveilled, and ill-defined human-to-human interface that can be easily manipulated. Subsequently, social media forums such as Facebook and Twitter become a battlespace of ideas, injected with disinformation in hopes of influencing individual, societal, and political behavior.

As a consequence, the discourse of Western civil society is shaped in ways fundamentally hostile to the effective functioning of pluralist liberal democracies. Fomenting dissension by spreading divisive social media posts and polarizing memes leads citizens in Western societies to like, and to share, the messages as well as to advocate for the ideas, thus creating a destructive civil discourse. In a homogenous society, such as Iceland, this type of campaign has less impact because the societal differences are primarily economic. [my emphasis]
Let me interrupt here to point out that the population of Iceland is roughly 360,000. The city of Atlanta GA alone has around 486 thousand.
But in countries with a variety of cultural and historical cleavages, malicious civil discourse deepens existing divisions that make social relations more acrimonious.

Disinformation tactics against civil societies in the United States and its Western allies are not particularly new. The novelty, however, is the use of free and open civil discourse, which is traditionally a Western strength, as the center of sociocultural strategy aimed at manipulating civil society into a new battlespace. The first component of this strategy relies on the existence of the internet and the use of social media. With the internet as the medium, individuals conduct essential societal interactions through a variety of apps and platforms that provide instantaneous, uberefficient, daily social contacts without the boundaries that affected civil interaction during the twentieth century. Anti-Western actors use these virtual networks to produce and to breed ideas degenerative to stable societal norms, which ultimately impact policy debates and elections. [my emphasis]
The rest of the article is filled with words, phrases, and comments to describe this process like these quotes:
  • Many virulent Salafi-Jihadists preach Western destruction in Western capitals and large cosmopolitan cities where their dialogue is legally protected.
  • ... undermining Western policy-making capacity and state power
  • ... in liberal democracies that are easily exploitable by hybrid actors who face few mechanisms of enforcement.
  • The value of freedom to liberal societies further complicates efforts to detect hostile attempts to create schismogenesis [social division] because recognizing the activity requires substantial domestic surveillance.
  • ... the West’s adversaries rely on a strategy of socially embedding hostility into the political discourse, converting civil society from a constructive force into a destructive one.
  • The strength of American democracy similarly promotes the same rights for all groups whether they are white supremacist groups in Charlottesville, Virginia, or Black Lives Matter marches in Houston, Texas.
  • ... Western laws, traditions, and norms prevent governments from investigating the actions of civil society organizations without reasonable cause.
  • Each individual has the potential to undermine the strengths of each aspect of civil society from within, sometimes with the complicity of individuals, sometimes via inadvertent foreign threats, and sometimes through soft power influence such as China’s educational exchanges through the Confucius Institute.
  • Nefarious governments, state affiliated proxies, and nonstate actors can, and do, exploit this defining liberal principle.
  • Many citizens with access to social media are subconsciously led to choose one side of a purely manufactured debate.
  • Such warfare is difficult for political and military leaders to respond to adequately, which has dark implications for how democracies are supposed to work.
  • ... the same Western culture and civil society institutions that made America and the West culturally stronger than the Soviet Union have been exploited by the losing side of the Cold War.
Parameters is not National Review. And the Strategic Studies Institute is not FOX News. But FOX and National Review are also not official military journals. Which means that these kinds of ideas in Parameters are considered part of the respectable spectrum of US military scholarship.

So, on the one hand, Jayamaha and Matisek are identifying some legitimate issues about information operations directed by governments.

But it's also striking that they raise some dilemmas that are as old as the concept of free speech as though they are dramatic new developments of the last decade or two. And they use vague, insinuating language that was actually common as dirt during the Cold War to blur distinctions that are actually not only much easier to make than their article suggests, but actually are extensively made in law and established political and diplomatic practices.

They allude to the dilemma of intolerant groups exploiting the freedom of expression in liberal states as though it were some relatively recent discovery. Here is how Rainer Forst in Toleration in Conflict (English version, 2013) describes the great liberal theorist John Locke's view on the limits of toleration as he laid them out in his Epistola de tolerantia (Letter Concerning Tolerance) of 1685:
In the second part of the essay, in which Locke rhetorically addresses the king, he recommends, for the sake of the preservation and stability of the kingdom, that the king should grant toleration to the Protestant Dissenters and also to the sects (which, in Locke's opinion, would then neutralise each other), but deny it to the 'papists'. For the latter defend opinions which are 'absolutely destructive' for the government because of their loyalty to the pope and possibly to foreign Catholic powers; they use toleration only for their own purposes but do not accept it as a claim on themselves; and) in contrast to Protestant groups) they cannot be integrated through toleration but would remain 'irreconcilable enemies'. Locke would continue to defend this, for his time typical, anti-Catholic position in the Epistola de tolerantia though he insists that in doing so he is guided not by dogmatic religious considerations but by political ones. [my emphasis]
Which brings us back to the March 2019 conference on family values sponsored by the Hungarian Embassy and hosted by the Library of Congress. There are elaborate laws and practices associated with such events. There is nothing illegal about attending such a conference. Presumably the attendees were generally sympathetic to the cause being promoted. Although the Christian Post quotes one of them, Peter Sprigg of the Family Research Council, criticizing Hungary's program of providing direct government payments to encourage parenthood, apparently finding it too socialistic for his taste.

Is any of this illegal? No, certainly nothing that I see in these reports.

Is it somehow sinister? Well, I think pretty much anything to do with the hate group Family Research Council is politically sinister. But it's not because of the fact that they attended a Hungary-sponsored event.

I'm not attempting here to address in any detail the various issues raised in the Parameters piece. What I am doing is using the "Making Families Great Again" event as an illustration of how there is a broad, largely familiar range of official international functions that are well understood and well regulated under US and international law. If you go listen to a speech by a foreign ambassador, that's an entirely legitimate thing to do in the US. If you knowingly accept secret payments from a foreign government to do some kind of assignment for them, then you probably are violating the law against working as an unregistered foreign agent. (Although if you're as dumb as Don Trump, Jr., you might be able to convince a prosecutor that you're just not smart enough to have broken the law.)

Russian intelligence agencies using Facebook ads and troll farms is a legitimate legal concern. But that can be addressed without framing every idea that might transcend a national border as, "the same Western culture and civil society institutions that made America and the West culturally stronger than the Soviet Union have been exploited by the losing side of the Cold War." And, not to be picky. But I'm not sure that Russia, Hungary, or even China qualify as "the losing side of the Cold War."

It's also problematic to frame such efforts as cyber warfare. Knocking out a country's power grid or inserting malicious software into military communications systems, yes, those qualify.

But when military officials or spokespeople or publications start identifying civilian trolls, even ones paid by unfriendly foreign powers, as "warriors"; or describing people who repost memes from such trolls as "undermining Western policy-making capacity and state power" in a "battlespace" that benefits "nefarious governments, state affiliated proxies, and nonstate actors"; or griping that this here pussy-ass librul democracy nonsense is lettin' danjerous furriners git away with too much bad stuff - then it's worth it for people who actually support democracy to take a critical look at what's being advocated.

Thursday, March 6, 2025

Dana Schmalz on the “population argument”

“For the sustainable habitation of our planet, the decisive thing is how we live and consume, not how many of us there are." – Dana Schmalz (1)

Giant problems seem to call for giant solutions. And they are also a temptation to look for easy answers. But we also need frameworks to conceptualize big problems. The leading environmental activists, Bill McKibben, for instance, has stressed that the most important elements of environmental policies are batteries, wind turbines, and solar panels. (2) This is a good way of focusing the need for addressing climate change to understandable concepts for public policy that people can conceptualize without having to understand how to build a solar panel or being able to explain how exactly ocean temperature affects jet streams.

In her book The Population Argument: How the Concern Over Too Many People Influences Politics (my translation of the German title), Dana Schmalz looks at the ways since the 18th century that concerns about population growth have affected popular and scientific understanding of social problems. One of the more toxic contemporary examples is “eco-fascism,” which is, yes, A Thing these days.

She cites several recent cases of far-right mass murderers who cited “eco-fascist” motives: the Christchurch, New Zealand case of 2019 (51 killed), El Paso TX in 2019 (23 killed), and Buffalo NY in 2022 (10 killed). The idea in all these cases was that minorities, Muslims, and/or immigrants were ruining the environment. This notion is often joined with xenophobic or racist ideologies like the far-right Great Replacement Theory.

As Schmalz’ historical account relates, the scientific and fact-based study of population issues have often been used as part of racist, eugenic, colonialist and ethnonationalist projects. The British economist and demographer Thomas Malthus (1766-1834) elaborated a demographic theory the human population grows geometrically while the world’s food supply can only grow arithmetically and therefore the food supply would not be able to support the growth rate of the world population, with starvation, mass misery, and recurrent social crises being the inevitable result. He argued for social policies to discourage and limit population growth.
Here social-scientific interest and social concern were thereby mixed with an apology for the better-off: the poverty of many workers could be explained by the fact that they had too many children - and not by the fact that wages were too low. The population argument instead of social redistribution. (Schmalz, p. 17; my emphasis)
This Malthusian notion that those people – not the respectable ones – have to be controlled and regulated for their own good, as well as to protect the affluent from them, has never lost its attraction for those who count themselves among the most worthy and deserving.

The concern for “overpopulation” would also figure in significant ways in the movement for women’s rights and reproductive freedom, sometimes in the form of seemingly unlikely alliances:
Equal reproductive freedom [became] repeatedly threatened from several sides: by conservative opponents of birth control such as the Catholic Church, by racist anti-feminists who only approve of births of certain people, and by representatives of neo-Malthusian approaches who want to regulate reproduction with a view to an alleged or actual common good.
The development of demographics in the 18th and the following centuries did not first create notions of superior and inferior groups. But the beginning of the modern age, conventionally dated from 1492 with the European “discovery” of the New World and colonialism there and in Asia and Africa greatly encouraged the notion. The post-1492 sudden vast expansion of the Spanish colonial project coincided with the Spanish Inquisition and the accompanying notion of pure blood (limpieza), i.e., the quasi-racial notion of the superiority of Christians to Muslims and (especially) Jews. (3)

With the development of biological studies in the 18th century, the use of classifications in zoological and botanical taxonomy based on the scheme propagated by Carolus Linnaeus (1707-1778) grew. And eventually a classification by race was applied to humanity, as well. This notion was then used by many to call some of the races superior to others. In practice, the human racial classifications were always more pseudoscience and ideology than anything scientific. (4) These pseudo-scientific assumptions and biologically and racially superior groups were obviously convenient for European colonialism in the New World and elsewhere.

Schmalz provides an overview of these historical debates. For example, the philosopher William Godwin (1756-1836), husband of the feminist and author Mary Wollstonecraft, argued from a democratically-oriented view that inequality and suppression of political rights were more important causes of social ills than the population numbers. And she reviews the even more radical-democratic criticism that Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels famously made of Malthusianism, which among other things contested Malthus’ argument that population would automatically grow exponentially without systemic efforts to lower birth rates.

The callousness that the Malthusian view could promote was famously illustrated by Charles Dickens in A Christmas Carol, when two gentlemen come into Ebenezer Scrooge’s office to ask for Christmas donations for the poor. Scrooge grumps that there are prisons and workhouses that provide for the destitute:
“I wish to be left alone,” said Scrooge. “Since you ask me what I wish, gentlemen, that is my answer. I don’t make merry myself at Christmas and I can’t afford to make idle people merry. I help to support the establishments I have mentioned—they cost enough; and those who are badly off must go there.”

“Many can’t go there; and many would rather die.”

“If they would rather die,” said Scrooge, “they had better do it, and decrease the surplus population. ...” [my emphasis] (5)

Since then, the argument over whether social ills are due to too many people or too little equality and economic justice has been a recurring one, albeit in evolving forms.

The plague of eugenics

The development of the theory of evolution of which Charles Darwin was the most important figure brought as a (toxic) biproduct the notion of eugenics, the notion that human reproduction should be regulated and restricted in such a way that “desirable” human characteristics should be promoted and less desirable ones eliminated.

Eugenic claims were used to bolster the remarkably racially discriminatory immigration in the United States in the late 19th and early 20th century. Schmalz cites Harry Laughlin and Prescott Hall, the head of the Immigration Restriction League, as two prominent figures who used eugenic arguments to justify these extreme immigration-restriction laws. Those laws were particularly impressive to a young Austrian politician named Adolf Hitler. American race and immigration laws became important models for the Nuremberg Race Laws of 1935. Hitler’s National Socialist movement became enthusiastic supporters of eugenic notion that helped justify gruesome genocidal policies.

But eugenic ideas were considered respectable in Britain and the US, as well. As an example, Foreign Affairs, the prestigious journal of the US Council on Foreign Relations is the direct successor to a journal published from 1910-1919 called The Journal of Race Development. The lead article in its inaugural issue was titled, “The Point of View toward Primitive Races.”

To be fair, its author was G. Stanley Hall, a leading American scholar who played a key role in introducing Sigmund Freud’s theories to the United States. And, as cringy as the vocabulary sounds today, he was making an argument that those who imagined themselves to be more “advanced” had an obligation to promote equality and improvement for all:
Whether the nations that now rule the world will be able to indefinitely wield the accumulated resources of civilization is by no means established. It may be that some stocks now obscure may a few centuries hence take up the torch that falls from our hand and develop other culture types very distinct from ours; and that to them and not to us will be appointed the task of ushering in the kingdom of the superman. [!!] (6)

But Schmalz notes that in the US and Europe at that time, “Overall, attention in these years was focused on issues the distribution of population in space: territory, territorial conflicts and migration.” (p. 94)

She cites the view of Hannah Arendt argument that the notion that overpopulation was a critical threat was an essential element of authoritarian movements in the 20th century:
Arendt described the feeling of people's own superfluity as a basis of totalitarian systems of rule. The idea that a population had to be cultivated like a garden and subjected to selection also formed a basis of totalitarianism. Zygmunt Bauman has analyzed this "gardening state" as an aspect of modernity and as an essential step towards the destruction of the Holocaust. Looking at population as something to be ordered was generally linked to the modern view of the world as formable and made use of a scientific logic, even if the resulting racist classifications lacked any real scientific basis. Above all, such an approach, which "sorted" the population according to value, negated the fundamentally equal dignity of human beings. In extreme cases, it opened the door to arguments that even called for the destruction of life "for the good of the community". Such a eugenic and racist ideology of annihilation reached a climax under the National Socialists. (p. 55)
As Arendt put it, “Only where great masses [of people] are [held to be] superfluous or can be spared without disastrous results of depopulation is totalitarian rule, as distinguished from a totalitarian movement, at all possible.” (7)

We see this notion in the current far-right rhetoric against refugees and immigrants in the US and Europe: there are too many of them here, we don’t need them, they’re taking our jobs, and they’re taking our tax dollars!

Population concerns after 1945

Eugenics after the Second World War was generally discredited, not least by the horrors which racist ideology could generate with eugenic goals as the justification.

But population was still also a major consideration in the approaches to economic development that were a major focus in the decolonizing world after 1945. “Gradually, the theme of population growth was understood as an aspect of development, and the concept of development as such increasingly became a central concern.” (p. 62) In the 1960s, population growth became a more frequent consideration. And in the 1970s as the seriousness of environmental issues was becoming more obvious, it also figured in the debates over what role population played in ecological problems. As Schmalz relates, concepts like “population explosion” became more common.

UN Secretary General U Thant suggested in a 1966 speech that too many people could become a danger for individual rights. That theme was taken up 1968 by a major conference in Teheran on human rights, whose official declaration that hunger and poverty caused by population growth was a danger to those rights. But that view was also contested in subsequent years. Another aspect of this discussion involved women’s reproductive rights, both in terms of women having access to birth control and family planning services and in the context of population control measures that actively sought to limit the number of children per family, as China famously did for years with its one-child policy. India also undertook major sterilization campaigns starting in the 1960s. Schmalz writes, “China’s one-child policy [1979/80-2015] was an extremely oppressive measure and, as such, prompted international criticism.” (p. 78)

The world’s population has grown rapidly. Part of the challenge in understanding the issue was then and still is: “The underlying debates were based on complex bodies of knowledge – on statistical knowledge about the total population in a country, the distribution of age groups, average life expectancy, but also statistics on education and access to health services.” (p.82) It’s complicated, in other words, and that leaves plenty of room for demagogues to cherry-pick data to distract and confuse people. (Not a problem unique to demography, obviously.)

In more recent years, the issue of migration has also involved invocations of a threatening population growth. Africa currently has the world’s fastest-growing population and is also being hit hard by climate change. This has led to hair-raising projections of billions of people being on the move, with European countries supposedly the preferred goal for them. Germany’s Angela Merkel, who argued for more acceptance of refugees in the so-called refugee “crisis” of 2015-16, stated in mid-2016 that 1.2 billion people leaving Africa was a core problem for Europe. Schmalz cites a book, The Scramble for Europe: Young Africa on Its Way to the Old Continent (2019) by Stephen Smith of Duke University that promotes this notion, though she notes that not all of Smith’s analysis is as sleazy as some of the marketing for the book. But she also discusses how this scare talk about Africans flooding into Europe has produced some brutally bad measures to restrict immigration to Europe. She observes, “Population growth is already serving as an occasion and justification for massive migration control.” (p. 89)

This is a common theme in the European immigration debates today. And, like many of the arguments xenophobes and ethnonationalists use, it’s bogus. There are not a billion black and brown people flooding out of African towards Europe. Most of the shocking numbers of total refugees in the world are either internal refugees within their own countries or in a nearby country. That doesn’t mean they don’t have serious problems, they do. But they aren’t flooding into distant wealthy countries. But it’s an illustration of how the Malthusian idea of too many people still affects politics in significant ways.

She argues that, “Today, the dominant idea is that states must shape population growth politically in such a way that emigration is not necessary.” (p. 95) Not only is that view unrealistic in today’s world economy. But heavily ideological, ethnonationalist influences dominate that view of development even today.
The demographic and economic development of Europe is often seen as a model. It is claimed that other countries and regions must go through the same developments in this later time. But it is precisely the massive emigration [within and out of Europe] that accompanied the growth of the European population is left out of that concept. (p. 96)
The xenophobia that has been a key issue for far-right parties in Europe and the US lives on anecdotes and prejudices. Facts are powerful things. But facts alone won’t in themselves counter political demagoguery. It requires democratic parties to introject those facts into the political debate in a way that voters can understand and, yes, it requires stigmatizing the xenophobic claims. Rightwingers can and do sneer at such efforts as “woke.” But voters make much better and more practical decision when they are awake rather than asleep.

The scorn of the more affluent for those less materially fortunate that Adam Smith in the 18th century lamented as a remarkably persistent prejudice, the kind of contempt that the German sociologist Wilhelm Heitmeyer calls “respectable callousness” (rohe Bürgerlichkeit), still plays a large role in perception of “overpopulation.” Smith described it in 1759 this way:
This disposition to admire, and almost to worship, the rich and the powerful, and to despise, or, at least, to neglect persons of poor and mean condition, though necessary both to establish and to maintain the distinction of ranks and the order of society, is, at the same time, the great and most universal cause of the corruption of our moral sentiments. That wealth and greatness are often regarded with the respect and admiration which are due only to wisdom and virtue; and that the contempt, of which vice and folly are the only proper objects, is often most unjustly bestowed upon poverty and weakness, has been the complaint of moralists in all ages. (8)
Schmalz describes that kind of respectable callousness in the present-day debates over “migration” in Europe:
The poorer the people who migrate, the more likely their number will appear to be excessive. Even though planes land in Europe every minute, it is the overcrowded boats that represent immigration for many, and whose occupants are the subject of endless discussions. The fact that populations in poorer countries on average are growing reinforces the impression among many that an ever-increasing, poorer proportion of the world's population is incessantly pushing into the richer parts of the world. This gets combined with racist prejudices. It is always "the others" who are too many. Racism contributes to the fact that people are not seen as having their individual stories, but as a non-individualized group. (p. 98) [my emphasis]
She also devotes a chapter to the ways in which women’s rights become mixed with immigration issues and can be used to reinforce “traditional” women’s roles, as well as to incite fear and hatred against immigrants. She quotes the geographer and migration researcher Nancy Heimstra: “The fertility of immigrant women, or more precisely, of non-white immigrant women, has long been the subject of fear and anger in the USA." (2001)

And Schmalz elaborates:
This observation from the United States can be applied to other places. The reproduction of immigrant women is often viewed critically, with the support of racist stereotypes and nativist fear. The rightwing discourse about the "too many children" that immigrant women supposedly have is often paired with an anti-feminism that laments the "too few children" of the local population. (p. 104)
She closes the book with an account of the present day discussions on ecological sustainability and population, emphasizing that sustainability has to do with factors like CO2 fuels that generate global warming, the need to not sluff those problems off as being secondary or pointless by falsely framing the problem as too many people. “Whether with eight billion, ten billion or much fewer people - the next few decades will be about survival and the good life on a threatened planet.“ (p. 154)

She also notes that based on current projections, world population would be expected to peak in half a century or so and then decrease: “Worldwide, the average number of children has been falling for years, while humanity continues to grow. The current forecast is that in the 2084 the most people ever will live on earth, and the world population will decline from then on.” (p. 153)

And she expects that for the next few decades, the so-called overpopulation problem will be most heavily discussed in connection with migration issues. The sooner democratic political parties learn how to advocate humane and practical measures for managing immigration and defusing ethnonationalist demagoguery, the better off the world will be. But those parties will still have to find ways to push back and discredit the “too many people” arguments. Facts and good sense can beat fearmongering and hate in politics. But it doesn’t happen automatically. It takes effort and creativity.

Notes:

(1) „Für das nachhaltige Bewohnen unseres Planeten ist ausschlaggebend, wie wir leben und konsumieren, nicht, wie viele wir sind.“ Schmalz, Dana (2025): Das Bevölkerungsargument. Wie die Sorge vor zu vielen Menschen Politik beeinflusst, 148. Berlin: Suhrkamp. All translations from the German here are mine.

(2) McKibben, Bill (2023): Yes in Our Backyards. Mother Jones May-June 2023. <https://www.motherjones.com/environment/2023/04/yimby-nimby-progressives-clean-energy-infrastructure-housing-development-wind-solar-bill-mckibben/> (Accessed : 2025-03-04).

(3) The father of the current Israeli Prime Minister was the author of a book on this development: Benzion Netanyahu, The Origins of the Inquisition in Fifteenth Century Spain (1995).

(4) Kolbert, Elizabeth (2018): There’s No Scientific Basis for Race—It's a Made-Up Label. National Geographic 03/12/2018. <https://www.nationalgeographic.com/magazine/article/race-genetics-science-africa> (Accessed: 2025-03-04).

(5) The Project Gutenberg eBook of A Christmas Carol in Prose; Being a Ghost Story of Christmas. (1843) <https://www.gutenberg.org/cache/epub/46/pg46-images.html>

(6) Hall, G. Stanley (1910): The Point of View toward Primitive Races. The Journal of Race Development 1:1. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/29737843?origin=crossref&seq=2> (Accessed: 2025-03-04).

(7) Arendt, Hannah (1958): The Origins of Totalitarianism, 311. New York: Meridian Books.

(8) Smith, Adam (2004 [1759]): The Theory of Moral Sentiments. Part 1, Section 3, Chapter 3. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Tuesday, October 15, 2024

Refuting the xenophobic political rhetoric in the EU

There are some basic facts about immigration in the EU that parties of the left, center, and (the pro-democracy) right have to find ways to inject into the conversation. Following are some of the key ones.

The European Union is based on what are called the Four Freedoms: freedom of movement for goods, services, capital, and people. The kind of combined economy the EU has can’t really function with a healthy dose of all four. How the euro currency is constructed and the (in my view) demented “debt brake” that says EU countries can have no more debt than 60% of their GDP are perpetual problems – but those don’t have to do with the free movement of people. (The free movement for people across borders is actually regulated by what is known as the Schengen system that includes non-EU countries like Switzerland. The first Schengen country which a person enters is the one responsible for checking passports.)

The politicians, of course, have to devise their own talking points for dealing with xenophobic demagogy. But talking points have to be combined with practical, reality-based policies. A few bullet-points on this:

• Xenophobia lives on lies and anecdotes: politicians call out the lies and provide a real-world context refuting them.

• Ending the free movement of people among EU countries would basically wreck the EU common market.

• The current EU “Dublin system” by which asylum-seekers are supposed to be processed by the country of entry has long since broken down and has stuck Greece and Italy with large refugee camps than neither handle well. It needs to be replaced by a required systematic cooperation throughout the EU. Bitching about how our country needs to be able to “control its borders” won’t solve any actual problem.

• Anyone who talks about making immigration physically harder and more dangerous in order to stop immigrants from being exploited by smugglers is blowing smoke. The main effect is to make to attempts to enter the EU more expensive and more deadly. The EU borders are already the deadliest in the world. People who are calling for tougher police or military measures to reduce refugee entry are pretty much consciously calling for more deaths and abuse.

• The third-country solutions, like the now-abandoned British scheme to ship all asylum seekers to Rwanda, or the current EU agreement with Tunisia to hold refugees that and process their European asylum claims, are basically scams to let politicians pretend they are doing something to keep the foreigners out. (This is not to say that any and all such third-party outsourcing is bogus. The EU-Türkiye agreement of 2016 was an example of how that can work reasonably well; but even that eventually became more-or-l ess a scam because the EU failed to follow it up with a more permanent solution.)

• Human rights matter, and they are part of the rule of law. And every EU country is responsible for maintaining the rule of law.

• The EU has to have significant immigration. The birth rates in the EU are below the replacement rate. And for the foreseeable future, maintaining European economies will require more workers that current birth rates don’t provide.

• Strong economies are a magnet for immigration. Western members of the EU attract immigrants from eastern ones. Europe attracts immigrants from outside the EU, both highly-skilled and unskilled.

• Immigration is not easy. And absorbing refugees is also a challenge. And, yes, that requires some amount of public investment for the receiving countries.

• All immigrants and refugees are people and some of them will commit crimes. The better integration can function, the less likely it will be that immigrants turn to criminal activity. In the EU and the US, crime rates among immigrants are generally lower than among native citizens.

• And, yes, all that includes adequate support of government programs, including schools and health insurance. They should be managed well by the government. But there will always be somebody who find it satisfying to bitch and moan about “welfare loafers” no matter what.

• “Help on the spot” is a classic politician’s magi-thinking notion when it refers to cutting down external immigration and asylum-seeking by promoting economic development in the countries now producing lots of refugees. (Short-term assistance in particular crisis moment is a different thing.), At best, promoting develop in poorer countries is a decades-long solution, not an immediate one. And, in any case, the most significant form of development aid that stimulates local economies are cash transfers the immigrants in the EU send to their families in both Global South countries and eastern European EU countries.

• “Help on the spot” is a classic politician’s magi-thinking notion when it refers to cutting down external immigration and asylum-seeking by promoting economic development in the countries now producing lots of refugees. (Short-term assistance in particular crisis moment is a different thing.), At best, promoting develop in poorer countries is a decades-long solution, not an immediate one. And, in any case, the most significant form of development aid that stimulates local economies are cash transfers the immigrants in the EU send to their families in both Global South countries and eastern European EU countries.

• Finally, “open borders” is basically a bogeyman slogan, because no significant political trend actually advocates it. Within the EU, open borders within the Union is an essential part of the construction of the EU, as noted above.

Sunday, April 25, 2021

Orbánism and authoritarianism in Hungary

Shalini Randeria analyzes examples of how rightwing populists can turn a democratic government into an authoritarian one without staging a coup, or a sudden revolution overturning the old governmental system, or blatantly going outside the letter of the law. Her article gives particular attention to Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán and his Fidesz party, who she describes as practicing "soft authoritarian rule" via "electoral authoritarianism."

She focuses on the use of ethnonationalist demagoguery and extreme gerrymandering in Hungary.

Randeria writes that one of the characteristics of ethnonationalist´politics to encourage "pro-natalist" policies. This means some form of promoting a higher rate of reproduction by those who are part of the favored type of people, or ethnic group, or Volk. This also tends to enable traditional masculine attitudes, some of them more toxic than others. She cites the new anti-abortion laws in Poland, and Hungary's withdrawal of rights based on non-binary, non-traditional gender identities, as well as the Orbán government' hostility to women's rights in general. "A politics that defines an ethnically, "racially" or religiously homogeneous nation as a political ideal and goal mobilizes against alleged internal enemies, for example, against cosmopolitan elites, minorities or against migrants."

(All the translations from German in this post are mine.)

Even the word "migrants" has an ideoligical twist in its use by European xenophobes. They assume that "refugee" and "immigrant" are more sympathetic and neutral terms. So they prefer to talk about "migration" and "migrants," because that invokes more of an image of people voluntarily wandering from one country to another.

"Pro-natalist" creates there is an implication and sometimes a more explicit demand to promote people from the pure natural ethnic groups to have more children. 

This is a big joke in the real world. Not one of the 27 countries in the European Union has a birth rate as high as the "replacement rate" that would keep the country's population stable over the long term. That rate is generally taken to be 2,1 children per woman. New immigrants, i.e., people who immigrate as adults, tend to have more children. But children of immigrants tend to have birth rates reflecting that of the country in which they grew up.

Which isn't surprising. Because children of immigrants to Hungary or Poland or Austria who grow up in those countries are Hungarians and Poles and Austrians. So that is one of many ways they are like their fellow Hungarians, Poles and Austrians.

Randeria gives a good description of voter suppression measures in Hungary, which she rightly compares to those the Republican Party in America is actively pursuing. She also compares gerrymandering by Venezuela's President Hugo Chávez to that of Orbán. I'm not familiar with drawing of electoral districts in Venezuela during his Presidency, and that charge is new to me. I do know about the American Republican Party's redistricting habits. And they are very compatable with Orbánism.
But the political body is deformed not only by population politics, but also by a strategic transformation of the electoral law. The fact that Viktor Orbán, as well as Hugo Chávez, used this tactic shows that such attacks on democracy do not only come from the far right. [Until recently, Fidesz had been a conservative party in the European Christian Democratic tradition.] The American political scientist Kim Lane Scheppele of Princeton University uses the term "autocratic legalism" to describe how legal and constitutional measures shift the democratic rules of the game toward illiberalism. In this respect, a variety of soft authoritarian tactics and practices can be observed. One measure favored by American Republicans is gerrymandering. The strategic manipulation of constituency boundaries is intended to distort election results in the long term in order to secure a political advantage for one's own party in the long term. [my emphasis]
There can also be other kinds of gerrymandering. In the US, we're all to familiar with racial gerrymandering. But since we're talking about electoral districts, partisan political considerations are always present.
Viktor Orbán's government in Hungary has taken this tactic to the extreme: it first halved the number of constituencies and then completely redefined the boundaries of these constituencies throughout the country. Constituencies that traditionally voted for Orbán's Fidesz party by a majority came out much smaller than those in which opposition parties could count on greater electoral success. [Opposition voting strength was diluted, in other words.] As a result of these demarcations, Orbán's Fidesz party won two-thirds of the seats in parliament in 2014 with only 45 percent of the vote. With this majority in his back, it was easy for Fidesz to make further constitutional changes. As early as 2012, there had been a constitutional amendment under Orbán, in which ethnic Hungarians living in neighboring states and without residency in Hungary were given the right to vote. A full 95 percent of these new voters outside Hungary's borders voted for the Fidesz party in 2014. In doing so, Orbán‘s government has succeeded in changing the electorate to serve its [Fidesz’] own long-term advantage. [my emphasis]
The gerrymandering is indeed extreme. But the addition of ethnic Hungarians living in other countries is also a disturbing piece of enthonationalist chauvinism, connected with resentments over the Treaty of Trianon (1920). Although Orbán isn't about to start a war with any of Hungary's neighbors over it, countries like Romania have reason to be concerned about Orbán's posturing.

Shaun Walker reported last year (Hungary marks treaty centenary as Orbán harnesses 'Trianon trauma' Guardian 06/04/2020):
While never speaking directly about reclaiming lost territory, Orbán’s government has made Hungarian minority populations in neighbouring countries a cornerstone of its foreign policy, pumping money into cultural centres, media outlets, churches and football clubs in the region and handing out Hungarian passports to those who want them. Hundreds of thousands of ethnic Hungarians have taken up the offer, and the vast majority have cast votes for Orbán’s Fidesz party, cementing its control over Hungarian politics.

Last month, Orbán caused consternation in a number of regional capitals by posting a map of historical Hungary on his Facebook page as part of a post wishing students good luck with their history exams. Slovenia’s president, Borut Pahor, expressed “rejection and concern” over the map. The rights of Hungarian minorities have caused tension in relations with both Romania and Ukraine in recent years. [my emphasis]

Thursday, January 30, 2020

EU long-term challenges on immigration and refugees (Part 1 of 3)

The European Union’s immigration situation faces two major problems, both now and for the foreseeable future.

One is that the EU needs more people. And that applies to most if not all member countries, not just to less wealthy ones like Hungary and Rumania, whose populations have been shrinking due to emigration of younger native-born people.

The other is that Europe’s near neighbors to the south have experienced nearly two decades of war and instability, with no near end in sight: the Middle East and North Africa, and Afghanistan as well, from which refugees make their way towards the EU countries.

In light of the 2015-6 refugee crisis (or acute phase of a much longer crisis), two major policies are needed: systematic recruitment and admission of immigrants for jobs currently going unfilled, whether the shortage is due to lack of skilled workers or because the jobs are so unpleasant they can’t get enough workers for them: and, a plan for fair sharing of refugees among all EU countries at an early stage, not only after asylum has been granted.

Immigration policies can be very complex. But the EU needs both those sets of policies and doesn’t have them now.

It’s a worldwide phenomenon that as countries become wealthier and more urbanized and decent health care becomes more available, the birth rate goes down. The replacement rate, the fertility rate at which the population will remain stable in numbers from one generation to the next, is generally taken to be 2.1 children per woman.

According to Wikipedia (List of sovereign states and dependencies by total fertility rate 01/23/2020), the EU member states have the following fertility rates, rounded to one decimal point:

Austria 1.5
Belgium 1.8
Bulgaria 1.6
Croatia 1.4
Cyprus 1.3
Czechia 1.6 (Visegrad Group)
Denmark 1.8
Estonia 1.6
Finland 1.8
France 1.9
Germany 1.5
Greece 1.4
Hungary 1.5 (Visegrad Group)
Ireland 2.0
Italy 1.3
Latvia 1.5
Lithuania 1.6
Luxembourg 1.6
Malta 1.5
Netherlands 1.8
Poland 1.3 (Visegrad Group)
Portugal 1.4
Romania 1.4
Slovakia 1.6 (Visegrad Group)
Slovenia 1.6
Spain 1.5
Sweden 1.8
UK 1.7

All of them are below the replacement fertility rate of 2.1.

I’ve flagged the Visegrad states, which have been particularly insistent on keeping refugees out of the EU. Visegrad Group member Poland is tied with tiny Cyprus as having the lowest. We should note here that the fertility rate won’t match one-to-one with national wealth measures. But all EU countries are already past the point where the fertility rate has dropped below 2.1.

Fertility rates below the replacement rate mean that over the coming decades, their populations will shrink. This is often discussed in the news in terms of how an aging population presents new challenges for country’s health care and government social insurance.

But it’s also generally assumed that a shrinking population is a danger to economic growth.

Scott Lanman writes (A World With Fewer Babies Spells Economic Trouble Bloomberg Businessweek 09/14/2018:
Forget the prophecies saying overpopulation will starve the planet. The human race is approaching the point where it’s no longer reproducing enough to expand the global headcount. In the world’s biggest economies -- the U.S., China, Japan and Germany -- it’s already happening or will soon. Economists say these countries could see slower economic growth unless they increase their working-age populations by accepting immigrants, possibly from regions with higher fertility rates, like parts of Asia and Africa. Lower fertility rates -- the number of live births per woman -- could also threaten safety-net programs like pensions and health care. [my emphasis]
In the US and Europe, the only reason it would threaten “safety-net programs” is if governments are unwilling to tax the wealth at a reasonable rate. But until those countries transition to a green economy in which economic prosperity is not linked to a growing population fueling growing consumption, a growing population is needed.

It was interesting to hear what Austrian Chancellor Sebastian “Basti” Kurz (ÖVP) himself recently said at the Davos World Economic Forum (A Conversation with Sebastian Kurz, Federal Chancellor of Austria 24.01.2020):
I recently had a discussion in which it was philosophized about how the post-growth society, and, can it [it] actually be good for a country when there is no more economic growth and if, yes, we still are satisfied, and would it not be even better in any case to measure the satisfaction of the population and not economic growth.

So, that all always sounds so beautiful and so romantic. I can only say that in Europe we have some of the oldest societies in the world. I think Germany has the second oldest society after Japan.

So, satisfaction doesn’t pay any pensions, okay? If we do not have growth, if we do not succeed in remaining economically competitive, that is, the European Union, because then its also Good Night welfare state and Good Night European achievements. (after 25:20 in the video)
The relation of birth and fertility rates has been studied in the context of Malthusian claims that low growth in poor countries is caused to a large if not near-exclusive extent by high population growth. This notion has been effectively refuted for, oh, the last two centuries. But it is still remarkably persistence because it is an effective distraction from maldistribution of world income and massive exploitation of poor countries by wealthier ones.

The European far right recognizes the decline of the population but try to use it as a justification for their racist, anti-Semitic “great replacement” theory. Europe’s current model authoritarian Viktor Orban is trying to promote a higher birth rate, framing in racist-nationalistic terms (Hungary to provide free fertility treatment to boost population BBC News 01/10/2020):
Hungary will provide free in-vitro fertilisation (IVF) treatment to couples at state-run clinics, Prime Minister Viktor Orbán has announced.

He said fertility was of "strategic importance". Last month his government took over Hungary's fertility clinics.

Mr Orban, a right-wing nationalist, has long advocated a "procreation over immigration" approach to deal with demographic decline.

The country's population has been falling steadily for four decades.
See also: Nora Shenouda, Ungarn setzt auf staatliche "Babyfabriken" Euronews 15.01.2020.

The idea that Hungary will get from a fertility rate of 1,5 to 2,1 or higher in any foreseeable future is nonsense. It would take forcing women out of the workforce and into a real Handmaid’s Tale kind of society in which women were basically only allowed to breed and raise children. And even that probably wouldn’t get it to the replacement rate. (If there is a side benefit of some improvement’s in women’s reproductive health care, that will be a desirable if unintended consequence.)

It’s also important to remember that the relationship between economic growth and declining population isn’t instantaneous. It doesn’t mean that if in 2020, Hungary’s population declines from 2019 that Hungary’s GDP or per capital income will decline from 2019 to 2020. Obviously, business cycles still exist.

And the fact that population decline does not manifest its effects instantly means that it’s difficult to make it a focus of short-term politics. We are seeing dramatically and worldwide now how the difficulty of prioritizing long-term policies against climate change is working out. That is, not well.

In Part 2, I will look specifically at how the new coalition government in Austria is approaching the long-term challenges of the fertility rates and refugees. (Or not doing so.)

Part 1: https://brucemillerca.blogspot.com/2020/01/eu-long-term-challenges-on-immigration.html
Part 2: https://brucemillerca.blogspot.com/2020/02/eu-long-term-challenges-on-immigration.html
Part 3: https://brucemillerca.blogspot.com/2020/02/eu-long-term-challenges-on-immigration_5.html