Arrests and confusion in the Haiti crises

The US is backing the Haitian "the prime minister who recently resigned his post" (?!) as the official head of government. (Jacqueline Charles and >Michael Wilner, Two South Florida men, 26 Colombians involved in Moïse assassination, Haiti police say Miami Herald 07/09/2021).

Arrests are continuing, including two Americans and a bunch of Colombians: Two South Florida men have been arrested in connection with the assassination of Haiti President Jovenel Moïse, along with 15 Colombian nationals, Haiti police said Thursday night.

James Solages, 35, of Fort Lauderdale, was identified as one of the assailants by Mathias Pierre, a minister in charge of Haitian elections. Solages, originally from Haiti, is an American citizen, Pierre said.

Haitian officials have not released the names of the other men arrested, but they said there are a total of 15 Colombians under arrest along with the two South Florida Haitian Americans. Police said three of the assailants, Colombians as well, were killed. Earlier, Haiti police had said seven of the assailants were dead. They did not explain the discrepancy, but said they are still looking for eight other assailants, all Colombians.

And there are two significant additional contenders for heading the government, as Jacqueline Charles reports in Two politicians have been claiming they are in charge in Haiti. Now there are three Miami Herald 07/09/2021. The article gives an idea of how seriously the national institutions of governance has deteriorate as Haiti is undergoing its own authoritarian trend. Jean-Bertrand Aristide was the first democratically elected president, winning the office in 1990. He was illegally ousted, and later restored to power by the US under the Clinton Administration.

The US is heavily involved in Haitian politics. Haiti is the poorest country in Latin America.

What the Biden-Harris Administration does in the coming weeks and months in Haiti will be a glimpse at what his Latin American policy more generally is. It's a safe bet that Haitian policy will not be a high priority for this Administration and will be largely ignored by the US corporate media. Biden gave this description of the US interest in Haiti earlier in hi career (Joe Biden In 1994: If Haiti Fell In The Sea, ‘It Wouldn't Matter A Whole Lot’)

Claude Joseph's government, the one officially recognized by the Biden-Harris Administration at the moment, is asking for US assistance, unsurprisingly. (Maria Ortiz, El gobierno interino de Haití solicitó asistencia de seguridad de Estados Unidos La Opinión 10.Julio.2021; Evens Sanon et al, Haiti’s interim government asks the U.S. to send troops Los Angeles Times/AP 07/09/2021) This may be an entirely sensible request on Joseph's government's part. But if the US intervened with military or other security forces on behalf of this government, that obviously could provide a real political advantage to Joseph. Although, in the situation there right now, that's not even clear.

As the LA Times/AP repots:

Haiti had grown increasingly unstable under Moise, who had been ruling by decree for more than a year and faced violent protests as critics accused him of trying to amass more power while the opposition demanded he step down.

The U.N. Security Council met privately Thursday to discuss the situation in Haiti, and U.N. special envoy Helen La Lime said afterward that Haitian officials had asked for additional security assistance.

Deutsche Welle news also reports, Haiti asks US to send troops amid political power vacuum 07/10/2021:

The apparent involvement of Colombian mercenaries is another part of the story that will likely provide some interesting details as the story unfolds. The Argentine Página/12 reports (Tres colombianos más detenidos en Haití 10.07.2021):

La capital de Haití volvió a reanudar sus actividades este viernes con la reactivación gradual del servicio transporte público y un mayor número de personas en las calles, aunque la incertidumbre está latente en la población y en las distintas teorías que emergen. "Se trata de extranjeros que llegaron al país para perpetrar este crimen. Los haitianos estamos consternados", declaró un habitante de la capital. "Necesitamos saber quién está detrás de esto, sus nombres, sus antecedentes para que la justicia pueda hacer su trabajo". Algunos, como el exsenador Steven Benoit afirmaron que pueden haber policías haitianos involucrados. "Moïse fue asesinado por sus agentes de seguridad. No fueron los colombianos quienes lo asesinaron. Fueron contratados por el Estado haitiano", dijo el viernes en la radio el exsenador Steven Benoit, sobre la confusa trama que desestabiliza al país con mayor pobreza del continente.

[Haiti's capital resumed its activities on Friday with the gradual reactivation of public transport service and a greater number of people on the streets, although uncertainty is latent in the population and in the different theories that emerge. "These are foreigners who came to the country to perpetrate this crime. Haitians are dismayed," said a resident of the capital. "We need to know who is behind this, their names, their background so that justice can do its job." Some, like former Senator Steven Benoit, claimed that Haitian police may be involved. "Moïse was killed by his security agents. It was not the Colombians who murdered him. They were hired by the Haitian state," former Senator Steven Benoit said on the radio Friday, about the confusing plot destabilizing the continent's most poverty-stricken country.] {my translation}

Putin on the Bolivian coup

Julio Burdman has a good commentary explaining Russia's formal position on Bolivia.  Vladimir Putin has criticized the coup in Bolivia against Evo Morales' democratically elected government (Interpretando a Putin en Bolivia Tiempo argentino 17.11.2019, with my translation into English):

Pero además, Rusia está defendiendo en Bolivia uno de los temas recurrentes de Putin: la legalidad del Estado. La diplomacia de Estados Unidos siempre defiende los valores de la democracia y la libertad (con el sesgo de sus alianzas, claro) y ahora con Trump agregó la retórica proteccionista (por lo menos, Trump lo es). La diplomacia china, siempre defensora de la autodeterminación de las naciones, en la era Xi Jinping (y Trump) se convirtió también en una portavoz a favor del comercio libre y contraria al proteccionismo. Y Rusia, la histórica vocera de la cooperación de los pueblos, con Putin se convirtió en el baluarte de la estabilidad política y el gobierno soberano. Putin brega por el estado-nación y por una institucionalización del derecho internacional, y no es fan de revueltas, protestas y mucho menos de secesionismos.

La Rusia de Putin es formalmente contraria a la teoría (washingtoniana) de los estados fallidos, y ve factores de desestabilización cuando un gobierno empieza a tambalear. Pero lo que más rechaza son las consecuencias de la desestabilización. En la doctrina rusa, sus intereses nacionales se ven afectados con la inestabilidad, mientras que los Estados Unidos (que tienen un sector privado y una sociedad civil más dinámicos que Rusia) se ven favorecidos en el desorden -y su espejo global. Por eso, para Rusia siempre tiene que haber un gobernante legítimo y legal en cada país. Por supuesto que Moscú puede tener amigos y aliados, pero el orden es la precondición. Hay, además, otro factor: Rusia siempre pelea por mantener la integridad de su territorio. En la historia rusa, la inestabilidad interna conduce a la fragmentación de su propio estado territorial. La doctrina Putin es internacional, y también es interna.

[But Russia is also defending in Bolivia one of Putin's recurring themes: the legality of the state. U.S. diplomacy always upholds the values of democracy and freedom (with the bias of their alliances, of course) and now with Trump he added protectionist rhetoric (at least, Trump is). Chinese diplomacy, always an advocate of the self-determination of nations, in the era of Xi Jinping (and Trump) also became a spokesperson for free trade and contrary to protectionism. And Russia, the historical spokeswoman cooperation among peoples, with Putin became the bulwark of political stability and sovereign rule. Putin fights for the nation-state and an institutionalization of international law, and is no fan of revolts, protests, let alone secessionisms.

Putin's Russia is formally opposed to the (Washingtonian) theory of failed states, and sees factors of destabilization when a government begins to wobble. But what it rejects most are the consequences of destabilization. In Russian doctrine, its national interests are affected by instability, while the United States (which has a more dynamic private sector and civil society than Russia) sees disorder as benefitting it - and its global mirror. Therefore, for Russia there must always be a legitimate and legal ruler in each country. Of course, Moscow may have friends and allies, but order is the precondition. There is also another factor: Russia always fights to maintain the integrity of its territory. In Russian history, internal instability leads to the fragmentation of its own territorial state. The Putin doctrine is international, and it is also internal.]

I read this as Burdman explaining the official stance that Putin's government takes, not defending it as thoroughly consistent. At one level, hypocrisy is part of the grease that makes international diplomacy work. So, of course in Ukraine - which most Russians reportedly see as legitimately a part of Russia - Putin objected to political disorder that pushed the Ukrainian government in a policy direction that Moscow didn't like. Obviously, Russian security and nationalist considerations have overridden any general concern for Ukrainian government sovereignty in the Russians annexing Crimea and militarily supporting internal separatist movements.

But Burdman's description is a good explanation of Russia's current formal stance. And it's consistent with other analyses from experts on Russia in emphasizing Putin's expressed view (cynical or not) of the United States as supporting "revolution" to achieve regime change in countries whose existing governments the US finds somehow inconvenient.

In the "realist" viewpoint, the current international order is defined by the ascendency of China, which is expanding its influence in the world to the (relative) disadvantage of currently more dominant powers like the US (globally), as well as Russia and the EU, more regionally but to a certain extent globally. In the realist view, the US, the EU, and Russia are in the position of managing China's rise and their own relative declines while trying to optimize their own positions.

In that framework, both China and Russia have an interest in cultivating stronger relationships in Latin America, the traditional sphere of influence of the US. They have good economic reasons for doing so. But there's also the political-military advantage of using those relationships to discourage unwanted US activity closer to their own borders. That was a key element in the Soviet Union's support for Cuba, most dramatically illustrated in the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962. (You have nuclear missiles in Turkey pointed at us? Let's see how you like nuclear missiles in Cuba pointed at you!)

But as useful as high-level realist considerations are in understanding interstate relations, nations are not abstract entities with predetermined definitions of their national interests. They are countries full of people with divergent interests. And defining what a country's national interest should be is as much a legitimate matter for political contention as any other issue. Given the stakes of real threats like the climate crisis and nuclear arms proliferation, defining the national interest is even more legitimate a topic of politics than many other things.

US policy toward Latin America has operated for a long time primarily on a definition of the US national interest as being more-or-less identical to those of oligarchs, US extractive industries, arms manufacturers, and financial buccaneers. It's a bad way to conduct relations with Latin America. And ideology also plays a role, sometimes really bad, unrealistic ideology. The US obsession with neoliberal economics, first pioneered in practice in the Chilean and Argentine military dictatorships of the 1970s, is a prime example of an ideological fixation that we could generously describe as deeply flawed.

In pure balance-of-power terms, the destructive effects of US economic policy and its accompanying attitude to democracy in Latin America ranging from indifferent to hostile create some obvious openings for other countries like China or Russia to make inroads into the US sphere of influence there. And so, neither Vladimir Putin nor Xi Jinping have to adhere to some universally consistent notion of national sovereignty and respect for other states' independence to make it in their interest to take such a diplomatic stance in Latin America.

Julio Burdman's comment, "Russia always fights to maintain the integrity of its territory. In Russian history, internal instability leads to the fragmentation of its own territorial state," is also consistent with most accounts I've seen of Putin's own orientation. Whatever standards he was applying, he seems to have considered the fall of the Soviet Union as a genuine national catastrophe for Russia. And his policies toward secessionist movements within Russia, like that of Chechnya, have been consistent with that orientation.

Putin definitely has policy goals oriented toward preserving and augmenting Russian national power and the interests of Russian oligarchs. But he doesn't seem to be promoting some more general universalist ideology, though his relationship to ideological far-right political groups and ideologies in Europe and the US have given some observers that impression. Too many Democrats in the US after the Russian interference in the 2016 Presidential election have been talking about Putin's government as though it were a mirror-image of a simplistic Cold War understanding of the USSR. Promoting a universalist ideology was a part of Soviet statecraft. Which, of course, did not exclude highly practical adaptations to particular foreign-policy circumstances.