A (mostly) decent American foreign-policy Establishment view of the Bolivian coup

Santiago Anria and Kenneth Roberts have a helpful and solid article about the Bolivian coup, Bolivia After Morales: What Lies in Store for the Country? Foreign Affairs 11/21/2019. (Accessing the full article requires registration.)

As one might expect from a piece in the stereotypically Establishment Foreign Affairs, the authors seem to be intent on not showing any special appreciation for Morales, that actually makes their account of his government's accomplishments even more convincing. I'll predict that this paragraph is not something we'll see Sen. Marco Rubio retweeting or asking to be entered into the Congressional Record:

Bolivia also performed well economically, in marked contrast to countries such as Argentina, where leftist rule quickly became a strain on public finances, or Venezuela, where it culminated in economic catastrophe. Unlike the leaders of those countries, Morales combined soaring rhetoric about nationalization with moderate policies. He welcomed foreign investors in Bolivia’s lucrative mining and hydrocarbon sectors while increasing the taxes they paid, producing steady economic growth, low inflation, and an extraordinary increase in state revenues. The government spent this money on basic infrastructure, education, health, and, to a lesser extent, social security. The new taxes also helped finance social programs that allowed Bolivia to reduce income inequality more dramatically than any country in the region. Such is the staying power of these social policies that Carlos Mesa, Morales’s main challenger in the 2019 election, promised to maintain them if elected. [my emphasis]

The dig at Argentinian kirchnerismo is gratuitous, especially in light of the spectacularly bad record of the standard neoliberal policies Mauricio Macri's subsequent Argentine government (2015-2019), which resulted in his loss of the Presidential election this year. And no mainstream American account of any Latin American event these days is complete without a mention of "Venezuela" as a socialist disaster - never, of course, as a petrostate disaster.

Anria and Roberts also make it clear what a nasty piece of work the new coup government has been so far:

[The coup-installed President Jeanine] Áñez’s interim government - purportedly a caretaker cabinet tasked with organizing new elections- seems intent on discrediting not just Morales but the whole of his party as legitimate actors in Bolivian politics. Áñez has threatened to call new elections via presidential decree, a step that would give her broad leeway to bar MAS candidates from running. [MAS is Morales' party, the largest in Bolivia.] Arturo Murillo, the iron-fisted new interior minister, has vowed to “hunt down” members of the old government. In a display of deep racial animosity, the government has cracked down on indigenous pro-Morales protesters using live ammunition and has gone so far as to preemptively exempt the military from criminal responsibility for any use of force against protesters. [my emphasis]

To put that last part in slightly more direct language, the coup government with no electoral legitimation has given the military a blank check to murder protesters.

All of which makes me wonder if the sentence in the lede paragraph that Morales' "ouster was a rare victory for democracy and the rule of law at a time when authoritarianism is on the upswing" wasn't some kind of misguided editiorial insert. Because even their criticisms of Morales don't come close to making a military coup "a rare victory for democracy." Although I wouldn't be surprised to see Marco Rubio tweeting that. But it's an appalling way to characterize what the article itself describes. (Update 11/25/2019: To be fair, that phrase was characterizing the pro-coup position. But it's still a case of phony "balance", i.e., "Neither narrative captures the whole story, yet both contain a kernel of truth.")

Not that it matters in immediate practice now. But I would like to see some kind of independent international review by some credible institution like the Carter Center of the vague and undocumented OAS charges of election irregularities. Although given the very sporadic coverage of Latin American affairs in the US and Europe, it's probably already become an article of faith that lazy pundits will repeat for the next century. But the historical record matters. And the OAS claims so far are unsubstantiated.

I was surprised yesterday when I picked up a copy of the left-leaning German weekly paper Jungle World ("Bolivien auf der Kippe" Nr. 27, 21.11.2019), which had a worthwhile feature on the extremism concept. But it also had an article on the Bolivian coup by Knut Henkel of the Green-affiliated Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung which was plainly slanted in favor of the golpistas, to a degree especially surprising for a supposedly left weekly. Its explanation of the OAS claims about election irregularities was just plain bad.

Putin on the Bolivian coup

Julio Burdman has a good commentary explaining Russia's formal position on Bolivia.  Vladimir Putin has criticized the coup in Bolivia against Evo Morales' democratically elected government (Interpretando a Putin en Bolivia Tiempo argentino 17.11.2019, with my translation into English):

Pero además, Rusia está defendiendo en Bolivia uno de los temas recurrentes de Putin: la legalidad del Estado. La diplomacia de Estados Unidos siempre defiende los valores de la democracia y la libertad (con el sesgo de sus alianzas, claro) y ahora con Trump agregó la retórica proteccionista (por lo menos, Trump lo es). La diplomacia china, siempre defensora de la autodeterminación de las naciones, en la era Xi Jinping (y Trump) se convirtió también en una portavoz a favor del comercio libre y contraria al proteccionismo. Y Rusia, la histórica vocera de la cooperación de los pueblos, con Putin se convirtió en el baluarte de la estabilidad política y el gobierno soberano. Putin brega por el estado-nación y por una institucionalización del derecho internacional, y no es fan de revueltas, protestas y mucho menos de secesionismos.

La Rusia de Putin es formalmente contraria a la teoría (washingtoniana) de los estados fallidos, y ve factores de desestabilización cuando un gobierno empieza a tambalear. Pero lo que más rechaza son las consecuencias de la desestabilización. En la doctrina rusa, sus intereses nacionales se ven afectados con la inestabilidad, mientras que los Estados Unidos (que tienen un sector privado y una sociedad civil más dinámicos que Rusia) se ven favorecidos en el desorden -y su espejo global. Por eso, para Rusia siempre tiene que haber un gobernante legítimo y legal en cada país. Por supuesto que Moscú puede tener amigos y aliados, pero el orden es la precondición. Hay, además, otro factor: Rusia siempre pelea por mantener la integridad de su territorio. En la historia rusa, la inestabilidad interna conduce a la fragmentación de su propio estado territorial. La doctrina Putin es internacional, y también es interna.

[But Russia is also defending in Bolivia one of Putin's recurring themes: the legality of the state. U.S. diplomacy always upholds the values of democracy and freedom (with the bias of their alliances, of course) and now with Trump he added protectionist rhetoric (at least, Trump is). Chinese diplomacy, always an advocate of the self-determination of nations, in the era of Xi Jinping (and Trump) also became a spokesperson for free trade and contrary to protectionism. And Russia, the historical spokeswoman cooperation among peoples, with Putin became the bulwark of political stability and sovereign rule. Putin fights for the nation-state and an institutionalization of international law, and is no fan of revolts, protests, let alone secessionisms.

Putin's Russia is formally opposed to the (Washingtonian) theory of failed states, and sees factors of destabilization when a government begins to wobble. But what it rejects most are the consequences of destabilization. In Russian doctrine, its national interests are affected by instability, while the United States (which has a more dynamic private sector and civil society than Russia) sees disorder as benefitting it - and its global mirror. Therefore, for Russia there must always be a legitimate and legal ruler in each country. Of course, Moscow may have friends and allies, but order is the precondition. There is also another factor: Russia always fights to maintain the integrity of its territory. In Russian history, internal instability leads to the fragmentation of its own territorial state. The Putin doctrine is international, and it is also internal.]

I read this as Burdman explaining the official stance that Putin's government takes, not defending it as thoroughly consistent. At one level, hypocrisy is part of the grease that makes international diplomacy work. So, of course in Ukraine - which most Russians reportedly see as legitimately a part of Russia - Putin objected to political disorder that pushed the Ukrainian government in a policy direction that Moscow didn't like. Obviously, Russian security and nationalist considerations have overridden any general concern for Ukrainian government sovereignty in the Russians annexing Crimea and militarily supporting internal separatist movements.

But Burdman's description is a good explanation of Russia's current formal stance. And it's consistent with other analyses from experts on Russia in emphasizing Putin's expressed view (cynical or not) of the United States as supporting "revolution" to achieve regime change in countries whose existing governments the US finds somehow inconvenient.

In the "realist" viewpoint, the current international order is defined by the ascendency of China, which is expanding its influence in the world to the (relative) disadvantage of currently more dominant powers like the US (globally), as well as Russia and the EU, more regionally but to a certain extent globally. In the realist view, the US, the EU, and Russia are in the position of managing China's rise and their own relative declines while trying to optimize their own positions.

In that framework, both China and Russia have an interest in cultivating stronger relationships in Latin America, the traditional sphere of influence of the US. They have good economic reasons for doing so. But there's also the political-military advantage of using those relationships to discourage unwanted US activity closer to their own borders. That was a key element in the Soviet Union's support for Cuba, most dramatically illustrated in the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962. (You have nuclear missiles in Turkey pointed at us? Let's see how you like nuclear missiles in Cuba pointed at you!)

But as useful as high-level realist considerations are in understanding interstate relations, nations are not abstract entities with predetermined definitions of their national interests. They are countries full of people with divergent interests. And defining what a country's national interest should be is as much a legitimate matter for political contention as any other issue. Given the stakes of real threats like the climate crisis and nuclear arms proliferation, defining the national interest is even more legitimate a topic of politics than many other things.

US policy toward Latin America has operated for a long time primarily on a definition of the US national interest as being more-or-less identical to those of oligarchs, US extractive industries, arms manufacturers, and financial buccaneers. It's a bad way to conduct relations with Latin America. And ideology also plays a role, sometimes really bad, unrealistic ideology. The US obsession with neoliberal economics, first pioneered in practice in the Chilean and Argentine military dictatorships of the 1970s, is a prime example of an ideological fixation that we could generously describe as deeply flawed.

In pure balance-of-power terms, the destructive effects of US economic policy and its accompanying attitude to democracy in Latin America ranging from indifferent to hostile create some obvious openings for other countries like China or Russia to make inroads into the US sphere of influence there. And so, neither Vladimir Putin nor Xi Jinping have to adhere to some universally consistent notion of national sovereignty and respect for other states' independence to make it in their interest to take such a diplomatic stance in Latin America.

Julio Burdman's comment, "Russia always fights to maintain the integrity of its territory. In Russian history, internal instability leads to the fragmentation of its own territorial state," is also consistent with most accounts I've seen of Putin's own orientation. Whatever standards he was applying, he seems to have considered the fall of the Soviet Union as a genuine national catastrophe for Russia. And his policies toward secessionist movements within Russia, like that of Chechnya, have been consistent with that orientation.

Putin definitely has policy goals oriented toward preserving and augmenting Russian national power and the interests of Russian oligarchs. But he doesn't seem to be promoting some more general universalist ideology, though his relationship to ideological far-right political groups and ideologies in Europe and the US have given some observers that impression. Too many Democrats in the US after the Russian interference in the 2016 Presidential election have been talking about Putin's government as though it were a mirror-image of a simplistic Cold War understanding of the USSR. Promoting a universalist ideology was a part of Soviet statecraft. Which, of course, did not exclude highly practical adaptations to particular foreign-policy circumstances.

Weird mini-analysis of the Bolivian coup by a New York Times reporter

Anatoly Kurmanaev is a "New York Times reporter in Caracas. Previously with Wall Street Journal, Bloomberg, Interfax in Russia & LatAm," accordig to his Twitter bio.

This doesn't make any sense.

Does he mean that the smart play is to have a bad economy because that will make the army loyal? But promoting economic prosperity makes you a LOSER who deserves to be overthrown in a military coup?

This lends credibility to Ryam Grim's caution:

What's happening in Bolivia is layered and complicated but a good rule of thumb is don't confuse yourself by reading the New York Times on South American politics. There are exceptions to that rule but it's generally a safe bet.

— Ryan Grim (@ryangrim) November 11, 2019

Anti-democracy coup in Bolivia

What's happening in Bolivia is clearly not a demand to repeat elections! It's a full-blown coup. The decision of the government leaders to resign doesn't look to have been voluntary, although there are a lot of details not yet known publicly.

Marco Teruggi reports (Se consumó el golpe en Bolivia: renunció Evo Morales Página/12 11.11.2019: my English translation):

El anuncio hecho por Morales era entonces cuestión de tiempo. La ofensiva golpista ya había tomado los principales espacios, y las renuncias de funcionarios se fueron sucediendo, la mayoría bajo amenaza y persecución.

La renuncia de Morales y Linera fue seguida de persecusiones: las autoridades del Tribunal Supremo Electoral, María Eugenia Choque y Antonio Costas, fueron detenidos y esposados por la policía, en un escenario de sucesión de imágenes y noticias mezcladas entre la confusión, la militarización, y la euforia golpista con gritos y evocaciones a la democracia y a Dios.

Luego de los anuncios desde Chapare, renunció la presidenta del Senado, Adriana Salvatierra, quien debía asumir la presidencia. Lo mismo sucedió con quien debía seguir, el primer vicepresidente, abriéndose un escenario de preguntas que serán resultan a medida que tome forma el reordenamiento conducido por la Policía Nacional, la Fuerza Armada, los dirigentes golpistas, los empresarios que financiaron, y quienes respaldaron la invalidación de las elecciones desde el primer momento: el gobierno norteamericano.

En ese contexto se sucedieron las denuncias respecto a la seguridad de Evo Morales, quien denunció que existe una “orden de aprehensión ilegal” en contra suya, y que su domicilio fue asaltado por grupos violentos. La situación de Morales se repite en el caso de varios dirigentes y militantes del proceso de cambio bajo amenaza de persecución.

[The [resignation] announcement made by [President Evo] Morales was therefore a matter of time. The coup offensive had already taken over the main spaces, and the resignations of officials were taking place, most under threat and persecution.

Morales' and Linera's resignations were followed by acts of persecution: the authorities of the Supreme Electoral Court, María Eugenia Choque and Antonio Costas, were arrested and handcuffed by the police, in a succession scenario of images and news mixed into the confusion, militarization, and coup euphoria with cries and evocations of democracy and God.

After the announcements from Chapare, the president of the Senate, Adriana Salvatierra, who was to assume the presidency, resigned. The same was the case with the person next in the succession, the first vice president, raising a series of questions about what will result as reordering takes shape led by the National Police, the Armed Forces, the coup leaders, the businessmen who financed it, and those who supported the invalidation of elections from the outset: the American government.

In this context, complaints regarding the security of Evo Morales, who denounced an "illegal apprehension order" against him, were reported, and that his home was raided by violent groups. Morales' situation is repeated in the case of several leaders and militants of the process of change [i.e., supporter of Morales] under threat of persecution.}

This coup is a wretched development for Latin America.

Mexico has offered Morales asylum. Emir Olivares Alonso, Tras renuncia de Evo, México le ofrece asilo de requerirlo La Journada 10.11.2019: "Following the military coup that led to Morales' resignation and the political crisis in that nation, the administration of [Mexican President] Andrés Manuel López Obrador offered asylum in his embassy in that nation to 20 officials of the Bolivian Executive and Legislative." (My translation)

By the way, there is another government in the Western Hemisphere that is laying the propaganda groundwork for claiming elections were invalid and the results should be resisted by violence if their side loses.

Think I'm exaggerating? Have you been following the news from the US since 2016?