Pero además, Rusia está defendiendo en Bolivia uno de los temas recurrentes de Putin: la legalidad del Estado. La diplomacia de Estados Unidos siempre defiende los valores de la democracia y la libertad (con el sesgo de sus alianzas, claro) y ahora con Trump agregó la retórica proteccionista (por lo menos, Trump lo es). La diplomacia china, siempre defensora de la autodeterminación de las naciones, en la era Xi Jinping (y Trump) se convirtió también en una portavoz a favor del comercio libre y contraria al proteccionismo. Y Rusia, la histórica vocera de la cooperación de los pueblos, con Putin se convirtió en el baluarte de la estabilidad política y el gobierno soberano. Putin brega por el estado-nación y por una institucionalización del derecho internacional, y no es fan de revueltas, protestas y mucho menos de secesionismos.I read this as Burdman explaining the official stance that Putin's government takes, not defending it as thoroughly consistent. At one level, hypocrisy is part of the grease that makes international diplomacy work. So, of course in Ukraine - which most Russians reportedly see as legitimately a part of Russia - Putin objected to political disorder that pushed the Ukrainian government in a policy direction that Moscow didn't like. Obviously, Russian security and nationalist considerations have overridden any general concern for Ukrainian government sovereignty in the Russians annexing Crimea and militarily supporting internal separatist movements.
La Rusia de Putin es formalmente contraria a la teoría (washingtoniana) de los estados fallidos, y ve factores de desestabilización cuando un gobierno empieza a tambalear. Pero lo que más rechaza son las consecuencias de la desestabilización. En la doctrina rusa, sus intereses nacionales se ven afectados con la inestabilidad, mientras que los Estados Unidos (que tienen un sector privado y una sociedad civil más dinámicos que Rusia) se ven favorecidos en el desorden -y su espejo global. Por eso, para Rusia siempre tiene que haber un gobernante legítimo y legal en cada país. Por supuesto que Moscú puede tener amigos y aliados, pero el orden es la precondición. Hay, además, otro factor: Rusia siempre pelea por mantener la integridad de su territorio. En la historia rusa, la inestabilidad interna conduce a la fragmentación de su propio estado territorial. La doctrina Putin es internacional, y también es interna.
[But Russia is also defending in Bolivia one of Putin's recurring themes: the legality of the state. U.S. diplomacy always upholds the values of democracy and freedom (with the bias of their alliances, of course) and now with Trump he added protectionist rhetoric (at least, Trump is). Chinese diplomacy, always an advocate of the self-determination of nations, in the era of Xi Jinping (and Trump) also became a spokesperson for free trade and contrary to protectionism. And Russia, the historical spokeswoman cooperation among peoples, with Putin became the bulwark of political stability and sovereign rule. Putin fights for the nation-state and an institutionalization of international law, and is no fan of revolts, protests, let alone secessionisms.
Putin's Russia is formally opposed to the (Washingtonian) theory of failed states, and sees factors of destabilization when a government begins to wobble. But what it rejects most are the consequences of destabilization. In Russian doctrine, its national interests are affected by instability, while the United States (which has a more dynamic private sector and civil society than Russia) sees disorder as benefitting it - and its global mirror. Therefore, for Russia there must always be a legitimate and legal ruler in each country. Of course, Moscow may have friends and allies, but order is the precondition. There is also another factor: Russia always fights to maintain the integrity of its territory. In Russian history, internal instability leads to the fragmentation of its own territorial state. The Putin doctrine is international, and it is also internal.]
But Burdman's description is a good explanation of Russia's current formal stance. And it's consistent with other analyses from experts on Russia in emphasizing Putin's expressed view (cynical or not) of the United States as supporting "revolution" to achieve regime change in countries whose existing governments the US finds somehow inconvenient.
In the "realist" viewpoint, the current international order is defined by the ascendency of China, which is expanding its influence in the world to the (relative) disadvantage of currently more dominant powers like the US (globally), as well as Russia and the EU, more regionally but to a certain extent globally. In the realist view, the US, the EU, and Russia are in the position of managing China's rise and their own relative declines while trying to optimize their own positions.
In that framework, both China and Russia have an interest in cultivating stronger relationships in Latin America, the traditional sphere of influence of the US. They have good economic reasons for doing so. But there's also the political-military advantage of using those relationships to discourage unwanted US activity closer to their own borders. That was a key element in the Soviet Union's support for Cuba, most dramatically illustrated in the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962. (You have nuclear missiles in Turkey pointed at us? Let's see how you like nuclear missiles in Cuba pointed at you!)
But as useful as high-level realist considerations are in understanding interstate relations, nations are not abstract entities with predetermined definitions of their national interests. They are countries full of people with divergent interests. And defining what a country's national interest should be is as much a legitimate matter for political contention as any other issue. Given the stakes of real threats like the climate crisis and nuclear arms proliferation, defining the national interest is even more legitimate a topic of politics than many other things.
US policy toward Latin America has operated for a long time primarily on a definition of the US national interest as being more-or-less identical to those of oligarchs, US extractive industries, arms manufacturers, and financial buccaneers. It's a bad way to conduct relations with Latin America. And ideology also plays a role, sometimes really bad, unrealistic ideology. The US obsession with neoliberal economics, first pioneered in practice in the Chilean and Argentine military dictatorships of the 1970s, is a prime example of an ideological fixation that we could generously describe as deeply flawed.
In pure balance-of-power terms, the destructive effects of US economic policy and its accompanying attitude to democracy in Latin America ranging from indifferent to hostile create some obvious openings for other countries like China or Russia to make inroads into the US sphere of influence there. And so, neither Vladimir Putin nor Xi Jinping have to adhere to some universally consistent notion of national sovereignty and respect for other states' independence to make it in their interest to take such a diplomatic stance in Latin America.
Julio Burdman's comment, "Russia always fights to maintain the integrity of its territory. In Russian history, internal instability leads to the fragmentation of its own territorial state," is also consistent with most accounts I've seen of Putin's own orientation. Whatever standards he was applying, he seems to have considered the fall of the Soviet Union as a genuine national catastrophe for Russia. And his policies toward secessionist movements within Russia, like that of Chechnya, have been consistent with that orientation.
Putin definitely has policy goals oriented toward preserving and augmenting Russian national power and the interests of Russian oligarchs. But he doesn't seem to be promoting some more general universalist ideology, though his relationship to ideological far-right political groups and ideologies in Europe and the US have given some observers that impression. Too many Democrats in the US after the Russian interference in the 2016 Presidential election have been talking about Putin's government as though it were a mirror-image of a simplistic Cold War understanding of the USSR. Promoting a universalist ideology was a part of Soviet statecraft. Which, of course, did not exclude highly practical adaptations to particular foreign-policy circumstances.
