The Iran nuclear deal - looking more and more like a lost opportunity

Fred Kaplan reports (Israel and Iran Are Tanking Their Own Security Slate 08/02/2021):

Iran’s drone strike on an Israeli-owned oil tanker last week was but the latest in a series of skirmishes between the two states in the past two years—though it also marked a dangerous escalation, in which both sides are taking higher risks but achieving no apparent gains in their security.

The attack may have been retaliation for an Israeli attack on an Iranian military vessel in April, which may have been a response to an Iranian attack on an Israeli-owned container ship in March…and on and on the trail of tit-for-tat attacks goes, at least back to the summer of 2019, when Israel attacked a ship carrying Iranian oil and arms through the eastern Mediterranean and Red Seas—in violation of sanctions that were re-imposed when then-President Donald Trump after he withdrew from the 2015 Iran nuclear deal.

The Biden-Harris Administration could have announced in January that the US was officially re-entering the JCPOA (Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action ), the landmark Iran nuclear nonproliferation agreement that the Obama-Biden Administration negotiated with iran, from Trump had withdrawn the US.

They didn't. In any international negotiation, there is always the chance to blame someobday else other than one's own side. Kaplan's article discusses the Iranian and Israeli aspects in this article.

I hope the JCPOA can be saved. But the clock is ticking.

And the US really needs to demand more of its own ally Israel:

On April 6 [2021], hours before U.S., Iranian, and European diplomats assembled in Vienna to reopen talks on the nuclear deal, an elite commando unit of the Israeli Navy attacked an Iranian military vessel. The next day, to drive the point home, Netanyahu said, “The deal with Iran that…threatens our destruction will not obligate us.”

It's also by no means clear that the Iranian government is completely serious about getting the US back into the agreement. It could well be that they are also now looking for a way to get out of it without taking the full blame: "Given the many Iranians (especially the IRGC) oppose reviving the nuclear deal or any friendly ties to the West, it may well be that some of their moves have been provocations for their own sake."

But the window of opportunity on keeping the JCPOA alive seems to be closing rapidly.

Kaplan also has some interesting news about Iranian-Saudi diplomacy that could undermine one of Netanyahu's and Trump's favorite achievements, the Abraham Accords. He argues that the Israeli-Saudi rapprochement is "based entirely on their shared hostility to Iran."

Quick takes on Biden policies

Here are some stories that focus on some significant issues the Biden-Harris Administration is dealing with.

Providing better access to COVID vaccine for poorer countries: Michael Safi, Covid vaccines: what is patent waiving and will it solve the global shortage? Guardian 05/06/2021; Sam Fraser, Biden takes a vital step on vaccine patents — but more action is needed Responsible Statecraft 05/05/2021.

That's good news as far as it goes. Notably, the EU was caught flat-footed by Biden's announcement. But the EU is not nearly as far along with the domestic vaccinations as the US is at the moment: Ashley Furlong, US shift on vaccines embarrasses Europe before India summit Politico EU 05/06/2021:

The U.S. decision to drop its objections was received as a seismic shift in Europe, with EU and U.K. officials scrambling Thursday morning to react and articulate whether they, too, would shift their position. And within the EU, cracks in the bloc's solidarity against the proposal started to form, with Italian officials expressing support for the patent waiver. [my emphasis]

Iran nuclear deal: Thomas Countryman, Biden is getting closer to a deal with Iran, and Democrats in Congress need to get with the program Business Insider 05/04/2021

Withdrawal of combat troops from Afghanistan: Stephen Walt, What Comes After the Forever Wars Foreign Policy 04/28/2021

Other signs of restraint in the Greater Middle East: Fred Kaplan, Saudi Arabia and Iran Are Starting to Solve Their Differences Without America Slate 05/05/2021

Interesting moment of pragmatism over NordStream 2: Marina Adami, Blinken: US ‘will respond’ if Russia ‘acts recklessly’ Politico EU 05/06/2021

The diplomat also reiterated U.S. President Joe Biden’s personal opposition to the Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline project linking Russia and Germany. Despite the U.S. Justice Department initially deciding to allow sanctions against the company building the gas pipeline as part of new penalties against Russia, the approval was reversed in April. However, the U.S. president still believes Nord Stream 2 is “a bad idea,” Blinken said. [my emphasis]

I could really do without all the "new Cold War" talk, although that talk is more centered on China than Russia. But the Nord Stream 2 pipeline is a big negotiating point, which could turn out to be constructive or seriously problematic, depending on how it is actually fitted into the larger picture of US-Russia-China relations. It increases European dependence on Russian gas. But Russia is a petrostate, so it also makes Russia more dependent on Europe.

So it's a relief to see this bit of pragmatism in US foreign policy. It makes total sense to keep Nord Stream 2 as a negotiating point in a larger set of relationships. Which I'm pretty sure is not exactly how it was being approached by the US the last couple of years.

Biden's military strike in Syria and the Iran nuclear deal

The Biden-Harris Administration has not yet re-entered the Iran nuclear deal (JCPOA, Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action). I realize that diplomacy can be tricky. But the US left the agreement and imposed drastic sanctions on Iran even though Iran was observing its terms and the European allies were and are very supportive of the agreement.

Stephen Miles discusses the strikes in Biden’s Syria strikes: A perpetual cycle of endless war Responsible Statecraft 02/26/2021. He refences this Congressional Research Service report, Instances of Use of United States Armed Forces Abroad, 1798-2020. He notes, "The journey from the start of 1991’s Operation Desert Storm to the present ... will take you through more than 30 long pages of airstrikes, invasions, and other instances of trying to bomb our way to peace."

The US fights too many wars.

Miles emphasizes that the JCPOA is an example of the kind of foreign policy that can move toward winding down "an endless war" in Syria and Iraq:

It was not a comprehensive peace, few ever are. Rather, it was a step-by-step process, starting by constraining Iran’s nuclear program and eliminating the risk of nuclear proliferation, that could and should have been built upon with further progress on our countries’ numerous other challenges. Unfortunately, Donald Trump chose to walk away — despite his own administration’s recognition that the deal was working — and embark on a path of “maximum pressure.” That path brought the United States and Iran to the brink of all-out, direct war multiple times during his presidency and remains one of the key drivers of the instability and conflict so violently on display this week in Iraq and Syria.

Today, as President Biden assesses his next steps, he would do well to remember how we got here, and use this opportunity to quickly and sharply change course. He should, of course, begin by ending “maximum pressure” and rejoining the JCPOA, putting the United States and Iran firmly back on the path of diplomacy. That alone, of course will not be enough to undo the damage already done not just in the last four years but the last 30. To achieve that will require the president fulfilling another campaign promise: to truly end our endless wars in the Middle East.

That will be no small undertaking, and it will require questioning and rejecting the status quo thinking that led him to his first airstrikes. [my emphasis]

Trita Parsi talks about the more specific diplomatic considerations in getting the US back into the JCPOA before Iran decides its not worth the effort, Iran rejects meeting as Biden’s slow diplomacy hits predictable snag 02/28/2021, writing that "the Biden team should have done their utmost to avoid engaging in public fights over 'who goes first' [in public steps toward reconciliation]. This is the inevitable outcome: everything becomes more politically costly. Even before real talks have begun."

Kali Robinson gives us some background on the deal at its current state in What Is the Iran Nuclear Deal? Council on Foreign Relations 02/25/2021. He warns that their is an election clock ticking currently:

Iran has called for the United States to return to the deal but has said it is not willing to discuss expanding the accord further. Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif told CFR in September 2020 that Iran will “absolutely not” renegotiate and that the United States should compensate Iran for damages caused by sanctions, which he says amount to $1 trillion.

However, the prospects for new negotiations could dim come June 2021, when Iran is set to elect a new president. Many analysts say a conservative, hard-line candidate will likely replace President Rouhani, whose popularity has plummeted with the unraveling of the nuclear deal.

Robinson' piece also talks about what a burden US sanction are to Iran. The mainstream foreign policy conversations tend to portray economic sanctions and embargoes as a peaceful alternative to war. But they can do severe damage and the kind of sanctions imposed on Iran are definitely on a spectrum of confrontation that could quickly turn into actual war.

And the Biden-Harris Administration did call the Syria military strike a signal to Iran.

What kind of post-Trump, post America-Alone foreign policy might we expect from Biden-Harris

John Feffer attempts some pre-Inauguration tea-leaf-reading on the Biden-Harris foreign policy in Biden Won’t Reset U.S. Foreign Policy On His Own Foreign Policy in Focus 12/03/2020.

[T]he world has moved on from 2016. The Trump team has left messes pretty much everywhere it camped around the world. A two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian stand-off has become ever more remote. The Iranians are understandably wary of U.S. promises of reengagement, and the reformists might only be in power for another half year in any case, pending an early summer election. Europeans are increasingly skeptical of relying on the United States for anything. China is hedging its bets after several years of more hostile U.S. policy.

Biden’s foreign policy team will have to navigate this new world. Their intentions — good, bad, indifferent — may end up mattering very little as they come up against the new geopolitical realities. [my emphasis]

Feffer notes several areas in which Biden will have the ability to make substantial policy changes without Congressional approval. This is important, because we have no reason to expect Tea-Party-on-steroids level of obstruction from QAnon-ized Republican Party of today.

As long as the Biden administration doesn’t need to push a treaty through the Senate, it will have a relatively free hand on foreign policy. It can rejoin the World Health Organization and the Paris climate accord. It can lift restrictions on travel and remittances to Cuba. It can negotiate its way back into the Iran nuclear deal. It can extend the New START treaty with Russia. Republicans can squawk all they want. It will be their turn once again to feel helpless in the face of executive power. [my emphasis]

Feffer also has these messaging suggestions for advocates of a progressive peace policy:

• Our efforts to reduce carbon emissions have to be framed as a massive jobs bill connected to the creation of clean energy infrastructure.
• Our desire to avoid a Cold War with China begins with the removal of tariffs that ultimately hurt U.S. farmers and manufacturers and continues with cooperation in clean energy that grows that sector in both countries.
• A détente with Cuba and a nuclear deal with Iran both give U.S. businesses a leg up in both countries and thus also can have job-creation potential domestically. [my emphasis]

One hopeful policy item is the Iran nuclear deal (JCPOA). As Trita Parsi writes in House Dems unite to support the Iran nuclear deal Responsible Statecraft 12/11/2020, there are strong signs that House Democrats will be supportive of a return to the agreement.

And Iran is initially making positive diplomatic signals on the deal, as Juan Cole discusses in Iran’s Pres. Rouhani to Biden: We will Fulfill our Nuclear Obligations on Day One if you Return to 2015 Deal Informed Comment 12/15/2020. This is a real opportunity, though obviously one with complications:

What [Iranian president Hassan] Rouhani is signalling to Biden and to Europe is that if they want Iran to go back to observing the stringent stipulations of the JCPOA, they can have that, but they have to turn on the money spigots.

A lot of Washington interests want to squeeze Iran, over issues like its presence in Syria, or its ballistic missile program, or human rights, by tying them to a resumption of the nuclear deal. These are very bad ideas, since denuclearizing the Middle East should come first. Biden is said to agree, and this is the most promising news on the horizon. Iran can be more successfully pressed on those other issues if it depends on income from a Renault car factory and exports to the US, etc. Isolated states find it easier to be rogue states. [my emphasis]