Biden-Harris China policy

Biden's Presidency hasn't hit its two-month mark yet. So in foreign policy, there haven't been any events to celebrate as a dramatic breakthrough. Rejoining the non-binding Paris Climate Accord is probably the closest.

Biden did bomb "a facility used by Iranian-backed militias" in Syria that killed a few people. (Reese Erlich, Foreign Correspondent: Biden’s Bombing of Syria Is a Dangerous Step Backward The Progressive 03/04/20121)

It seems to have become a toxic piece of Beltway Village rhetoric that a new President has to bomb somebody as a normal rite of passage. Trump version of it, coming less than three months after taking office - also in Syria, country on which the US has not declared war, produced its own cringe-inducing moments in punditry, which is saying a lot: Jim Naureckas, The Essential Pundit Take: ‘Trump Became President’ by Bombing Syria FAIR 04/17/2017. The reference there is to CNN's Fareed Zakaria, and Naureckas observed:

Note the assurance with which Zakaria insists that a military attack on a sovereign state, unauthorized by the United Nations and unjustifiable in terms of self-defense, signifies a new respect on Trump’s part for “global norms” and “international rules.” Clearly, for Zakaria as for most pundits, the norm is that international law does not apply to the president of the United States—a doctrine that is usually referred to by the euphemism “American exceptionalism.”

Note, too, the contempt with which Zakaria dismisses the idea that a “pesky Congress” should constrain a president’s ability to make war; who needs a constitutionally mandated declaration of war when you’ve got a “broader moral and political purpose”? [my emphasis]

The Biden-Harris Administration is rolling out its China policy, obviously one of the most consequential areas for US foreign policy. The Obama-Biden Administration undertook a shift in foreign and military policy to put more emphasis on balancing China's rising economic, political, and military influence. Trump made a big deal of rhetorically posturing against China and imposed tariffs on Chinese imports, because he loved the idea of tariffs even though he didn't seem to actually understand how they worked. But decide the narrative of some commentary even on the left that Trump was actually dovish, he continually promoted large increases in the Pentagon budget that were largely focusing on building up for a potential military confrontation with China.

Michael Swaine strikes a cautionary note about the early indications of the Biden-Harris China policy (Biden is playing into great power competition trap with China Responsible Statecraft 03/09/2021):

Before taking office, Biden National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan and others who have now joined the Biden Administration explicitly stated that they do not favor a Cold War with China, titanic ideological struggles, or fruitless efforts to restore American primacy. And they certainly expressed a desire for more positive consultation with allies and partners than occurred during the failed Trump Administration.

But since taking office, the dominant themes and initiatives on China and East Asia today sound more like the old zero-sum, dominance-oriented Trump “strategy” toward Beijing of yesterday. These include repeated references to strategic competition and the correctness of Trump’s basic hardline approach to Beijing, the formation of a Pentagon Task Force focused on how best to counter China, and assertions of a need to restore America’s “traditional role” in Asia. There have been formal statements by leading Biden officials hyping the central importance of the “pacing threat” posed by China, and, as noted above, about cooperation with Beijing in some areas, as needed. While correctly stressing the top-priority requirement to strengthen U.S. competitiveness and Washington’s image in the world, the Interim National Security Strategic Guidance, as with other Biden documents and statements, seems to avoid talking specifically about how best to engage Beijing and East Asia in more positive-sum, cooperative ways that benefit all parties. [my emphasis]

Swaine in an earlier piece discusses one of the biggest potential flashpoints in US-China relations, which is Taiwan. (A word of caution: China’s aggressive Taiwan flyovers could be just the start Responsible Statecraft 01/26/2021) "Last weekend’s flight of more than two dozen Chinese military aircraft across the midline of the Taiwan Strait and the strong U.S. verbal response reaffirming support for Taiwan reflect the continued escalation of Sino-U.S. tensions, a dynamic that needs to be brought under control as soon as possible."

This kind of probing and testing really is a normal part of external powers testing the responses of a new leader in a major rival power. But, as with ritual but deadly American Presidential bombings of Syria, "normal" does not equate to "benign".

EU relations to China are also a major element affected US-China policy. Wolfgang Münchau's Eurointelligence in a March 5 item (That sums it up scroll down) reports:

The mercantilism at the heart of German foreign policy was expressed with brutal clarity by [former German Chancellor] Gerhard Schröder in a rare article published in the newspapers of the Handelsblatt group. He is saying: forget human rights. Foreign policy is about self-interest and gain alone. A moralising foreign policy, as he calls it, does not work. This is obviously a position we disagree with strongly. But it differs from Angela Merkel's foreign policy only in terms of its honesty. He describes the status quo. He is not calling for something that does not exist, both in Germany and the EU. It is also the guiding philosophy of the EU-China comprehensive agreement on investment, with the exception that Schröder, unlike the proponents of CAI, does not pretend that the deal would co-opt China into a dialogue.

Schröder's point is that under the Biden administration, the US is now focused on China as a systemic rival and is asking the European to join the coalition. He questions whether this is in the European interest. [my emphasis in bold]

The Uighur Issue

One of the biggest issues for China, the US, and the EU is the persecution of Muslim Uighurs in China's in Xinjiang province. (Dutch parliament declares Chinese treatment of Uighurs a ‘genocide’ Politico EU 02/25/2021)

A February 26 Eurointelligence piece at the same link as above (Dutch parliament calls genocide in Xinjiang) observes:

The issue is fraught because the term genocide is generally reserved for situations in which mass killing is occurring. As the Economist noted in a recent article, that is not what’s happening in Xinjiang, although reports of arbitrary mass incarceration, torturous re-education programmes, forced labour and forced sterilisation have horrified international observers.

The human rights concerns are real and substantial. However, countries also instrumentalize human rights issues all the time. Complete moral purity in human rights policy is not likely to prevail among countries run by human beings any time soon. And even the best of intentions in human rights has to be acted out in an international systems with many conflicting interests and goals among countries.

As a practical as well as humanitarian matter, it's in the interest of the US and the EU to push for more humane treatment of the Uighur Muslims. Because it's something that Muslim countries and peoples are very aware of the Uighur situation. However, some Muslim countries in 2020 expressed explicit support for China's Uighur policy, including Bahrain, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Pakistan, the "State of Palestine", Syria, the UAE, and Yemen. (Zachary Basu, More countries join condemnation of China over Xinjiang abuses Axios 10/08/2020)

I have a more general concern that the concept of "genocide" is becoming diluted as it is applied to more and more instances of atrocities and persecution. But that's a topic for another day.

On the Uighurs, see also: John Bellinger III, China’s Abuse of the Uighurs: Does the Genocide Label Fit? Council on Foreign Relations 02/03/2021. "There is a difference between use of the word genocide in common parlance, and even by human rights groups, and the Genocide Convention’s definition, which is quite narrow," Bellinger notes.

A very recent report called The Uyghur Genocide touted as the first "independent legal analysis" by "non-governmental organization" endorses the genocide label for China's Uighur policy. (Ben Westcott and Rebecca Wright, Independent report claims evidence of Beijing's 'intent to destroy' Uyghur people Middle East Eye 03/09/2021)

The source of the report is the Newlines Institute, which describes itself as a division of small private instiuttion called the Fairfax University of America (FXUA). It was formerly known as Virginia International University (VIA), which didn't enjoy the most sterling reputation. (Elizabeth Redden, Agreement Allows Virginia International to Continue Operating Inside Higher Ed 06/18/2019)

An article in from nine years ago in The Morning Call mentioned that VIA had been identified in court records as linked to the Gülen Movement. (Steve Esack, Allentown school directors question charter school applicant's ties to Gülen Movement 12/16/2012) How independent the Newlines Institute may be is not entirely clear to me. Here is one report on the Gülen Movement, Turkey coup: What is Gulen movement and what does it want? BBC News 07/21/2016. I posted about it in Fethullah Gülen and last year's coup in Turkey 11/15/2017.

I'm not rejecting the Newsline report out of hand. But I am saying it deserves careful critical scrutiny.

Maggie Thatcher and Hong Kong

Doug Bandow look back at the British deal made by Margaret Thatcher with China on the terms for the handover of Hong Kong in 1997. "Tragic though this outcome is, the worsening dictatorship cannot be blamed on Thatcher. And there was little she could have done to have saved China or Hong Kong. Moreover, there is good news: history rarely offers permanent verdicts. We have no idea what will follow Xi," he writes. (Negotiating Hong Kong: playing chicken with millions of lives Responsible Statecraft 07/15/2020)

He describes the options that the UK faced if it had tried to set up Hong Kong as a permanent colony - which would have been a real anachronism in the world of 1997! - or to try to support it as an independent country.

Noting that the recent developments produced what looks like an "ugly reality", he describes the practical limitations in the throwback colonial option, but these would also apply to an independence option guaranteed by Britain:

Beijing would have responded angrily but likely avoided war. In 1997, when the lease formally expired, China’s GDP was little more than half of the UK’s and about a tenth of America’s. Beijing had not fared well militarily when seeking to teach Vietnam “a lesson” in 1979. Although the PRC was a nuclear power, so were London and Washington, which would have been on Thatcher’s speed dial to back up the British.

More important, the PRC was only beginning its economic Long March, reforming its economy and entering foreign markets. Conflict would have interrupted that process, with long-term negative impacts. The pragmatic Deng likely would have played the long game, avoiding a direct confrontation until he or his successor was sure of winning.

In the meantime, however, Hong Kong would have become an increasing burden on the United Kingdom, which probably would have been locked out of the newly expanding Chinese market. The right mix of verbal threats and military deployments by Beijing would have forced the UK to maintain a battle-ready garrison with sufficient back-up — perhaps an aircraft carrier permanently berthed in the harbor — just in case. Doing so would be difficult and expensive for London.

Beijing could have isolated the colony and systematically harassed British rule. The result would not just have inconvenienced residents and burdened London. Many foreign companies would have avoided settling in Hong Kong; some established firms would have left for safer and more hospitable havens elsewhere, such as Singapore. [my emphasis]

After Britain's experience with the massive decolonization following the Second World War, it's not surprising that they decided not to rerun the experience with Hong Kong.

With Trump relying on anti-China agitation for his reelection campaign, it's worth paying attention to various kinds of chicanery on the government's part in that regard. The very creepy Attorney General William Barr is threatening businesspeople over "appeasement" of China, threatening prosecutions for espionage. The Financial Times reports (Kadhim Shubber, Barr warns against corporate America's China 'appeasement' 07/16/2020):

Campaign aides believe Mr Trump can regain lost ground against Democratic rival Joe Biden by casting himself as tough on China, part of an effort to draw a contrast on the subject with the policies of the Obama administration, where Mr Biden served as vice-president.

Mr Barr took particular aim at large US technology companies and Hollywood, insisting that business leaders who pander to Beijing's demands would only reap short-term rewards.

Attorney General Barr delivers remarks on China policy in Grand Rapids, Michigan PBS Newshour 07/16/2020: