Tuesday, November 17, 2026

Ongoing European defense developments

The British Independent recently ran this eye-catching headline: (1)


With any major European Union endeavor, it’s convenient to remember two things. One is that any organization consisting of 27 sovereign national states is complicated and the decision-making process often looks convoluted. On the other hand, the EU manages to achieve a remarkable constructive action and is a major factor in promoting international stability and cooperation and serves as a major tool in European power projection. And the European countries since 2022 with the current Russia-Ukraine War and the increasing hostility of the Trump 2.0 Administration to European democracies have strong incentives to stick together in matters of collective defense.

American governments except for Trump’s have understood that the EU has also functioned in part as an enhancement to US power, not least because most EU nations are also NATO allies. But Trump’s militarist-isolationist approach has put the European NATO allies in the position of having to distance themselves from their increasingly unreliable US ally. The erratic Trump regime’s increasingly pro-Russian foreign policy in the middle of the ongoing war in Ukraine is an additional incentive.

Russia has been making public threats and committing hostile acts of sabotage and occasional terrorism against European countries. This is described by terms like “shadow war” or “"grayzone war." Less suitable terms like “hybrid war” are also used that tend to obscure more than they explain.

The current Wikipedia definition of hybrid warfare gives an indication of why it’s misleading to apply it to isolated acts of sabotage, verbal and visual propaganda ops, routine intelligence operations, or short airspace violations (which are illegal but routine). And adversary government seeding online rumors may be irritating and inconvenient, but it shouldn’t be seen as qualitatively equal to funding guerrilla armies to conduct irregular military operations inside a targeted country.
Hybrid warfare was defined by Frank Hoffman in 2007 as the emerging simultaneous use of multiple types of warfare by flexible and sophisticated adversaries who understand that successful conflict requires a variety of forms designed to fit the goals at the time. While there is no clear, accepted definition, methods include political warfare and blend conventional warfare, irregular warfare, and cyberwarfare with other influencing methods, such as fake news, diplomacy, lawfare, regime change, and foreign electoral intervention. By combining kinetic operations with subversive efforts, the aggressor intends to avoid attribution or retribution. The concept of hybrid warfare has been criticized by a number of academics and practitioners, who say that it is vague and has disputed constitutive elements and historical distortions. (2)
Hyping external threats is normal, especially for business and institutions who themselves benefit from high domestic concern over foreign threats. Distinguishing between the real potential threats and the overhyped ones is a constant challenge. The old joke of “just because you’re paranoid doesn’t mean they’re not after you” is perpetually relevant to international affairs and even to cooperation between the militaries of allied countries.

The key countries in forming a European defense cooperation that doesn’t rely critically on the United States as an active ally in some potential future war with Russia are Britain, France, Germany, Poland, Spain, and Italy. Five of those six countries are EU members, and Britain is making moves to more formally align itself against with the EU.

But the EU is not designed to be a super-state with full command of its own armed forces. There is a small EU army. But it is not designed to play the kind of role the US has played in NATO, which is to be in practical command of NATO forces when engaged in combat. Still, coalition warfare is nothing new to Europe, from the Thirty Years War (1618-1648) to the two World Wars of the 20th century.

Politico recently described the context of European collective defense planning this way, variations of which we will hear many times in the next few years:
The [EU’ administrative] Commission can’t negotiate Europe’s future security architecture - that’s for NATO members and national capitals to decide. But equally NATO, Paris and Berlin cannot negotiate EU sanctions or Ukraine’s accession to the bloc - these are in the Commission’s remit.

And the idea that the “E3” — Europe’s big economic and military beasts of Germany, France and the U.K. — would let either the Commission, the European Council or NATO do it all on their behalf is not realistic.

As one EU diplomat put it: “The reason why Europe hasn’t found one person who can represent the whole of Europe is that Europe is not a superstate.”

In the context of the Ukraine talks, European interests encompass many EU member states but also countries like the U.K., and Norway, as well as Turkey and Moldova, the diplomat said. “Who can promise troops on the ground on behalf of the rest of Europe? Who can offer billions in financing? It’s difficult.” (3)
Yes, preparing for a potential world war is difficult! Fighting one is, too. But it would a mistake for Americans to fall back on lazy stereotypes of squabbling Europeans. US Gen. Dwight Eisenhower and his British counterpart Gen. Bernard Montgomery during the Second World War famously had contentious differences over how the war should be fought. (4) The US and Britain also found coordinating with their Soviet ally quite challenging at times. But Britain, the US, and Russia still celebrate their victorious cooperation in a very prominent way.

Notes:

(1) Croft, Alex (2026): Europeans overwhelmingly back creation of EU army amid fears of war with Russia. Independent 11/13/2026. <https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/europeans-eu-army-poll-russia-war-b3084330.html> (Accessed: 2026-17-11).

(2) Hybrid warfare. Wikipedia 11/01/2026. <https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Hybrid_warfare&oldid=1383146144> (Accessed: 2026-17-11).

(3) Ross, Tim (2026): Why Europe failed to find a superhero to take on Putin. Politico EU 11/13/2026. <https://www.politico.eu/article/why-europe-failed-to-find-a-superhero-to-take-on-vladimir-putin/> (Accessed: 2026-16-11).

(4) Klustner, Bradley (2026): Eisenhower and Montgomery: Strategy, Leadership, and Tension at the End of World War II. Gettysburg College 2016. <https://cupola.gettysburg.edu/student_scholarship/492/> (Accessed: 2026-17-11).

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