He discusses the situation in terms of the "collective action problem," of states needing to coordinate with each other when there is no one state among them that is clearly more powerful than the others. He describes the post-WW II situation in Europe as one in which the US was able to act as a "pacifier" to organize Europe to act in a (more-or-less!) coordinated fasion. (1)
He refers back to a 1990 paper he did called, "Why We Will Soon Miss The Cold War." He notes at the start that the kind of fragmentation among European allies that could have happened if the US had drastically reduced its role in Europe did not actually take place. But the "collective action problem" is still a lasting challenge in the international state system we have. (2)
Since it's his own YouTube channel he uses for these lectures, I assume he picked the title, "Europe Is Coming Apart." Part of his style is to describe his concepts in ways that make people focus on the issue in a way that may not be their usual approach. His foreign policy theory, which he called "offensive realism," is about the dynamics of the interactions of nation-states and the kind of risks and opportunities they create for decision-makers. But he's also keenly aware that national decision-makers come with their own sets of assumptions. And his analyses are often centered on how leaders can and should avoid making dumb and destructive mistakes. For all his emphasis on the structural imperatives of the international system, he's not a determinist. He's very aware that it's fallible human being who make the actual decisions, always based on less than 100% complete knowledge.
In his paper from 36 years ago, Mearsheimer wrote:
We may, however, wake up one day lamenting the loss of the order that the Cold War gave to the anarchy of international relations. For untamed anarchy is what Europe knew in the forty-five years of this century before the Cold War, and untamed anarchy -- Hobbes's war of all against all -- is a prime cause of armed conflict. Those who think that armed conflicts among the European states are now out of the question, that the two world wars burned all the war out of Europe, are projecting unwarranted optimism onto the future. [He seems here to be referring mainly to the theory that democracies do not go to war with each other, an idea of which the neoconservatives were particularly fond at that time.] The theories of peace that implicitly undergird this optimism are notably shallow constructs. They stand up to neither logical nor historical analysis. You would not want to bet the farm on their prophetic accuracy.As he points out in his lecture, it's not as though intra-NATO relations have been friction-free since the end of the Second World War. The US forced an end to the British-French-Israeli invasion of Egpyt in the Suez crisis of 1956. European allies were not uniformly happy about America's Vietnam War - especially after France's own catastropic version wound up in a clear defeat for France. France also didn't have universal enthusiasm among its NATO allies on its Algerian War, which also ended in a French defeat. The controversy over stationing of medium-range-balistic missiles in Europe was also a source of tension. The Iraq War of the Cheney-Bush Administration was not popular with European allies like France and Spain.
During the Kosovo War - one whose legitimacy was questionalble under itnernational law despite the genuinely despicable practice of the Serbian government - produced this controversy which is well worth remembering:
As BBC News reported in 2000, summarizing a incident described in a documentary of theirs about that war:
Details of Russia's surprise occupation of Pristina airport at the end of the Kosovo war [1999] are revealed in a new BBC documentary on the conflict. For the first time, the key players in the tense confrontation between Nato and Russian troops talk about the stand-off which jeopardised the entire peacekeeping mission. The Russians, who played a crucial role in persuading Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic to end the war, had expected to police their own sector of Kosovo, independent of Nato.In other words, the US role in holding the European alliance together was not always friction-free!
When they did not get it, they felt double-crossed.
As Nato's K-For peacekeepers prepared to enter the province on 12 June, they discovered the Russians had got there first. A contingent of 200 troops, stationed in Bosnia, was already rolling towards Pristina airport. General Wesley Clark, Nato's supreme commander, immediately ordered 500 British and French paratroopers to be put on standby to occupy the airport.
"I called the [Nato] Secretary General [Javier Solana] and told him what the circumstances were," General Clark tells the BBC programme Moral Combat: Nato at War. "He talked about what the risks were and what might happen if the Russian's got there first, and he said: 'Of course you have to get to the airport'."
"I said: 'Do you consider I have the authority to do so?' He said: 'Of course you do, you have transfer of authority'."
But General Clark's plan was blocked by General Sir Mike Jackson, K-For's British commander.
"I'm not going to start the Third World War for you," he reportedly told General Clark during one heated exchange. [emphasis added; paragraph breaks adjusted] (3)
The AP has a brief report on the arrival of Russian troops then. Fortunately, it did not become a shooting war between NATO and Russian forces. (4)
Mearsheimer describes the dynamics of bipolar situations like the NATO/Warsaw Pact situation of the Cold War:
[D]eterrence is difficult to maintain in a multipolar state system, because power imbalances are commonplace, and when power asymmetries develop, the strong become hard to deter. Two great powers can join together to attack a third state, as Germany and the Soviet Union did in 1939, when they ganged up on Poland. Furthermore, a major power might simply bully a weaker power in a one-on-one encounter, using its superior strength to coerce or defeat the minor state. Germany's actions against Czechoslovakia in the late 1930s provide a good example of this sort of behavior. Ganging up and bullying are largely unknown in a bipolar system, since with only two great powers dominating center stage, it is impossible to produce the power asymmetries that result in ganging up and bullying.Mearsheimer in the current lecture also references the dynamic I mentioned in my earlier post, which is that the EU itself will not be able to act as a unified body that commands all the defense preparations of all of Europe, even if Britain winds up formall rejoining the Union. Europe's two nuclear powers are Britain and France, and they are included among the six militarily strongest nations, which also include of Germany, Poland, Spain, and Italy. Those six powers acting in coordination will be the most critical ones in developing new common defense arrangements for Europe.
There is a second reason that deterrence is more problematic under multipolarity. The resolve of opposing states and also the size and strength of opposing coalitions are hard to calculate in this geometry of power, because the shape of the international order tends to remain in flux, owing to the tendency of coalitions to gain and lose partners. This can lead aggressors to conclude falsely that they can coerce others by bluffing war, or even achieve outright victory on the battlefield. For example, Germany was not certain before 1914 that Britain would oppose it if it reached for Continental hegemony, and Germany completely failed to foresee that the United States would eventually move to contain it. In 1939 Germany hoped that France and Britain would stand aside as it conquered Poland, and again failed to foresee the eventual American entry into the war. As a result, Germany exaggerated its prospects for success, which undermined deterrence by encouraging German adventurism. [emphasis added]
Notes:
(1) Europe is Coming Apart. John Mearsheimer-Offensive Realism YouTube channel 11/18/2026. <https://youtu.be/xR-kl0d1dNM?si=L6r8G65oAhy9xqTY> (Accessed: 2026-19-11).
(2) Mearsheimer, John (1990): Why We Will Soon Miss The Cold War. Atlantic Monthly (Aug. 1990), 35-50. <https://www.mearsheimer.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/07/A0014.pdf>
(3) Confrontation over Pristina airport. BBC News 03/09/2000. <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/671495.stm> (Accessed: 2026-19-11).
(4) Kosovo: Russian Peacekeeping Force Arrives. AP Archive YouTube channel 06/30/2015. <https://youtu.be/uSxuQQxIgIY?si=LEReZbDieVyDwx7Q> (Accessed: 2026-19-11).
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