Among other things, Mearsheimer discusses why he judges that Israel has long been more of a strategic liability to the US than a net asset.
He also discusses a topic he’s been stressing for a while, which is that the shift away from a '“unipolar” world to one with the US as the biggest power in the world with both Russia and China competing in the international system as major powers. He defines the “unipolar moment” as lasting from December 1991 “when the Soviet Union collapsed” to 2017.
It was the Obama Administration that implemented a foreign policy “tilt to Asia” that began to give a significantly higher priority to containing China’s increasing influence. (2)
Hill presses Mearsheimer on Russia’s intentions in Ukraine. Mearsheimer maintains that Russia is unlikely to attempt to occupy all of Ukraine any time in the near future. Because occupying the western Ukraine would present the Russians with a protracted war of resistance which he judges that they want to avoid. He also argues that since Ukraine has no realistic possibility in the near future of reconquering their territory that Russia now holds, that Ukraine’s best self-preservation move right now would be to declare itself neutral, move away from its current relations with the West, and make some kind of peace agreement with Russia. He also makes the uncomfortable point that if Ukraine has no realistic possibility to prevail against Russia, continuing to supply them with weapons to keep the war going would be immoral. Although, as a hardcore international-relations “realist,” he knows that great powers’ foreign policy is often guided by other than moral considerations.
Mearsheimer stresses that there’s no serious reason at the moment to think that Russia has territorial aims on current NATO countries. But, at the same time, the requirements of the war in Ukraine have actually led to a significant upgrade in Russia’s combat readiness - contrary to Western expectations that the conflict with Ukraine would weaken Russia’s military capabilities.
Ain’t gonna study war no more - maybe someday
Mearsheimer argues that in the current no-longer-unipolar world, the practical strategy the US should be pursuing is to improve relations with Russia as a way of balancing against China: similar to how the US for decades used China to balance against the Soviet Union.
But the long-term effect of NATO expansion has turned out in practice to be a proxy war in Ukraine against Russia. Improving relations with Russia is likely will be a long haul.
And between Russia’s aggression in Ukraine and the possibility of Donald Trump again as President, with the European allies knowing they can’t count on him to keep NATO commitments, they are reviewing their options. And all of them at the moment point toward greater military preparedness of the Europeans’ part.
What Dwight Eisenhower said early in his Presidency is still true:
Eisenhower’s actual foreign policy as President with John Foster Dulles as his Secretary of State left much to be desired. But there are always “opportunity costs” to military spending.
One development that is promising for a common European defense policy is the change of government in Poland. The previous rightwing, authoritarian-leaning government was anti-Russian but also a difficult partner in a European Union based on democratic institutions. The new government is willing to revive the “Weiner Triangle” group of France, Germany, and Poland, which could provide joint leadership to more independent European security cooperation, i.e., not as closely dependent on the US.
As Judy Dempsey of Carnegie Europe notes, the three countries do “have different views on Europe’s future trajectory.”
Since there is so much money to be made on government military purchases, citizens in a democracy always have good reason for healthy skepticism about calls for greater military expenditures and excellent reason to expect their representatives to scrutinize procurement practices closely.
But - in the spirit of the old saying “just because you’re paranoid doesn’t mean they’re not after you” - just because defense contractors are seeking predatory profits at the expense of the public doesn’t mean there aren’t actual threats to be addressed. And while Russia is unlikely to militarily attack NATO any time soon, Europe is far away from anything like the Common European Home that Mikhail Gorbachev once envisioned.
Still, as Albrecht von Lucke recently wrote, if Trump becomes President and actually follows through on his threat to tell the Russians to “do whatever the hell they want” to countries who don’t pay up enough to NATO (5), which Trump seems to understand as a type of Mob protection racket, “the US under Trump would finally change from an allied country to an enemy of Europe.” (6)
Von Lucke notes that Europe has to recognize that not only has Trump even as a private citizen under multiple criminal indictments been able to block aid to Ukraine. But Europeans should also Biden’s subservience to Benjamin Netanyahu’s outrageous conduct in the current Gaza war as a sign of the decline of American dependability as an ally for Europe:
Von Lucke further notes that if Russia did intend to eventually attack NATO states, it would still take 5-8 years for it to prepare itself for such a reckless move. But he also draws the dubious conclusion that the EU countries should try to postpone that date as far as possible by providing as much aid as possible in the current war, though he doesn’t advocate direct armed intervention.
There is an awful lot riding on the US Presidential election for Europe this year.
Notes:
(1) John Mearsheimer: Israel lobby’s influence on US policy as powerful as ever - UpFront. Al Jazeera 03/29/2024.<https://youtu.be/vqQsqVkboMs?si=SY0YCKq2UBilbbz4> (Accessed: 2024-30-03).
(2) Lieberthal, Kenneth G. (2011): The American Pivot to Asia. Brookings Institute 12/21/2011. <https://www.brookings.edu/articles/the-american-pivot-to-asia/> (Acessed: 2024-30-03).
(3) Eisenhower, Dwight (1953): Address "The Chance for Peace" Delivered Before the American Society of Newspaper Editors [April 16, 1953]. The American Presidency Project. <https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/address-the-chance-for-peace-delivered-before-the-american-society-newspaper-editors> (Accessed: 2024-30-03).
(4) Dempsey, Judith (2024): The Weimar Triangle’s Moment to Lead. Carnegie Europe 03/19/2024. <https://carnegieeurope.eu/strategiceurope/91994> (Accessed: 2024-30-03).
(5) Ibssa, Lalee & Kin, Soo Rin (2024): Trump says he'd 'encourage' Russia 'to do whatever the hell they want' if a NATO country didn't spend enough on defense. ABC News 02/11/2024.> (Accessed: 2024-30-03).
(6) Von Lucke, Albrecht (2024): Europa ohne Schutzmacht: Angriff von Putin und Trump. Blätter für deutsche und internationale Politik 3:2024, 6. My translation from the German.
He also discusses a topic he’s been stressing for a while, which is that the shift away from a '“unipolar” world to one with the US as the biggest power in the world with both Russia and China competing in the international system as major powers. He defines the “unipolar moment” as lasting from December 1991 “when the Soviet Union collapsed” to 2017.
It was the Obama Administration that implemented a foreign policy “tilt to Asia” that began to give a significantly higher priority to containing China’s increasing influence. (2)
Hill presses Mearsheimer on Russia’s intentions in Ukraine. Mearsheimer maintains that Russia is unlikely to attempt to occupy all of Ukraine any time in the near future. Because occupying the western Ukraine would present the Russians with a protracted war of resistance which he judges that they want to avoid. He also argues that since Ukraine has no realistic possibility in the near future of reconquering their territory that Russia now holds, that Ukraine’s best self-preservation move right now would be to declare itself neutral, move away from its current relations with the West, and make some kind of peace agreement with Russia. He also makes the uncomfortable point that if Ukraine has no realistic possibility to prevail against Russia, continuing to supply them with weapons to keep the war going would be immoral. Although, as a hardcore international-relations “realist,” he knows that great powers’ foreign policy is often guided by other than moral considerations.
Mearsheimer stresses that there’s no serious reason at the moment to think that Russia has territorial aims on current NATO countries. But, at the same time, the requirements of the war in Ukraine have actually led to a significant upgrade in Russia’s combat readiness - contrary to Western expectations that the conflict with Ukraine would weaken Russia’s military capabilities.
Ain’t gonna study war no more - maybe someday
Mearsheimer argues that in the current no-longer-unipolar world, the practical strategy the US should be pursuing is to improve relations with Russia as a way of balancing against China: similar to how the US for decades used China to balance against the Soviet Union.
But the long-term effect of NATO expansion has turned out in practice to be a proxy war in Ukraine against Russia. Improving relations with Russia is likely will be a long haul.
And between Russia’s aggression in Ukraine and the possibility of Donald Trump again as President, with the European allies knowing they can’t count on him to keep NATO commitments, they are reviewing their options. And all of them at the moment point toward greater military preparedness of the Europeans’ part.
What Dwight Eisenhower said early in his Presidency is still true:
Every gun that is made, every warship launched, every rocket fired signifies, in the final sense, a theft from those who hunger and are not fed, those who are cold and are not clothed. This world in arms is not spending money alone.
It is spending the sweat of its laborers, the genius of its scientists, the hopes of its children. (3)
Eisenhower’s actual foreign policy as President with John Foster Dulles as his Secretary of State left much to be desired. But there are always “opportunity costs” to military spending.
One development that is promising for a common European defense policy is the change of government in Poland. The previous rightwing, authoritarian-leaning government was anti-Russian but also a difficult partner in a European Union based on democratic institutions. The new government is willing to revive the “Weiner Triangle” group of France, Germany, and Poland, which could provide joint leadership to more independent European security cooperation, i.e., not as closely dependent on the US.
As Judy Dempsey of Carnegie Europe notes, the three countries do “have different views on Europe’s future trajectory.”
Take Poland. The Tusk government—as its predecessor—wants Ukraine to win the war. Warsaw’s response has been to provide Ukraine with as much military support as possible to achieve that.
As for Macron, he has changed his attitude toward both Ukraine and Russia. Once intent on creating a European security structure together with Moscow, Paris has abandoned the idea and is supplying sophisticated weaponry to Kyiv. In Berlin, Macron openly said the goal is to “never let Russia win.” Paris and Warsaw are increasingly aligned over Russia.
Scholz, however, has never uttered the “win” word. At the joint press conference on March 15, the chancellor repeated what has become his mantra: Berlin will support Ukraine for “as long as it takes.” (4)
Since there is so much money to be made on government military purchases, citizens in a democracy always have good reason for healthy skepticism about calls for greater military expenditures and excellent reason to expect their representatives to scrutinize procurement practices closely.
But - in the spirit of the old saying “just because you’re paranoid doesn’t mean they’re not after you” - just because defense contractors are seeking predatory profits at the expense of the public doesn’t mean there aren’t actual threats to be addressed. And while Russia is unlikely to militarily attack NATO any time soon, Europe is far away from anything like the Common European Home that Mikhail Gorbachev once envisioned.
Still, as Albrecht von Lucke recently wrote, if Trump becomes President and actually follows through on his threat to tell the Russians to “do whatever the hell they want” to countries who don’t pay up enough to NATO (5), which Trump seems to understand as a type of Mob protection racket, “the US under Trump would finally change from an allied country to an enemy of Europe.” (6)
Von Lucke notes that Europe has to recognize that not only has Trump even as a private citizen under multiple criminal indictments been able to block aid to Ukraine. But Europeans should also Biden’s subservience to Benjamin Netanyahu’s outrageous conduct in the current Gaza war as a sign of the decline of American dependability as an ally for Europe:
In foreign policy, not only is Biden showing himself as relatively powerless in the Ukraine war, but also in the conflict in Palestine. Because Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu keeps escalating his destructive war against Hamas, ignoring the warning from Washington.
Von Lucke further notes that if Russia did intend to eventually attack NATO states, it would still take 5-8 years for it to prepare itself for such a reckless move. But he also draws the dubious conclusion that the EU countries should try to postpone that date as far as possible by providing as much aid as possible in the current war, though he doesn’t advocate direct armed intervention.
There is an awful lot riding on the US Presidential election for Europe this year.
Notes:
(1) John Mearsheimer: Israel lobby’s influence on US policy as powerful as ever - UpFront. Al Jazeera 03/29/2024.<https://youtu.be/vqQsqVkboMs?si=SY0YCKq2UBilbbz4> (Accessed: 2024-30-03).
(2) Lieberthal, Kenneth G. (2011): The American Pivot to Asia. Brookings Institute 12/21/2011. <https://www.brookings.edu/articles/the-american-pivot-to-asia/> (Acessed: 2024-30-03).
(3) Eisenhower, Dwight (1953): Address "The Chance for Peace" Delivered Before the American Society of Newspaper Editors [April 16, 1953]. The American Presidency Project. <https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/address-the-chance-for-peace-delivered-before-the-american-society-newspaper-editors> (Accessed: 2024-30-03).
(4) Dempsey, Judith (2024): The Weimar Triangle’s Moment to Lead. Carnegie Europe 03/19/2024. <https://carnegieeurope.eu/strategiceurope/91994> (Accessed: 2024-30-03).
(5) Ibssa, Lalee & Kin, Soo Rin (2024): Trump says he'd 'encourage' Russia 'to do whatever the hell they want' if a NATO country didn't spend enough on defense. ABC News 02/11/2024.
(6) Von Lucke, Albrecht (2024): Europa ohne Schutzmacht: Angriff von Putin und Trump. Blätter für deutsche und internationale Politik 3:2024, 6. My translation from the German.
No comments:
Post a Comment