The liberal thinker and European politician Ralf Dahrendorf warned already in 1997 about the negative effects for parliamentary democracy resulting from the social polarization and from the end of the social reconstruction pact after 1945. (1)
Dahrendorf was referring to the social welfare state, the formal institutionalization of unions and wage bargaining, and the western European economic recovery sparked by massive state-funded reconstruction after the Second World War, aided by the Marshall Plan.
He foresaw an authoritarian age as a result of neoliberalism and turbo-globalization in which democracy would remain only on paper.
The ratings on the trustworthiness of politicians sank in our survey to an average between 9% and 11%. Only in Germany (19%) and by the United Kingdom (15%) is the approval higher - in France and Hungary they [the politicians] are considered especially unreliable.
Like the chicken and the egg question, interpreting poll results also often depends on how one asks the question.
Variations of democracy and liberalism in the EU
Thanks in no small part to the development of the European Union, there are formal baseline standards for democracy and the rule of law. Very formal ones, actually, in the case of the EU.
In the widely-used V-Dem Institute rankings of countries for 2023, the 27 EU member nations rank as follows:
Liberal democracies
Belgium
Czech Republic
Denmark
Estonia
Finland
France
Germany
Ireland
Italy
Latvia
Luxembourg
Netherlands
Spain
Sweden
Electoral democracies
Austria
Bulgaria
Croatia
Cyprus
Greece
Lithuania
Malta
Poland
Portugal
Romania
Slovakia
Slovenia
Electoral Autocracy
Hungary
Austria
Bulgaria
Croatia
Cyprus
Greece
Lithuania
Malta
Poland
Portugal
Romania
Slovakia
Slovenia
Electoral Autocracy
Hungary
In these rankings, 13 of the 27 EU member nations don’t meet the full qualifications to be considered liberal democracies, which include considerations of the rule of law, government transparency, enforcement of anti-corruption laws, and freedom of the press.
Those differences matter in interpreting the meaning of polls on the confidence people have their politicians. That 71% of the people in Hungary consider their politicians unreliable could reflect good pro-democracy instincts. Why French voters would have a similarly dim view of their politicians presumably reflects different considerations. (Or not!)
Rathkolb draws conclusions that will presumably sound good to pretty much anyone actually left of center in their political orientation:
I know from a couple of presentations I heard from Rothkolb several years ago is that he is a fan of the studies on authoritarianism that various Frankfurt School scholars produced in the 1940s. He even referred his listeners to the five volumes of the Studies in Prejudice Series on the website of the American Jewish Committee, which sponsored the study. Although the current version makes it somewhat less convenient to download PDFs of the books than it was a few years ago.
American pundits have a lazy habit of talking about how more educated people tend to vote Democratic more than those with less education. And then to infer that this means that “working class” voters prefer Trump and the Republicans. But if we think of people who would be eligible to join unions in the US, it includes nurses and public employees, both professions with relatively high levels of unionization, and a large proportion of those workers have four-year colleges degrees (or higher). Other categories like computer programmers, bank and insurance company employees, hospital and university and corporate administration, a large number of the non-management roles include people with college educations, many more if we count community college certificates as well as college graduates. And many non-graduates also have substantial college educations.
Since the average income of college graduates broadly speaking is higher than those without a degree, this is also interpreted to mean that more affluent voters prefer Democrats. But that shouldn’t be taken at face value.
A perennial discussion among the progressives and the ideological left is the relative importance of “class” versus “identity” issues. The theoretical discussions can be important and interesting, though often requiring sorting through hair-splitting arguments. But the hairs don’t always split so cleanly.
The post-Dobbs-decision politics in the United States since 2022 are a good illustration of this. The need to access to abortion care and in-vitro fertilization is by no means restricted by class or income. And the political reaction against Dobbs has strongly favored the Democrats. (Who very foolishly for decades tiptoed around their own support for abortion rights, even though their formal position was very popular among voters.)
But since most supporters of abortion rights aren’t part of the 1% - which is also true of most if not all political issues - this can’t be taken as strictly due to class or income factors. On the other hand, wealthier women and their families also have access to more alternatives than those of average income in states where abortion is outlawed.
Similar considerations would apply to the category of “people who fear downward social mobility.” This, by the way, was a much-discussed phenomenon in the 1960s when discussing why lower-income people may have been inclined to vote for George Wallace or Richard Nixon. “Status anxiety,” it was often called.
But it is not automatic that people feeling pessimistic about their future prospects automatically become racial bigots, xenophobes, fascists, or violent militia goons.
Rothkalb’s prescription for “comprehensive measures and laws to narrow the gap between the income levels” is absolutely sensible. Especially since disparities in income during the neoliberal decades brought with them a deterioration in the effectiveness of democracy. When billionaire sugardaddies can buy everything from media outlets to politicians to judges and Supreme Court Justices, the actual value of citizens’ votes is reduced. The Dobbs decision in the US was a dramatic example of that.
As Joseph Stiglitz put it 2012 referring to the Great Recession of the late 2000s:
The Great Recession offers evidence of a colossal failure. And this failure has imposed an enormous burden on ordinary Americans - as workers, as homeowners, as taxpayers ... We explained how the failure of macroeconomics finally brought to the fore the problems with our economic system. When things were going well, most people were prospering and could persuade themselves that those who weren't had only themselves to blame. But with the recession of 2008, the story stopped making sense. Too many people who "played by the rules, studied hard, worked hard" were just getting by, or not even getting by. The system wasn't working.
... [I]n many ways, our economic system has benefited those at the top, at the expense of the rest, and that this system is far removed from what has been called "the achievement model of income determination," in which incomes reflect contributions to society. … Policy entails choices. … [S]ome of the policy choices have simultaneous.ly increased inequality - benefiting those at the top - and hurt the economy. /4) [my emphasis]
Those differences matter in interpreting the meaning of polls on the confidence people have their politicians. That 71% of the people in Hungary consider their politicians unreliable could reflect good pro-democracy instincts. Why French voters would have a similarly dim view of their politicians presumably reflects different considerations. (Or not!)
Rathkolb draws conclusions that will presumably sound good to pretty much anyone actually left of center in their political orientation:
Our polls show clearly that people who fear downward social mobility tend to be more attracted to authoritarian messages than those who feel more socially and economically secure. And the more complete one’s education is, the easier it is to adjust to the rapid changes of the present and not to fall into apathy and the search for a stark, rightwing Führer associated with it.
“Disadvantages in the infrastructure in rural and regional area can lead to a strengthened trend to authoritarian messages.”
For the political agenda, that means not only to talk about social justice, but through comprehensive measures and laws to narrow the gap between the income levels. Only then, as Dahrendorf proposed, can the authoritarian trend be stopped.
I know from a couple of presentations I heard from Rothkolb several years ago is that he is a fan of the studies on authoritarianism that various Frankfurt School scholars produced in the 1940s. He even referred his listeners to the five volumes of the Studies in Prejudice Series on the website of the American Jewish Committee, which sponsored the study. Although the current version makes it somewhat less convenient to download PDFs of the books than it was a few years ago.
American pundits have a lazy habit of talking about how more educated people tend to vote Democratic more than those with less education. And then to infer that this means that “working class” voters prefer Trump and the Republicans. But if we think of people who would be eligible to join unions in the US, it includes nurses and public employees, both professions with relatively high levels of unionization, and a large proportion of those workers have four-year colleges degrees (or higher). Other categories like computer programmers, bank and insurance company employees, hospital and university and corporate administration, a large number of the non-management roles include people with college educations, many more if we count community college certificates as well as college graduates. And many non-graduates also have substantial college educations.
Since the average income of college graduates broadly speaking is higher than those without a degree, this is also interpreted to mean that more affluent voters prefer Democrats. But that shouldn’t be taken at face value.
A perennial discussion among the progressives and the ideological left is the relative importance of “class” versus “identity” issues. The theoretical discussions can be important and interesting, though often requiring sorting through hair-splitting arguments. But the hairs don’t always split so cleanly.
The post-Dobbs-decision politics in the United States since 2022 are a good illustration of this. The need to access to abortion care and in-vitro fertilization is by no means restricted by class or income. And the political reaction against Dobbs has strongly favored the Democrats. (Who very foolishly for decades tiptoed around their own support for abortion rights, even though their formal position was very popular among voters.)
But since most supporters of abortion rights aren’t part of the 1% - which is also true of most if not all political issues - this can’t be taken as strictly due to class or income factors. On the other hand, wealthier women and their families also have access to more alternatives than those of average income in states where abortion is outlawed.
Similar considerations would apply to the category of “people who fear downward social mobility.” This, by the way, was a much-discussed phenomenon in the 1960s when discussing why lower-income people may have been inclined to vote for George Wallace or Richard Nixon. “Status anxiety,” it was often called.
But it is not automatic that people feeling pessimistic about their future prospects automatically become racial bigots, xenophobes, fascists, or violent militia goons.
Rothkalb’s prescription for “comprehensive measures and laws to narrow the gap between the income levels” is absolutely sensible. Especially since disparities in income during the neoliberal decades brought with them a deterioration in the effectiveness of democracy. When billionaire sugardaddies can buy everything from media outlets to politicians to judges and Supreme Court Justices, the actual value of citizens’ votes is reduced. The Dobbs decision in the US was a dramatic example of that.
As Joseph Stiglitz put it 2012 referring to the Great Recession of the late 2000s:
The Great Recession offers evidence of a colossal failure. And this failure has imposed an enormous burden on ordinary Americans - as workers, as homeowners, as taxpayers ... We explained how the failure of macroeconomics finally brought to the fore the problems with our economic system. When things were going well, most people were prospering and could persuade themselves that those who weren't had only themselves to blame. But with the recession of 2008, the story stopped making sense. Too many people who "played by the rules, studied hard, worked hard" were just getting by, or not even getting by. The system wasn't working.
... [I]n many ways, our economic system has benefited those at the top, at the expense of the rest, and that this system is far removed from what has been called "the achievement model of income determination," in which incomes reflect contributions to society. … Policy entails choices. … [S]ome of the policy choices have simultaneous.ly increased inequality - benefiting those at the top - and hurt the economy. /4) [my emphasis]
Notes:
(1) Rathkolb, Oliver (2024): So kann die Demokratie gewinnen. Der Standard 31.03.2024. <https://www.derstandard.at/story/3000000213499/so-kann-die-demokratie-gewinnen> (Accessed: 31-03-2024). My translation from the German.
(2) V-Dem Institute at the University of Gothenburg. Democracy Winning and Losing at the Ballot, March 2024. <chrome-extension://efaidnbmnnnibpcajpcglclefindmkaj/https://v-dem.net/documents/43/v-dem_dr2024_lowres.pdf> (Accessed: 31-03-2024).
(3) At the AJC Archives site, search for “Studies in Prejudice”. <https://ajcarchives.org/Portal/Default/en-US/Search/SimpleSearch>
(4) Stiglitz, Joseph E. (2012): The Price of Inequality: How Today’s Divided Society Endangers Our Future, 238-239. New York & London: Norton & Co.
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