American officials travel to the region often, and sometimes announce that they got Israel to agree to open a new aid crossing, for instance. But for all the U.S. diplomatic efforts over the past six months, the American public sees that the United States is not really getting meaningful results, either in averting famine in Gaza, or in getting a new hostage release deal, or in ending the war.
American officials travel to the region often, and sometimes announce that they got Israel to agree to open a new aid crossing, for instance. But for all the U.S. diplomatic efforts over the past six months, the American public sees that the United States is not really getting meaningful results, either in averting famine in Gaza, or in getting a new hostage release deal, or in ending the war.
“In my own polling, it isn’t so much that people were not supporting one side or the other,” Telhami told me. “In fact, Americans throughout the polling, including in October and November, maintained that they wanted the U.S. to have an even-handed policy.”
“It is more about…supporting a set of principles,” Telhami said. “They’re appalled by the degree to which there are violations of international law, the humanitarian crisis, and the inability of the Biden administration to stop it.” [my emphasis] (1)
Haaretz columnist Amos Harel talks about how Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is defying and insulting his most important foreign ally, the United States.
Israel acts as if it's a mouse that roars. But there's nothing comic in the current scenario. ... It's not clear how a country that is so completely dependent on American weapons and armaments (which were also the topic of Defense Minister Yoav Gallant's visit to Washington this week), and is desperate for American political support, allows itself to show such a disdainful attitude toward the only world power that still wants the best for it. (2) [my emphasis]
It’s important to remember than Netanyahu has maximum incentive to prolong the war as much as possible and even expanding it. He is extremely unpopular among Israeli voters and he faces a continuation of corruption charges against him that could well send him to prison if he is no longer Prime Minister, in which office he enjoys immunity from current prosecution. Prolonging the war also lets him avoid personal political accountability for his remarkably sloppy job in preparing for an attack like that of October 7.
One of the future possibilities is a further escalation into Lebanon against the Hezbollah militia.
Harel reports:
The events of the past few days reflect a further escalation. Israel attacks, again and again, deep into Lebanese territory, from north of Beirut to the Bekaa Valley. Hezbollah's UAV network and some of its air defense batteries are in the crosshairs. Hezbollah responds with an unusual mass of missiles – barrages of 50 Katyushas or more – but does not match Israel by attacking 100 kilometers inside our territory, only firing the barrages against the Galilee, and sometimes the Golan Heights. Wednesday's exchanges of fire were heavier than usual. ...
[T]he IDF [Israeli Defense Forces] is taking care to announce that it has learned lessons from the fighting in Gaza to prepare its forces for a heavier war in Lebanon. Northern Command has been training for this in the past few days. The strikes against Hezbollah's UAVs and SAMs (surface-to-air missiles) go deep inside Lebanon and are intended to upgrade the air force's supremacy if a general war breaks out. But all these measures do not provide an exit from the impossible circumstances in which the residents were forced to abandon the border region. (Almost twice as many Lebanese have abandoned their villages on the other side of the border.)
Seemingly, a possible exit point from the crisis is known. The American government has already explained that it intends to renew diplomatic efforts to achieve calm on the Israel-Lebanon border the moment a cease-fire is declared between Israel and Hamas in Gaza. But the contacts for a cease-fire and a hostage deal have deadlocked – and the freeze is also affecting the Lebanese arena, which is considered secondary, but liable to turn into the main arena and bleed more heavily. [my emphasis]
From Netanyahu’s position of wanting to prolong the war, expanding the war in Lebanon – which is already happening, as Harel notes – would be very beneficial, even if, maybe especially if, it escalated to direct involve Iranian forces. Iran seems to be trying to avoid that. And Joe Biden, too. But Biden has been obscenely deferential to Netanyahu in the current war and starvation campaign.
It’s also important to remember that in less than a year from now, Donald Trump could again be President. As he has shown, his only real interest and whatever little bit of competence in foreign policy he has demonstrated are focused on how he or his family can get money from it. (3) Netanyahu is clearly not concerned that his deadly antics endanger Biden’s chances of re-election. If Trump isn’t more pliable, Netanyahu knows he can be easy bought.
In a separate column, Harel reminds us how serious the Israel-Hezbollah conflict on the Lebanese border really is:
The temperature on the Israel-Lebanon border continues to rise, but so far it has somehow stayed below the threshold of all-out war. Had we been told a year ago that missiles would be continually launched into Israeli territory from Lebanon for almost six months, that 60,000 Israeli border-area residents would be forced to leave their homes, and Israel would count more 20 dead and Lebanon almost 350 – we'd have assumed with a strong degree of certainty that this would mean war. And yet, Israel and Hezbollah continue to avoid a general confrontation, even if that is liable to change later.
The events of the past few days reflect a further escalation. Israel attacks, again and again, deep into Lebanese territory, from north of Beirut to the Bekaa Valley. Hezbollah's UAV network and some of its air defense batteries are in the crosshairs. Hezbollah responds with an unusual mass of missiles – barrages of 50 Katyushas or more – but does not match Israel by attacking 100 kilometers inside our territory, only firing the barrages against the Galilee, and sometimes the Golan Heights. Wednesday's exchanges of fire were heavier than usual. ...
Seemingly, a possible exit point from the crisis is known. The American government has already explained that it intends to renew diplomatic efforts to achieve calm on the Israel-Lebanon border the moment a cease-fire is declared between Israel and Hamas in Gaza. But the contacts for a cease-fire and a hostage deal have deadlocked – and the freeze is also affecting the Lebanese arena, which is considered secondary, but liable to turn into the main arena and bleed more heavily. (4)
One thing is clear. The policy that Netanyahu is following is being supported with American money and financial aid. The US doesn’t have to keep doing this. It’s the Biden Administration’s choice and that of Congress. [my emphasis]
Notes:
(1) Rozen, Laura (2024): New poll shows waning American support for Israel war in Gaza. Diplomatic 05/27/2024. <https://diplomatic.substack.com/p/new-poll-shows-waning-american-support> (Accessed 2024-28-03).
(2) Harel, Amos (2024): Netanyahu's Confounding Contempt for the Only World Power With Israel's Interest at Heart. Haaretz 05/27/2024. <https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/2024-03-27/ty-article/.premium/netanyahus-confounding-contempt-for-the-only-world-power-with-israels-interest-at-heart/0000018e-7c90-d680-a1cf-fe97200e0000> (Accessed 2024-28-03).
(3) Debusmann, Jr., Bernd (2024): Jared Kushner defends controversial $2bn Saudi investment. BBC News 02/14/2024. <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-68296877> (Accessed 2024-28-03).
(4) Harel, Amos (2024): Stagnation in Israel-Hamas Talks Could Turn Conflict With Hezbollah to Full-scale War. Haaretz 03/28/2024). <https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/2024-03-28/ty-article/.premium/the-northern-front-heats-back-up-and-israel-readies-for-larger-war-with-hezbollah/0000018e-81a8-d4d2-abfe-a3e9c5630000> (Accessed 2024-28-03).
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