Anatol Lieven's "restrainer" positions on Ukraine and Kazakhstan

Anatol Lieven offers his own "restrainer"-oriented views of the situation with Ukraine and Kazakhstan in these three posts:

My plea for Ukrainian neutrality has just been published by Responsible Statecraft:https://t.co/Xm0a6KXfHt

— Anatol Lieven (@lieven_anatol) January 3, 2022

As US diplomat Wendy Sherman sits down w/ Russia's Sergei Ryabkov today, RS's @lieven_anatol has a few suggestions involving autonomy for the Donbas region and Ukrainian autonomy. MORE: https://t.co/dRV4PValmi pic.twitter.com/03nNTCepJh

— Responsible Statecraft (@RStatecraft) January 10, 2022

There's a great temptation for Washington to get involved in #Kazakistan right now whether it be for the usual democracy promotion or to cause trouble for Russia and China. NEW @lieven_anatol on why this would be the worst move possible: https://t.co/s3Q1nVS2J2

— Responsible Statecraft (@RStatecraft) January 10, 2022

In his post on Kazakhistan, Lieven writes:

The temptation for the United States to become involved in backing unrest in Kazakhstan stems from two sources (apart from the innate tendency of the democratism industry in the West to idealize any protest against an authoritarian regime as “democratic” and to lend it unthinking support). First of course is the desire to make trouble for Russia. Already, while U.S. Secretary of State Anthony Blinken has criticized Russia’s dispatch of troops to Kazakhstan, sections of the Western media and commentariat are celebrating the diversion of Russian military force and attention from Ukraine.

The second motive lies in a desire to make trouble for China. One important part of China’s Belt and Road network is intended to run through Kazakhstan. China has invested heavily in Kazakhstan’s infrastructure and created a free trade zone and transport hub at Khorgos on the border with Kazakhstan. [my emphasis]

He also gives some important background on the risk of ethno-nationalist sentiments breaking out in Kazahkhstan:

The deployment of Russian troops to Kazakhstan to support the government is likely to increase anti-Russian feelings; and if God forbid ethnic violence does erupt in Kazakhstan, it could help to produce a future Russian government far more chauvinist than that of Putin. This would be a disaster for Russia, Russia’s neighbors, and above all Russia’s own ethnic minorities. And if Washington were seen to be supporting violence against ordinary Russians, then America will be faced in future with a danger far more formidable than that of Putin: an infuriated Russian nation.

Trans-Dniester (Transdniestria) and US-Russia relations

Anatol Lieven calls attention to a region that is not much discussed in American politics but could become a big issue in US-Russia relations in We have no intention of fighting Russia so stop arming Ukraine for battle Responsible Statecraft 03/23/2021.

The BBC's Trans-Dniester profile (09/17/2018) provides this image showing the Trans-Dniester region in question. The piece also has background information of the post-Soviet history of the dispute.

As the title of Lieven's column indicates, the Transdniestrian issue is intimately connected with Ukraine, Although Modova is the country that has the direct territorial dispute with Russia:

The most volatile dispute in this region may not be in Ukraine itself, but Transdniestria, the breakaway Russian-speaking region of the former Soviet republic of Moldova that has since 1992 been protected by a garrison of Russian “peacekeeping” troops.

While no Moldovan government has suggested recognizing Transdniestrian independence (nor has Russia done so), Moldova since independence has been ruled by former communists or moderate nationalists anxious to avoid new conflict. However, this could change as a result of the December 2020 election of the strongly nationalist and pro-Western President Maia Sandu, who has called for the withdrawal of the Russian force from Transdniestria.

From a military point of view, the position of Russia’s force in Transdniestria is acutely vulnerable; because unlike Crimea [Ukraine], the Donbas [Ukraine], Abkhazia [Georgia] or South Ossetia [Georgia], it is entirely cut off from Russia by the territory of Ukraine and Moldova. In the event of a blockade by these countries, the Russian troops there could not be supplied. Neither Moldova nor Ukraine has imposed a blockade — despite Kiev’s bitter hostility to Russia since 2014 — for fear that Russia would go to war in response. The United States must try to maintain that dynamic. Dmitri Trenin of the Carnegie Moscow Center has written that a blockade of the Russian force in Transdniestria “would present Russia with the dilemma of conflict or humiliation.” And there is little doubt what Vladimir Putin would choose. [my emphasis]

As he explains, the US is not going to war directly over Russian incursions into the internationally recognized territories of Ukraine (Crimea and the Donbas) or Georgia (Abkhazia and South Ossetia). Russia has declared Crimea to be part of Russia, and Russia maintains breakaway mini-republics in the indicated areas of Georgia and Ukraine. Those two countries were both formerly part of the Soviet Union, and Putin's policy has aimed at preventing them from becoming part of NATO or the EU.

Occupying parts of those countries effectively prevents their incorporation into NATO or some other military alliance with Western countries. Because such an alliance that would require the Western powers to define the borders to be defended, which would require either recognizing the Russian occupations or agreeing to militarily defend against those occupations.

And the US policy toward Russia is more than ever related to the US policy toward China. As Lieven puts it, "a war in Ukraine would be one of the greatest geopolitical gifts to China that Beijing could possibly dream of."