It’s one of those habits Democrats fell into by giving clowns like James Carville way more credibility than they ever deserved.
John Mearsheimer’s advocacy of his “offensive realism” theory of foreign relations often leads him to make gloomy predictions. But he has the annoying habit of often being right about the topics he analyses. He also has a particular style of wording his points in a way that forces the listener to think more closely about what he is saying. And on issues like the Iran and Russia-Ukraine Wars, he obviously pays close attention to the available information and knows how to employ historical examples without reducing them to clichés.
He recently started his own podcast in which he gives presentations directly to the audience. A recent one carries a title that Ukraine’s more enthusiastic partisans would not have selected: “Is Ukraine Committing National Suicide?” (2)
Both the Russia-Ukraine War and the current Iran War – which has involved a number of countries in the Middle East besides Israel and Iran – keep reminding us that in foreign policy and wars, multiple things can be true at the same time, things that can seem to be contradictory.
For instance, it can be true (and is) that Russia’s seizure of the Ukrainian province of Crimea and of large parts of the eastern provinces (oblasts) of Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhzhia and Kherson, were acts of aggression that violate international law. It can also be true (and is) that Russia had real security concerns about the possibility of Ukraine becoming a member of the NATO alliance.
It can be true (and is) that Ukraine is extremely unlikely to recognize Russian annexation of those five provinces. It can also be true (and is) that there is no realistic hope that Ukraine can militarily retake those provinces in any immediate future or in any immediate peace settlement.
The current war began in February 2022 with the Russian invasion. Ukraine was able to retake some of the ground initially captured by Russia, including a significant counter-offensive in mid-2023. But the war since then has essentially been a protracted war of attrition, with the front lines largely frozen in place, with gains by either side difficult and very limited. The heavy use of drones on both sides of the lines of occupation has made seizing and holding territory very difficult for both sides. Advances by either side have been slow and costly.
One surprising part of the general reporting and analysis of the war is the treatment of the strategic bombing campaigns of both sides. Strategic bombing aims at targeting military and economic facilities to undermine the enemy side’s ability to wage war. As distinct from tactical bombing in direct support of ground and sea forces. With the assistance of its allies and its own technical capabilities, Ukraine has been making some spectacular strikes inside Russia, including on Moscow. But the value of Ukraine’s strikes in weakening Russia’s ability to wage war is questionable, especially in comparison to Russia’s strikes on Ukrainian strategic targets.
As Robert Pape, Mearsheimer, and others have been continually pointing out, particularly in relation to the Iran War, as damaging as “strategic” bombing of civilian areas is, it has never in itself led a civilian population to demand their government stop waging a war. As a general rule, having a foreign country bombing one’s neighborhood doesn’t give the civilians in the area being bombed extra sympathy for the side doing the bombing. It just doesn’t work that way. And there’s seems to be little sign of major Russian dissent against the current war in any case. But Ukraine’s boosters in the media often present such Ukrainian strikes on Russia civilian targets and cities deep inside Russia and
Mearsheimer’s analysis above looks at the substantial long-term disadvantages facing Ukraine. The fact that the Russian seizure of Ukrainian territory was illegal – and very arguably unnecessary in strategic terms from Russia’s actual situation – does not mean that Ukraine has a good practical chance any time in the immediate future to recapture the occupied territory militarily. On the other hand, countries facing foreign invaders or foreign occupiers have often shown themselves to be willing to wage protracted resistance against them. Nationalism and patriotism can be powerful motivators.
But it doesn’t mean that David always wins over Goliath. At some point, Ukrainians are likely to decide that continuing the current war of attrition offers fewer obvious advantages than establishing some kind of stable ceasefire without any formal final resolution of the occupation.
Back to multiple things being true simultaneously, it can be true that Russian leaders are overly suspicious and/or paranoid about the danger that an independent Ukraine poses to its national interests. It can also be true (and is) that Western policymakers see the current war with Ukraine as weakening Russia and giving European allies a chance to improve their preparedness for a potential future conflict with Russia with minimal reliance on the US, whose reliability as an ally can’t be restored simply by Trump leaving office.
Mearsheimer makes some important practical points about Europe’s official stance on what he describes as exaggerated fears of Russia promoted by European NATO and EU members. He argues that some of that fear is real, although he thinks it is greatly exaggerated, and continues to argue that Russia has never made explicit claims to take over all of Ukraine. He has argued since 2022 that Russia’s goal was to seize and control parts of Ukrainian territory to prevent it from becoming a NATO member, and also to make Ukraine into a dysfunctional “rump state.” It’s not that he regards that as a good or legitimate goal but rather one consistent with the Russian government’s calculation of its own security interests.
Mearsheimer also points out that European leaders sounding the alarm about Russian intentions serves two other political purposes. One is to use that argument to slow the process of American withdrawal from a commitment to actively defend Europe in case of an actual Russia attack. Another is to use that as a way to help persuade European publics of the need for more robust defense spending. To a certain extent, current European governments are arguing the case for military Keynesianism as an antidote to the chronic austerity politics that has plagued the EU, largely an inheritance from the longer German commitment to what Paul Krugman has called “austerianism.” (Russian threat or not, it has been a bad, very damaging policy habit which at least created a climate that has benefited the neo-fascist-type parties in Europe.)
Despite the recent publicity about “hybrid” attacks, If the recent incident with drones at the Leipzig airport was intended to be a serious military attack, it was a pretty pitiful attempt. But we can expect more news of such provocations. And, yes, Western countries will be also carrying out such stunts. If Russia actually carries out a military strike against Western countries or seizes territory of a NATO countries – this is where the Suwalki Gap/Suwalki Corridor along the Polish-Lithuanian border comes in as a possible target – then we’re getting into actual World War III territory. Which of course no one in their right mind wants to see happen.
Speaking of which, there is an increasing amount of talk about World War Three in connection with Russia’s and China’s current relations with Iran. Mercy Kuo, for instance, recently wrote in The Diplomat:
Both Russia and China share a common motivation to weaken the U.S. either leading to its defeat or to a protracted war that bleeds U.S. strength, ties it down in the Gulf, and prevents greater military support for Ukraine, Taiwan, and Washington’s Asian and European allies. They also aim to weaken American alliances, damage America’s global standing and economy, and increase its domestic polarization. Moreover, this war validates their ideology about the decline of an American-led world order and the alleged rise of a new multipolar order, thereby lending credence to that ideology. (3)Which is basically a melodramatic way of saying that the relative power of the US in the world is declining in relation to the increasing influence of China and Russia and that big powers continue to maximize their own influence. And of course they seek to take advantage of the fact that the US is currently led by a President with no strategic vision beyond self-enrichment and no capability of conducting anything like normal diplomacy.
Russia has formal relationships with Iran and they have been cooperating with Iran since the joint US attack in January:
The expectation that Russia would come to Iran's aid is based not least on the support that Iran has provided to Russia in the war against Ukraine. The close relations between the two countries go further back. Since 2015 at the latest, when Tehran and Moscow both intervened militarily in Syria to support the regime of Bashar al-Assad, cooperation between the two states has become much more intensive, especially in the military sphere. The Western sanctions that hit Russia after the annexation of Crimea in 2014 and especially since the major attack on Ukraine in 2022 also indirectly contributed to a rapprochement. The US had already imposed the first sanctions on Iran in 1979, followed later by other Western countries, and these coercive measures were also tightened after 2022. (4)Mearsheimer does not see any immediate threat of direct, overt Russian aggression against current NATO members. He notes that the current war with Ukraine has produced a lot of Russian casualties and has done significant damage to its economy. On the other hand, despite all the triumphalist rhetoric from Western critics of Russia, Russia has ramped up its military production in a big way since 2022 and now has a much larger army with considerable combat experience. Which is presumably not the result expected by those who accept as quasi-religious dogma that the Soviet war against the Muslim guerrilla fighters in Afghanistan brought down the Soviet Union. (Or their war against the “brave mujahideen freedom fighters”, if one prefers).
Notes:
(1) "New Low in U.N. History": Trita Parsi on Trump's Threat to Annihilate Iran at General Assembly. Democracy Now! YouTube channel 09/23/2026. <https://youtu.be/l5vl6zkDCOM?si=YDfETUUzLzcbXt09> (Accessed: 2026-24-09).
(2) John Mearsheimer-Offensive Realism YouTube channel 09/22/2026. <https://youtu.be/zmatx3ZJDKY?si=QlAyFMd6owaCBUHj> (Accessed: 2026-24-09).
(3) Kuo, Mercy (2026): The China-Russia Factor in the Iran War. The Diplomat 09/23/2026. <https://thediplomat.com/2026/09/the-china-russia-factor-in-the-iran-war/> (Accessed: 2026-24-09).
(4) Gasimov, Zaur (2026): Balanceakt im Nebel des Krieges. Die Beziehungen zwischen Russland und Iran. Osteuropa 76:1-2, 83-84. Translation from the German original.
No comments:
Post a Comment