He discusses his view of the Russian war aims: “First, Putin aimed to unite Russians and Ukrainians, whom he considers to be ‘one people.’ Ukrainians, in his view, are just Russians with accents. Regarding this war objective, Putin has failed miserably.” It’s true that Putin’s government has advocated a kind of Panslavic concept that sees Russia and Ukraine as somehow spiritually united. A conservative Orthodox Christianity heavily influences Putin’s rhetoric. And a popular narrative of Russia’s historical origins traces it back to the establishment of the “Kyivan Rus,” traditionally dated to the 9th century.
As far as I’ve seen, Russia has never officially and explicitly stated that they intend to conquer all of Ukraine. That would be an enormous undertaking and would create a chronic headache for a Ukraine that was formally absorbed as part of Russia. As we have seen for decades and especially since 2022, there are certainly plenty of Ukrainians who would really prefer not to be part of Russia.
McFaul also observes:
... Putin did not achieve his second war objective—regime change or what he oddly calls “denazification.” (Nazis do not rule Ukraine.) Zelenskyy, his security detail, and all Ukrainian warriors have prevented Putin from overthrowing the democratically elected president and parliament. In the first days of the full-scale invasion, Zelenskyy evaded multiple assassination attempts. Putin’s original dream of installing a pro-Kremlin puppet to rule Ukraine seems more fantastical today than ever before.This is a far more plausible claim. There are actual neo-Nazi groups in Ukraine. They don’t control the government, but they exist and are intensely anti-Russia. Volodymyr Zelensky’s government created an unnecessary headache for itself in pandering to admirers of that marginal but real trend:
Poland and Ukraine have a common enemy — Russia — but a dispute over massacres eight decades ago is increasingly being weaponized in domestic politics on both sides.This was an “own goal” on Ukraine’s part. Especially since Poland, which has the biggest active-service army in the EU, shares and border with Ukraine, and has hosted millions of Ukrainian refugees.
The historical feud began in May when Ukraine’s President Volodymyr Zelenskyy named a Ukrainian military unit after the “Heroes of UPA,” which outraged Poland. The Ukrainian Insurgent Army, known as UPA, killed tens of thousands of Poles in World War II in an ethnic cleansing campaign in what is now western Ukraine.
On the Polish side, the heated debate about Zelenskyy’s move is already threatening to weigh on next year’s crucial general election — with the nationalist camp seeing an opportunity to score points against pro-EU centrists. [my emphasis] (2)
McFaul notes that “democracy is still Ukraine’s form of government,” as the US expects its allies to at least pretend to be. The 2026 edition of the widely used Democracy Report from the V-Dem Institute notes, “There are many populous countries in the region undergoing autocratization during the last two decades, such as Romania, Russia, Ukraine, and until recently Poland.”
McFaul’s third main point is on firmer ground with his point that “after more than four years of fighting, Ukrainians have continued to deny Putin his revised, more limited war aim of annexing major chunks of Ukrainian territory.” In its categorization for 2025 rating countries in the four large categories of Liberal Democracies, Electoral Democracies, Electoral Autocracies, and Closed Autocracies, both Russia and Ukraine are included in the Electoral Autocracies slot, with Ukraine having moved more toward more authoritarian governance in 2025. (The US and the UK both fall into their Electoral Democracies category.)
Relations between nations can be facilitated by similar types of governance. But other factors drive international alliances. And international law on national sovereignty does not depend on the type of their internal governments. And that is also true of any ethical or religious version of the just war concept.
McFaul observes, plausibly, that the “Ukrainians thwarted Putin’s plan to kill Zelenskyy and install a Kremlin-friendly puppet.” The idea that Putin’s government would want a friendly and/subordinate regime in Kiev is far more likely than the assumption their intention was to annex the entire country. He also makes the sensible argument that Russia’s current goal is the “more limited war aim of annexing major chunks of Ukrainian territory.” Having Russia in de facto control of provinces of the Crimea, Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia and Kherson would make it in practice much more difficult if not impossible for Ukraine to join with the EU or NATO. And it actually is reasonable to assume, despite the protests of Ukraine’s political partisans, that Russia’s concern, repeated consistently for years over NATO membership for Ukraine, was the main reason for its current war of aggression.
This is a brief explainer from the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) of an important element of Ukraine’s defense called the “fortress belt” in the Donetsk province. (3) This is a militarily critical element in Ukraine’s defense, because Ukraine has successfully used it to block Russian advances. And if Moscow undertakes another effort to directly attack the capital Kiev, the fortress belt area would be crucial in blocking a ground invasion aimed at Kiev.
Notes:
(1) McFaul, Michael (2026): Ukraine is Winning. McFaul’s World 06/12/2026. <https://michaelmcfaul.substack.com/p/ukraine-is-winning> (Accessed: 2026-07-05).
(2) Kość, Wojciech (2026): How a bloody past is reshaping politics in Poland and Ukraine. Politico EU 06/30/2026. <https://www.politico.eu/article/poland-ukraine-pis-party-volodymyr-zelenskyy-donald-tusk-karol-nawrocki-bloody-past/> (Accessed: 2026-07-05).
(3) Ukraine’s Fortress Belt: The Key to Sustaining the Frontline. Institute for the Study of War YouTube channel 05/22/2026. <https://youtu.be/7pDakmv6gaQ?si=AcxC76p_r70uEIuZ> (Accessed: 2026-07-05).
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