Chomsky on the Russia-Ukraine war

I won't elaborate the idea that the current Russia-Ukraine war changes everything, or that we're living in a new world now, etc. Because, who knows, by this time next year we could be focused on some new metaphorical asteroid approaching. (Hopefully only a metaphorical one!)

But I also want to do a couple of posts about consciously left takes on the Ukraine situation.

Here is an interview with Noam Chomsky from The Real News, in an event sponsored by various leftie groups. Including the "Communist Party USA," which is apparently still around. (At least there's a website by that name.) Noam Chomsky: A Left Response to the Russian Invasion of Ukraine 04/08/2022:

I check in on Chomsky's commentary periodically, mostly because it's consistently irritating but in a thought-provoking way. He often sounds like a gloomy anarchist or a Borg spokesperson: All governments are brutal and oppressive, all political movements are corrupted and inadequate, Resistance Is Futile!

But if he were nothing but Mr. Gloom-and-Doom, nobody but burnt-out cynics would pay any attention to him. The main value I find in his commentary is that he practices "fundamental criticism," which doesn't translate easily into current political slogans or policies. But because he is well-infomred and reflective, he focuses on points worth considering. And what may be excessive cynicism in one way also forces his listeners to look at comparisons they might not otherwise make. (The interviewer here does ask challenging questions of Chomsky.)

For instance, Chomsky mentions the fact that countries that are not part of the West or the Northern Hemisphere aren't nearly so enthusiastic about condemning Russia's invasion of Ukraine as NATO members are. That doesn't require any exotic explanation, of course. Just as NATO member states differ in their emphasis on the Ukraine war (Poland and the Baltic states now and in the foreseeable future can be expected to grumble that their NATO partners are insufficiently hardline in their opposition to Russia), so also countries from China and India and Pakistan to all of Latin America are not as likely as American TV audiences to see Russia's intervention in Ukraine as a uniquely shocking event. African nations tend to take a hard line against the idea of changing national boundaries by force.

I'm reminded that after the 9/11 attacks in 2001, most Americans were in such a "USA! USA!" mode that most didn't notice something the mainstream media didn't emphasize anyway, which was while Latin American countries joined most others in expressing their solidarity with the US, their diplomatic responses were notably more muted than even some countries like Iran - whose condemnation of the attacks didn't seem to make much of an impression on Dick Cheney and the neoconservatives.

Geography obviously matters. China is an ally of Russia at the moment and they have been guarded in their official position, though supportive of Russia in the UN Security Council. In this instance, Russia is in the process of invading and trying to conquer and incorporate a country that is a direct neighbor or near-neighbor to various EU and NATO countries. Of course, those countries are going to focus a lot of attention, concern, and action on responding to that invasion.

Chomsky is highly critical of the Russian invasion in this interview. But he makes a very valid point when he asks if Mexico were to try to join a military alliance with China, would the US regard that as a national security threat? I doubt anyone alive actually believes otherwise. The Monroe Doctrine in practice is alive and well, though there is no international law justification for the US deciding to topple governments in Latin America whenever they become inconvenient.

But the scorn which some New Cold War enthusiasts direct against almost any attempt to point to the actual political conflicts in the recent past between NATO and Russia over Ukraine is a bit silly. Of course looking at the key developments that led up to the current moment is important. Another left writer, Loren Balhorn, editor and co-founder of the German version of Jacobin, notes, "In the days before the [2022 Russian] invasion, we [at Jacobin] believed, as did a large part of the international community also (and not least most Ukrainians themselves), that Vladimir Putin was bluffing." (my translation; Jeder Krieg ist eine Niederlage Jacobin.de 15.04.2022)

Obviously, serious foreign policy analysts and scholars as well as intelligence agencies - and hopefully even some journalists! - would want to look back at the chain of developments that led to February 24's invasion and see what they got right and wrong in their judgments and risk assessments. It would be too much to hope that the pundits on the American Sunday-morning news shows would bother with such an effort, though they will have no problem heaping scorn on the past assessments of people who are not currently all-out New Cold Warriors.

Balhorn explains his own editorial reflection (my translation):

We thought [Putin] wanted to unsettle the West, perhaps use the threat of war to drive a wedge between NATO member states and achieve a more favorable outcome for himself – unquestionably a cynical scam, but still rational from his point of view. Irrational, on the other hand, would be a military attack that could only end in disaster for Ukraine, Russia and, last but not least, Putin himself. So, no need to panic.

Obviously, we were wrong. We misjudged the Kremlin's calculations and geopolitical ambitions. We weren't attentive enough to the Great-Russia project that Putin has adopted to ideologically legitimize his crumbling rule – a regime that in recent years has increasingly relied on open repression in the face of economic stagnation and growing discontent. As a result, we did not see the war coming until it exploded on our screens on the morning of February 24.

Explaining is not excusing. And understanding is not sympathizing.

Not that a New Cold War will lack for excusing and sympathizing in all sorts of directions.