One notable thing about this article is Fisher’s repeated reminders that governments' information operations, common as they may be, may not have nearly the effect that policymakers hope and imagine. Yes, people running American foreign policy may be doing stuff that doesn’t necessarily work very well. This may come as a shock to some.
Russian Interfernce in Current US Political Discourse
The influence of non-US governments on American politics has become a big issue since 2016. The Russian intervention in the 2016 Presidential election has been well documented. The actual effect of that intervention on the outcome of that election is much harder to estimate. To say that it determined the end result would require showing that a few tens of thousands of voters in Michigan, Wisconsin, and Pennsylvania were decisively influenced to change their votes from the Democratic candidate Hillary Clinton to Donald Trump or some third party. It would also require showing, for instance, that the reduced turnout that was seen in Detroit and Flint, Michigan, was directly related to Russian information operations.
And all of this would have to be evaluated in relation to domestic political events, notable among them FBI Director James Comey’s highly unusual announcement of an investigation of Hillary Clinton’s e-mails two weeks before Election Day. In practice, that is effectively impossible.
Then again, that’s part of what disinformation campaigns aim to do, spread information in a way that obscures its origins.
In the 2016 case, the Democrats have given a lot of emphasis to Russian interference and Trump’s seeming deferral to Vladimir Putin in many ways. Both of which are justified. But the Democratic establishment being what it is, promoting new-Cold-War attitudes and their endless fretting about sounding “tough” on foreign policy gets into the mix. And in the impeachment process in 2019-20, they deliberately emphasized Trump’s foreign shenanigans aimed at influencing American politics and mostly studiously avoided digging in the staggering corruption the administration is obviously practicing.
Here’s where I feel I should mention that there are scholars, journalists, and political analysts who have kept their heads in looking at Russian information operations in American politics. One notable example is Marcy Wheeler who posts as emptywheel at the blog of the same name.
Obviously, disinformation operations are one important factor in a complex web of relationships between the US and Russia. Here I would just note that outside of some of the more literate Republican authoritarians like Steve Bannon or Sebastian Gorka, there is not a lot of overt admiration for Vladimir Putin or his particular brand of government among the US public. So there isn’t much of a constituency for *welcoming* Russian propaganda interference in American elections. At a basic level, of course Russia and other governments (China, Saudi Arabia, Israel, Britain, and pretty much every other one) make some effort to influence American political opinion in some way. And most Americans would take it as a given that the federal government should be making efforts to counter illegal interference by foreign governments in American elections.
It’s also important to remember something that seems to be widely neglected in US media treatments of this problem. Which is that the most important measures for securing American elections are things like preventing hacking of voting systems and rigging voting machines are also things that work against *the high-priority Republican Party goal* of suppressing potential Democratic voters.
Fisher's study
Aleksandr Fisher’s article reports on “a survey experiment – analyzing the conditions under which states can influence public opinion about an adversary.” He writes, “This is the first study, to my knowledge, that measures the causal effect of modern Russian propaganda on American audiences.” (“Modern” there presumably means the post-Soviet era.) His study specifically tests whether knowing that the Russian state outlet RT is the source of a story affects the participants’ evaluation of its validity, using a story about Ukraine.
He writes of the current state of academic studies of the field:
I’ve been following politics more-or-less actively for my whole adult life, and even before I was old enough to vote at 18. So I’m used to the need to evaluate sources and to think critically about their perspectives and biases. And that includes information from government sources. There are public news stations that are institutionally largely independent, like the BBC, Aljazeera, and RT (formerly Russia Today). They have records and reputations that people can evaluate. And those records change and evolve over time.
With an outlet like RT that is widely understood to be directed by Russian government policy, it becomes an easily accessible source for anyone who is curious for whatever reason about what the preferred Russian policy is. Even public or private stations with a reputation for bad or crassly propagandistic journalism, such as FOX News or One America, can be a source to see what their propaganda position of the moment is. And also, it’s notable when they provide reporting that goes against their usual ideological mode, as when some leading FOX News figure criticizes Trump directly. “Evidence against interest,” attorneys call it.
For instance, in Fischer’s article, I was struck by a sentence when he uncritically cites the shadowy PropOrNot group, which is a highly dubious sources, though he does note it is an “anonymous” group, an important qualifier. (On PropOrNot, see: Dave Lindorff, Rather Than Exposing Propaganda, WaPo Shows How It’s Done FAIR 12/08/2016) That raises a caution for me about his choice of sources. But that doesn’t mean I dismiss everything in the piece, not least because he provides extensive citations of his other sources.
He finds from his study that negative RT information affected the American participants’ attitudes toward Ukraine negatively, even when they knew RT was the source. “People still have less favorable attitudes toward Ukraine when they know the information comes from a Russian-funded news network. They also do not become any less critical of Ukraine when they are told the intentions of the Russian news network.”
He makes this qualification:
This being an actual scholarly article, Fisher lists various possible weaknesses of the study and the sampling. The survey was taken in October 2016, more than two years after the intensive reporting on the Russia-Ukraine conflict around the time Russia occupied and annexed Crimea. And one of the limitations he identifies is the fact that “the conflict in Ukraine is a low-saliency issue for most Americans.” (my italics)
The international coverage by American media has been drastically cut back since the end of the Cold War. Unless Americans have a particularly strong independent connection with a particular foreign country, like Cuban or Venezuelan exiles or their descendants, most people are likely to take their cues about a foreign country from the American government’s position as communicated by American media. Most Americans in October 2018 probably had a vague idea that the US was siding with Russia against Ukraine over some conflict. But knowing anything substantial about internal events or political forces in Ukraine? Being able to identify Ukraine on a map with borders but no names shown? Not nearly so likely.
So it’s not surprising that when confronted with more specific information about Ukraine, most participants wouldn’t have a basis to raise appropriate questions or challenge specific claims. Especially if it’s not framed specifically in the context of American foreign policy positions.
The influence of non-US governments on American politics has become a big issue since 2016. The Russian intervention in the 2016 Presidential election has been well documented. The actual effect of that intervention on the outcome of that election is much harder to estimate. To say that it determined the end result would require showing that a few tens of thousands of voters in Michigan, Wisconsin, and Pennsylvania were decisively influenced to change their votes from the Democratic candidate Hillary Clinton to Donald Trump or some third party. It would also require showing, for instance, that the reduced turnout that was seen in Detroit and Flint, Michigan, was directly related to Russian information operations.
And all of this would have to be evaluated in relation to domestic political events, notable among them FBI Director James Comey’s highly unusual announcement of an investigation of Hillary Clinton’s e-mails two weeks before Election Day. In practice, that is effectively impossible.
Then again, that’s part of what disinformation campaigns aim to do, spread information in a way that obscures its origins.
In the 2016 case, the Democrats have given a lot of emphasis to Russian interference and Trump’s seeming deferral to Vladimir Putin in many ways. Both of which are justified. But the Democratic establishment being what it is, promoting new-Cold-War attitudes and their endless fretting about sounding “tough” on foreign policy gets into the mix. And in the impeachment process in 2019-20, they deliberately emphasized Trump’s foreign shenanigans aimed at influencing American politics and mostly studiously avoided digging in the staggering corruption the administration is obviously practicing.
Here’s where I feel I should mention that there are scholars, journalists, and political analysts who have kept their heads in looking at Russian information operations in American politics. One notable example is Marcy Wheeler who posts as emptywheel at the blog of the same name.
Obviously, disinformation operations are one important factor in a complex web of relationships between the US and Russia. Here I would just note that outside of some of the more literate Republican authoritarians like Steve Bannon or Sebastian Gorka, there is not a lot of overt admiration for Vladimir Putin or his particular brand of government among the US public. So there isn’t much of a constituency for *welcoming* Russian propaganda interference in American elections. At a basic level, of course Russia and other governments (China, Saudi Arabia, Israel, Britain, and pretty much every other one) make some effort to influence American political opinion in some way. And most Americans would take it as a given that the federal government should be making efforts to counter illegal interference by foreign governments in American elections.
It’s also important to remember something that seems to be widely neglected in US media treatments of this problem. Which is that the most important measures for securing American elections are things like preventing hacking of voting systems and rigging voting machines are also things that work against *the high-priority Republican Party goal* of suppressing potential Democratic voters.
Fisher's study
Aleksandr Fisher’s article reports on “a survey experiment – analyzing the conditions under which states can influence public opinion about an adversary.” He writes, “This is the first study, to my knowledge, that measures the causal effect of modern Russian propaganda on American audiences.” (“Modern” there presumably means the post-Soviet era.) His study specifically tests whether knowing that the Russian state outlet RT is the source of a story affects the participants’ evaluation of its validity, using a story about Ukraine.
He writes of the current state of academic studies of the field:
[D]uring the Cold War, US government officials were optimistic that by providing more information to citizens in the Soviet Union, these audiences would hold their government more accountable and push for democratic reforms. According to one comprehensive study of Western broadcasting to the countries behind the Iron Curtain, Western radio had between 25 and 50 million Soviet listeners from 1978–1990, and Radio Liberty reported a weekly listenership of over 15% (35 million people) after jamming ended in 1988. While these figures may look impressive, scholars still debate the actual influence of these initiatives and foreign messaging in general.He emphasizes that previous studies indicate that negative propaganda communicated by one government to another country’s public about a third country can increase negative attitudes toward the third party. But he argues that they have not established it generates a positive attitude about the country running the information operation. Especially: “When citizens have weak prior opinions about a foreign nation, a small amount of negative coverage can make these negative attributes more salient.”
While information from foreign countries has never been as abundant or accessible as it is now, it is not clear how international audiences respond to information from foreign actors. A growing body of research shows that foreign actors can significantly shape public opinion. Others argue that foreign cues are ineffective or even counter-productive. Noting an in-group bias to political persuasion, some argue that foreign messages – especially from low credibility sources – will be discounted by audiences or provoke backlash effects. [my emphasis; parenthetical sources references in the original omitted without ellipses]
I’ve been following politics more-or-less actively for my whole adult life, and even before I was old enough to vote at 18. So I’m used to the need to evaluate sources and to think critically about their perspectives and biases. And that includes information from government sources. There are public news stations that are institutionally largely independent, like the BBC, Aljazeera, and RT (formerly Russia Today). They have records and reputations that people can evaluate. And those records change and evolve over time.
With an outlet like RT that is widely understood to be directed by Russian government policy, it becomes an easily accessible source for anyone who is curious for whatever reason about what the preferred Russian policy is. Even public or private stations with a reputation for bad or crassly propagandistic journalism, such as FOX News or One America, can be a source to see what their propaganda position of the moment is. And also, it’s notable when they provide reporting that goes against their usual ideological mode, as when some leading FOX News figure criticizes Trump directly. “Evidence against interest,” attorneys call it.
For instance, in Fischer’s article, I was struck by a sentence when he uncritically cites the shadowy PropOrNot group, which is a highly dubious sources, though he does note it is an “anonymous” group, an important qualifier. (On PropOrNot, see: Dave Lindorff, Rather Than Exposing Propaganda, WaPo Shows How It’s Done FAIR 12/08/2016) That raises a caution for me about his choice of sources. But that doesn’t mean I dismiss everything in the piece, not least because he provides extensive citations of his other sources.
He finds from his study that negative RT information affected the American participants’ attitudes toward Ukraine negatively, even when they knew RT was the source. “People still have less favorable attitudes toward Ukraine when they know the information comes from a Russian-funded news network. They also do not become any less critical of Ukraine when they are told the intentions of the Russian news network.”
He makes this qualification:
I find some evidence that providing information about the intentions of RT mitigates the effect of propaganda in individuals with greater levels of political awareness ... What this means in practice is that making the source of foreign information apparent is an important counterpropaganda strategy, but it may only be effective on a limited audience with sufficient prior knowledge about the topic. Individuals with low levels of prior knowledge about Ukraine are actually more likely to adopt less favorable attitudes toward Ukraine when presented the treatment with more information about the Russian network.The level of information is apparently based on a self-identification of the participants, rather than on any kind of test requiring them to demonstrate specific knowledge.
This being an actual scholarly article, Fisher lists various possible weaknesses of the study and the sampling. The survey was taken in October 2016, more than two years after the intensive reporting on the Russia-Ukraine conflict around the time Russia occupied and annexed Crimea. And one of the limitations he identifies is the fact that “the conflict in Ukraine is a low-saliency issue for most Americans.” (my italics)
The international coverage by American media has been drastically cut back since the end of the Cold War. Unless Americans have a particularly strong independent connection with a particular foreign country, like Cuban or Venezuelan exiles or their descendants, most people are likely to take their cues about a foreign country from the American government’s position as communicated by American media. Most Americans in October 2018 probably had a vague idea that the US was siding with Russia against Ukraine over some conflict. But knowing anything substantial about internal events or political forces in Ukraine? Being able to identify Ukraine on a map with borders but no names shown? Not nearly so likely.
So it’s not surprising that when confronted with more specific information about Ukraine, most participants wouldn’t have a basis to raise appropriate questions or challenge specific claims. Especially if it’s not framed specifically in the context of American foreign policy positions.
An Appendix detailing the survey results is available online and not behind subscription: Supplementary Online Appendix.
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