Re-education camps for Muslims in China's Xinjiang

There have been reports over the last two years about Muslims being required to go into re-education centers in the province of Xinjiang.

China is, of course, a secular Communist state that officially rejects a religious worldview. The Communist government has traditionally been leery of religious institutions or movements that could present a challenge to the authority of the state or offer opportunities for foreign powers to interfere in China.

Chinese Muslims have generally not been a notable concern for Western media. After the September 11, 2001 attacks in the United States organized mainly by Saudis, the US made a "War on Terrorism" a central theme of its foreign policy, a concern shared to various degrees by European countries and Russia. The negative image of Russia's First and Second Chechen Wars in the Western press was considerably tempered by by the War on Terrorism emphasis.

Concern over Muslim militance in Xinjiang didn't begin with September 11. Dru Gladney writes ("Central Asia and China", Oxford History of Islam, John Esposito, ed. 1999):

In 1997 bombs exploded in a city park in Beijing on May 13 (killing one) and on two buses on March 7 (killing two), as well as in the northwestern border city of Urumqi, the capital of Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region, on February 25 (killing nine), with more than thirty other bombings in 1997 and six in Tibet alone. Most of these bombings are thought to have been related to demands by Muslim and Tibetan separatists. Eiglit members of the Uighur Muslim minority were executed on May 29 for alleged bombings in northwest China, with hundreds arrested for suspicion of taking part in ethnic riots and engaging in separatist activities. At a time when China celebrates its recovery of Hong Kong, which took place on July 1, 1997, many wonder if it can hold on to rebellious parts of its restive west.

Uighurs and Han Chinese are the two largest ethnic groups in Xinjiang, which also includes Kazakhs, Mongolians and various others. Islam began to take hold in what is now Xinjiang as early as the tenth century continuing through the end of the 1600s. The famous Silk Route network of trade routes facilitated the movement of people and ideas along with commercial goods. During the last half of the 19th century and into the 20th century, the common religion of Islam became a strong mutually identifying factor among the various people in the region.

As this map from Wikimedia Commons shows, Xinjiang has borders with seven other countries: Mongolia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgystan, Tajikistam. Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India.

The formal borders of today in the region are legacies of Western colonialism and Russian and Chinese dominance. What we tend to call ethnic tensions persist, notably between the Uighurs and the Han in Xinjiang, differences that involve politics, language, religion and all the other things that combine in "ethnic" rivalries.

The Communist government in China as well as the Soviet Union were relatively cautious about secularizing the Central Asian Islamic regions. A crackdown on religious practices in Xinjiang drew strong resistance, including the declaration of a short-lived Uighur Republic. A clear split between the Soviet and Chinese Commuist leaders was already occurring in the late 1950s, and the Soviets  provided some assistance and encouragement to armed opposition group in Xinjiang.

During the Cultural Revolution, the national government and the Red Guard militants campaigned hard against Muslim institutions in Xinjiang. After 1978, anti-Islam measures were reduced, coinciding not only with a conservative turn in the Chinese government but also with increased diplomatic outreach to Islamic countries.

The current issue of Der Spiegel (45; 10.11.2018) includes a report by Katrin Kuntz ("Die Verschwundenen") which relays a UN estimate that around one million people are currently interned in what Kuntz calls "allegedly hundreds of eduction camps" or "indoctrination camps."

She also conducted interviews in Kazakstan with three individuals who claimed to have been interned and a dozen families saying they had relatives in the camps. According to the timeline she constructs, about two years ago the central government started applying stronger measures against people in Xinjiang, such as closing Uighur schools and substituting Chinese ones (her article mentions this only as an individual experience of former detainee Guly Omarkan), and pressuring people to attend re-education classes.

Chen Quanguo was appointed in 2016 as the top official in Xinjiang and he increased the number of police and established checkpoints. People who traveled abroad, even across the immediate border to visit relatives or do business, came under more suspicion. At the beginning of 2007, the provincial government began an action called "becoming a family" in which up to one million individuals were sent to Xinjiang homes, where local residents were required to quarter them. Their job, according to Kuntz' report, was to fink on the families with whom they were staying.

This latter claim strikes me as odd. For one thing, I've don't hear about this particular kind of measure other places, except in instances like the post-Second World War occupation period in Germany, or maybe the quartering of soldiers the British practiced before and during the American Revolution, a measure specifically banned in the US Constitution. For another, it doesn't sound like a very clever way to spy on people. It's a lot less subtle than hacking computers or monitoring phones. I'm wondering if that might not be a secondary or teritary purpose of a program aimed at integrating (or puoshing) the local people into differnt sort of approved cultural habits, e.g., speaking Mandarin. Kunzt does note that the expressed purpose of the program is "winning hearts."

The Spiegel report does not describe how long the typical stay is or a more general idea of the conditions. Obviously, if the subjects are required to stay there for longer than a few days, it is effectively being in prison. Or maybe like country jail if the stays are shorter.

This Amnesty International report does say this (China: Families of up to one million detained in mass “re-education” drive demand answers 09/24/2018):

The authorities label the camps as centres for “transformation-through-education”, but many simply call them “re-education camps”. Those sent to detention camps are not put on trial, have no access to lawyers or right to challenge the decision. Individuals could be left to languish in detention for months, as it is the authorities who decide when an individual has been “transformed”.

Kairat Samarkan was sent to a detention camp in October 2017, after he returned to the XUAR [Xinjiang] following a short visit to neighbouring Kazakhstan. Police told him he was detained because he was accused of having dual citizenship and had betrayed his country. He was released in February 2018.

The Chinese government initially denied the existence of the camps. But last month they formalized it: China legalises 're-education camps' in Xinjiang Aljazeera 10/10/2018.

The revised rules, passed on Tuesday, call on local governments to tackle "terrorism" by establishing "vocational education centres" that will carry out the "educational transformation of people who have been influenced by extremism".

The centres should teach Mandarin Chinese, legal concepts and vocational training, and carry out "thought education," according to a copy of the rules posted on the regional government's website.

As many as a million people are believed to have been detained in extrajudicial detention centres in Xinjiang as authorities there seek to battle what they describe as religious extremism, separatism and terrorism.

Aljzeera's UpFront program ran this report in September, Has China detained a million Uighur Muslims? 19/15/2018:

Victor Gao of the Center for China and Globalization defends China in this report by denying large-sale interment while emphsizing the menance of terrorism.

Although putting people in re-education camps involuntary is probably not an effective way to discuourge Islamism or secession sentiments, the threat of terrorism in Xinjiang is not entirely imaginary. Liza Steele and Raymond Kuo wrote in "Terrorism in Xinjiang?" Ethnopolitics, 6:1 (2007):

China rarely evokes images of radical Islam, bus bombings, and mosque razings. Yet all of these elements have had a distinct impact on life in the north-western province of Xinjiang. Since 1989, the territory has been rocked by protests, occasional rioting and even terrorist attacks, which Beijing claims are perpetrated by Islamist extremists belonging to the region’s sizable Muslim Uighur population.

See also: Jonathan Kaiman, Chinese media reports 50 killed in Xinjiang in revision of death toll Guardian 09/26/2014; Xinjiang attack leaves at least 15 dead Guardian/AP 11/29/2014: ("The official Xinhua news agency said the attack took place on Friday on a 'food street' in Shache county, where state media said a series of attacks in July left 96 people dead, including 59 assailants.")

Other reports on the camps:

• Mathias Böhlinger, China's Xinjiang Muslims live in fear of disappearing into camps Deutsche Welle 17.09.2018
• Lily Kuo, Pakistan criticises China over treatment of ethnic Muslims Guardian 09/21/2018
• Frances Eve, China is committing ethnic cleansing in Xinjiang – it's time for the world to stand up Guardian 11/03/2018