Friday, November 2, 2018

A win for EU law and democracy in Poland

Wolfgang Münchau's Eurointelligence Professional Briefing (Public Section) 10/31/2018 has an optimistic take on Poland's response to an important ruling by the European Court of Justice (EJC) in A further move in Warsaw to submit to the ECJ’s authority (scroll down).

The case in question had to do with a move made by Poland's authoritarian government to undermine the judicial independence of the Polish Supreme Court. As Jon Stone reports (European Court of Justice orders Poland to stop purging its supreme court judges Independence 10/19/2018):
Since coming to power in 2015, Poland’s right-wing populist Law and Justice governing party has pushed through a series of controversial changes to judicial appointments that critics say put too much power in the hands of the government and endangers the independence of the judiciary.

The numerous changes give the governing majority in parliament greater power over judicial appointments, while another new law also forced around a third of the country’s supreme court judges into retirement earlier this year.
This was a critical step by the Polish government in departing from the minimal standards of democracy required by the European Union for member states. Both Poland and Hungary are currently under "Article 7" investigations for such violations of EU democratic standards, the actions against the Supreme Court being the most pressing concern in Poland's case. (Maïa de la Baume and Dvid Herszenhorn, EU unpersuaded by Poland’s defense at rule-of-law hearing Politico EU 06/27/18)

The ECJ ruled that the changes violated European law. And the Polish government has agreed to abide by the ruling for now. The judges the government forced into retirement are now back and work and recruitment for their replacements has been halted.

A previous Eurointelligence briefing (Poland's local elections reveal deeply-split country 10/25/2018) noted:
The government in Warsaw continued as in the past to respond with mixed signals, saying on the one hand that it would respect EU law – and therefore the ECJ’s injunction - while trying to get Poland’s supreme court to invalidate the ECJ's ruling. Its argument is that the Polish constitution supersedes the ECJ's treaty-based powers in this case. We note that this dispute is not specific to Poland: the conflict about the primacy - or not - of the national constitution over EU treaties has for instance been brought repeatedly before Germany’s supreme court. The judges in Karlsruhe judges have until now responded with deliberately ambiguous judgments, maintaining a prudent judicial truce, and evading a clear decision about its own possible subjection to the ECJ. Will the Polish judges risk a fundamental conflict their German peers have until now done everything to avoid? And, if yes, how will the EU respond? What is at stake here goes way beyond the preservation of fundamental norms in Poland. [my emphasis]
As the 10/31/2018 briefing puts it, the represents a win for "a common view of the proper order of things" within the EU:
What if this common view is no longer shared to a sufficient degree by political majorities in each member state of the EU? Three things can happen. States can choose to leave. Disintegration can occur from within. Or the common view becomes a common order imposed and successfully enforced from above in a classic process of state formation. It is the third response that is at work in the EU — forget all the analysis being written about how EU integration has come to a halt.

The EU’s nascent fight against dark money and corruption, the halt to Poland’s judicial reform – these are just two of the manifestations of European power expanding its reach and moving to assert control in important and unprecedented ways. Is it a struggle? Of course it is. An easy one? Of course not. But it is a sign of the EU responding to challenges of a kind that were always going to be inevitable in a hugely expanded Union of 445 million inhabitants and 27 States, with more power rather than new weakness. [my emphasis]
Poland had regional elections last month, and the results were mixed. But they were certainly not a sweep for the rightwing populists.

The rigtwing populist Law and Justice Party (PiS, from the Polish initials) under its Chairman Jarosław Kaczyński is the dominant party at the national level. The 2018 regional elections were the first time in three years the PiS faced the voters' judgment. The results came out with 32% for the PiS and 44% for the two largest opposition groupings: Citizens Coalition with 27% and PSL (Polish Farmers Party) with 17%. (Clara Mode, Polen, wo bei einer Wahl alle Parteien gewinnen und keine verliert Standard 30.10.2018)

The current Polish President is Andrzej Duda of the PiS, elected in 2015. But Kaczyński is widely regarded as the power behind the throne.

The May 2019 EU elections are already getting a lot of attention. The rightwing populist parties In Europe have ironically used the EU Parliamentary elections as a way to build an anti-EU message and get recognition for their leaders. So hopefully the other parties will take the EU elections more seriously than in the past. And that seems to be happening at the moment. May will be a big milestone in current EU politics.

Ivan Krastev wrote earlier this year ("Eastern Europe's Illiberal Revolution" Foreign Affairs 97:3 May/June 2018):
Poland's government has also sought to dismantle checks and balances, especially through its changes to the constitutional court. In contrast to the Hungarian government, however, it is basically clean when it comes to corruption. Its policies are centered less on controlling the economy or creating a loyal middle class and more on the moral reeducation of the nation. The Polish government has tried to rewrite history, most notably through a recent law making it illegal to blame Poland for the Holocaust. [my emphasis]
He also notes that the rightwing populist regimes currently in power in Hungary and Poland display "a Janus-faced attitude toward the EU." That is, they bitch and moan about the EU. But they get a lot of money from the EU: "Poland is the continent's biggest recipient of money from the European Structural and Investment Funds, which promote economic development in the EU'S less developed countries."

This is at least analogous to the phenemenon we see in the US, where the Democratic states tend to be net contributors of federal revenue while Republican ones are net recipients, even though the Republicans actually want to reduce those transfers significantly.

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