Summarizing US-Iran clashes since 2018

Nathaniel Davis provides a helpful summary of the clashes between the US and Iran since the US withdrawal from the nuclear arms-control treaty with Iran, The Rockets of January: Have We Really Escaped ‘A Trap From Which There Was no Exit’? Responsible Statecraft 01/14/2020:

Recent provocations included escalating attacks on U.S. forces in Iraq by Iranian-backed militias. Grown out of militias that fought against coalition forces during the Iraq War, they were reconstituted and rebranded with Iranian help to fight against ISIS. Modeled to some degree on Lebanese Hezbollah, they constitute a state within a state, and are part of the reason for months of protests in Baghdad against government corruption and Iranian influence in the country. These attacks culminated in a rocket attack near Kirkuk on December 27, in which a U.S. contractor was killed and several U.S. and Iraqi military personnel were wounded. The U.S. retaliated on December 29, striking five Kataeb Hezbollah bases in Iraq, killing at least 25. The militia responded by violently protesting at the U.S. embassy in Baghdad, causing extensive damage, including graffiti reading “Soleimani is my commander.” The U.S. answered by sending Marines to the embassy, deploying portions of the 82nd Airborne Division’s Immediate Response Force to the region, and targeting Soleimani.

Since the killing of Soleimani, Iranian state television called the act the “the biggest miscalculation by the U.S.” in the post-World War II period, a telling statement when one considers that same period includes the U.S.-backed coup of Mohammad Mosaddegh in 1953, U.S. support for the Shah of Iran through 1979, and the accidental downing of Iran Air Flight 655 by USS Vincennes in 1985, all cardinal sins in the eyes of the Iranian regime. Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei warned of “harsh retaliation,” and the U.S. Embassy urged Americans to leave Iraq immediately. The Iraqi parliament voted along sectarian lines on a non-binding resolution to expel U.S. forces, and President Trump responded with a threat of sanctions. On January 5, Iran announced that it would no longer abide by the restrictions of the nuclear agreement, opening the door to the development of a nuclear weapon as a hedge against the threat of regime change. On Wednesday, Iran launched multiple ballistic missiles at bases housing U.S. forces in Iraq. The visually spectacular attacks resulted in no casualties, and it is possible that the strikes were designed with that outcome in mind. Following the attacks, Iranian foreign minister Javad Zarif tweeted “Iran took & concluded appropriate measures…We do not seek escalation or war, but will defend ourselves against any aggression.” In remarks on January 9, President Trump made it clear that the U.S. response to the strikes would be increased economic sanctions, rather than a military response. For the moment at least, it appears that the chain of escalations emanating from the death of Soleimani has been broken by mutual acts of restraint by both the U.S. and Iran.

Davis stresses the restraint is not some permanent state of affairs. To back away from the escalatory spiral since Trump left the JCPOA nuclear agreement will require constructive measures to reduce the tension.

Another piece at Responsible Statecraft by Gary Sick looks at the actual common interests of the US and Iran, How the U.S. and Iran Can Work Together on Their ‘Shared Priorities’ 01/13/2020.
Suadad al-Salhy (Iran tasked Nasrallah with uniting Iraqi proxies after Soleimani's death 01/14/2020)

The leaders of Iranian-backed paramilitary groups in Iraq have agreed to put their differences aside and back Hadi al-Amiri as the new chairman of the Popular Mobilisation Forces (PMF) as part of a wider plan brokered by Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah to quell tensions between the groups and create a “united resistance” to US troops in the country. ...

Most of the leaders then flew to Tehran on Sunday, before moving onto the Iranian city of Qom on Monday where they also met with influential Iraqi cleric Moqtada al-Sadr in a significant display of Shia unity.

Iraq is majority Shi'a. But that doesn't mean there aren't real tensions between Iraqi and Iranian Shi'a:

Iran is facing unprecedented tension in its relationship with the United States after it bombed Iraqi military bases hosting US forces last week, in retaliation for the killings of Soleimani and Muhandis.

In addition, the relationship between Sistani, the spiritual leader of the Shia community in Iraq, and [Iranian Ayatollah] Khamenei has deteriorated significantly because of the Iranian supreme leader's insistence on using Iraq as a proxy battleground for the confrontation with the US, and over the role of Iranian-backed armed groups in the killing and intimidation of Iraqi anti-government protesters.

So there *were* casulties in the Iranian retaliatory missile strike

Defense One has reported that the Iranian missile strike after the assassination of Iranian Gen. Soleimani actually did produce American casualties, though it reports no deaths among them: Kevin Baron, Eleven US Troops Were Injured in Jan. 8 Iran Missile Strike 01/16/2020.

Cody Fenwick observes (The Trump administration misled the country by saying there were ‘no casualties’ from Iran attack: report Raw Story 01/17/2020):

Defense Secretary Mark Esper said the day after the attack: “Most importantly, no casualties, no friendly causalities, whether they are U.S., coalition, contractor, et cetera.”

Since “casualties” refers to people both killed and injured in a war, this statement was clearly false.

And he continues with a plausible interpretation:

Why does this matter? Arguably, it’s a good thing that the severity of the Iran strike was downplayed because it allowed both sides to stand down and prevented the situation from spiraling further out of control. (Tragically, a plane headed to Ukraine — which included many Iranian passengers - was shot down by the Iranian military on the same night as the attack in an apparent accident in the fog of war.)

And yet it’s vital that the American people can trust that the federal government is providing accurate information and not trying to spin the facts to fit the president’s preferred narrative. The claim that there were no casualties from the Iran strike helped construct a narrative that the regime was intentionally trying to avoid injuring or killing Americans; many believed that the show of force from Iran was an attempt at a face-saving measure that would nevertheless not prompt more retaliation from Trump. [my emphasis]

Yeah, facts matter.

It's worth noting that the Defense One story states:

In the past week, news organizations that were granted access to the base to film the damage and interview military personnel have reported that no Americans were killed, wounded, or “seriously injured.” But the New York Times reported on Monday that some personnel had been treated for concussions.

In a Jan. 16 statement, a spokesman for the U.S. military command in Baghdad said, “As previously stated, while no U.S. service members were killed in the Jan. 8 Iranian attack on Al Asad Air base, several were treated for concussion symptoms from the blast and are still being assessed.”

The Times story linked there (Alissa Rubin, ‘It Was Like a Scene From an Action Movie’ 01/13/2020) reported, " No one was killed or wounded in the five barrages of multiple missiles that night, although several military personnel who were working were checked for concussions."

I won't try to parse whether concussions count as a "wound". But it seems entirely fine to me to describe those as "casualties". The Wikipedia entry for casualty (person) says:

In military usage, a casualty is a person in service killed in action, killed by disease, disabled by injuries, disabled by psychological trauma, captured, deserted, or missing, but not someone who sustains injuries which do not prevent them from fighting. Any casualty is no longer available for the immediate battle or campaign, the major consideration in combat; the number of casualties is simply the number of members of a unit who are not available for duty.

So it sounds to me like being made not available for duty while receiving medical attention from possible brain damage count.

Jake Tapper and a couple of others are reporting the story for CNN, too, US troops were injured in Iran missile attack despite Pentagon initially saying there were no casualties 01/17/2020:

Concussions are not always apparent immediately after they've been suffered, but the disclosure indicates that the impact of the attack was more serious than initial assessments indicated. The attack, launched in retaliation for the US airstrikes that had killed Iranian Gen. Qasem Soleimani, significantly ratcheted up tensions between Iran and the US, though the prospect of further military confrontation appears to have abated for now.

A US military official told CNN that 11 service members had been injured in the attack, which was first reported by Defense One. Following the attack, the Pentagon had initially said that no casualties had resulted from the 16 missiles fired by Iran. The US military defines a casualty as either an injury or fatality involving personnel.

Asked about the apparent discrepancy, a Defense official told CNN, "That was the commander's assessment at the time. Symptoms emerged days after the fact, and they were treated out of an abundance of caution."

Loose talk about official assassinations is irresponsible

There is a long history in which the assassination of one nation's senior officials by another country is considered a reckless thing and illegal in international law.

This image can serve as a reminder:

Copy of the death mask of Archduke Franz Ferdinand (1863-1914)

Paul Pillar discusses this in Making America Rogue Again Responsible Statecraft 01/06/2020:

Refraining from assassinating foreign leaders has been a wise American policy, partly to avoid the negative consequences of such killings. The consequences include reprisals by the targeted parties that may be not only in-kind but also take other forms. Moreover, other parties may be encouraged to play the game of nations by such loose and deadly rules. In this regard it is worth noting that the Russian foreign ministry’s statement about the Soleimani killing included the observation, “We have encountered a new reality—the murder of a representative of the government of a sovereign state, an official in the absence of any legal grounds for these actions.”

Killing a leader senior enough to make policy has the further disadvantage of eliminating one of the very people one may need to come to terms with to resolve a conflict. Soleimani was such a leader, being far more than just the commander of the Quds Force and, by some estimates, second only to Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei in shaping Iranian policy in the Persian Gulf and other nearby parts of the Middle East. The one thing now publicly known, via the Iraqi prime minister, about the mission that Soleimani was undertaking when he came to Baghdad on Friday was that he was conveying Iran’s reply to Saudi Arabia’s latest message in an Iraqi-mediated effort to calm cross-Gulf tensions. Everyone should applaud such an effort, in the interest of reducing the chance of war and disruption in the Persian Gulf. By killing Soleimani, Trump has also probably killed, at least for the time being, such peace-making endeavors.

In addition to avoiding the negative practical consequences, foreswearing the assassination of foreign leaders is a matter of principle. It gets to the character and values of a nation, and to the nation’s self-image and self-esteem. Killing other nations’ leaders is not the sort of thing a good nation does. It is the sort of thing terrorists do. [my emphasis]

The entire column is well worth reading. He has important observations about the assassination of Soleimani and its context. "The assassination of Qassem Soleimani, and the rationales offered for this killing, exhibit extreme myopia no matter where one looks in space and time."

And, in general, the new Responsible Statecraft website operated by Andrew Bacevich's Quincy Institute.

Chemi Shalev (Israelis Hailing Trump for Killing Soleimani Forget the Destructive Consequences of Past Assassinations Haaretz 01/06/2020) writes:

Yahya Ayyash deserved to die. The so-called Hamas “engineer”, who was assassinated in January 1996, had perfected the suicide vests worn by Hamas terrorists, turning them increasingly lethal. His killing sparked widespread enthusiasm among Israelis. Then Prime Minister Shimon Peres, who approved the plan to booby-trap Ayyash’s cellphone, was portrayed for the first time in his life as the kind of ruthless leader Israelis yearn for.

The end is known. The killing of Ayyash enraged Palestinians and pushed Hamas to carry out four suicide bombings within eight days, in which 59 Israelis were killed. The shock and fear that gripped Israeli public opinion turned Peres from valiant hero to impotent loser paved the way for Benjamin Netanyahu’s sensational victory in the May 1996 elections – and changed Israel forever. [my emphasis]

But he expresses some optimism that many Americans will recognize the recklessness of Trump's assassination of Qasem Soleimani:

Unlike his Israeli fans, most Americans cannot separate Trump’s supposedly brave if brazen decision to approve Soleimani’s assassination from his otherwise erratic and impulsive conduct in all other arenas, foreign and domestic. Trump’s threat to destroy 52 Iranian targets, including world heritage cultural sites, is not only a barbaric notice of intent to commit war crimes, unbecoming of any U.S. President, it is also a symptom of the kind of presidential inanity that could ignite the Middle East - and inflict a harsh blow on Israel itself. [my emphasis]

James Stavridis also reminds us to brace for what's coming (Brace for the Unintended Consequences of Killing Soleimani Bloomberg Opinion 01/06/2020): "So often, big doors can swing on small hinges. The effects of Soleimani’s death will ripple from Baghdad to Tel Aviv to Nairobi to South America."

A former supreme allied commander of NATO, Stavridis has this to say about NATO countries' reactions:

Finally, at the geostrategic level, there is the way the Soleimani assassination will be received in NATO. During my time as the alliance’s top military commander, it became clear to me that the center of gravity of the alliance is political cohesion. Now that consensus is weakening, as many of the member-states start questioning the legality of this action under international law.Unintended consequence. Germany has already suspended the rotation of its troops to Iraq, and the entire North Atlantic Treaty Organization mission there - to train the Iraqi security forces - is paused and at risk. [my emphasis]

Despite his warnings, though, he nevertheless tacks on in the final paragraph, "Based on what information has been made public and my own experience, I support the administration’s decision to take out Soleimani." He does not discuss the legal issues involved.

Whataboutism doesn't tell us a lot about the fact that a US war with Iran is a really BAD policy

Wars and lesser international conflicts offer plenty of opportunities for whataboutism, i.e., yeah, what Country X did was bad but just look at what Country Z did!

Which is why listing grievances and competing atrocity stories are insufficient to understanding the causes of a war or the prospects for peace. And the progress made in international law over the last couple of centuries mis a recognition that "whatever you can get away with" is not the highest principle in international affairs, despite the fact that it all too often works out that way in practice.

Graham Fuller reminds us of the superficiality of the Trump Administration justification for the assassination/target killing of Iranian general Qasem Soleimani (U.S. Foreign Policy by Assassination Responsible Statecraft 01/04/2020):

The trembling puffery and outrage on the part of most politicians and commentators in the US that “Soleimani was responsible for the deaths of any number of American soldiers in Iraq” reflects either childish naivete or massive self-delusion about what the nature of war is all about. Iran knew it was in the US neocon cross-hairs when the US invaded Iraq in 2003; the standing joke in the US then was that war with Iraq is fine, but “real men go to war with Iran.”

The Cheney-Bush Administration had named Iran as one of the three members of David Frum's Axis of Evil along with Iraq and North Korea. The threat of war against Iran were obvious. And the US' close ally Israel, to whom both parties' leaders continually declare to be an invaluable ally, has periodically ever since then threatening to bomb facilities in Iran that Israel claims it is using for nuclear arms development.

The US had fully supported Saddam Hussein’s vicious war against Iran throughout the 1980s. It was not surprising then that Iran aided the massive uprising of Iraqi Sunni and Shi’a forces to resist the US military invasion and occupation of Iraq - a presence that lacked any legal standing. Naturally Iran provided advice and weapons to Iraqi guerrillas to facilitate killing the soldiers of the American occupation, that’s what war is. [my emphasis]

It's also important to remember that during and after the long Iran-Iraq War (1980-88) and thereafter until 2003, the Sunni-led Iraq of Saddam Hussein and the Shia government of Iran balanced each other military and political power and therefore limited the potential ambitions of both countries that might be of concern to the US, NATO, or their other neighbors.

But Iraq is also a majority Shia country. So it was clear to most everyone paying attention that removing Saddam's Sunni government with a promise for democratic elections would produce a Shia-dominated government which was likely to have better relations to Iran than Saddam did. And that's what happened. What also happened was a civil war between Shia and Sunni groups with the Kurds a third group of belligerents.

This has never meant that Iraqis Shias were more loyal to Iran than to their own country. Iraqi Shias fought in the Iraqi army in the long war against Iran. They didn't act like some giant Fifth Column of Iran. But there was never any good reason to think that the post-Saddam Iraqi government would be other than close to Iran. Nor that there would be military cooperation between Iran and the Iraqi government as well as between Iran and secular Shia militias in Iraq.

The US has supported any number of guerrilla forces around the world to fight against enemies and regimes we don’t like, starting with military aid, training, intelligence, joint missions, etc., as we have seen most recently in Iraq, Syria and Yemen. There is precious little ground for US moral outrage in all of this - unless one simply assumes, as the US usually does - that America by definition represents the “moral cause,” the “good guys,” and has a god-given right to intervene anywhere and everywhere in the name of freedom, democracy or human rights or to protect whatever it is. [my emphasis]

This does not mean that the US has no good and practical reasons for opposing Iranian policies, as on terrorism. The US certainly has an interest in nuclear nonproliferation in Iran. Which is why it was a great thing that the US and various other countries had come to agreement with Iran in 2015 on an effective arms control regime with extensive international inspections. Donald Trump cancelled that treaty in May 2018 and then opposed severe sanctions of Iran, who had been abiding by the treaty. And only after the Soleimani assassination a few days ago did Iran finally announce it would no longer abide by the treaty.

Whether Qasem Soleimani was a Bad Man or not is really beside the point of whether its either justified or any kind of a practical good idea for the US to have a war with Iran. It's a terrible idea. Fred Kaplan pessimistically concluded immediately after the assassination, "The United States is now at war with Iran." And he does not think that is a good idea. (Trump Just Declared War on Iran Slate 01/03/2020)