Mearsheimer does process world affairs through his “offensive realist” viewpoint that focuses particularly on the dynamics of great-power competition.
But in this discussion, he focuses mainly on the immediate specifics of the diplomacy over Ukraine and Israel. He continues to emphasize his plausible argument that Ukraine is effectively losing the war, in the sense that there is no obvious practical prospect at the moment of Ukraine retaking large amounts of the territory Russia has occupied.
Crimea has been absorbed formally into Russia since 2014. And now Russia controls large parts of eastern Ukraine and they are likely to be in a position of control for years. If Biden had been willing and/or capable of developing some kind of armistice agreement after Ukraine’s 2023 counteroffensive stalled out, it might have been possible to limit further losses for Ukraine and establish some meaningful long-term negotiating framework.
But that would have involved some kind of de facto agreement by the US and Europe not to make Ukraine a part of NATO and formal security arrangements for a sustainable ceasefire. Some reductions of the Western sanctions on Russia would have had to be addressed, as well.
But that ship sailed long ago. As Mearsheimer emphasizes here, Trump’s latest statement seemingly reversing his previous policy or more-or-less backing the Russian position is really an attempt to wash his hands of the situation and avoid blame at the moment when there is a formal recognition that Ukraine has lost this round of the extended conflict with Russia.
It’s important to keep in mind, though, that “Peace” President Trump’s bragging about how quickly he would bring about an end to the Russo-Ukraine War was a complete and total flop.
The reality is that Russia has conquered large parts of Ukraine in an illegal invasion. Certainly, the exceptionally reckless approach of the Cheney-Bush Administration in pushing ahead with an explicit commitment in 2008 to make Ukraine a NATO member, even though Ukraine did not meet the requirements to begin a formal accession process, was a disastrous move.
But the genie isn’t going back into the bottle anytime soon. Not only Europe and the US but the world community in general has a stake in not recognizing Russia’s illegal annexations of Ukrainian territory. For Europe, it is important from their general security perspective to make a strong showing that they are not inclined to roll over in the face of Russian aggression against even non-NATO, non-EU countries. It would be much preferable if European leaders and policy analysts would avoid invoking the Munich Analogy, which tends to cast any practical concessions as Chamberlain caving to Hitler and making a much bigger war inevitable.
There’s also a practical side to European policy that is not entirely a happy one for Ukraine. The longer Russia is tied down in an active shooting war in Ukraine, the less likely it is to play dangerous provocative games to challenge the seriousness of NATO and EU members in responding to threats. This means that in grim practical terms, having an active war continue between Ukraine and Russia gives Europe more time to make major political and military adjustments to adjust to the Trump policy, which amounts to kissing off the concept that the US will actively participate in European defense. On the one hand, this is beneficial for Ukraine in holding off Russian gains. But it also means that it creates pressures for Ukraine not to accept a possible imperfect but beneficial end of the current conflict.
Unless Putin dies or decides to step down, any return of full sovereignty to Ukraine is likely to be off the table for Russia.
This situation calls to mind one of Hegel’s grimmer comments on the course of human affairs: “The history of the world is not the ground of happiness, because the periods of happiness are blank pages in it.” But he qualifies that immediately by adding, “the object of history is, at the least, change.” (2)
Deutsche Welle English also takes a look at Trump 2.0’s Ukraine policy in the context of Trump‘s drive to remake the US into an autocracy: (3) Erik Kirschbaum from the Los Angeles Times is one of the panelists who postures as a blustering hawk who mainly adds hot air to the discussion.
And as we head into the fourth quarter of 2025, Peace President Trump’s miserable failure in diplomacy over the Russo-Ukraine War, Trump has basically committed itself to support Netanyahu’s genocide in Gaza and his warlike actions against several neighboring countries. Elan Nechin writes in Haaretz about Netanyahu’s latest imagery of Israel as a modern-day Sparta:
Netanyahu's invocation of Sparta collapses the moment he steps off the plane in the United States. He arrives not as a great wartime leader, but as a supplicant, begging Trump – who's more interested in TV talk show hosts than charting a new path for the region – for unending support.There is so far no sign that Trump is willing to put meaningful restraints on Netanyahu over anything he wants to do. And Israel cannot continue what it is doing today without massive American support. As Amos Harel observes:
Without Trump, Netanyahu is exposed, a hollow strongman propped up by a single patron while the rest of the world, save Hungary and a few Pacific islands, makes clear what is right and what is wrong. Not even the American public is with Netanyahu. Polls increasingly show that they back a Palestinian state, and support for Israel is sliding fast. Netanyahu is so alienated and weak, on his way to meet Trump, that he even rerouted his flight to dodge European airspace. Some Spartan leader. [my emphasis] (4)
Unlike the harsh criticism Netanyahu has faced from other leaders, there hasn't been even a hint of a crisis between him and Trump. The president has given Netanyahu full backing in all his moves, from the deliberate collapse of the previous hostage deal talks and the resumption of fighting in Gaza in March, to Netanyahu's August announcement instructing the army to capture Gaza City. Trump limited himself to what, for him, was a polite protest when Netanyahu ordered the September 9 assassination of Hamas' negotiating team in Doha. …
We've seen this before, with recurring speculation over pressure that Biden, and later Trump, would apply on Netanyahu over the past two years. The safe bet, therefore, remains the same: Netanyahu will continue to stall and drag things out, and hope that the cease-fire talks collapse again so the blame can be pinned on Hamas. [my emphasis] (5)
Notes:
(1) Prof. John Mearsheimer: Ukraine is Trump’s War. Judge Napolitano-Judging Freedom YouTube channel 09/25/2025. <https://www.youtube.com/live/dMtCZnq-zLI?si=2u__b2DL3V6PKZJA> (Accessed: 2025-26-09).
(2) Hegel, G.W.F. (2015): Gesammelte Werke 27:1, 54 (Nachschrift Hotho, 1822-23). Düsseldorf: Nordrhein-Westfälische Akademie der Wissenschaften und der Künste. My translation to Englsih.
(3) Trump the unpredictable: What's his real plan for Ukraine and for democracy? - To the Point. DW News 09/25/2025. <https://youtu.be/UKx2LnkCeAM?si=nSbrBYCEW7TlxYW-> (Accessed: 2025-26-09).
(4) Nechin, Etan (2025): Netanyahu Declares a Spartan Israel – and Then Runs to Trump Begging for Cover. Haaretz 09/25/2025. <https://www.haaretz.com/opinion/2025-09-25/ty-article-opinion/.premium/netanyahu-declares-a-spartan-israel-and-then-runs-to-trump-begging-for-cover/00000199-6bbf-db6e-a5d9-ffffe07a0000?gift=bb91b01b8c4549218b10ba276e701fcf> (Accessed: 2025-26-09).
(5) Harel, Amos (2025): Trump's New Gaza Plan Has One Palpable Weak Point: It Clashes With Netanyahu's Promises to His Voters. Haaretz 09/26/2025. <https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/2025-09-26/ty-article/.premium/trumps-new-gaza-plan-has-a-weak-point-it-clashes-with-netanyahus-promises-to-his-voters/00000199-825a-db6e-a5d9-d67e6cf70000?gift=4ef89b83c72342729e0cc481624d3d99> (Accessed: 2025-26-09).
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