He mentions the idea of a common European fund for defense, which could play a useful role in a rearmament project.
Binoy Kampmark recently commented on how seriously Wahington’s European allies take the signs that they cannot rely on the US as a reliable ally, referencing Trump’s 2025 visit to a NATO meeting in the Hague:
The confidence trickster [i.e. conman, in this case Donald Trump] was at it again on his visit to The Hague, reluctantly meeting members of the overly large family that is NATO. President Donald Trump was hoping to impress upon all present that allies of the United States, whatever inclination and whatever their domestic policy, should spend mightily on defence, inflating the margins of sense and sensibility against marginal threats. Never mind the strain placed on the national budget over such absurd priorities as welfare, health or education.
The marvellous [sic] irony in this is that much of the budget increases have been prompted by Trump’s perceived unreliability and capriciousness when it comes to European affairs. Would he, for instance, treat obligations of collective defence outlined in Article 5 of the organisation’s governing treaty with utmost seriousness? Since Washington cannot be relied upon to hold the fort against the satanic savages from the East, various European countries have been encouraging a spike in defence spending to fight the sprites and hobgoblins troubling their consciences at night. (2) [my emphasis]
The current German government is even willing to back away from austerity economics, one of the sacred cows of German economic policy for decades now.
A total of 847€ billion is on the table by 2029. The defense budget is planned to grow gradually to 152.8€ billion by 2029. By comparison, in 2024 it was 51.95 billion euros. The share of defense spending to Germany's gross domestic product (GDP) would thus increase from 2.4% percent in 2025 to 3.5% percent in 2029.
In 2025, German Defense Minister Boris Pistorius (SPD) will be able to hire 10,000 new soldiers and 1,000 civilian personnel. "It is a clear signal that we are strengthening the troops," said [Finance Minister Lars] Klingbeil [SPD]. Chancellor Friedrich Merz also referred to the significantly higher military spending in his government statement in the Bundestag on Tuesday.
"We are not doing this, as is sometimes claimed, to do a favor for the US and its President a favor, we are doing this out of our own view and conviction, because we have to fear that Russia will continue the war beyond Ukraine," he stressed. Germany, according to Merz, is "back on the European and international stage". This "new determination" is "registered in the world and warmly welcomed by our partners and friends." (3)
The current European commitment to boosting their defenses seems genuine. How well they will do it, how much funding they will divert from civilian programs and infrastructure, who much they will be willing and able to build up domestic defense industries, how much politics will become militarized, whether countries like Germany and Poland will develop their own nuclear weapons – these issues will be playing out on a grand scale.
There is also the critical political and strategic question of how Europe in its own judgment will judge Russian capabilities and intentions. That Russia is now what the old Soviet Union would have called a capitalist imperialist country is clear. And their current ideology doesn’t make much pretension of international solidarity or liberal internationalism. So we can expect pressures from their own military-industrial complex similar to those in the Western countries when it comes to armaments and foreign policy. But getting entranced by hawkish obsessions about some kind of genetically-fixed Russian obsession with expanding their borders would be a big mistake for Western countries.
And, at the moment, there seems to be a widespread assumption that Russia and China are some kind of solid, hostile bloc trying to undermine the US and European governments, which is a very bad sign. Making policy, especially military policy, based on realistic information is extremely important. Underestimating real threats would obviously be problematic. For the US in particular, but also more than ever for European nations, having well-staffed foreign ministries with deep expertise on potential adversary nations is critical. If all potential adversaries and threats are seen through a primarily military perspective, you wind up with the problem of “if your only tool is a hammer, every problem looks like a nail.”
Nuclear weapons proliferation is also a real and concrete threat to the whole of humanity. And that means that governments who otherwise hate each other need to work out meaningful deal to control and reduce the number of nuclear weapons in the world. A big nuclear war would certainly “own the libs,” which seems to be the guiding concept of politics for Trumpistas. But it would also be very bad even for the most devoted MAGA chuds and even for sacred corporate profits.
I’m surprised that we don’t see the old term for tea-leaf-reading of Russian issues, “Kremlinology,” being used much for the current situation. But having good Kremlinology, and Sinology, are important. And that’s why having competent civilian foreign-policy resources is so important. Some of the current analysis about Russia, even in serious academic and foreign-policy work, amounts to speculation about speeches or books by some crank Russian scholar or intellectual who was once seen shaking hands with Vladimir Puttin 20 years ago, and how they are sinister echoes of some 19th century Russian philosopher and how that means the current Russian government is just like Peter the Great. Or something.
A bad basis for formulation serious and realistic foreign policy.
Also, good (?!) old-fashioned power politics would suggest that it would be in Europe’s interest to pursue better relations with China as a power-balancing move in relation to Russia and the US. And assuming Russia is always going to be a hostile military threat to Europe has led to bad results in the past. For American foreign policy in particular, threat inflation has been a chronic problem for decades. (4)
Notes:
(1) Why is NATO boosting defence spending and can Europe afford it? Counting the Cost. Al Jazeera English YouTube channel 06/26/2025. <https://youtu.be/oWDaF10TFFQ?si=hSeiMQhTTmWqg3lP> (Accessed: 2025-18-07).
(2) Kampmark, Binoy (2025): The five percenters: NATO’s promise of war. Middle East Eye 06/28/2025. <https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20250628-the-five-percenters-natos-promise-of-war/> (Accessed: 2025-18-07).
(3) Baumann, Birgit (2025): Berlin macht für die deutsche Aufrüstung viele neue Schulden. Der Standard 24.06.2025. <https://www.derstandard.at/story/3000000275241/berlin-macht-fuer-die-deutsche-aufruestung-viele-neue-schulden> (Accessed: 2025-28-07). My translation to English.
(4) See, e,g,: Record, Jeffrey (2002): Making War, Thinking History: Munich, Vietnam, and Presidential Uses of Force from Korea to Kosovo. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press.
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