Recalling the first months of the Russo-Ukraine War

With Trump travelling to Alaska this week to meet with his friend (?) Putin over Russia’s ware with Ukraine –Trump of course is promoting it with his usual reality-TV bluster (1) - it’s worth recalling some earlier stages of the war and the diplomacy over it.

The historian Serhii Plokhy in his 2023 book on the current conflict, The Russo-Ukrainian War, refers to the perception of the Biden Administration and its goals during the first year of the war. The book was originally published in English. But since I don’t have immediate access to the English original at this writing, the following quotes are my translations from the German version. (2)

One thing that Plokhy makes clear is that the Biden Administration and the NATO allies embraced a very Cold War-like posture in their response to the 2022 invasion.

Now, for the first time since the middle of the 20th century, the United States had been drawn into such a war. And as in March 1941, when President Franklin D. Roosevelt signed the original Lend-Lease Act, the United States did not enter the war directly. Just like then, the goal was to help victims of aggression. The Biden government was determined to eliminate Russia as a threat to peace not only in Ukraine but around the world, to ensure its defeat in the current war and to weaken it so that it could not fight any more wars if possible. This was the leitmotif of the remarks of Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin, who, together with Secretary of State Antony Blinken, paid a surprise visit to Kyiv on April 25. " We want to see Russia weakened to the degree that it can’t do the kinds of things that it has done in invading Ukraine.," Austin said the next day when he arrived in Poland from Kyiv. (3) He added, "We believe we can win," and then corrected himself: "they can win if they have the right equipment, the right support." (p. 320) [my emphasis]

Apart from the question of whether the initial diplomatic and military response from the US was sensible in the circumstances, this was a public statement from the then-Secretary of Defense saying specifically that the US wanted to see Russia weakened. This was on its face a more ambitious goal than helping Ukraine repel the Russian invaders.

This is a factor that hasn’t gotten as much attention in the commentary as it probably should have. If the goal was to weaken Russia, then it could also be argued that a longer war with Russia would be more likely to increase the chances for that outcome than a shorter one. And a large part of the US foreign policy establishment assumed that financing and supporting the Afghan mujahadeen – we didn’t call them “Islamic terrorists” yet – was a brilliant success and probably even a major contributor to the fall of the Soviet Union.

If the Trump 2.0 regime continues to distance itself from supporting Ukraine, it’s possible that European foreign-policy makers may experience some of the same temptation. It may not make much practical difference. But it could also risk passing up come future ceasefire agreement that could minimize Ukraine’s losses and create a change for a more constructive peace in the future.

Plokhy also observed about the reaction of then German Chancellor Olaf Scholz (SPD):

He then flew to Moscow to dissuade Putin from his war plans by assuring him that Ukraine would definitely not be admitted to NATO for the next 30 years. After being rebuffed there, he made a stopover in Kyiv on his way back to Germany. Zelensky immediately reminded him that [the] Nord Stream II [oil pipeline] was a geopolitical weapon of the Russians, and his visit caused little enthusiasm in the Ukrainian capital. (p. 328)

The NATO issue will still be part of the bargaining over the Russo-Ukraine War. Scholz’ proposal that came to nothing at that time is a reminder that there are various ways to diplomatically finesse the issue.

But apart from formal NATO membership, the NATO allies up to now have treated Ukraine as an ally even though it is not part of the formal NATO defense commitment. But not with the level of direct participation that would be expected with an attack against a member state.

Notes:

(1) Stokols, Eli & Meserly, Megan (2025): ‘Severe consequences’: Trump warns Putin ahead of Alaska summit. Politico 08/13/2025. <https://www.politico.com/news/2025/08/13/severe-consequences-trump-warns-putin-ahead-of-alaska-summit-00506827> (Accessed: 2025-13-08).

(2) Plokhy, Serhii (2023): Der Angriff. Russlands Krieg gegen die Ukraine und seine Folgen für die Welt. Hamburg: Hoffmann und Campe.

(3) First Austin quote in: Borger, Julian (2022): Pentagon chief’s Russia remarks show shift in US’s declared aims in Ukraine. Guardian 04/25/2022. <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/apr/25/russia-weakedend-lloyd-austin-ukraine> (Accessed: 2025-13-08).

Second Austin quote: Secretary Antony J. Blinken and Secretary Lloyd Austin Remarks to Traveling Press 04/25/2022. US Embassy in Ukraine. <https://ua.usembassy.gov/secretary-antony-j-blinken-and-secretary-lloyd-austin-remarks-to-traveling-press/> (Accessed: 2025-13-08).

(4) Ukraine, Europe, and Trump are in agreement ahead of Alaska summit, says Germany's Merz. DW News YouTube channel 08/13/2025. <https://youtu.be/lRjHYMrXwOs?si=CeXDaB6mtuohhRhg> (Accessed: 2025-14-08).