But he makes an important point about the current moment, which is that Ukraine’s formal position that there must be a ceasefire before peace negotiations begin doesn’t in itself make a lot of sense outside of tactical negotiation strategy.
The Russian side made clear from the very start of negotiations that they would not agree to an unconditional ceasefire. Indeed it would have been completely illogical for them to do so, given that military pressure on Ukraine, and advances on the battlefield, are by far the most important leverage that Russia can bring to bear at the negotiating table.The word “unconditional” is doing a lot of work there. Obviously, unless one side just unilaterally declares a ceasefire, there would have to be some understandings between the conflict parties about the timing and parameters of it would be. Even the Israelis have been doing that with Hamas – though the routine outcome is that Israel, the more powerful party, breaks the ceasefire unilaterally and says it’s all Hamas’ fault.
The refusal to recognize this on the part of Western analysts and European governments betrays either an inability to understand obvious realities or a desire that the war should continue indefinitely, in the hope that Russia will eventually accede to present Ukrainian conditions for peace. That would make sense if Ukrainian conditions were realistic, and if developments on the battlefield were in Ukraine’s favor. But some of Ukraine’s demands are completely unacceptable to Moscow, and Ukraine and the West have no way of compelling Russia’s agreement, since it is the Russian army that is advancing (albeit slowly) on the ground and the West cannot provide soldiers to supplement Ukraine’s increasingly outnumbered and depleted forces. [my emphasis] (1)
Lieven’s essay argues that from Ukraine’s and the West’s viewpoint, “the best that can realistically be hoped for is a combination of deterrents and incentives that will discourage a return to arms for a long time to come.” He also writes:
None of this should be taken as saying that all of Russia’s conditions are acceptable or should be accepted. Putin appears to have dropped one impossible demand, that Ukraine withdrawal from the whole of Kherson and Zaporizhia provinces. The remaining Russian demand is for the Ukrainian army’s withdrawal from the part of Donetsk that it holds, in return for Russian withdrawal from much smaller parts of Kharkiv and other provinces.I’ve been assuming that Ukraine’s demand for an “unconditional” ceasefire was more a political talking point than a serious condition for negotiations. It would be an “unconditional” event only if Russia decided unilaterally to just stop its war. As a political polemic that’s understandable, as Lieven also suggests. At this point, though, Ukraine’s best hope for stopping the war in the short term would be to agree to some such deal as Lieven suggests.
Trump is reportedly advising the Ukrainian government to accept this. They are refusing to do so, which is very understandable, but also mistaken if by accepting this they can get a stable peace and Russian compromise in other areas — notably, in Moscow’s demand for Ukrainian “demilitarization.” For realistically speaking, the Ukrainian army seem to be in the process of losing this land anyway. [my emphasis]
But it’s also hard to imagine how that could occur without the US, the major European countries, and Russia all establishing agreements and incentives to discourage both Ukraine and Russia from restarting the conflict. And as Lieven also discusses, the prospect of NATO countries themselves actually stationing troops in Ukraine as a security force is unlikely in the extreme, at least in any immediately foreseeable near term.
Lieven’s comment that European countries might be operating “on a desire that the war should continue indefinitely” if no outright Ukrainian victory is possible is discordant note in the current reporting on the war. But it’s also clear that the US and its European allies have been thinking about the prospect of potentially weakening Russia by dragging out the current war over Ukraine as long as feasible.
Eric Frey, an Austrian journalist who follows US politics closely, takes note of the ineptness of Trump’s diplomacy in Alaska:
[Putin] has completely convinced Donald Trump of his ideas for an end to the Ukraine war and led the President of the United States around like a schoolboy. Putin's so-called peace plan calls for Ukraine to give up its strongest military defenses without a fight and in return receive vague promises from a man [Putin] whose word has never been worth anything. (2)Then he turns to immediately talking about the Munich Analogy, which made me want to tune out completely. But I was amused by this: “Does he really want to go into the history books as a second Neville Chamberlain, as Neville Chambertrump?” Dorky, but somehow cute.
But since I am very confident that Trump has never in his life read even a single history book, I doubt Trump cares what history books will say about him. At least not as long as his cult followers continue to adore him.
The Nation’s Katrina Vanden Houvcl also puts a somewhat hopeful spin on the result of Alaska’s meeting. Not one that I find entirely convincing, but worth hearing: (3)
Notes:
(1) Lieven, Anatol (2025): Why Trump gets it right on Ukraine peace. Responsible Statecraft 08/17/2025. <https://responsiblestatecraft.org/trump-ukraine-russia-agreement/> (Accessed: 2025-17-08).
(2) Frey, Eric (2025): Putin hat Trump vorgeführt, aber den Krieg noch nicht gewonnen. Standard 17.08.2025. <https://www.derstandard.at/story/3000000283725/putin-hat-trump-vorgefuehrt-aber-den-krieg-noch-nicht-gewonnen> (Accessed: 2025-18-08). My translation to English.
(3) Russia Expert Katrina vanden Heuvel on Trump Summits with Putin, Zelensky. Democracy Now! YouTube channel 08/18/2025. <https://youtu.be/jgvrc1SzSsc?si=xJeULWT5Anhudws3> (Accessed: 2025-18-08).
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