Checking in on “EU vs. DiSiNFO”

The European Union has an information operation called EU vs. DiSiNFO which aims to counter disinformation distributed by foreign actors or deceptive domestic sources.

Such debunking functions are sensible. And it’s thoroughly unsurprising that the EU would have such a service. I sometimes check it if I see a claim about some country that seems questionable.

But a government operation is not an independent news operation. For instance, I randomly called up a current article on the EU vs. DiSiNFO with the subtitle, “Disinformation from Georgia to Ukraine.” It states the following about the Russo-Georgian War of 2008, a brief conflict that was part of the deteriorating relationship between Russia and the West:

The 2008 war in Georgia foreshadowed the Kremlin’s larger-scale playbook in Ukraine. Just as in South Ossetia and Abkhazia, Russia used fabricated claims to prepare the ground for invasion. In both cases, Moscow exploited local tensions, fueled separatism, and then intervened militarily under a false humanitarian pretext. The strategic logic remained the same: deny sovereign nations the right to choose their alliances and futures, while attempting to reestablish a sphere of influence through force, coercion, and manufactured instability.

By invading South Ossetia, Russia initiated the first military conflict in Europe in the 21st century – and it wasn’t to be the last. Many experts agree it served as a test run for the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2014 and especially in 2022. Tactics rehearsed in Georgia, such as “humanitarian intervention,” protection of “compatriots,” distribution of Russian passports, and massive disinformation, were later deployed in Ukraine. (1)

This fits nicely into the current EU narrative about Russia, which presents Russia as an expansionist power that is (maybe) trying to reconstitute the old Soviet Union without the “Soviet” part. Anne Applebaum articulated a cautious version of this view in 2022 soon before the start of the current Russo-Ukraine War:

Although [Putin] is sometimes incorrectly described as a Russian nationalist, he is in fact an imperial nostalgist. The Soviet Union was a Russian-speaking empire, and he seems, at times, to dream of re-creating a smaller Russian-speaking empire within the old Soviet Union’s borders. (2)

Kofman gives Moscow the primary blame for initiating the conflict over the disputed territory of South Ossetia, one of several unresolved boundary issues left from the breakup of the USSR. But he is also critical of how Mikheil Saakashvili handled the situation, as well:

U.S.-Russian relations had changed considerably from 2006 onward, but in 2008 there were important catalyzing events with the recognition of the independence of Kosovo by the United States and most E.U. states, and NATO’s 2008 Bucharest Summit, where the alliance promised that Ukraine and Georgia would someday become members of NATO. For Moscow, both of these decisions crossed red lines. By 2008, Russia had fleshed out plans for a military operation to impose its will on Georgia. The strategic aim was to give Moscow plausible deniability when it came to whom to blame for the conflict while preventing Georgia from being able to choose its own strategic direction. Moscow actively sought the war, and hoped it might result in regime change in Tbilisi.

Russia set up Georgia’s leader, Mikheil Saakashvili, into initiating hostilities against its proxy forces in South Ossetia, and then crushed the Georgian military in a brief conventional conflict. Saakashvili walked down that path, despite U.S. warnings, because of his own ambitions. Yet Moscow was also surprised by the timing of the Georgian attack, which somewhat pre-empted Russian plans. NATO’s declaration added a broader geostrategic dimension to a war that was already well on its way to happening given Georgia’s ambitions to retake lost territory, and Russia’s intent to deal Saakashvili a major defeat. Putin was not going to let Saakashvili take the territories back, but after NATO’s declaration at the Bucharest Summit he resolved to teach the West a lesson about Russia’s ability to veto further NATO expansion eastward. Indeed, ... the indicators were there in advance in Russian statements that this was going to happen. It was meant as a clear warning to other governments about integrating with NATO. Even today [2018] Russia’s Prime Minister Medvedev warns that bringing Georgia into the alliance “could provoke a horrible conflict.”

The Russian military operation itself was disjointed, but its strategic goals were met. Saakashvili stepped into a trap designed by Putin to take advantage of the Georgian leader’s ambitions, fears, and inexperience. The dominant story is that Georgia opened hostilities, but Russia bears overall blame for the conflict. As Robert M. Gates, then the U.S. secretary of defense, recalled, “The Russians had baited a trap, and the impetuous Saakashvili walked right into it.” Though true, that is not the full story. Both sides made structural choices responsible for this conflict, and the escalation of events on August 7, 2008, did not go to either’s expectations. [my emphasis]

It's worth noting here that the validity of a country’s military actions does not depend on who “shot first.” But the point here is that the EU vs. DiSiNFO account quoted above fails to convey the basic facts about the beginning of that conflict well.

The following EU vs. DiSiNFO video about Chinese “FIMI” (Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference) reminded me of the limits of what seems to be the agency’s typical approach: (4)

Propaganda is information designed to persuade, although that’s a fuzzy concept and normally used only in a political context. Religious proselytizing is also designed to persuade, but it’s not usually called “propaganda.” Articles in academic and scientific journals also try to persuade their audiences.

“Propaganda” is generally understood as deceptive or shady, and is often both. The claim is sometimes made that the most effective propaganda is based on facts. But some of the most enduring propaganda claims are bogus, such as the trope that “Mussolini made the trains run on time.” He didn’t (with the except of particular tourist trains), and trains in Fascist Italy were subject to the typical inefficiency in public services that dictatorships produce.

The ”FIMI with Chinese characteristic” video is one I would count as providing useful information but with a propaganda twist. I don’t notice anything obviously false in it. But one key piece of information is omitted, which is that China – and the US and the UN - formally consider Taiwan as part of the nation of China, though Taiwan in many ways has long functioned as an independent entity. For the US, it was the Nixon Administration that established the “One China” policy in agreement with the People’s Republican of China, which recognized Taiwan as part of China but also noted the fact of two separate governments, though with diplomatic acrobatics. In other words, the two states are acknowledged in fact (de facto) but not officially (de jure). (5)

After the stalemate in the Chinese Civil War over taking Taiwan, the Taiwanese government also considered itself the legitimate government of all of China. In more recent years, a Taiwanese independence movement has gained political popularity. Beijing views that claim in a similar light to that in which the Lincoln Administration viewed the Confederate States of America.

John Copper explains it as follows:

In 1949 Chinese communist armies defeated Nationalist forces on the mainland and established the People’s Republic of China there. The Nationalist government and armies fled to Taiwan, resulting in the separation of Taiwan from China. In the ensuing years the ROC [Republic of China, i.e., Taiwan] claimed jurisdiction over the Chinese mainland as well as Taiwan, although in the early 1990s Taiwan’s government dropped this claim to China. The Chinese government in Beijing has maintained that it has jurisdiction over Taiwan and has continued to propound a one-China policy—a position that few countries in the world dispute. There has been no agreement, however, on how or when, if ever, the two entities will be reunified. [my emphasis] (6)

A four-and-half-minute video can only convey limited information, of course. But the one-state/two-governments situation with China is a basic background fact that isn’t even mentioned. I timed myself saying, “The United States and the United Nations recognize Taiwan as a legitimate part of the nation of China.” It took all of twelve and a half seconds.

Both public and private resources countering “disinformation” are important. The most important type being a free press. And of course governments can and should provide relevant information for important concerns in everything from weather to international affairs. (For the Trump 2.0 Administration, the concept of even providing accurate weather information seems to be a bridge too far!)

But ideally, they need to do it well. Including EU vs. DiSiNFO.

Notes:

(1) Genocide Claims, Peace Enforcement and Proxy Regions: Disinformation from Georgia to Ukraine. EU vs. DiSiNFO 08/08/2025. <https://euvsdisinfo.eu/genocide-claims-peace-enforcement-and-proxy-regions-disinformation-from-georgia-to-ukraine/> (Accessed: 2025-09-08).

(2) Applebaum, Anne (2022): The Reason Putin Would Risk War. Anne Applebaum website (originally published by The Atlantic) 02/03/2022. <https://www.anneapplebaum.com/2022/02/03/the-reason-putin-would-risk-war/> (Accessed: 2025-09-08).

(3) Kofman, Michael (2018): The August War, Ten Years On: A Retrospective on the Russo-Georgian War. War on the Rocks 08/17/2018. <https://warontherocks.com/2018/08/the-august-war-ten-years-on-a-retrospective-on-the-russo-georgian-war/> (Accessed: 2025-09-08). Kofman goes into some detail about the conflict between Georgia and Russia leading up to 2008.

(4) FIMI with Chinese characteristics: Ivana Karásková on FIMI as a tool of political coercion. EUvsDininfo YouTube channel 08/01/2025. <https://youtu.be/hdo_Yykmjq8?si=uyPj8ic8Es7WcGVm> (Accessed: 2025-09-08).

(5) See: Goldstein, Steven (2023): Understanding the One China policy. Brookings Institution 08/31/2025. <https://www.brookings.edu/articles/understanding-the-one-china-policy/> (Accessed: 2025-09-08).

What is the 'One China' policy? BBC News 10/06/2021. <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-38285354> (Accessed: 2025-09-08).

Ian, Chong Ja (2023): The Many “One Chinas”: Multiple Approaches to Taiwan and China. Carnegie Endowment. <https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2023/02/the-many-one-chinas-multiple-approaches-to-taiwan-and-china?lang=en> (Accessed: 2025-09-08).

(6) Copper, John C. (2025): "history of Taiwan". Encyclopedia Britannica 04/05/2025. <https://www.britannica.com/topic/history-of-Taiwan>. (Accessed: 2025-09-08).