Escalation possibilities in the Iran War

Israel has initiated a war of aggression against Iran.

From the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists: (1)

This wasn’t a “one-off” attack. It was a major attack against Iran’s nuclear program and included the targeted assassinations of several senior Iranian officials and senior nuclear scientists. At least some of them carried out by strikes on their residences.

It was clear that the United States approved the attack. Trump even stated publicly that the US would take part in defending Israel against counterattacks. Israel is already being struck by Iranian counterattacks, including in Tel Aviv, where many key Israeli military facilities are located.

Lubna Masarwa reports that the attacks are making people there aware that Iranian strikes are much more serious than anything Hamas has ever been able to inflict:

Orly Noy, a Jerusalem-based journalist, told [Middle East Eye] that Iran's attacks had shattered the myth that Israeli leaders had often repeated to the Israeli public: that they were immune to any and all reprisal attacks.

"The Israeli public has been convinced over the years that it can exist here in the region while deeply disdaining all its neighbours and rampaging in a thuggish and murderous manner against everyone - whenever and however it wants - relying solely on brute force.

"That's why there was something so substantial about the sight of the bombed-out buildings in Ramat Gan [a city in the Tel Aviv district]," he said.

"They are so similar to the images we're used to seeing from Gaza. Those sooty grey skeletons of buildings, that billowing cloud of dust, that carpet of ash and rubble covering the street, those images of children's dolls in the hands of rescue teams.

"The scale is, of course, completely different, but these images are nevertheless a momentary rupture of this disturbed fantasy that we are immune to everything," he added. (2)

Democracy Now! Has brief takes from Trita Parsi and the critical-minded Israeli journalist Gideon Levy: (3)

Amos Harel gives this status report:

As could have been anticipated, the Iranians have recovered from the initial shock of the attack. Hamas and Hezbollah recently found replacements, albeit sometimes less skilled, for senior officials assassinated by Israel. Iran is much more organized, and after some command positions were reassigned, the order for retaliatory strikes was given Friday evening. By Saturday morning, over 200 ballistic missiles had been launched in four barrages, along with more than 40 drones. The interception rates remained high, but the 10 or so missiles that landed in the Tel Aviv metropolitan area were enough to cause unprecedented damage.

Three civilians were killed and about 75 were wounded by the missiles, while millions spent long hours in shelters and safe rooms. The scale of the destruction was striking, resembling a more lethal and precise version of the Iraqi Scuds fired at Tel Aviv and Ramat Gan in 1991, during the Gulf War.

The damage caused is immense and extensive, and the images are likely to persuade most residents to be more attentive to the Home Front Command's instructions, which, in the case of the Houthi missiles (usually a single missile per barrage that was intercepted) had come to be seen more as recommendations. (4)

Harel, who seemingly has very well-informed perspectives on the Israeli’s government war politics, also writes about the US role:

The coordination between Israel and the United States on the eve of the attack was tighter than it seemed. President Donald Trump did express concern about an Israeli attack on Iran a few hours before the bombing began, but in hindsight, it appears to have been an attempt to maintain distance in case the attack failed.

Trump likes "winners." Once it was clear that the opening strike was successful, he quickly jumped on the bandwagon. The president said Friday that he hopes the Israeli attack will convince the Iranians to return to negotiations on a new nuclear deal, while displaying more flexibility toward his demands. This is still very much in doubt, and in any event, that's not what Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu wants.

Trump gave Netanyahu the green light he asked for for the first operation. (In the preliminary meetings, IDF Chief of Staff Lt. Gen. Eyal Zamir presented the support of the Americans as a precondition for launching the operation.)

Now the prime minister needs the Americans for two additional important things: first, to join in so as to cause more severe damage to Iran's nuclear program and second – an even more ambitious scenario – to help topple the regime. The IDF says it was not assigned this mission, but already Saturday afternoon the prime minister declared, "We will strike every site and every target of the Ayatollah's regime."

The question about the extent of the American involvement seems to be not whether it will be pulled further into the war, but whether the Trump 2.0 regime is willing to say no to Benjamin Netanyahu’s government on any major demand. Peace President Trump has shown himself to be remarkably inept in diplomacy generally, including with Israel. And if he has any clear strategic concept on the Middle East or anywhere else, he’s managing to keep the evidence well hidden.

Richard Haass is (for better or worse!) probably literally the best-credentialed member of the US foreign policy establishment of any person alive. Katie Couric interviews him on the Middle East situation. It gives a good idea of the kinds of things that could go wrong in the current situation. Really wrong, I should say. (5)

That the Israeli-Iran War is a disaster is a given. The question is how big a disaster it will be and particularly how much the incompetent Trump 2.0 Administration gets drawn into it.

Bernie Sanders warns, "The U.S. must make it clear that we will not be dragged into another Netanyahu war.” (6)

Iran also has a drastic new incentive to develop nuclear weapons.

How this works out well for anybody – except for war profiteers, of course! – I can’t even picture.

Since China is officially the main competing superpower to the US, it’s worth paying attention to the official Chinese positions on foreign policy crises. China Daily is an English-language publication of the Central Propaganda Department of the Chinese Communist Party so it’s ready source for the official public stances, although that doesn’t mean it is giving detailed analysis of the country’s diplomatic positions. This short article, “Iran FM: If Israeli attacks stop, 'our responses will also stop',” basically quotes Iranian Foreign Minister Seyed Abbas Araghchi but does not describe China’s official position. (7)

The Carnegie Endowment in 2024 published an analysis on “Cooperation Between China, Iran, North Korea, and Russia.” (8) The authors suggest that a balancing strategy by the US based on more cooperation with China over matters related to Iran would be a option, although at the moment that would seem to go against the official US policy of treating China as its main international competitor:

The best way for the United States to halt or reverse the trend toward greater cooperation between the four states is thus to seek to attenuate China’s relationship with the other three. Iran, North Korea, and Russia would be very weak and isolated from the world without China’s support. Beijing’s actual and potential role as a leader, organizer, and proponent of cooperation between these powers also looms large because alliances and groups often rely on strong leadership for their sustainment.

As tensions between the four states and the West have increased, China has been more willing to play that leadership role, but it is not clear how much it would sacrifice in its positive economic relations with the United States and its allies in Europe and Asia in order to organize deeper cooperation among these economically weak partners. China is deeply integrated into the world economically and politically in ways that the other three countries are not. China benefits from the existing world order far more than the other three and prefers different end states from them when it comes to international rules of the road, for example. China wants reforms of the world order, but what Russia, Iran and North Korea seek more resembles an outright revolution. Russia moreover now sees its relationship with Europe as almost entirely adversarial whereas China seeks to sustain a positive economic and political relationship with the wealthy European nations. [my emphasis]

They add, “If America … does not find a mode of coexistence with China that reduces the tension in their relationship and Chinese perception of threat, Beijing is likely to conclude that its best option is to double down on its relationship with these other U.S. adversaries.”

The Bulletin also provides this analysis from Dan Drollette, Jr.:

For months (if not longer), there had been speculation that Israel’s prime minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, would not be able to resist this tempting target, even if the two countries have historically avoided directly targeting each other’s territories. After all, the strengths of Iran’s proxies were close to an all-time low, its anti-aircraft capabilities were degraded, and it seemed that Iran was on a path to revving-up its nuclear capabilities—making it appear that now was the time to risk an attack. In their 2024 Bulletin article, “Why Iran may accelerate its nuclear program, and Israel may be tempted to attack it” authors Darya Dolzikova and Matthew Savill described this situation in detail, and wrote that there was another motivation for Netanyahu as well: timelines. They said: “[Israel] could attempt a strike in a short period—maybe days or weeks—whereas it would probably take Iran several months to a year from the point of decision to have a viable weapon…”

And they make this grim point: “What this [Israeli] attack means for the future of de-escalation in the Middle East—and indeed any deal over Iran’s uranium enrichment program—does not look promising.” [my emphasis] (9)

Notes:

(1) Diaz-Maurin, François (2006): Israel is now at war with Iran. Seeks regime change. Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 06/14/2025. <https://thebulletin.org/2025/06/israel-is-now-at-war-with-iran-seeks-regime-change/#post-heading> (Accessed: 2025-15-06).

(2) Masarwa, Lubna (2025): Israel: Euphoria gives way to fear after Iranian missiles rain down on Tel Aviv. Middle East Eye 06/14/2025. <https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/israel-euphoria-gives-way-fear-after-iranian-missiles-rain-down-tel-aviv> (Accessed: 2025-15-06).

(3) Israel Attacks Iran, Killing Top Military Leaders, Scientists; Hits Nuke Sites in Expanding Conflict. Democracy Now! YouTube channel 06/13/2025. <https://youtu.be/DMT1c2JHPQ4?si=WgS_wCQJcWQnuAQ0> (Accessed: 2025-15-06).

(4) Harel, Amos (2025): Israel Stunned Iran, but Needs U.S. to Shape a Clear Exit Strategy. Haaretz 06/15/2025. Full article link: <https://www.haaretz.com/2025-06-15/ty-article/.premium/israel-stunned-iran-but-needs-u-s-to-shape-a-clear-exit-strategy/00000197-7001-d9fe-a597-ff1dd3110000?gift=aca78634e9bf49c98cecbd9ac1d97f3e> (Accessed: 2025-15-06).

(5) Israel Attacks Iran. Discussing what we know with Richard Haass. Katie Couric YouTube channel 06/14/2025. <https://youtu.be/ShMMRqCIpy8?si=APPznT8cQoPydHxc> (Accessed: 2025-15-06).

(6) Queally, Jon (2025): Bernie Sanders Says US Must Not Be 'Dragged Into Another Netanyahu War'. Common Dreams 06/13/2025. <https://www.commondreams.org/news/bernie-sanders-israel-iran-war> (Accessed: 2025-15-06).

(7) Haipei, Cui (2025): China Daily 06/15/2025. <https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/202506/15/WS684e85a7a310a04af22c6522.html> (Accessed: 2025-15-06).

(8) Chivvis, Christopher & Keating, Jack (2024): Carnegie Endowment. <https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2024/10/cooperation-between-china-iran-north-korea-and-russia-current-and-potential-future-threats-to-america?lang=en> (Accessed: 2025-15-06).

(9) Drolette, Jr., Dan (2025): A brief look back at what led to Israel’s attack on Iran, from the Bulletin’s archives. Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 06/13/2025. <https://thebulletin.org/2025/06/a-brief-look-back-at-what-led-to-israels-attack-on-iran-from-the-bulletins-archives/#post-heading> (Accessed: 2025-15-06).