Trump-and-Vance vs. Zelenskyy

This has been quite a week in US and European foreign policy!

Trump on Friday presided over one of the greatest diplomatic disasters in modern history. Tempers flared, voices were raised and protocol was shredded in the once-hallowed Oval Office. As Trump got into a shouting match with Ukraine’s Volodymyr Zelenskyy, a horrified Europe watched the post-second world war order crumble before its eyes. [my emphasis] (1)

It was Donald Trump and his Opus Dei Vice President J.D. Vance who presided over Friday’s fiasco. Co-President Elon Musk was for some unannounced reason not present at the event.

Eric Edelman and Eliot Cohen did this podcast on the conservative site The Bulwark, in which both appear to be genuinely stunned by Friday’s bizarre Oval Office show with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy. (2)

Cohen here argues that Trump’s brand of isolationism is the same as the realist/restraint school of foreign policy thought, which is misleading, although we could identify occasional overlaps. I think he’s mostly taking a dig here at the Quincy Institute and their Responsible Statecraft website by talking about their namesake John Quincy Adams.

(Trigger warning: They introduce the ubiquitous Munich Analogy within the first four minutes. I hope by the 22nd century people won’t have to hear about the Munich Analogy year in and year out.)

Also, I hope I never feel the urge to use the phrase “objectively pro-Putin” as they do here. We have more than enough tired tropes in foreign policy discussions as it is. Fun trivia: it’s a favorite habit of neocons to accuse their critics of being “objectively” pro-Bad-Stuff, e.g., objectively pro-Saddam, objectively pro-terrorist, etc. This is a rhetorical holdover from the Trotskyist roots of so many neocons like Norman Podhoretz. It’s always helpful to remember that all of foreign policy involves some form of taking sides with this or that country or one issue or another or maybe many. Approving of some policy position by Country X does not in itself mean that that someone is “objectively pro-Country-X.”

Eliot Cohen suggests that the Friday Oval Office meeting may have been seen by European NATO allies as a kind of nail-in-the-coffin for any lingering hope that Trump may be willing or able to conduct some kind of practical foreign policy with half-competent diplomacy. Cohen says that his advice to European allies would be: “For the next three years and 11 months, you cannot trust this American administration.” To his credit, he also acknowledges that there are people in the world who have had good reason before now to have less than complete trust in the US.

Here Brian Tyler Cohen interviews Tommy Vietor of the Pod Save the World podcast about Friday’s fiasco. Vietor was as spokesperson for Obama’s National Security Council 2011-2012. (3)

Kaja Kallas is Vice-President of the European Commission and the foreign minister of the EU, though her formal title in the latter role is High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. In 2021-2024, she was the Prime Minister of Estonia from the liberal (in the European sense) Estonia Reform Party. She says it’s time for Europe to take up the hoary if informal title of Leader Of The The Free World, since the Trump-Vance-Musk Administration. (4)

Juan Cole has a sobering reflection, “The West has Long Demanded of Palestinians what Trump Demanded of Ukraine — and More”:

I don’t bring all this up to talk about the rights and wrongs of the Ukraine War. There are military analysts and political scientists who have argued for some time that given Russia’s advantages in size and manpower, an outright Ukrainian victory is unlikely. That said, emboldening Putin in this way is unwise, sort of like letting your rival at the poker table know you don’t have any face cards.

I would like to take the moment to point out that Trump’s demands of Ukraine are no different than the US and Western Europe’s demands of the Palestinians back in the 1990s, and that nowadays the West appears to expect the Palestinians simply to commit mass suicide. (5)

The future of Ukraine

It’s always helpful to keep in mind in the current state of the Russia-Ukraine War that official government positions are an always somewhat messy combination of formal positions, practical considerations, and negotiating positions. Countries also act out of principles of some kind. At a minimum their positions reflect some kind of ideological framework. Those frameworks are typically remarkably flexible when applied to foreign policy.

Kaja Kallas in the interview above talks about percentages of national budgets spent on military budgets, which is often how military spending is discussed politically. But while such percentages are an indication of a country’s policy priorities, they don’t give a comparative measure of actual military capabilities.

The World Bank has a table for national GDP by country for 2023 in US dollar equivalents. (6)

So, if 3% of GDP would be a prudent amount for Italy to spend on defense, would it be adequate for the Russians with a similar GDP to spend 3% on national defense? Or for Brazil?

A quick look at the map shows that each country has a very different geographic situation and very different potential risks. Brazil is more endangered by the possibility of a US-backed coup than from the threat of Paraguay ganging up with Uruguay to attack it. Even if Portugal were on the most hostile terms with its fellow NATO ally Spain, it wouldn’t need to build up the same size army and navy as Spain to be able to defend effectively against a Spanish invasion. Then there’s Russia, the country with the world’s largest land mass, a nuclear arsenal, sea borders all over the place, and various land borders with countries including China who have not always been on good terms with Russia, even if we look at only the last century or so.

The physical military defense needs of a country just can’t be measured in any meaningful way by what percentage of GDP it spends on its military. In the readjustments that Trump’s drastic downgrading of the NATO relationships are forcing, the European NATO countries will have do not only make hardheaded realistic assumptions about Russia’s intentions as well as their capabilities. And the European countries will need to make similar evaluations of their own positions. This will create pressure for a new arrangement with France and Britain for nuclear defense. And the larger powers including Poland and (yes) Germany will also have to re-evaluate their own lack of a nuclear deterrent.

Ukraine and future European defense

The adjustments that European countries make on self-defense in the coming months and years won’t be unmitigated good news for Ukraine. The EU nations do take the position that Ukraine deserves assistance in the fight against Russia. But their strategic priority will be to set up security arrangements to prepare for the contingency of a war with Russia. Ukrainian defense will necessarily be a secondary priority.

Timothy Garten Ash recently said on a Chatham House podcast:

I don't think there's much sense in going deep into what one might call Trumpology. It may be that there is simply no consistency in what is clearly a totally disinhibited narcissistic personality who tells us he was saved by God from an assassin's bullet in order to make America great again and save the world. There's a wonderful term sashing trying to make sense of Trump's nonsense, called “sane-washing”. …

But for me the important conclusion … is simply this: we should assume the worst case scenario that we cannot now rely on, we in Europe I mean, cannot now rely on Trump for supporting Ukraine, or ultimately long term for our own security.

So that rather than speculating about the mind of Donald Trump I think the real conversation we need to have is what do we do next in Europe. (7)

It seems to be safe to assume that Ukraine will not regain the control over its legally recognized territory before the Russians’ seizure of Crimea in 2014. And that there will continue to be resistance to Russian occupation in the other eastern parts of the country occupied by Russia. Chatham House last October spelled out four broad scenarios for how the Russia-Ukraine War could play out, the first two of which seem particularly relevant at the moment:

‘Long war’ – An attritional conflict giving each side the possibility to exhaust the other. Ukraine would continue to fight and try to rebuild at the same time, while incurring ever greater human losses on the battlefield and to migration.

‘Frozen conflict’ – An armistice that would stabilize the front line and allow both sides to regroup and rebuild their depleted forces in preparation for further fighting. There would be no agreement on Ukraine’s future military status or the size of its armed forces. Ukraine would remain formally committed to the goal of full restoration of its 1991 borders. [my emphasis] (8)

For the coming months, the “frozen conflict” option would require some kind of serious US diplomacy with Russia to make this happen. But the last two weeks have dramatically reminded us that Trump has shown no capacity to manage a strategic negotiation successfully.

At the Responsible Statecraft site mentioned above, Anatol Lieven and George Beebe seemingly try to be generous and give Trump credit for having some kind of broader strategic vision over the Russia-Ukraine War.

Based on their own view of the world and international relations (shared in private by a good many tough-minded members of the U.S. establishment) Trump and Vance by contrast believe that Russia had certain legitimate reasons to see Western ambitions in Ukraine as a threat to its security and vital interests. They see this war as part of a broader geopolitical conflict between the West and Russia over NATO expansion and Europe’s security order. Absent diplomacy, they think the spiral of action and reaction in this geopolitical conflict will only escalate, risking, in Trump’s words, “World War III.”

Trump and Vance see Putin as a ruthless but rational actor (much, perhaps, as Trump sees himself) who will make a deal and stick to it if it meets Russia’s essential conditions. They do not believe that Putin has any intention of going on to attack NATO. Above all, they are determined not to make any more U.S. security commitments in Europe beyond NATO’s existing borders. [my emphasis] (9)

Like I said, this seems to be a generous interpretation. Lieven and Beebe there are giving Trump and Vance credit for having something like a realist-theory model of the conflict. I haven’t heard anything from Trump or Vance that would make me think that is so. And I doubt that Trump is even capable of conceptualizing the situation in such strategic terms. He’s a cheap hustler who thinks foreign policy is a mob protection racket. Vital interests? A broader geopolitical conflict? Does anyone recall ever hearing anything like that from Donald Trump’s mouth?

I did a Google search on the question, Has Donald Trump ever used the phrases "broader geopolitical conflict”? No quotes popped up, but the Lieven-Beebe article was at the top of the results list.

So I tried ChatGPT (AI), which replied: “I couldn't find any public records of former [sic] U.S. President Donald Trump specifically using the phrase ‘broader geopolitical conflict’."

Microsoft Copilot (AI) replied:

Donald Trump and JD Vance used the phrase "broader geopolitical conflict" during a heated Oval Office meeting with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy on February 28, 202512. This discussion became particularly tense as Trump and Vance criticized Zelenskyy for his stance on the war in Ukraine and his perceived lack of gratitude for U.S. support.

Which I hadn’t caught in watching it. But Copilot gave me two references. Neither of which contained the phrase. Nor did the transcript provided by Foreign Policy. (10) It’s still prudent to stay on a trust (maybe)-but-verify basis with AI searches.

But this part of the Lieven/Beebe analysis seems pretty straightforwardly obvious:

Ukraine’s position is gravely weakened; and if in the next round of negotiations the U.S. and Russian teams can come up with a reasonable compromise, Ukraine would be well advised to accept it in principle and try to negotiate as many advantages as possible over the details of the ceasefire and any changes to the Ukrainian constitution — negotiations in which Ukraine will of course have to be involved, whatever the state of relations between Trump and Zelensky.

For if Ukraine continues to oppose a deal and Trump withdraws U.S. support (including not just weapons but even more importantly Starlink and real-time battlefield intelligence), Ukrainian forces will face huge difficulties in holding their present positions and warding off a catastrophic defeat.

This will be true even if European countries continue their support. The governments of the EU and UK are now facing a critical dilemma, to which they will have to respond at their summit (including Zelensky) this coming Sunday, March 2. They will no doubt pledge to continue supporting Ukraine with aid.

But those European countries will not only have the limits on their own resources and the urgent pressure for building up themselves militarily. They will also have in mind the same unstated assumption of which the Biden Administration was clearly aware, which is there is a potential advantage for them in a longer war between Russia and Ukraine as opposed to a shorter one. Despite public rhetoric, they will also not be thinking exclusively in terms of the moral virtues of the “rules-based international order.”

And they have no reason to expect another “1989” to happen suddenly, where Russia decides to pull back from its current militarily goals in Ukraine in a way similar to what happened at the end of the Warsaw Pact.

Notes:

(1) Smith, David (2025): Diplomacy dies on live TV as Trump and Vance gang up to bully Ukraine leader. The Guardian 02/28/2025. <https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2025/feb/28/trump-zelenskyy-shouting-match-oval-office> (Accessed: 2025-01-03).

(2) Oval Office Ambush. The Bulwark YouTube channel 03/01/2025. <https://youtu.be/09jLvF2IYGg?si=ZOo3BTM-FLXPrwZE> (Accessed: 2025-01-03).

(3) Obama official issues DIRE WARNING over Trump's Oval Office meltdown. Brian Tayler Cohen YouTube channel 03/01/2025. <https://youtu.be/2QlFS01-dOA?si=U9YtJ-JGbmokmEaO> (Accessed: 2025-01-03).

(4) Full interview: European Union's top diplomat Kaja Kallas. Face the Nation YouTube channel 02/28/2025. <https://youtu.be/F6d1iH5MxR4?si=b0hdb4m5ogzwW8S2> (Accessed: 2025-01-03).

(5) Cole, Juan (2025): The West has Long Demanded of Palestinians what Trump Demanded of Ukraine - and More. Informed Comment 03/01/2025. <https://www.juancole.com/2025/03/demanded-palestinians-ukraine.html> (Accessed: 2025-01-03).

(6) World Bank Group GDP (current US$). <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD> (Accessed: 2025-01-03).

(7) Should Europe start planning for the worst? Chatham House YouTube channel 02/24/2025 (after 4:30 in the video). <https://youtu.be/lU0V0c5Ig-w?si=S_rP1KOq0rEkTQ7q> (Accessed: 2025-01-03).

(8) Briefing Paper: Four scenarios for the end of the war in Ukraine (2024): Chatham House Oct 2024. <https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/2024-10/2024-10-16-scenarios-end-war-ukraine-lough.pdf> (Accessed: 2025-01-03).

(9) Lieven, Anatol & Beebe, George (2025): Hard truths about the Trump-Zelensky-Vance Oval Office blow-up. Responsible Statecraft 02/28/2025. <https://responsiblestatecraft.org/zelensky/> (Accessed: 2025-01-03).

(10) Rathi, Anusha & Lu, Christina (2025): Read Trump and Zelensky’s Fiery Oval Office Exchange. Foreign Policy 02/28/2025. <https://foreignpolicy.com/2025/02/28/trump-zelensky-meeting-transcript-full-text-video-oval-office/> (Accessed: 2025-01-03).