In the proverbial grand scheme of things, a pro-Russia orientation is not bad or good in itself. The New START nuclear-arms limitation treaty between the US and Russia the came into force in 2011 and was extended by five years by President Biden. Russia suspended it on their side in 2023 but pledged to adhere to the treaty's limits on nuclear warheads. (1) The New START treaty was agreed to by both nations, i.e., they both recognized their agreement on the matters covered by the treaty was in both countries' national interest. On that point, supporting that treaty was pro-America and pro-Russia at the same time.
But those moves in these early weeks of Trump’s 2.0 term look like an arbitrary shift to treating Russia as a friendly power and the NATO countries as now longer partners - to the point of threatening military action against two of them, Canada and Denmark. But the future of nuclear arms-control agreements with Russia looks grim at this point in time. (2)
Sorting through the current situation on the Russia-Ukraine War requires keeping in mind not only the varying national interests at stake and the intensions of the Trump and Putin governments. It also requires taking into account Trump’s obvious lack of anything like a sensible strategic perspective in foreign policy, how ill-suited his “transactional” negotiation style is to major international agreements, and his erratic decision making. It’s one thing for a country to leave ambiguity and flexibility in its public diplomatic positions. But we’re putting tariffs on Mexico and China, except tomorrow we’re dropping them again, but we’ll put them on again a month from, unless we decide something different tomorrow – that looks very much like outright disorientation and incompetence.
The Peace President’s diplomatic accomplishment during Trump 1.0
Laura Rozen reminds us of one of Trump’s actual diplomatic achievements in his first term, the agreement for the US to leave Afghanistan at a particular date, which wound up being done during the time Joe Biden was President:
In 2019-2020, Trump’s envoy opened negotiations with the Taliban, cut the western-backed Afghanistan government out of the talks, and in February 2020 signed a deal with the Taliban agreeing to the full withdrawal of U.S. and foreign forces from Afghanistan the following year in exchange for the Taliban’s pledge to prevent Afghanistan being used as a base for international terrorism. Joe Biden inherited the U.S.-Taliban deal when he became president in 2021, withdrew the last remaining U.S. military forces on a slightly adjusted timetable - -and then took the political blame when the Afghan government rapidly collapsed and the Taliban took over Kabul just weeks later, in August 2021. [my emphasis] (3)That agreement let Trump say, look, I’m a peacemaker! Though he didn’t actually execute the withdrawal himself, that fell to Biden on the timeline Trump’s agreement set. Now Trump is criticizing the withdrawal itself as disgraceful and so on. But Trump’s agreement led directly to the swift reversion of the Afghan government to Taliban rule after 20 years of US war to prevent just that.
The Abraham Accords were the most notable diplomatic seeming success stories of Trump 1.0. It promoted better relations with Israel for Bahrain, Morocco, Sudan, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). The negotiating effort was nominally led by Trump’s son-in-law Jared Kushner, whose Affinity Partners private equity fund coincidentally received $2 billion dollars from Saudi Arabia’s sovereign wealth fund soon afterward, (4) with Qatar’s Investment Authority and Lunate, an asset manager based in Abu Dhabi, kicking in another $1.5 billion more recently. (5) As they say: Nice work if you can get it.
Marcy Grossman, Canada’s Ambassador to the UAE at the time they were negotiated, noted even almost a year after Hamas’ October 7, 2023 attack on Israel: “While the accords have faced criticism for sidelining the Palestinian issue, there is still potential for them to serve as a framework that encourages renewed dialogue.” (6) In fact, Israel and Trump 1.0 obviously saw the Accords as a way to cut the Palestinians out of US-Arab and Arab-Israeli relations altogether. With Israel now conducting a literally genocidal war in Gaza, and having devastated Lebanon, and now trying to establish de facto control of Syria south of Damascus, it would be hard to see the Middle East is a more peaceful place today thanks to Trump 1.0’s Abraham Accords.
Trump 2.0 and the Russia-Ukraine War
Lawrence Korb and Stephen Cirnbala give a helpful example of what a real diplomatic solution to the war could look like. The prospects for Trump 2.0’s current diplomacy delivering a deal anything like this are vanishingly close to zero:
1) Arranging a cease-fire in place at a time agreed upon by Ukraine and Russia;It is often suggested that Trump has an ideological affinity for Putin and other dictatorial/authoritarian figures. And that’s probably true in the sense that he admires their level of executive power and impunity from the rule of law. But Western commentators also sometimes seem to be making a lazy assumption that this is some kind of restoration of the ideological role the Soviet Union played with affiliated Communist Parties in other countries. Those parties did recognize the Soviet Party as the leading part in what they understood to be a process of world revolution and shared its political ideology - with varying degrees of faithfulness ranging from open rebellion of those in China and Yugoslavia to the public grumping over “Eurocommunism” in the 1970s.
2) Stipulating which forces on each side can remain stationed on Ukrainian territory after the ceasefire and during follow-on negotiations. For this purpose, Crimea will be assumed as Russian territory, but the status of other oblasts and towns in the east and south of Ukraine will be subjects for further discussion.
3) During the negotiations, neither side should be permitted to engage in short or long range attacks by ground, maritime or air forces against the forces of the other side, nor against populations located within their respective spheres of influence; this restriction includes clandestine operations making use of proxies or other unconventional warfare or covert action.
4) States or groups of states represented at the talks should include, in addition to Ukraine and Russia: the United States; the European Union; the UN Security Council; and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). Observers representing other interested states and organizations can be invited, including from NATO and the European Union. (7)
But not only does Trump seem to have no strategic vision of foreign policy in any normal sense, he also seems to have little actual political ideology beyond dislike of racial minorities and a weird fondness for tariffs – though he also really doesn’t seem to understand the basics of how tariffs work. And Putin? Although he has made formal agreements in the past to far-right parties in France, Italy and Austria, he is not claiming to lead a global political movement or ideology. And even his own political ideology appears to be a fairly vague mixture of nationalism, theocratic Christian conservativism (Russian Orthodox variety), and a spattering of notions from assorted anti-democratic, rightist cranks like Alexander Dugin.
The Russia-Ukraine War appears to have made Über-Realist John Mearsheimer at age 77 more famous than he has ever been, although he’s been a prominent foreign policy scholar for decades. He has been appearing on a variety of podcasts, some of which don’t apply as rigorous of standards as one might wish when selecting guests. He appears weekly, for instance, on the podcast of Andrew Napolitano, who seems to be a rightwing crank in his general political outlook. Plus, Napolitano has had a dubious-sounding gold coin sales business as one of his frequent advertisers, for whom Napolitano himself does the pitches. But Napolitano is also a competent interviewer. (Welcome to the media environment of 2025!)
This segment begins with a discussion of Israel, then turns to the Ukraine crisis. (8)
Mearsheimer describes Trump in this interview as an “anomaly.” Works for me: the Orange Anomaly.
He is generous in describing Trump’s goals in the Russia-Ukraine War negotiations. But he also knows that Ukraine and the European allies (ex-allies?) are going to have an important influence on the outcome, no matter what Trump’s and Putin’s governments negotiate on their own. “He’s not a warmonger,” says Mearsheimer about Trump. By which he presumably means Trump doesn’t use the standard blustering language that both neocons and liberal interventionists conventionally employ. (As always, if you listen to one of Mearsheimer’s interviews of this length and you’re not irritated by something he says – you’re probably not paying attention.)
In a new print interview with Spiegel International, Mearsheimer discusses his view on what Trump 2.0 policy means for Europe. (9)
DER SPIEGEL: Mr. Mearsheimer, will the beginning of Donald Trump's second presidency go down in history as the turning point when the bond between America and Europe was broken?And he thinks that the relations between the US and Europe are definitely in a qualitatively new state:
Mearsheimer: I think the answer is yes. The Trump administration is bent on fundamentally changing America’s relations with its European allies and greatly reducing the U.S. role in NATO, if not pulling the U.S. out of NATO.
DER SPIEGEL: Is it ultimately in vain, therefore, when European politicians such as French President Emmanuel Macron, British Prime Minister Keir Starmer and soon Friedrich Merz make pilgrimages to Washington?So, yes, the times, they are a’changin’. But with Trump 2.0 in charge in the US, it’s certain to be a confusing and ugly process.
Mearsheimer: This breakup is going to take time. The Europeans want to gauge, face to face, exactly what Trump thinks about relations with the EU, about his relationship with Russia and about how to settle the war in Ukraine. From their point of view, this makes perfect sense. But I bet they know that there’s no way to change Trump's mind and to repair this relationship. [my emphasis]
In this segment from the British Channel 4, CNN’s Christiane Amanpour and the British historian Mark Galeotti discuss the diplomatic challenges of the Russia-Ukraine War. (10) This is a helpful exchange to hear, because diplomacy is a smoke-and-mirrors act, where excruciating nuances in what is being put on the table and how are important. It’s a decent companion piece to Mearsheimer’s interview above. Because I have the definite impression that Mearsheimer is not especially interested in the diplomacy as such, though he obviously pays attention to it. His focus is on trying to understand the interests and assumptions behind the goals of governments in international relations, not so much the fog of diplomacy.
Unlike Mearsheimer’s coy – and probably intentionally provocative – characterizations of Trump’s goals, the Amanpour-Galeotti discussion gives a better understanding of the (severe) limits of Trump’s diplomatic concepts. It would be giving him too much credit to talk about Trump having strategic concepts beyond fantasies about pre-First World War imperialism.
Matt Duss of the Center for International Policy in his own analysis of the instantly-infamous Trump-Zelenskyy Oval Office meeting focuses on that understanding of Trump’s international politics:
You can say this for Trump: at least he’s consistent. The previous administration’s approach to two major wars – Ukraine and Gaza – was characterized by a glaring double standard in which Russia’s blatant violations of the laws of war were rightly condemned, while Israel’s commission of the same were shamefully excused and supported. The rights of the Ukrainian people to freedom and self-determination were treated as unquestionable, while those same rights for the Palestinian people were considered negotiable, if considered at all.Finally, Stephen Wertheimer offers this analysis of Trump’s Ukraine view:
Trump now appears to be resolving this tension by throwing the Ukrainians under the bus along with the Palestinians. And as with his forced-displacement proposal for Gaza, he seems to see Russian talks over Ukraine as primarily a business venture, with the state department readout of the meeting highlighting possible new “investment opportunities” in warming US-Russia relations. (This shows again how wildly off the mark the Washington establishment’s “isolationist” criticisms of Trump have been. In truth, Trump is much more an old-school imperialist, always looking for new spoils to be enjoyed. The amount of time and energy devoted to the idea that Trump is a “Russian asset” obscured the more prosaic homegrown danger posed by his predatory authoritarian capitalism.) [my emphasis] (11)
The crux of the message seems to be this: the US will either broker an end to the war in Ukraine in short order or remove itself from the conflict, unless perhaps it deems Russia to have obstructed a ceasefire. (As Trump told Zelenskyy on Friday: “You’re either going to make a deal or we’re out.”) Washington will also refuse to make any commitment to Ukraine’s postwar security, such as Nato membership, that would run a major risk of drawing the US into direct war with Russia – “world war three,” as Trump sees it – if Russia invades Ukraine again.Notes:
The US has the sovereign right to adopt this stance, for the sake of its own interests, which include limiting the costs and risks the US is bearing for European defense. So Europe cannot dissuade the US, but it can work with Washington to achieve US goals while finding the best possible arrangement to protect Ukraine, secure Europe, and preserve Nato. …
The other version is far more optimistic: European leaders still hope to convince Trump to make a major US security guarantee to Ukraine. This effort drove British, French and Ukrainian leaders to visit the White House last week. In public remarks, all three attempted to sell Trump on providing a US “backstop” for a European military force, involving perhaps some 30,000 troops, to be placed in Ukraine once the fighting stops. Trump did not rule out some sort of US support for a European military contingent, but he indicated little willingness to put much American muscle behind it. “I’m not going to make security guarantees beyond very much,” Trump said. “We’re going to have Europe do that.” [my emphasis] (12)
(1) Kirby, Jen (2023): The last US-Russia arms control treaty is in big trouble. Vox 02/26/2023. <https://www.vox.com/world-politics/2023/2/25/23610797/ukraine-war-putin-nuclear-new-start-treaty-suspension> (Accessed: 2025-08-03).
(2) Rumer, Eugene (2023): The Method Behind Putin’s New START Madness. Carnegie Endowment 02/28/2025. <https://www.vox.com/world-politics/2023/2/25/23610797/ukraine-war-putin-nuclear-new-start-treaty-suspension> (Accessed: 2025-08-03).
(3) Rozen, Laura (2025): Trump approach to end Ukraine war echoes his deal with Taliban. Diplomatic 03/05/2025. <https://diplomatic.substack.com/p/trump-approach-to-ukraine-echoes> (Accessed: 2025-07-03).
(4) Debusemann, Jr., Bernd (2024): Jared Kushner defends controversial $2bn Saudi investment. BBC News 02/14/2024. <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-68296877> (Accessed: 2025-07-03).
(5) Grossman, Marcy (2024): As the Israel-Hamas war continues, the Abraham Accords quietly turns four. Atlantic Council 09/11/2024. <https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/menasource/abraham-accords-anniversary-gaza/> (Accessed: 2025-07-03).
(6) Tan, Gillian (2024): Kushner’s Affinity Gets Additional $1.5 Billion From Qatar, Abu Dhabi’s Lunate. BNN Bloomberg 11/20/2024. <https://www.bnnbloomberg.ca/business/company-news/2024/12/20/kushners-affinity-gets-additional-15-billion-from-qatar-abu-dhabis-lunate/> (Accessed: 2025-07-03).
(8) Prof. John Mearsheimer: What I'd Tell Lavrov. Judge Napolitano-Judging Freedom YouTube channel 03/04/2025. <https://www.youtube.com/live/XYzesWfrSms?si=0f0bkK3MPocpUiia> (Accessed: 2025-06-03).
(9) Mearsheimer, John (2025) (Interview): The Shifting World Order. "Trump and Vance Have Contempt for The Europeans": Spiegel International 08.03.25. <https://www.spiegel.de/international/world/the-shifting-world-order-trump-and-vancehavecontempt-for-the-europeans-a-7e70c5b5-b307-45cc-940e-62e40a506ad2> (Accessed: 2025-08-03).
(10) Is Trump sacrificing Ukraine to Putin? The Fourcast/Channel 4 News YouTube channel 03/04/2025. <https://youtu.be/HUCN5Rnl8Ps?si=4NjFt7_wYOoZpEUn> (Accessed: 2025-06-03).
(11) Duss, Matt (2025): What are we to make of Trump’s Ukraine policy? The Guardian 02/21/2025. <https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2025/feb/21/trump-ukraine-russia-policy> (Accessed: 2025-02-03).
(12) Wertheimer, Stephen (2025): Is Europe misunderstanding Trump’s position on Ukraine? The Guardian 03/03/2025. <https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2025/mar/03/europe-trump-ukraine> Accessed: 2025-03-03).
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