[A]n independent Ukraine securely embedded in the EU; a Europe better able to deter and counterbalance Russia with its own resources; and a Russia and China that are less united in their hostility toward Washington. That vision is well worth pursuing, even if the odds of failure are significant. (1)
The phrase “the devil is in the details” hardly begins to describe the complications below those broad goals. But that’s also what foreign policy strategy is about: having a large view of desired goals, and then pursuing the kind of maddening details and complicated negotiations and maneuvering and various forms of carrots-and-sticks offers and concessions that lead to a better strategic situation. Hopefully one that does not require war to achieve.
Beebe’s piece also follows the convention in these kinds of articles of proposing ideas to the current or incoming government as though the audience is professional and competent and serious about pursuing a responsible foreign policy. It seems almost like a farce to make such a pitch as though Trump were a competent actor with a real sense of broader public responsibility.
Deutsche Welle reports on peace deal prospects (2):
At the same time, pitching an argument to the Trump Administration which sounds like it’s based on those assumptions inevitably highlights how reckless and irresponsible an actor Trump and the Trumpistas are on the international scene.
Beebe’s recommendations are based on looking at the reality of the situation:
Put American Interests First. The Biden administration has, from the invasion’s start, insisted that it is up to Ukraine to decide if and when to seek an end to the war. It has offered tactical advice but deferred to Kyiv on setting strategy. This has proved to be a recipe for unending conflict that is devastating Ukraine and perversely incentivizing Kyiv to draw the United States more directly into the war. [my emphasis]
But, despite his signature MAGA slogan, Trump has no thought of putting “American interests first.” Trump puts his own personal interests first, last, and everywhere in between.
Broaden the Problem. Part of the reason that Biden has deferred to Kyiv was a widely shared belief in Washington that the war is a bilateral matter between Russia and Ukraine, and that the key to any peace settlement was to maximize Ukraine’s leverage on the battlefield. That assumption was fundamentally flawed. It failed to understand that Russia’s enormous numerical advantages in population and military production meant Ukraine’s military was bound to weaken over time in a war of attrition, even with robust Western support. And it failed to recognize that the United States has long been able to negotiate from a position of strength if it viewed the war through a wider lens. [my emphasis]
When people say that Trump has a “transactional” approach to foreign policy, they mainly mean that he sees international relations in terms of negotiating -Trump/Mafia style – with individual nations. Viewing the Russia-Ukraine War or any other foreign policy “through a wider lens” is something that Trump has give us very limited evidence that he is capable of doing.
He talks about NATO as if it’s a mob protection-racket run by the US. He has threatened military action against NATO ally Denmark in order to take Greenland from them. He has threatened Panama with military action if they do not surrender the Panamanian territory of the Panama Canal to the US. Panama is a US ally under the Rio Treaty (3) (officially the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance), probably another treaty that Pete Hegseth, Trump’s nominee to be Secretary of Defense, also knows nothing about. Trump probably also knows nothing about it and cares even less.
Play the China Card. Recognizing that the war has deepened Russia’s dependence on China, the Biden administration pressed the Chinese to arm-twist Putin into ending the invasion, dangling the prospect of new sanctions if Beijing refused. But Beijing’s ambivalence toward the war was never going to translate into picking sides, and Biden’s with-us-or-against-us approach missed an opportunity to explore the subtleties in China’s calls for settling the war.
Donald Trump is going to take a sophisticated balance-of-power, triangulating approach to US-China-Russia relations? My guess: (4)
To be fair, I’m confident that George Beebe doesn’t actually think so, either. But observing the style of offering serious advice to government officials is at least a kind of statement of optimism or hope.
I actually do hope that there is some kind of more-or-less functional agreement gets done on Ukraine that at least would minimize further military damage until a more pragmatic-minded President comes to the Oval Office. We’ll see if the incoming Trump Administration can achieve something like that, or at least is willing to get out of the way for someone else to structure the peace arrangement. But it’s hard to imagine Russia being willing to agree to such a settlement without the US signing on.
Notes:
(1) Trump may get Russia and Ukraine to the table. Then what? Responsible Statecraft 01/13/2025. <https://responsiblestatecraft.org/trump-ending-war-ukraine/> (Accessed: 2025-13-01).
(2) Could the Trump administration broker a Russia-Ukraine peace deal in 2025? DW News YouTube channel 01/03/2025. <https://youtu.be/i3xn7tFhnaM?si=Okk9JPvcEZQvIsHa> (Accessed: 2025-03-01).
(3) Lobo, Francisco (2025): The Rio Treaty’s Security Pact and Unintended Consequences of Threatening Canada, Greenland, and Panama. Just Security 01/08/2025. <https://www.justsecurity.org/106160/rio-treaty-trump-canada-greenland-panama/> (Accessed: 2025-13-01).
(4) Same Line Different Films - I Don't Think So. Larry Dors YouTube channel 05/29/2019. <https://youtu.be/X0f3efFUgDM?si=VOfD0aHJtLDXFvpG> (Accessed: 2025-13-01).
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