Looking at the New Year for Syria

Richard Haass applies his impeccable credentials as a member of the US foreign policy establishment to several issues in the New Year. After cautiously expressing “some reason for optimism” for “potential ceasefires in both Ukraine and Gaza” and even “possibly a grand bargain with Iran.” (1)

It’s nice to see someone entering the New Year with an upbeat perspective!

But after the Happy New Year intro, he gets down to more specific analysis starting with Syria:

I want to start with Syria ... [A]s we often see in history, the victors tend to fall out once the glue provided by shared opposition to the former regime disappears. We are seeing some of this in Syria. There is a degree of score-settling, which to many in Syria I expect looks a lot like attacks on the Alawites, the ethnic minority to which the Assads belong. It is also hard not to worry that ISIS will exploit the situation for its own purposes. We are also seeing some foreign intervention. Israel seems to have settled into the south; it has no interest in seeing a unified Syria that can again constitute a threat. Turkey, I would wager, is preparing an assault on the Kurds even if in principle it wants Syria to calm down so millions of Syrian refugees in Turkey can return home. Turkish businessmen are also keen to help Syria rebuild. It will be interesting to see if the Turks hold off until after January 20 before going after the Kurds and, if they are so inclined, what sort of signal they receive from the Trump administration. [my emphasis]

Most Americans have presumably heard of the Kurds over the last several decades of the forever wars. From Iraq, or Syria, or Türkiye, or maybe Iran. The long conflict in Syria since 2011, also known as the Syrian Civil War, has probably appeared to most Americans as a murky mess, sometimes involving sarin gas chemical warfare. The Syrian Kurds established an autonomous government in northeastern Syria, formally called the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria, also referred to as the Rojava region, which has a notable democratic orientation not common to other Syrian political factions so far. The Kurds have been US allies there so far. As a Council of Foreign Relations (which Haass headed for 20 years, 2003-2023) report explains:

Kurds have fought to consolidate a de facto autonomous territory in northern Syria, which has made them alternately friends and foes of Arab opposition groups. The Islamic State’s siege in 2014 of Kobani, a strategically located Kurdish town near the Turkish border, was a turning point. The defense of the town by the Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG) highlighted the militant group’s effectiveness against the Islamic State. U.S. forces aided in ousting Islamic State fighters from Kobani and continued to provide arms and air support to the YPG-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF).

Over time, the YPG’s priority turned to consolidating autonomous Kurdish cantons in the country’s north, a region the Kurds refer to as Rojava (Western Kurdistan). YPG fighters, interested in protecting fellow Kurds, have been accused of ethnic cleansing in mixed Arab-Kurd areas. The YPG is tied to the Turkey-based Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), which Ankara and Washington have designated a terrorist organization. In August 2016, Turkey deployed its military along the Syrian border to both roll back Islamic State forces and, in tandem with Syrian Arab and Turkmen fighters, block the Kurds from linking up their two cantons in a contiguous territory. The United States faced the dilemma of trying not to alienate either the YPG or Turkey, a NATO ally that was also a vital partner in the war against the Islamic State. But Washington eventually chose Ankara, agreeing in October 2019 [the first Trump Administration] to remove its troops in Syria near the Turkish border so that Turkey could launch a military offensive against the Kurds. [my emphasis] (2)

But the US hasn’t completely abandoned the Syrian Kurds, so far. And has also imposed restraints on Türkiye’s action against Rojava. Türkiye supported the Islamic insurgents (formerly affiliated to Al Qaida) which recently took power in Damascus. Yet as Haass notes in the quotation above, Türkiye could wind up going to war with the Rojavan Kurds. He seems to think that could begin any day now.

Israel’s goals in Syria are unclear. But so far the goal seems to be to leave Syria as a failed state.

The [Israeli] military operation’s scale and focus raise pressing questions about Israel’s intentions [in Syria] and its long-term impact on Syria’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. Analysts have drawn comparisons to the chaos seen in Iraq after the US-led invasion and Libya’s fragmented post-Gaddafi reality.

Israel’s occupation of additional Syrian territories near the Golan Heights compounds this uncertainty.

The Golan, a region of strategic and symbolic significance, was annexed by Israel in 1981, a move deemed illegal by the United Nations. Since Assad’s fall, Israel has extended its control, even seizing a UN-monitored buffer zone.

This occupation has sparked no condemnation from western nations, despite UN affirmations of Syrian sovereignty over the Golan Heights. (3)

And Juan Carlos Sanz notes that Turkey is serious about exercising major influence in Syria going forward:

In the culmination of its neo-Ottoman expansion strategy across part of its former empire, Turkey has quickly staked its claim in Syria. An unprecedented deployment of spies, diplomats, security agents, and bodyguards has been visible on the streets and in hotels of Damascus. Ankara has also sent 120 members of its Ministry of the Interior’s rescue teams to search for hidden underground cells in the notorious Saidnaya prison, a symbol of the atrocities committed by the Assad family during half a century of dictatorship. Dozens of Turkish reporters have closely followed these developments, with Turkish media deploying one of the largest international presences in the country, including television broadcasting teams stationed at key points in the Syrian capital.

Since becoming Turkey’s top political leader in 2002, President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has had to wait for his gamble on the Syrian opposition and his stance against the Assad regime to pay off, emerging as a winner after more than 13 years of civil strife, destruction, and barbarism. Turkey has worked hard to reverse its course as sidelined power — a position the war had relegated it to. [my emphasis] (4)

Türkiye’s hopes for a more powerful Syria as a Turkish ally is likely to run up against Israel’s (presumed) aim of keeping Syria in “failed state” condition. But Türkiye’s ambition to crush the functioning of the Kurkish Autonomous Region in Rojava is also likely to cause complications with the US, as well. Of course, if the Trump 2 Administration actually does pull out of NATO, that will scramble relations with Türkiye along with all the other NATO allies.

Sanz also points to moves by Türkiye that could lead to some kind of peaceful accommodation with the Rojava Kurds. But it could also turn very ugly.

Deutsche Welle reported last week on Türkiye's’s aims in Syria: (5)

Notes:

(1) Haass, Richard (2025): Not Peanuts (January 3, 2025). Home and Away. <https://richardhaass.substack.com/p/not-peanuts-january-3-2025> (Accessed: 2025-03-01).

(2) CFR.org Editors (2024); Syria’s Civil War: The Descent Into Horror. Council on Foreign Relations 12/20/2024. <https://www.cfr.org/article/syrias-civil-war> (Accessed: 2025-03-01).

(3) Bakir, Ali (2024): Israel’s attacks on Syria threaten regional stability and will ultimately backfire. Middle East Eye 12/31/2024. <https://www.middleeasteye.net/opinion/syria-israel-attacks-threaten-regional-stability-backfire> (Accessed: 2025-03-01).

(4) Juan Carlos Sanz, Juan Carlos (2025): Turkey stakes its claim in Syria. El País 01/02/2025. <https://english.elpais.com/international/2025-01-02/turkey-stakes-its-claim-in-syria.html> (Accessed: 2025-03-01).

(5) What are Turkey's aims in Syria? DW News YouTube channel 12/27/2024. <https://youtu.be/1MChjr2O1n4?si=fx5jncua8nHVFNd-> (Accessed: 2025-03-01).