Joschka Fischer on the current Middle East crisis and Gerhard Mangott on Ukraine’s current grim situation in the war with Russia

Former German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer writes:

Throughout this century-long struggle [in Israel-Palestine], the wider world has undergone vast and profound geopolitical changes, from the fall of the old colonial empires to the two world wars and the long Cold War. Yet the Israel-Palestinian conflict has remained predominantly a regional affair, or even merely a local one between two small populations. Unlike the crisis in Sarajevo in the summer of 1914, this conflict has never sparked a global conflagration or a clash of great powers, culminating in a world war. But now that geopolitical reality, too, may be giving way before our very eyes. [my emphasis] (1)

This was from last week. And of course things are moving fast in that area and are very hard to reasonably predict even from one week to the other at the moment.

Fischer tends to take a pragmatic-realistic view of international affairs. Which, among other things, led him as Foreign Minister two decades ago to oppose the US war in Iraq and warn about the even greater danger of a war with Iran. He continues:

Ever since Iran launched an unprecedented missile attack against Israel from its own territory on April 13, the two have been in an undeclared state of war, and not over any piece of land. This conflict has a much larger dimension, because as long as Israel – one of [sic!] the strongest military powers in the Middle East – exists, Iran cannot achieve its goal of regional hegemony. For Iran, then, Israel is primarily a means to that end. The Jewish state provides it with a crucial advantage over its main Arab rival, Saudi Arabia, by furnishing a raison d’être for Hamas, Hezbollah, and other participants in the Axis of Resistance.

Iran’s advanced nuclear program is another means to the same end. A nuclear-armed Iran would shift the balance of power in the Middle East, and probably globally, too. [my emphasis]

Fischer is focusing here on the cold power-balancing logic that is unfortunately a constant feature of international politics. That doesn’t mean the leaders of countries aren’t making choices, they are. But, unlike weapons lobbyists and chronic hawks, one big strength of the “realist” outlook - depressing as it often can be - is that it is often good in taking account of downside risks than many players in the foreign policy game prefer to minimize or ignore.

As Biden’s time in office creeps slowly to an end, I tend to think more and more that he has been operating on autopilot when it comes to foreign policy: keep expanding NATO, always back Israel’s wars no matter how damaging to American interests and to real people they may be, don’t hold back with fantasies of American omnipotence.

“There’s nothing, nothing beyond our capacity if we work together,” he said in 2022 and has said essentially the same on various occasions. “We just need to remember who the hell we are. We’re the United States of America. The United States of America. There’s nothing beyond our capacity.” (2)

There’s balance of power rationality - and there is human arrogance

Any time the leader of a nuclear power says, “There’s nothing beyond our capacity,” people everywhere have good reason to worry. Biden should have taken the advice of some of his more sober-minded contemporaries and elders on foreign policy outlooks:

Like Sen. William Fulbright (1905-1995), longtime Democratic Senator from Arkansas in 1966:

There are many respects in which America, if it can bring itself to act with the magnanimity and the empathy appropriate to its size and power, can be an intelligent example to the world. We have the opportunity to set an example of generous understanding in our relations with China, of practical cooperation for peace in our relations with Russia, of reliable and respectful partnership in our relations with Western Europe, of material helpfulness without moral presumption in our relations with the developing nations, of abstention from the temptations of hegemony in our relations with Latin America, and of the all- around advantages of minding one's own business in our relations with everybody. Most of all, we have the opportunity to serve as an example of democracy to the world by the way in which we run our own society; America, in the words of John Quincy Adams, should be "the well-wisher to the freedom and independence of all" but "the champion and vindicator only of her own." ...

If we can bring ourselves so to act, we will have overcome the dangers of the arrogance of power. It will involve, no doubt, the loss of certain glories, but that seems a price worth paying for the probable rewards, which are the happiness of America and the peace of the world. [my emphasis] (3)

Fulbright wasn’t right about everything, of course. During the Cuban Missile Crisis, he was an advocate of invading Cuba. But he was capable of seeing disasters in progress like the Vietnam War and understanding them for what they were.

Many of the wars fought by man -- I am tempted to say most -- have been fought over such abstractions. The more I puzzle over the great wars of history, the more I am inclined to the view that the causes attributed to them -- territory, markets, resources, the defense or perpetuation of great principles — were not the root causes at all but rather explanations or excuses for certain unfathomable drives of human nature. For lack of a clear and precise understanding of exactly what these motives are, I refer to them as the "arrogance of power" -- as a psychological need that nations seem to have to prove that they are bigger, better or stronger than other nations. Implicit in this drive is the assumption that the proof of superiority is force -- that when a nation shows that it has the stronger army it is also proving that it has better people, better institutions, better principles — and, in general, a better civilization. The evidence for my proposition is the remarkable discrepancy between the apparent and hidden causes of some modern wars and the discrepancy between their causes and ultimate consequences. [my emphasis]

Fulbright continues by relating the supposed cause and the final result of the Franco-Prussian War (1870-1871):

THe precipitating cause of the Franco-Prussian war, for example, was a dispute over the succession to the Spanish throne and the ostensible "underlying" cause was French resistance to the unification of Germany. The war was followed by German unification -- which probably could have been achieved without war -- but it was also followed by the loss of Alsace-Lorraine, the humiliation of France and the emergence of Germany as the greatest power in Europe, which could not have been achieved without war. The peace treaty, incidentally, said nothing about the Spanish throne, which everyone apparently had forgotten. [my emphasis]

Funny how that works!

In that speech, Fulbright was concentrating on encouraging Americans, both politicians and citizens, to understand that the nominally noble motives given by the US government for its actions abroad, and its wars in particular, are generally phony: “Not once, so far as I know, has the United States regarded itself as intervening in a Latin American country for selfish or unworthy motives - a view not necessarily shared by the beneficiaries.”

Fulbright wasn’t some kind of out-of-touch “isolationist” who wanted the US to ignore the rest of the world. What he wanted was more practical action, better recognition of real conditions in the world, and less hypocritical and/or self-delusional assumptions from US citizens, politicians, and government officials in foreign policy and wars.

The real dilemmas of Israel-Palestine and Ukraine

Joschka Fischer writes carefully – but not especially optimistically – “All the parties involved [in the current Middle East crisis] are stubbornly convinced of their own chances, and neither the Palestinians nor the Israelis will ever simply give up.”

One implication of this comment would be that some or all of the various parties (Israel, Palestine, Hezbollah, Lebanon, Syria, Iran, Lebanon) have to changes their goals. Another would be that we are drifting toward an inevitable disaster.

But the latter conclusion is exactly what Israel’s government wants the world to think, especially its critical backer, the US. If there’s no solution, if it’s an irrational conflict that has been going on for millennia, there’s no reason for the US to be particularly concerned about pushing for a actual solution that would bring peace.

But the US does have ways to influence the situation, more than any other single country. It could (and should!) cut off military aid to Israel until it stops the genocide currently under way in Gaza. And it could start pushing Israel and other countries to stop pretending that there will be a “two-state solution.” (It would be a huge stretch at this point to pretend that Israel is even pretending anymore.) As much of a diplomatic shibboleth as that has been for decades, it very hard to see how it is possible now. The reality is that Israel is a de facto apartheid state pursuing a long-term but real agenda of ethnic cleansing against the Palestinians. The only realistic option that would mean a real peace appears to be either an actual democracy in all of Palestine, or Eretz Israel, as the Likud Party and other conservative Zionist groups call it.

But for the US to take that position would be a huge change.

As bad as the Biden policy may be on Israel, his team also seems to be on cruise control in the Ukraine War, apparently envisioning much more fighting and no serious attempt to bring any kind of peace. The US and other NATO countries look to be ready to keep the war going as long as Ukrainians are willing to keep fighting it. At best, that adds up to a bleak prospect for the Russia-Ukraine War. Why the Ukraine hawks are celebrating the current Ukrainian Kursk incursion into Russia is not at all clear beyond short-term enthusiasm over a momentary gain for the home team.

I’ve probably cited John Mearsheimer at least a hundred times on the Ukraine War since February of 2022. But his evaluations of the situation have held up well, even given the many uncertainties in the situation. In a recent interview, he observed, “What’s happening here is that the Ukrainians are taking a bad situation on the battlefield and making it worse [in the current Kursk operation].” He thinks the Ukrainians have put up to a third of their troops into the Kursk operation and that Russia is inflicting heavy casualties on them and destroying many of their armored vehicles. Actually, he says that it will mean that the Ukrainians’ eastern front inside their country “will collapse” and Russia will be able to take even more territory. (4)

Gerhard Mangott, a Russia expert at the University of Innsbruck (Austria) who also has a solid record on his analysis of the Ukraine War, seems to share the apprehension expressed by Mearsheimer and apparently most everyone who is not in a full cheerleading-for-Ukraine role:

The Ukrainian invasion of the Kursk region is a major military risk. Just because Ukraine has made significant territorial gains in this lightly defended region does not provide strategic sense for this operation. This would be the case only if Russia had withdrawn troops from eastern Ukraine to defend Kursk. There, the Ukrainian army has been in constant retreat for many months. Russia is slowly but steadily gaining more and more ground, at great sacrifice. However, Russia has withdrawn troops from other, currently uncontested sections of the front, from fewer or hardly contested sections of the front in the Ukrainian regions of Kharkiv, Kherson or Zaporizhja. In addition, Russia is in no great hurry to push the Ukrainian army out of Kursk. So far, the Russian army has in particular carried out air operations to destroy soldiers and equipment – not only in Kursk, but also in the neighboring Ukrainian region of Sumy, which had served as a staging and supply area for the Ukrainian advance. [my emphasis] (5)

The power politics of the international situation certainly suggests various alternatives to countries for what their foreign policies could be. But real people in decision-making positions have to set priorities based on feasible options available to them. Since this involves human decision-making, there’s no guarantee that the decisions will be optimal.

But it’s also true that various internal economic and political dynamics inside countries also play a significant role in how leaders pick particular foreign policies. Mearsheimer and his colleagues Stephen Walt have long argued that internal political support for Israel’s policies have repeatedly led the US government to take decisions that are suboptimal from the viewpoint of American national interests. And the “military-industrial” complex is real and exerts huge pressure for the US to pursue policies that keep arms sales at a high level.

The psychological factors Fulbright citied in his 1966 speech also play a real role. Blustering and chest-pounding along with a missionary spirit are a real part of the mix, even though they can’t be quantified materially. Trump’s version is a particularly disturbed caricature of this phenomenon. But it’s far from being unique to him.

Fulbright’s lecture and the book he made it into argue that plain human arrogance plays a disturbingly large role in foreign policy decisions:

For lack of a clear and precise understanding of exactly what these motives are [of individual policymakers], I refer to them as the "arrogance of power" -- as a psychological need that nations seem to have to prove that they are bigger, better or stronger than other nations. Implicit in this drive is the assumption that the proof of superiority is force -- that when a nation shows that it has the stronger army it is also proving that it has better people, better institutions, better principles — and, in general, a better civilization.

Drift is not a robust or sensible foreign policy for Israel or Ukraine

Seymour Hersh recently made a fair point about public incuriosity the press and Members of Congress about who is running the show in the White House and for how long:

Biden’s bad day at the office in June, his disastrous debate with Donald Trump, did not happen suddenly but revealed a condition that had been apparent to many for months at least. A lot of hard questions are not being asked by the press about when Vice President Harris and the White House staff who still support her knew the truth about Biden’s impairment. It was an internal secret for how long? More than one year?

There is a lot of explaining for the Democrats to do between now and the election in November. I also think it’s fair to ask if the White House is as involved in the planning and execution of the current Israeli war with Hezbollah as it was during the Bush administration. It is our bombs and other munitions that are being fired. (6)

Keeping policy in both the Ukraine and Israel-Palestine on autopilot for the remaining five months of the Biden Administration would be irresponsible. On the latter, Meron Rappaport recently wrote: “Every war entails a certain level of dehumanization of the enemy. But it seems that in the current war in Gaza, the dehumanization of Palestinians is close to absolute.” (7) And that is having the ugliest of real-world-consequences.

Still, the Biden Administration continues to provide complete military support to Israel’s war against civilians in Gaza. And in the West Bank. (8)

Notes:

(1) Fischer, Joschka (2024): This Time Is Different in theMiddle East. Project Syndicate 08/19/2024. <https://www.project-syndicate.org/columnist/joschka-fischer> (Accessed: 2024-26-08).

(2) Biden, Joe (2022): Remarks by President Biden in Press Conference. White House website 11/ß9/2ß22. <https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/2022/11/09/remarks-by-president-biden-in-press-conference-8/> (Accessed: 2024-27-08).

(3) Fulbright, William J. (1966): The Arrogance of Power (speech) 05/05/1966. <https://digitalcollections.uark.edu/digital/collection/Fulbright/id/532> (Accessed: 2024-27-08).

(4) John J. Mearsheimer: How the West and Zelensky Prepare to Risk Everything. John L. Mearsheimer YouTube channel 08/27/2024. <https://youtu.be/rlq42jBl9yE?si=aybd9ug-TX80VR5A> (Accessed: 2024-27-08).

(5) Mangott, Gerhard (2024): Kurzer Blick auf den Ukrainekrieg. Blog 08/28/2024. <https://www.gerhard-mangott.at/?p=5238> (Accessed: 2024-28-08). My translation from German.

(6) Hersh, Seymour (2024): What They Talk About When They Talk About War. Substack 08/27/2ß24. <https://seymourhersh.substack.com/p/what-they-talk-about-when-they-talk> (Accessed: 2024-28-08).

(7) Rapoport, Meron (2024): Israeli society’s dehumanization of Palestinians is now absolute. +972 Magazine 08/23/2024. <https://www.972mag.com/dehumanization-moral-abyss-israelis/> (Accessed: 2024-28-08).

(8) At least 9 killed as Israel launches major raid on occupied West Bank. Al Jazeera 08/23/2024. <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/8/28/at-least-7-killed-as-israel-launches-major-raid-on-occupied-west-bank> (Accessed: 2024-28-08).