CBS reports (1):
The AP reports:
Iran’s foreign minister Monday accused the United States of giving Israel the “green light” for a strike on its consulate building in Syria that killed seven Iranian military officials including two generals.
Hossein Amirabdollahian reiterated Tehran’s vows that it will respond to the attack, widely blamed on Israel, that appeared to signify an escalation of Israel’s targeting of military officials from Iran, which supports militant groups fighting Israel in Gaza, and along its border with Lebanon.
Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah in an address Monday reiterated the Iran-backed group’s support for a Tehran military response to the attack that killed Gen. Mohammad Reza Zahedi, a senior military official in the Iranian Revolutionary Guard’s Quds Force, and worsened fears of the war spiraling into the rest of the Middle East. (2)
Paul Pillar takes a dim view of the Netanyahu government’s intentions:
Israel’s bombing of an Iranian diplomatic compound in Damascus, killing a senior commander in Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps and several other Iranian officials in addition to at least four Syrian citizens, was a marked escalation. Besides being as much an act of aggression in Syria as many previous Israeli aerial attacks, hitting the embassy compound constituted a direct attack on Iran.
Iranian leaders will feel heavy pressure to respond forcefully. …
Escalation as an intended way for Israel to work its way out of the Gaza dead end has two elements. The main one is to provoke Iran to hit back, which can enable Israel to present itself as defending rather than offending and to push debate away from the destruction it is wreaking on Gaza and toward the need to protect itself against foreign enemies. The other element is to increase the chance of the United States getting directly involved in conflict with Iran. If it does, war in the Middle East would be seen as not just a matter of Israel bashing Palestinians but instead would involve equities of Israel’s superpower patron. …
The United States could get dragged into an Israeli-Iranian conflict in either of two ways. One would be through political demands within the United States for Washington to act more directly to defend “our ally Israel” when under attack from Iran.
The other way is for Iranian reprisals against Israel to extend as well to U.S. targets. …
Despite frequent references in symmetrical terms to a “shadow war” between Iran and Israel, a compilation of events in that war shows an asymmetrical pattern of Israel initiating most of the violence and Iran mostly responding. For the United States to distance itself from this pattern would be not only in U.S. interests but also the interests of regional peace and security. (3) [my emphasis]
And Haaretz reports:
Israel isn't built for long wars. In all its war plans, ever since its inception, the Israel Defense Forces has planned short wars lasting a maximum of a month. The plans always involved a massive mobilization of all reservists, a major push at the beginning of the war and large-scale attacks on all fronts simultaneously, with the goal of breaking the enemy's spirit and bringing about its surrender.
Only a great power that isn't dependent on the rest of the world can afford to wage long wars. The United States can. So can Russia. But a country that is utterly dependent on the rest of the world can't keep fighting for a long time. After all, without arms and ammunition from the U.S., we would have had to resort to fighting with sticks and stones long ago. (4) [my emphasis]
That last part is obviously hyperbolic. But the point he’s making is a very important one.
It’s worth remembering at this point that numerous leaders are calculating their options in what they consider to be a very high-stakes situation. There’s no guarantee they will make the best decisions. And, as Shtrasler puts it, after October 7, Netanyahu “wanted a war that would go nowhere and last forever.”
Trita Parsi comments on those calculations and options that all sides are considering:
Iran's options in the region are very limited precisely because it has prioritized improving relations with its Arab neighbors. A more isolated Iran would have less to lose.
This may leave Iran contemplating a strike on Israel proper. This would, of course, be extremely risky, mainly because of the difficulty of calibrating a proportionate response (and impact) that doesn't provide Netanyahu with the opportunity to force Biden to go along with Israel escalating matters further - think of a repeat of Biden's disastrous bearhug of Israel on October 8. (6)
At the moment, there is no happy ending is in sight.
Notes:
(1) Iran vows retaliation for Israeli strike on embassy in Syria. CBS News 04/08/2024. <https://youtu.be/KSAhsIPg-bA?si=4VdSfN6LcjjM6V81> (Accessed: 2024-06-04).
(2) Chehayes, Kareem & Aji. Albert (2024): Iran’s foreign minister accuses U.S. of giving Israel ‘green light’ to attack consulate in Syria. AP News 04/08/2024. <https://apnews.com/article/syria-iran-israel-hezbollah-lebanon-consulate-amirabdollahian-68c7a652c5434d80fbff47e0ddbdd483> (Accessed: 2024-06-04).
(3) PIllar, Paul (2024): Is Israel's plan to draw the US into a war with Iran? Responsible Statecraaft 04/05/2024. <https://responsiblestatecraft.org/iran-israel-war/> (Accessed: 2024-06-04).
(4) Israel at War, Day 185: New Truce Proposal Presented to Hamas, White House Says. Haaretz 04/08/2024. <https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/2024-04-08/ty-article/.premium/israel-at-war-day-185-new-truce-proposal-presented-to-hamas-white-house-says/0000018e-be79-d480-a99e-fe7fc2490001> (Accessed: 2024-06-04).
(5) Shtrasler, Nehemia (2024): Haaretz 04/07/2024. <https://www.haaretz.com/opinion/2024-04-07/ty-article/.premium/netanyahu-is-prolonging-the-gaza-war-and-israel-cant-afford-it/0000018e-b476-d50a-a1bf-fc7ede1f0000> (Accessed: 2024-08-04).
(6) Parsi, Trita (2024): X [Twitter] 04/0/2024. <https://twitter.com/tparsi/status/1777349205138317395> (Accessed: 2024-08-04).
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