Almost no one doubts the outcome of Russia’s presidential election, where President Vladimir Putin is set to secure another six years in power with a huge lead over his opponents.
With the election under tight control and wartime repressions stronger than ever, anti-war Russians nonetheless have some options to show their discontent with the Kremlin in the March 15-17 vote, experts and opposition politicians say.
Putin’s competitors on the ballot are Vladislav Davankov of the New People party, Leonid Slutsky of the Liberal Democratic Party and Nikolai Kharitonov of the Communist Party. Though they are running on different platforms, all are widely seen as backed by the Kremlin.
With no real alternative to Putin and no "against all" column on the ballots, some activists and politicians have advocated for intentionally spoiling the ballot as a form of protest. (1)
Michael Kimmage and Maria Lipman have an analysis of the current Russian political system, aka, Putin's system:
In his quarter century in power, Putin has pursued two separate goals. The first has been to create a vast machinery of repression, eliminating any domestic forces that oppose him or that have the potential to do so. This process has entailed the murder of journalists, the arrest of insufficiently loyal oligarchs, and the persecution of any viable political alternative to Putin. The liberal politician Boris Nemtsov was killed outside the Kremlin in 2015. The political activist Vladimir Kara-Murza has been imprisoned since the start of the war in Ukraine. And after displaying unyielding political courage, the opposition leader Alexei Navalny died at the age of 47 in a penal colony in the Russian Arctic. He had survived an attempted assassination by poisoning, in 2020. A year later, after receiving medical care in Germany, he returned to Russia, aware of the risks he was taking.
Putin’s other goal has been to deprive most Russians of the ability to imagine a future without him. Because it is impossible to counter him today, the thinking goes, it will be impossible to counter him tomorrow. No longer hemmed in by a parliament, a constitution, or a political opposition, Putin is at the height of his power. A prevailing sense of “forever Putinism” provides many Russians with a sense of stability; it is the political continuity they know best. For a minority, it induces despair or rage.
Forever Putinism has its vulnerabilities. Any regime that promises to live forever cannot let itself be perceived as failing. To endure, Putin’s regime must maintain the illusion not just of its inevitability, which it has already achieved, but also of its own immortality, which it cannot achieve. Visible cracks in the myth have the potential to undermine the myth itself. Putin’s presentation of himself as an omnipotent savior—the only one who can steer Russia’s destiny—thus presents a long-term risk for the regime. (2) [my emphasis]
Nothing lasts forever, of course. But some things can last for a long time. And even authoritarian regime have public opinion to contend with and conflict-ridden politics. Even when those don’t play out like they do in liberal democracies.
Western sanctions on Russia over Ukraine haven’t had nearly the desired effect
Kimmage and Lipman note that Putin does have a posture that actually is presumably appealing to many Russian voters, however little their actual votes may count this year:
Through its media infrastructure, the Kremlin repeats its talking points daily. It claims, not without justification, that Russia has gained the upper hand on the battlefield; that outside the U.S.-led West, public opinion is more sympathetic toward Russia’s position; and that the Russian economy is in good shape, a point bolstered by low unemployment and rising wages. In the eyes of his domestic audience, Putin has passed an important test: he has stood up to the West, defying its criticism, its sanctions, and its military aid to Ukraine. [my emphasis]
Whether Putin would win a bigger percentage of the vote in a genuinely free election this year than Benjamin Netanyahu would is an interesting speculation. Putin’s vote percentage would almost surely be bigger. (3)
Another sad verdict on the sanctions from Michael Corbin:
As of January 2024, the Russian Federation was subject to over 28,000 sanctions and the majority of these occurred after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. Approximately 16,000 of these sanctions were imposed against individuals, while nearly 10,000 were imposed against companies and 3,200 against institutions.many Western democracies.
Additionally, there have been sectoral sanctions such as general trade embargoes on gas and oil. The EU and the U.S. have imposed most of these but countries like Japan, South Korea and Switzerland have also participated. While these sanctions intended to hamper Russia’s war effort and foment domestic economic and political instability, most have not achieved these objectives. Russia has maintained its military activities in Ukraine while recent IMF forecasts predict growth of 2.6 percent in 2024 — at a time when many EU countries are heading toward recession amidst significant political uncertainty in 2024 — a pivotal election year in many Western democracies.
Perhaps the greatest achievement has been reinforcing Russia’s trade pivot to the East and the Global South and away from the European Union. (4) [my emphasis]
Economist Jamie Galbraith explains how the economic sanctions against Russia and against Putin’s government have come up short (5): many Western democracies.
Arnaud Bertrand highlights and quotes a couple of Galbraith’s points (6):
Ed Corcoran gives a broad description of the Russia opposition and suggests that “the West” needs to encourage the democratic opposition to Putin and Putinism but also hold out a constructive vision like the one that unfortunately failed to emerge from the situation in 1989-91:
A broad range of Russian opposition groups works to provide alternatives to Putin. This includes several hundred thousand Russians, mostly young, educated, and politically active, who have recently emigrated and are now actively opposing Putin as well as maintaining connections with friends and relatives still in Russia. Opposition groups are working hard to overcome their differences to pave the way for a post-Putin era. In April 2023, they issued a Declaration of Russian Democratic Forces and in May, a Russian Democratic Club met in Paris and brought together a coalition of Russian anti-war democratic forces. In October, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) created a “recurring contact platform” for dialogue with representatives of Russian democratic opposition forces who share Council of Europe values, fully respect Ukraine’s territorial integrity, and condemn Russia’s war of aggression. Participants in the meeting included representatives from a half dozen major opposition groups, including the Free Russia Foundation, the Russian Anti-War Committee, the Russian Action Committee, and the True Russia Project. (7)
With all the hype over Russian and Chinese attempts to meddle into US politics, it’s worth noting that while countries do it all the time, it’s very tricky business. And the long US record of regime change has left, to put it generously, mixed results. In a world which is increasing “globalized” in so many ways, making choices about which countries and which of their foreign policies to oppose or support is a part of political life. Which is why there are rules and traditions and laws and understandings of what is legitimate and illegitimate influence. As we’ve seen in recent months, Israel and the United States have particularly intense interest in what happens in the other countries’ politics, even though - for better or worse - the two countries are closely allied.
Corcoran’s broad concept is:
The West needs to build on PACE’s initiative to work with the Russian opposition to promote a new progressive Russia in active partnership with the rest of Europe. A good starting point would be issuing an attractive and persuasive New Russia Vision that counters Putin’s warped vision of Russian history with its aggressive forms of patriotism, Soviet nostalgia, and pride in the past. Such a vision statement has to include two major components. It must portray a modern Russia that integrates its varied ethnic groups into a dynamic and democratic society alongside traditional Russian cultural and social values. And it must demonstrate how a dynamic Russian economy could integrate with Europe and the industrialized world to provide prosperity at home and leadership on a global scale. ...There is already a long history of the US and Russia making efforts to influence, improve, or polarize the relationship between the two. Some, like nuclear-arms-control treaties, have obviously had more constructive effects than others.
The central task is doing what should have been done 30 years ago: integrate Russia into the industrialized world, focusing on collaborative political, social, and economic actions while actively inviting Russians to join in development efforts. A ceasefire in Ukraine would be a good starting point and would be well received by the majority of the Russian people. But the West needs to make clear that ending the war and lifting sanctions means restoration of Ukraine’s sovereign control over its own territory. The West needs to actively work with Russian opposition elements to widely distribute this view to the Russian people as part of a broader New Russia Vision countering Putin’s medieval version of imperial dominance. [my emphasis]
But the benefit to the US of relying on 1950s Cold War-type propaganda battles with Russia and China is highly dubious. That’s why a broader vision is needed that actually guides policy is needed.
Having a practical version of such a thing obviously relies on having reasonably pragmatic US Administrations working on it. The Raving Orange Clown approach isn’t going to get us there, however big a man-crush Donald Trump may have on Vladimir Putin.
Notes:
(1) Putin’s Election Win Is Almost Certain. What Can Anti-Kremlin Russians Do? The Moscow Times 03/14/2024. <https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2024/03/14/putins-election-win-is-almost-certain-what-can-anti-kremlin-russians-do-a84409> (Accessed: 03/14/2024).
(2) Kimmage, Michael and Maria Lipman, Maria (2024): Forever Putinism: The Russian Autocrat’s Answer to the Problem of Succession. Foreign Affairs 03/13/2024. <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/russian-federation/vladimir-putin-forever-putinism> (Accessed: 03/14/2024).
(3) Disapproval of Netanyahu among Israeli voters does not equate to opposition to the current war on Gaza civilians. But he is one seriously unpopular Prime Minister. See: Scheindlin, Dahlia (2024): Netanyahu Didn't Tell Biden the Whole Truth About Israelis and the Gaza War. Haaretz 03/13/2024. <https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/2024-03-13/ty-article-magazine/.premium/netanyahu-didnt-tell-biden-the-whole-truth-about-israelis-and-the-gaza-war/0000018e-389b-dc74-adbe-bcbf118b0000> (Accessed: 03/14/2024).
(4) Corbin, Michael (2024): Did the West 'crush' Russia’s economy for invading Ukraine? Responsible Statecraft 02/14/2024. <https://responsiblestatecraft.org/russia-sanctions-ukraine/> (Accessed: 03/14/2024).
(5) Galbraith, James K. (2024): Sanctions: To Russia with Love. New Economic Thinking YouTube channel 02/28/2024. <https://youtu.be/y4T5gmAndFk?si=Aobs7AQ-MP7p0gCR> (Accessed: 2024-15-03).
(6) Bertrand, Arnaud (2024): X/[Twitter] 03/11/2024. <https://twitter.com/RnaudBertrand/status/1767011514781999513> (Accessed: 2024-15-03).
(7) Cocoran, Ed (2024): Post-Sanctions Russia. Foreign Policy in Focus 02/12/2024. <https://fpif.org/post-sanctions-russia/> (Accessed: 2024-15-03).
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