Türkiye's (Turkey's) foreign policy mischief

While NATO proudly backs Ukraine against Russia in defense of national sovereignty and international law, NATO member Türkiye (Turkey) appearance to involve it in new interference in Syria against Kurdish forces:

Turkey's leader [Recep Tayyip Erdoğan] said to Vladimir Putin “it is ... a priority to clear the border of terrorists, at least 30 km deep", referring to Kurdish fighters from the People's Protection Units (YPG) in northern Syria, according to a statement from his office.

The two leaders also discussed grain supplies and a potential regional gas hub in Turkey, both countries said.…

Both Moscow and Washington oppose a possible Turkish ground incursion into northern Syria. (Northern Syria needs 'clearing' of Kurdish forces: Erdogan tells Putin (2022). In: Euronews 11-Dec-2022 <> (Accessed 2022-12-11)

But Connor Echols doesn’t expect the Biden-Harris Administration to discourage such an intervention very strongly:

“The Biden administration sees Turkey as a very important ally vis-à-vis the conflict in Ukraine,” [Giorgio] Cafiero [of Gulf State Analytics] said, noting Ankara’s key role in providing weapons to Kyiv and moderating talks between the warring parties. “The White House is not interested in aggravating Turkey right now.”

So Washington will likely avoid using its significant leverage over Ankara — including a pending deal that would enable Turkey to buy a fleet of 50 new F-16s — to try to prevent an offensive in Syria. Instead, U.S. leaders will continue to call on both Kurdish and Turkish fighters to deescalate. (Turkey is about to invade Syria, and the US won’t do much to stop it. Responsible Statecraft 11.29.2002)

Türkiye has new leverage because of its role in supporting the NATO effort to back Ukraine:

Turkey’s threatened incursion into northern Syria is testing US efforts to balance between an important counterterrorism partner in the Middle East and a pivotal geopolitical ally in the war in Ukraine.

At the heart of the tussle between Ankara and Washington is the United States’ support for the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), a Kurdish-majority militia Washington has partnered with to fight the Islamic State (IS) group.

Ankara views the SDF as an extension of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party, which has waged a decades-long war for independence against Turkey. The US considers the group, known as the PKK, a terrorist organisation, but refuses to cut ties with the SDF, which Washington sees as the most effective fighting force against IS.

Türkiye has its own power-balancing calculations at work, which Erdoğan has used fairly skillfully in recent years. It holds upwards of 3 million refugees that the EU is paying Türkiye to keep there under an agreement worked out between Angela Merkel in 2016 and renewed in 2021. This deal gives Erdoğan to pressure the EU (or blackmail them, depending on one’s perspective) at any time by threatening to send hundreds of thousands of refugees into the EU.

It’s both a tragedy and a scandal - and political malpractice of a very high order - that after the 2015-16 uptick in immigration that EU-Türkiye deal has so far been the best they could do in establishing a decent refugee policy includes burden-sharing within the Union as well as adherence to international humanitarian law. While the far-right parties have been the most toxic in promoting xenophobic politics, the center parties have been basically pitiful in pushing back against the anti-refuge demagoguery, a factor which Vladimir Putin and the Russian leadership clearly hope will be a major factor in weakening EU unity over Ukraine in the coming months.

The current situation with oil and gas sanctions against Russia and Russian embargoes of supplies damages the EU economies more than that of the United States, whose oil and gas producers are notably benefitting. (I take it for granted that war profiteers of all stripes are happy for the booming new business, at least until nukes start dropping.)

Europe has three important pipeline corridors for gas imports, from Norway, North Africa and Azerbaijan. The one from Azerbaijan goes through Türkiye. Stefan Meister explains, “Türkiye is … NATO's most important partner on the Black Sea. Ankara sees itself as a bridge for trade between Asia and Europe. One of Turkey's main goals is to become an energy hub from the Caspian region as well as the Middle East to Europe.”

And he notes that the current situation makes Türkiye an attractive partner for wider cooperation for both NATO and Russia:

Russia's war against Ukraine and the attempt to cut it off completely from its ports and transit opportunities in the Black Sea increase the need for the EU and NATO (Europe's key security partner) to play a greater role in the Black Sea. Turkey is the key state, as the [UN] agreement on grain exports negotiated by President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan [facilitating indirect negotiations between Russia and Ukraine] recently showed. At the same time, Moscow is courting Ankara with energy projects and offers of economic cooperation. From Moscow's point of view, Turkey should become a key country to circumvent Western sanctions.

See also:

Harrer, Gudrun (2022): Türkische Drohung gegen die Kurden: Erdoğans Syrien-Poker In: Standard 24.11.2022 24.11.2022

Matthews, Sean (2022): Turkey's looming invasion of Syria tests US-Kurdish ties. In: Middle East Eye 11/30/2022

Tausende Kurden demonstrieren in Syrien gegen türkische Luftangriffe In: Standard 27.11.2022