Importance of China
He opens with an analysis of China’s ambiguous position on Ukraine, recognizing the central importance of China’s position on the matter. We may be in a New Cold War. But China is a far more powerful geopolitical player than it was during the first one.
On the one hand, Von Lucke assumes that China gave Russia its acquiescence, at the least, prior to the February 24 invasion. Earlier in the month, Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping had issued a “Joint Statement” on their common foreign policy positions. It included China taking a public and official stand against NATO enlargement for the first time:
The sides oppose further enlargement of NATO and call on the North Atlantic Alliance to bandon its ideologized cold war approaches, to respect the sovereignty, security and interests of other countries, the diversity of their civilizational, cultural and historical backgrounds, and to exercise a fair and objective attitude towards the peaceful development of other States.It also included a statement that involves a diplomatic dilemma for China, which maintains that Taiwan is a part of China - which the US “one China” policy also accepts - and that the resolution of Taiwan’s status is ultimately an internal Chinese sovereign concern:
The sides emphasize that the principles of the non-use of force, respect for national sovereignty and fundamental human rights and freedoms, and non-interference in the internal affairs of other States, as enshrined in the UN Charter, are applicable to the information space.Von Lucke sensibly notes that it is highly unlikely that Putin “wanted to dupe his powerful ‘friend’ [Xi] by leaving him completely in the dark about his views,” i.e., his immediate plans for Ukraine. But he further observes, “But above all, China’s role at the moment is still unclear.”
A quick Russian victory would also have sent a clear message to China to undertake the long-planned annexation of Taiwan. But the increasingly brutal war [in Ukraine] is becoming more and more of a problem for Beijing. On the one hand, China is bound by the new boundless friendship with Moscow [that Xi and Putin proclaimed in January]; on the other hand, unlike Russia, it is deeply intertwined with the global economy and thus highly dependent on its dealings with the West. In turn, since Russia depends on the relationship with China as a result of its isolation from the West, Xi Jinping could yet become the decisive player in ending the war.We can doubt whether China is gauging its political and military options for Taiwan on the successful of imperial annexations by Russia. Of course China is paying attention to the progress of the current war and the role of Ukraine allies. But the Taiwan issue is a distinct and much more long-standing that the current Russia-Ukraine situation, which was decisively influenced by events in Ukraine in 2004 and 2014, as well as the pivotal and very unfortunate NATO declaration in 2008 (the Bucharest Declaration) that Ukraine would someday, somehow become a NATO member even though the country wasn’t in a condition to begin a formal accession process. (And still isn’t).
Von Lucke is cautious about associating himself with the years-long warning of the “realist” school, and John Mearsheimer in particular, on the international decisions that led to the current war. But he also agrees that the 2008 NATO declaration was a boneheaded move, though he expresses it more politely. And he notes that “even Heinrich August Winkler, the biggest defender of the West among German historians,” agrees that the Bucharest Declaration
Economic sanctions against Russia
Economic sanctions against Russia were particularly stringent at the start. As Von Lucke put it, “the EU and the USA have imposed sanctions on Russia in a magnitude that has never before been the case with a large state.” And they have since been tightened significantly. A ninth EU sanctions package was passed in December.
How effective these actually are in persuading Russia to back off the current war is another question. US sanctions in places like Iraq and Iran have inflicted serious damage on the civilian populations without obvious success in getting the targeted governments to comply with US demands. Gerd Grözinger has suggested that tariff on Russian fossil fuel imports would have been a preferable mechanism than the boycott actually imposed. The Institut für Weltwirtschaft Kiel (IfW) has made a similar argument, noting that the sanctions (as of June) would have more a long-term effect as compared to an immediate one.
The sanctions also haven’t presented an unspoiled picture of European unity. But generally the NATO/EU response has been unified in support of Ukraine.
EU military defense
However, the larger question is how effectively the EU will handle what German Chancellor famously called a Zeitenwende (turning point) in European foreign and defense policy. Without minimizing the often-malign influence of weapons lobbyists and the firms that hire them, it is clear that Von Lucke is being realistic in arguing for much better EU military coordination and for more military spending, which has certainly been committed in the months since his article first appeared.
But he also notes that the German military budget alone of €52 billion annually is “only ten billion less than the Russian one.” As Von Lucke writes, “despite all the problem in Ukraine,” the Russian forces “have a very different striking power.” He doesn’t elaborate. But obviously with Russia currently having the largest number of nuclear weapons of any country and Germany having none, the Russian firepower in orders of magnitude greater.
Comparisons of military budgets between countries can be tricky. We often see such comparisons presented as a percentage of GDP. But that comparison is more useful for advocates of higher military budgets in the US or Europe to make Russian military spending look gargantuan, because the US and the EU have much higher GDPs than Russia. So if the US and Russia were spending exactly the same amount of money on their military budgets, the percentage of GDP for Russia would be far greater, simple because the GDP is much smaller.
What counts is what the absolute amount of the spending is and how effective the constitution of the forces is. And Von Lucke argues plausibly that Germany’s effectiveness is seriously lacking.
SIPRI gives the military budgets of Germany and Russia in 2021in USD as $56 billion and $66 billion respectively. (The figure for the US is $801 billion.) After the Russian invasion of Ukraine this year, Germany committed to a one-time supplement to its military budget of €100 billion to be spread over an unspecified period of time. And even before that, Germany also committed as part of a NATO agreement to increase its annual military budget to an (essentially arbitrary) 2% of GDP.
What will count most of all, though, is the level of improved military cooperation the EU countries can achieve.
The “Trump” factor
Von Lucke notes that the imperative for improved EU military coordination comes not only from Russia but also from the other side of the Atlantic.
Noting Trump’s notorious admiration for Putin, he writes:
On the other hand, imagine that in this war situation, not Joe Biden, but Donald Trump had been president of the United States – with his admiration for Putin's "genius". Who would want to claim that the West would have held together as it is doing today? It is therefore high time for the European Union to finally wake up and understand the need for its own collective self-defence. Because as early as 2024, the US president could be Donald Trump again – and with this autocrat friend, US deterrence for Europe would probably be passé.It worth noting here that despite Trump’s notorious admiration for Putin and other autocratic types, he continued to approve escalating military budgets. At the same time, his obvious hostility to NATO was something that Putin’s government was no doubt glad to see. The Trump Administration was also hostile to the NordStream 2 project.
It’s also the case that the Trumpist isolationist-militarist viewpoint is not unique to Trump. Any other likely 2024 Republican Presidential candidate could very well pursue a similar NATO-suspicious or even NATO-hostile course.
Von Lucke also notes that pre-Trump US Administrations have also pursued policies that don’t align with the interests of the EU. He mentions the Iraq War in particular, which set off massive disruptions in the Middle East which, among other things, sent millions of war refugees in flight toward Europe. So he stresses:
By 2024 at the latest, by the next US presidential election, Germany, the entire EU, must have become [better prepared in defense], it must have enormously strengthened its autonomous defense of freedom and democracy. This applies not least to the organization of the military at EU level.(I should stress that he does not seem to be directing the need for military defense against war refugees!)
It’s also the case that, while the US is providing the most financial support for Ukraine in the war effort, the EU is notably more disadvantaged in the short run by the sanctions against Russia than the US. Or, at least some US corporations benefit. (So does Saudi Arabia’s Aramco.) The increase in the sale of fracked gas from the US to Europe certainly isn’t an unqualified benefit to the American people.
With even the most necessary increases in military preparedness, there are always things that can go seriously wrong. It’s in that context that Von Lucke argues that it is now “high time for the European Union to finally wake up and understand the need for its own collective self-defense.”
It’s a very tall order.
Need for cooperation with Russia on mutual interests
But he also stresses that NATO and Russia still have common interests on which they need to cooperate, despite all the hostility currently present. He mentions in particular carrying forward the US-Russia Strategic Stability Dialogue to prepare a successor to the New Start nuclear-arms-control treaty; continuing to work on nuclear nonproliferation, including reviving the Iran nuclear agreement. Sadly, the prospects for reviving the Iran agreement look less promising at the moment than they did earlier in 2022.
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