Russia-Ukraine war and the WWII-Vietnam frameworks of the US foreign policy establishment

David Rothkopf provides a helpful roundup of respectable (i.e., elite, establishment) foreign policy experts discussing the current Russian situation in the immediate wake of their serious setback after Ukraine's September counteroffensive this month: What Happens to Russia After It Loses? Daily Beast 09/13/2022.

He starts with a caution appropriate to the moment:

Ukraine’s President Volodymyr Zelenskyy offered stirring video remarks this weekend that doubled down on his commitment to defeat the invaders completely, to push them out of the borders of Ukraine.

We can’t know whether that goal will be achieved, or if it is how long it will take. But what we can see, yet again, is that Vladimir Putin’s decision to launch a broader invasion of Ukraine last February was a devastating miscalculation. [my emphasis]

Rothkopf's smorgasborg of opinion includes Hal Brands, Ivo Daalder, Jill Dougherty, Mark Hertling, Tom Nichols, Stephen Sestanovich, and Angela Stent.

The foreign policy establishment, aka, "the Blob" as adherent of the realist school like Stephen Walt call it, has a strong tendency to vacillate between Cold War militancy and post-Cold War triumphalism. Marilyn Young in 2004 provided this description of the framework in which the foreign policy establishment operates, one which is still very relevant nearly two decades later (Cold War Triumphalism: The Misuse of History After the Fall of Communism, Ellen Schrecker, ed.):

There seem to be only two kinds of war the U.S. can fight: World War II or Vietnam. The conviction on the part of some Americans and many politicians that the United States could (or should or would) have won the war in Vietnam is a convenient mechanism for getting around a remembered reality of defeat. An alternate strategy is to concentrate the national mind on World War II, skipping not only Vietnam but also Korea. In recent movie and television serials World War II is depicted as a long, valiant struggle that the U.S. fought pretty much on its own, winning an exceptionally clean victory that continues to redeem all Americans under arms anywhere at any point in history. In virtually every military action since 1975, the administration in charge has tried to appropriate the images and language of World War II. Thus, seriatim, Noriega, Aidid, Milosevic, and Saddam Hussein (twice) were roundly denounced as the Adolf Hitler du jour; September 11, 2001, of course, is the twenty-first-century Pearl Harbor. Nevertheless, in each of these wars or warlike events, some journalist or politician was bound to ask the fearful question: is this another Vietnam? [my emphasis]

The positive Second World War image encourages the notion that wars should involve complete defeat of the Enemies of the US and the complete reconstruction of their societies. But in fact that outcome was an unusual one. Recent attempts by the US to repeat it in Afghanistan and Iraq were, let's say, insufficiently achieved.

The negative Vietnam image not only encourages literal overkill in situations like the Iraq War. It also encourages the notion of giving adversaries similar headaches. That was the explicit intent with the Carter and Reagan Administrations' support of the jihadists in Afghanistan fighting against Russian forces there. (In the 1980s, we called what we now see as "Muslim jihadist terrorists" by a different label, "brave mujahideen freedom fighters".)

In this case, the notion of setting up another "Vietnam" for Russia in Ukraine is easily visible in Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin's statement of American war aims for the current Russia-Ukraine war: "We want to see Russia weakened to the point where it can’t do things like invade Ukraine."

Tom Nichols' following comment can be seen against this World War II/Vietnam dichotomy: "He's [Putin] going to leave the country [Russia] poorer, more hated, and more isolated than at any time since Stalin’s death." Joseph Stalin died in March, 1953. Most of what we now know as the Cold War took place after his death, during which time the US treated the USSR as a world power who was endangering American interests in every corner of the world. And well into the 1980s, dedicated Cold Warriors presented it as the Evil Empire that was a constant threat to the United States all over the world.

Rothkopf observes, "Russia is still the largest country in the world, with ;more nuclear weapons than anyone. And yet, remarkably, despite all that, Putin’s disaster in Ukraine may well leave Russia as little more than a dangerous middleweight power — Belgium with an attitude."

On the one hand, it's important to look realistically at Russia's ability to throw its weight around in distant parts of the globe. It has real limits. On the other hand, there seems to be a taste of triumphalism in the notion of Russia as "Belgium with an attitude." Because Belgium is definitely not "the largest country in the world." Nor does it have any nuclear weapons at all.

It would be more realistic to describe Russia as "Belgium with an attitude" - and the ability to set off a nuclear war that would likely literally end the human race. Belgium also does not have the ability to engage in a war that could send 10 million refugees into other EU countries, nor to cause energy shortages all across Europe - both of which capabilities it could use to weaken the EU as a strategic rival. Russia has both.

Dougherty argues for a more pragmatic look at the real existing Russia:

Jill Dougherty, who also teaches at Georgetown’s School of Foreign Service and is a global fellow at the Wilson Center’s Kennan Institute, observes that Russia’s deepening decline could trigger dangerous instability both for Putin and for the world. “At home in Russia, ominously, prices for goods are rising and, although most Russians support the war, there are small but significant signs of domestic frustration and even criticism of Putin himself. Massive brain drain is siphoning off Russia's best and brightest high-tech specialists. [my emphasis]

That latter consideration is one that seems to have escaped the Twitter warriors demanding a complete bloc of tourist visas for Russians. You might think that New Cold Warriors would want to leave open the most obvious channel for Russians to become part of the "brain drain" that is a significant disadvantage for Russia.

“The prospect of defeat in Ukraine,” she continues, “Carries potentially grave threats to Vladimir Putin's rule.The closer he comes to losing, the more desperate he may grow, with little to stop him from striking out in savage retribution. The possible use of tactical nuclear weapons in Ukraine cannot be ruled out. The Kremlin can try to redefine ‘victory’ and ‘defeat,’ but someone will have to be blamed and, already, Putin is denouncing his internal ‘enemies’ and ‘Fifth Column traitors,’ leaving Russia an angry, resentful, and isolated country.” [my emphasis]

Rothkopf's article doesn't mention it. But historians and military analysts have noted that Putin was the Prime Minister who was the main leader in charges of government forces during the Second Chechen War of 1999-2000. The Russian conduct of the war was not pretty. Greg Myre gives some details in Russia's wars in Chechnya offer a grim warning of what could be in Ukraine NPR 03/12/2022.