The second 2022 issue of the German skeptics’ magazine Skeptiker (35:2) carries a cover story about psychoanalysis: Timm Bölke and Bianca Holtschke, “Ein skeptischer Blick auf die Psychoanalyse.” Skeptiker is a quarterly journal of the Gesellschaft zur wissenschaftlichen Untersuchung von Parawissenschaften (GWUP) which provides popular analyses of pseudoscientific and paranormal claims. It’s similar in this way to the American Skeptical Inquirer. The US magazine Skeptic also covers similar material.
I can’t claim any special qualifications to evaluate the medical claims made about psychoanalysis. But Sigmund Freud’s psychoanalytic theory had an enormous influence on 20th century culture, philosophy, social theory, even theology. And the positivist approach, which many in the “skeptics movement” tend to favor, faces particular challenges in evaluating a field like psychoanalysis, as opposed to claims based on chemical, biological, or physics experiments.
How scientific paradigms develop
Bölke and Holtschke deal harshly with Sigmund Freud himself, accusing him of crassly fraudulent claims about his own work. Because Freud was and is such an iconic figure, it makes sense for historians, critics, and scientists to pay attention to how his personal quirks or failures may have influenced the initial version of psychoanalysis. But versions of psychoanalysis have been practiced for well over a century. And any science progresses to new knowledge and understanding, without necessarily meaning the previous versions were flatly wrong.
The physics theory of relativity - elaborated by Albert Einstein years after Freud’s landmark Interpretation of Dreams (1899) provides a good example. Einstein looked at phenomena that the prevailing Newtonian theory couldn’t adequately explain and thereby revolutionized physics. (Better telescopes also played an essential role.) But that didn’t mean that Newton’s theory was false. The proverbial apple still falls from the tree because of the gravity Newton described. But it did mean Newtonian physics was incomplete.
The later theory of quantum physics was never accepted by Einstein himself. But it was critical to the development of atomic weapons and power plants, as was the theory of relativity also, because they adequately described certain characteristics of the physical world. Physics is still in search of a Grand Unified Theory that will encompass the realities recognized by Einsteinian and quantum physics.
The popular understanding of medicine tends to assume that doctors are well-trained in science. And it’s true that they have to study more hard science than most of us. But medicine is not identical to science. There is medical science but also medical technique. A thorough knowledge of human biology does not in itself made a biologist a surgeon, because surgery is a technique. Likewise, a lung surgeon can do her work successfully without being able to reel off a detailed description of the molecular activity in lung cells. In other words, biology and medicine are closely connected but distinct fields of activity.
The “skeptics movement's” view of not only psychoanalysis but of psychology in general tends to be very fond of the kind of philosophical positivism that Karl Popper advocated. A major feature of Popper’s theory was the notion of falsifiability. Kids get a version of this is basic science classes when the function of physical experiments are explained. This is the idea of coming up with a hypothesis, then figuring out experiments to test it. If your hypothesis is , “If you combine substance X and Substance Y, it produces Substance Z,” then you need to demonstrate that in experiments that other experimenters can duplicate.
If the experiments don’t produce the expected result, the hypothesis has been “falsified,” proven not to be true. This is obviously a drastically oversimplified description. But that’s the basic idea.
Popper argued that a scientific claim cannot be considered valid as science if the theory can’t be falsified in this way. But some big parts of science can’t be easily duplicated in experiments. To stick with a physics example, we can’t really construct experiments to duplicate the Big Bang (that began the universe) hundreds of times over in various different laboratories. Instead, we have to look at the current evidence that we are able to observe to draw conclusions about that major event a few billion years ago.
This goes as well for geology and the past history of biological evolution, as well, although those aren’t trying to explain a singular event 13.5 billion years past. To some extent those can be tested in shorter-term observations. Still, they rely heavily on making plausible explanations based on evidence of long-past events.
Something similar is true with the social sciences in general but also in areas like medicine where science and “art” (or technique) combine. Broadly speaking, social sciences like political science, sociology, and economics have to rely on recorded experiences that are overdetermined, i.e., that are significantly influenced by multiple causal factors.
Bölke's and Holtschke's positivist criticism of Freud
Bölke and Holtschke complain that Freud’s clamed discoveries that became psychoanalytic theory were based on case studies of his patients. “Freud was an inspiring story-teller who could always present his stories in a superb manner.” They argue that his ability to be a slick scammer (they aren’t quite that crass in their wording) had a huge role in the popularity and influence his ideas attained.
But their main criticism rests on a positivist argument based on Popper’s idea of falsifiability: “A scientific theory is a coherent sentence based on evidences that describe causal mechanisms and can be empirically tested in cases,” i.e., experiments. And, they complain, “It’s not very surprising that Freud never undertook the attempt to examine his stories [i.e., his psychological theories] with independent and sound methods.” Popper himself had directly criticized psychoanalysis for its alleged lack of falsifiability.
And this is really the core of their argument, that Freud was contemptuous of actual “sound methods” of evidence and the heavily implied implication that anyone who takes any of his ideas seriously today shares such a contempt for evidence. The very fact that Freud made significant alterations in his theories based on his and other psychologists’ and psychiatrists’ experience during his lifetime raise an obvious question about his disdain for evidence. And there is the fact that even his most supportive psychoanalytic colleagues, including his biographer and longtime head of the Psychoanalytic Association and a key member of Freud’s inner circle, Ernest Jones, never accepted Freud’s idea of the “death instinct,” which Freud took very seriously. That raises an obvious question about his followers’ supposed disdain for “sound” evidence.
Martin Hoffmann also notes (Psychoanalysis as Science 10/12/2015):
Even if Freud himself took psychoanalysis to be a scientific, validated theory, his own research methodology faces serious problems. From the perspective of contemporary science, it constitutes the most “unscientific” aspect of his whole conception, because it is generally seen as falling victim to the post hoc ergo propter hoc fallacy. It is therefore deemed inappropriate for producing any substantial scientific evidence. But – contrary to Popper’s prominent critique – it cannot be denied that many claims of psychoanalytic theory are empirically testable and that since the 1950s, a remarkable body of evidence that fulfills scientific research standards has been generated with the aim of confirming the central theoretical claims of psychoanalysis and the efficacy of psychoanalytic therapy. Therefore, in a processual or methodological sense, today’s psychoanalysis is without any doubt a scientific research program. But at the same time, it is an open question whether the scientific endeavor to confirm the central claims of psychoanalysis will turn out to be successful. [my emphasis]Even more dubious, Bölke and Holtschke state as accepted fact that studies on twins have shown “that practically all personality traits have important genetic components.” For anyone who has some familiarity with eugenic arguments, this is a big red flag. Especially when they use it to minimize and essentially dismiss the idea that “problems in early childhood” can have any meaningful influence on a person’s personality development.
They go on to cite conditions like schizophrenia and depression that are widely assumed to have distinct biological origins. But in a social and political environment full of eugenic and racialist minefields, it pays to look carefully at the evidence. Especially when it’s cited for such a broad claim about personality traits. Since people are homo sapiens whose physical form is constructed via genetic instructions, it’s basically a pointless truism to saying that “all personality traits have important genetic components.“
Freud himself was not a eugenicist, although he did have a quirky adherence to some part of the Lamarckian theory of evolution, i.e., the inheritance of acquired characteristics, which the biological science of his time had clearly discredited. He believed that some memories and experiences were transmitted by heredity.
What is this debunking exercise really about?
In my experience, such claims as those of Bölke and Holtschke about genetics and personality when made in conversation are usually a prelude to denying that there might be anything like a social component to people’s behavior. Even though that genetic heritage - homo sapien babies take quite a few years to be able to physically survive without some sort human society - requires building societal structures. And usually in such a conservation, it doesn’t take long to get to something along the lines of, “Us white folks sure are smarter than them blacks.” (I grew up in Mississippi, so I speak from experience. Though I have not tested it for Popperian “falsifiability.”)
And however far medical science and psychology may have progressed since Freud’s time, his theories and their popularity were very important in showing just how important family environments and social structures more generally are in the development of individual personalities.
Bölke and Holtschke do bring forward legitimate questions about Freud’s approach to constructing his theories.
But their article is largely a debunking attempt based on positivist assumptions that they apply in a superficial way that seems to discount any understanding of personal psychological development that isn’t based strictly on dubious, quasi-eugenic genetic assumptions.
Later in the article, they focus on an argument made by Theodore Adorno that Freud’s “analytic psychology [is] the only one that seriously researches the subjective conditions of the objective irrationality.” Adorno and Popper were two of the leading representatives of opposing sides of an academic controversy known as the Positivism Dispute. It was a “discussion about the bases, establishment of goals, and the dependency of social science methods as well as the results of social contexts and interests.” (Positivismusstreit Spektrum.de, accessed 04.09.2022.)
Bölke and Holtschke interpret this to mean that the Frankfurt School outlook, aka, “critical theory,” which was notably represented in the Positivism Dispute by not only Adorno but Jürgen Habermas, depends absolutely on the correctness of Freudian theory. They make this generalized summary of Adorno’s view: “Without psychoanalysis, [there can be no] criticism of society.”
It’s true that the Frankfurt School was known for doing pioneering work on the notion of the “authoritarian personality,” which has acquired new urgency in a number of countries in recent years, not least the United States. And they did use Freudian theory in combination with a Marxist-informed social analysis in that effort. The Studies on Authority and Family (Studien überAuthorität und Familie, 1936) led particularly by Erich Fromm were the first major result of that research. Fromm’s Escape From Freedom [British title: The Fear of Freedom] (1941) also reflects those insights, as does the Studies in Prejudice research directed by Max Horkheimer for the American Jewish Committee.
The Frankfurt School and Critical Theory remain bogeymen for rightwingers and the topic of anti-Semitic conspiracy theories. Bölke and Holtschke don’t dwell on this political aspect. But their seemingly out-of-hand rejection of that project is an indication of the conservative implication of their brand of positivism.
Psychoanalysis and pharmaceutical medicine
It’s worth mentioning here that Freud in his time saw the effectiveness of psychoanalytic therapy mainly for a limited number of medical conditions including obsessive-compulsive disorders and what was then diagnosed as “conversion-hysteria,” now called conversion disorder.
Freud was trained as a neurologist. And for all his findings about social influences on psychological disorders, he remained confident that drug therapies for mental and psychological disorders would continue to advance. The failure of his early efforts to find such a therapeutic use for cocaine presumably left him a particular awareness of how tricky that effort could be.
See also: Monah Winograd and Marcia Davidovich, Freudian Psychoanalysis and Epistemology-Political Disputes Journal of Psychoanalytic Studies/Recherches en psychanalyse 2014:1)
(All translations from German here are mine.)
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