Is a ceasefire in Ukraine coming in the winter? And what might that mean?

A six-months-point evaluation of the Ukraine-Russia war in the Austrian daily Standard points to the current uncertainty of the military standoff. (Florian Niederndorfer, Das ukrainische Dilemma ein halbes Jahr nach Kriegsbeginn 24.08.2022; the translations to English here are mine.)

An end to the bloodshed is not in sight; that much is certain after half a year. The arms deliveries of the West, whose dignitaries demonstratively celebrated Ukraine's independence in Kiev a year ago, are not yet sufficient to enable the defenders to turn the tide that Zelensky conjures up in his increasingly martial speeches. For this, estimates the Austrian Army analyst Markus Reisner …, it would take eight to ten times as many weapons as before: "You give Ukraine too much to die, but too little to live." The recent, albeit spectacular, successes, such as the attacks on Russia's bridgehead near Kherson or the destruction of Russia's Saky airfield in Crimea, could not hide the fact that Kiev's offensive, which has been announced for weeks, has so far failed to materialize.

Thus, the Ukrainians are left with only the courage of despair. "Attacks from the air, such as those we have now seen in Crimea, are also a sign to the West that arms deliveries are paying off," says Reisner. Because without more weapons from the West, Ukraine is lost. And finally, the aid was more small than big. "My Ukrainian comrades wonder why the US only supplies 16 HIMARS multiple rocket launchers when it has 300 of them." To counter Russian supremacy, at least 60 to 100 pieces of the state-of-the-art systems would be necessary – i.e. one fifth to one third of the entire US arsenal. This is not realistic.

It's not clear from the quote whether it is Reisner pointing out that that such deliveries are not realistic or Standard putting his statements in context.

But it’s a reminder that there are other considerations than whether Ukraine needs, wants, or demands more weapons. One is the actual supply, as indicated there. Although I don’t doubt US weapons manufacturers will be happy to make more. But even that doesn’t happen at the snap of a finger.

In addition, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine this year jolted NATO into confronting the reality that there really could be a Russian attack on NATO allies Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. Back when NATO was merrily “enlarging” itself, the US and most of its NATO allies in practice discounted the possibility that they might actually have to militarily defend those borders. And those countries are formal NATO allies, while Ukraine is not. NATO is currently in the process of bolstering its preparedness for a conventional attack on those Baltic states.

Accession to NATO normally takes years of preparation. That’s because the joining country has to bring its own military and intelligence standards to the NATO minimum. Including training the country’s soldiers on advanced weapons. That can’t be done overnight, either. And the military training NATO countries have been giving Ukraine since 2014 was heavily oriented toward preparing them for a partisan (guerilla) fight against a Russian occupation.

Zalensky’s government recently dismissed hundreds of officials suspected of actively assisting Russia. So NATO has good reason to wonder what kind of security Ukraine can actually enforce, including on weapons systems they don’t want to fall into Russian hands. Presumably, they weren’t training them to use HIMARS in partisan warfare. And while Ukraine has reportedly made real progress in the rampant general corruption in their country, corruption is still a real problem when it comes to weapons shipments. Because those are hot items on the black market.

Le Monde reported earlier this month that France is concerned about diversions to the black market (Elise Vincent, War in Ukraine: West concerned about spread of weapons 08/01/2022):

The difficulties [with avoiding black market diversion] concern smaller arms and ammunition, especially those that made a difference against the Russians during the first phase of the war. "The Javelin, the Stinger – these are an issue," said the same French source. These portable weapons are easy to handle, and capable of neutralizing an armored vehicle at a distance of several hundred meters, or of targeting helicopters and combat aircraft at low altitude. [my emphasis]

A ceasefire later this year might be a hopeful sign. Or it might not. More from Standard:

Six months after the beginning of the war, the situation in the east is also anything but hopeful for the Ukrainian defenders. A primary goal of Russian President Vladimir Putin, namely the conquest of the entire Donbass, is within reach. Reisner considers it likely that he will succeed in this by November: "Then Moscow could open negotiations, also due to its own exhaustion." In view of the winter, the energy situation and the deepening recession, the West could force Ukraine to a peace – catastrophic for Kiev.

The Innsbruck political scientist and Russia expert Gerhard Mangott also expects a ceasefire in winter – and points to a Ukrainian dilemma: "For Moscow, this would be a win-win situation, because if Kiev agrees to this ceasefire, it could consolidate in the conquered territories. If not, Russia will benefit from the threat of a split in the West."

Depending on the course of winter, the war will probably be somewhat less intense in half a year, but there can be no talk of peace, Mangott predicts. "After the conquest of Donbass, the Russian army will expand its defensive positions rather than launch new major offensives, for example on Odessa." Still, Putin has probably given up his goal of conquering the entire Ukraine because this simply overwhelms the armed forces. [my emphasis]

Which brings us again to the still-unanswered question of what the US goal in this war really is. If the US is willing to take advantage of a relative stalemate to push for a real diplomatic solution that would end the war without immediately restoring all the occupied Ukrainian territory - yes, that seems far off right now - or is it what Defence Secretary Lloyd Austin said earlier this year, without so far (to my knowledge) being repudiated or walked back by the Biden Administration: “We want to see Ukraine remain a sovereign country, a democratic country able to protect its sovereign territory. We want to see Russia weakened to the point where it can’t do things like invade Ukraine.” (US pledges extra $713m for Ukraine war effort and to weaken Russia Guardian 04/25/2022)

If that is the goal, to weaken Russia to the point that it no longer has the ability to launch another operation like its now-stalled invasion of Ukraine, that end is not going to be suited by any kind of near-term peace agreement or frozen conflict. That calls for the Ukraine war to go on actively for much longer. Which the US was at least partially anticipating in focusing on training Ukrainian forces in 2014-2022 for partisan warfare against a Russian occupation.

That means that there could be a real divergence in the perceived interests among Ukraine, the European NATO allies, and the United States.